

CONCLUSION

NIDS and The CMSS GS have done a comprehensive joint research on security issues in Asia-Pacific region for two years. During the Cold War era, Japan and The Soviet Union/Russia had been on different sides, but the fact that NIDS and CMSS GS, security think tanks of both countries, have grappled with the joint research shows that relations between both countries has been getting better and better.

As presentations and discussions by both sides on the process of this joint research have shown, both sides agree with some points, but disagree with other points. We can point out the following four points that both sides agree with. First point is both sides' perception that in the Asia-Pacific region, the traditional security issues of North Korea and the China-Taiwan problem continue to be sources of regional instability. As to the China-Taiwan problem, both Japanese and Russian sides think that concerned parties should try to prevent China-Taiwan relations from being tensioned militarily. And as to the North Korean problem, both sides think that concerned parties should try to persuade North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks in order to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons program.

Second point is both sides' perception that it is necessary for us to establish and strengthen some multilateral security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides recognize that ARF has made much contribution to strengthening CBMs in this region, and that it is necessary to heighten the function of ARF from the level of CBMs to the level of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. And both sides hope that the Six-Party Talks which covers North Korea's nuclear weapons problem will be able to become a multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia.

Third point is both sides' perception that because after the Cold War, especially after the September 11, diverse non-traditional security threats (risks) have been becoming more serious, it is indispensable for us to strengthen international cooperation for dealing with these threats (risks). The Asia-Pacific countries face varied non-traditional threats (risks) such as international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, international organized crimes such as smuggling narcotics, and piracy which threatens security of sea lanes, and in order to contain and prevent these threats (risks), it is indispensable for the Asia-Pacific countries to establish international cooperation mechanism in which participate as many countries of this region as possible. The fact that both Japan and Russia participate in the US-led PSI shows that both sides share the same perception of how to deal with serious non-traditional threats (risks).

Forth point is both sides' perception of the difference of security environment between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union/Russia took CBMs in Europe, including arms control and arms reduction. Taking into consideration the difference of security environment between two regions, both sides think that CBMs in Europe cannot be applicable to the Asia-Pacific region. But the Asia-Pacific countries must learn one important lesson from Europe's experience in CBMs. Sharing the belief that

European countries must prevent another war from breaking out, they started the process of European integration. At first, they grappled with strengthening economic cooperation, and then have tried to expand the realm and scale of cooperation. As a result of strengthening integration, European countries have succeeded in constructing non-war community. The process in Europe from regional economic cooperation to non-war community is an important historical lesson for the Asia-Pacific countries. Learning this lesson, Japan and Russia now grapple with strengthening economic cooperation mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region.

On the other hand, Japan and Russia disagree with some points, especially with roles of the bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. The US-Japan alliance is indispensable for Japan's security, and Japan considers the US-led "hub and spokes" alliance system⁶² as an important security mechanism for peace and stability in this region. The United States and Japan have grappled with reconfirmation of the alliance and strengthening it since the end of the Cold War. Russia has watched with caution the post-Cold War development of the US-Japan alliance. Russian military leadership considers NATO's enlargement to the east in Europe as an attempt to strengthen a military alliance led by the US. Russian military leadership understands that the US attempt to strengthen its alliance with Japan in Northeast Asia is linked with NATO's enlargement to the east.

If Russia and China will strengthen strategic partnership between them and the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership will develop into a hostile military bloc against the strengthening US-Japan alliance, the situation of opposition between two hostile blocs will be fixed in East Asia. It is important for Japan and Russia to prevent confrontation between these two blocs from appearing by strengthening Russo-Japanese security cooperation. Because varied non-traditional threats (risks) become serious now, strengthening security cooperation is indispensable for both sides. Now the function of ARF remains at the level of CBMs and security dialogue and it cannot function as a mechanism for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention due to the lack of military capabilities. The US-led "hub and spokes" alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region can make up for the flaw of ARF.

It is difficult for the Asia-Pacific countries to rapidly institutionalize multilateral security mechanisms because security environment in the Asia-Pacific region is different from that in Europe. To try to rapidly institutionalize multilateral security mechanisms of European type is not always proper for Asian way of behavior or Asian strategic culture. As the Russian leadership has insisted, it will take long time to institutionalize multilateral security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region, and it is proper for the Asia-Pacific countries to approach to this problem step by step. This gradual approach to this problem consists of three aspects; (1) from CBMs to complex and comprehensive mechanisms, (2) from bilateral

⁶² The alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region is referred to as the "hub and spokes" model, with the U.S. serving as the hub of a wheel and with each of the five bilateral alliances (Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) serving as the spokes. David Shambaugh, "Asia in Transition: The Evolving Regional Order," *Current History*, April 2006, p.153.

cooperation to multilateral cooperation, and (3) from sub-regional and issue-oriented security mechanisms to Asia-Pacific regional security mechanisms. Concerning the third aspect, some sub-regional and issue-oriented security mechanisms such as the Six-Party Talks and SCO function now, and in these cases, strong ties with ARF, a whole framework which covers the entire Asia-Pacific region, must be ensured. In other words, one important point for Asia-Pacific countries is to follow up the results of activities in the sub-regional and issue-oriented security mechanisms and to strengthen the function of the entire regional security mechanisms.

As one of the concrete measures for strengthening function of ARF, referring to the European experience, I propose to establish the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in ARF. The CPC of OSCE,⁶³ which was created in 1990 at the Paris Summit of CSCE, and provides direct support to all OSCE field operations, helping them fulfill their tasks in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Though the roles of CPC of OSCE have been enhanced gradually, there is a limit to the conflict prevention capability of OSCE because it does not have its own military capabilities. However, the fact that OSCE has tackled conflict prevention activities shows well its change from an organization for mere diplomatic consultations to an organization for actions. The experience of OSCE is of great use for ARF which aims to enhance its function from mere security dialogues to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.⁶⁴

⁶³ On the organization, missions and history of CPC of OSCE, refer to OSCE homepage, <http://www.osce.org/cpc/13077.html> and <http://www.osce.org/cpc/13081.html>. And refer to Akiko Fukushima, “Dai 2 sho Oshu anzenhosho kyoryoku kiko (OSCE) no ajia no funso yobo eno gani (Chapter 2 Some Implications of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for conflict prevention in Asia),” Tokai daigaku heiwa senryaku kokusai kenkyusho ed., *Human Security*, No.5 (2000/2001) (http://www.tokai.ac.jp/spirit/archives/human/pdf/hs05/01_02.pdf#search='OSCE').

⁶⁴ When former Russian President Yeltsin visited officially to South Korea in November 1992, he proposed an idea of establishing the North-East Asian center for regional conflict prevention as a first step to the goal of establishing the Asia-Pacific center for regional conflict prevention. According to his proposal, the purpose of establishing the center was to form gradually a mechanism of inter-governmental consultations to prevent crises from breaking out in the Asia-Pacific region, and the center was to play the following roles; (1) exchange of military information to enhance predictability and openness of military activities; (2) holding consultations when extraordinary military activities and dangerous military accidents occur; and (3) giving to governments of the Asia-Pacific region various advices based on analyses of data and facts.