Indonesia in 2013: Challenges and Innovations

Iis Gindarsah

**Introduction**

Indonesia is facing an increasingly complex environment today. The country’s recent defense guidelines have reiterated a wider array of threats such as border disputes, cross-border insurgencies, civil strife, and natural disasters. Consequently, the Indonesian military (TNI) has to gear up for a full-spectrum of missions ranging from conventional contingencies to military operations other than war—including peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance. In his speech to mark the 68th anniversary of the TNI last year, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono reiterated his commitment to the strengthening of national defense. With a positive economic outlook for the foreseeable future, the Indonesian government should have adequate resources to meet the country’s defense needs.

**Counter-intelligence Challenges**

Indonesia’s counter-intelligence community faces a more challenging operational environment than ever before. In theory, counter-intelligence (CI) means information gathered and activities conducted to identify the enemy presence within a friendly intelligence network, and penetrate, recruit, and neutralize hostile intelligence activities. The newly passed Law No. 17/2011 on State Intelligence mandates that the primary responsibility of national counter-intelligence is to prevent, exploit, and thwart any intelligence acts perpetrated by adversaries against the country’s national security.

Indonesia’s current strategic environment presents several outstanding challenges for its CI community in fulfilling its commitments to the state. First, the proliferation of non-traditional security issues—including economic disruption, terrorism, and transnational organized crimes—increases the probability that there will be greater, if not more overlapping, espionage threats (or potential ones) to Indonesia. In effect, the scope of national CI responsibilities is likely to be more complex because the
source and objective of hostile intelligence penetrations may vary from one to another.

As such, defense planning activities and classified or highly classified documents may not necessarily be the primary target nowadays. Given the importance of national competitiveness in a globalized economy, foreign governments might attempt to collect information related to technological expertise, resource exploration maps, and or strategic commercial plans. It is also plausible, under such eventualities, that civilian scientists or government contractors could be seen as potential targets, or even as vulnerable as state officials, due to their knowledge and access to sensitive materials.

Second, the ongoing threat of terrorism has greatly complicated national CI efforts. The objective of CI and counterterrorism are practically identical — the identification and neutralization of hostile secret organizations. However, the diversification of functions and priorities among Indonesia’s intelligence services on counterterrorism are likely to raise bureaucratic and coordination issues because of their overlapping roles in CI.

Third, the advent of the information age has also created another potential nightmare for Indonesian CI professionals. A highly dynamic threat environment entails accurate assessments, timely warning, and rapid dissemination of intelligence. While information technologies— including computer interconnection — are essential for better intelligence sharing, they are not impenetrable by cyberespionage threats. Hostile intelligence services might attempt to intercept electronic transmissions, or hack computer mainframes to steal sensitive information. Consequently, CI specialists will have to find new counter-measures for national security entities to protect their databases, operational networks, and digital communications against cyber attacks.

Fourth, the various loopholes within Indonesia’s existing legal frameworks could also undermine the work of the CI community. Indonesia’s Criminal Law (KUHP) on crimes against state security requires four “pre-conditions” for the conviction of espionage acts. The accused individual must: (1) deliberately reveal, communicate or smuggle (2) classified information or materials (3) to foreign powers (4) with
intent to harm national security. Given these legal requirements, prosecutors will find it difficult to present solid evidence to charge and win cyber-espionage lawsuits, for example. Indeed, to successfully prosecute such lawsuits, the confidential data that was transferred to the opponent must be included in the indictment documents. This could seriously hamper the CI community’s “damage assessment” process to investigate just how far has the national security or intelligence system been compromised. Even worse, the accused spy and his lawyer could try “graymail” attempts by threatening to reveal classified information in an open court as a means to avoid prosecution.

Fifth, the exclusive focus on a specific CI approach may discard the bigger goal. Law enforcement officers naturally tend to overemphasize making successful prosecutions of espionage acts. This, however, will eliminate the possibility of counter-espionage operatives turning the still-secret moles’ discoveries into useful assets for disinformation operations against the adversary.

Last but not least, many within Indonesian society tend to overlook the imperative to have a rigorous national counter-intelligence system and operation. Given their previous experience under the authoritarian regime, legislators and democratic activists have become wary of secrecy and overzealous CI operations. While stressing the principles of transparency and accountability, they fear that the practice of secrecy will endanger the checks-and-balances system under which strong democratic governance rests. Indeed, the public’s negative perception was very much evident in the judicial review of the State Intelligence Law and the process to halt the passing of the State Secrecy Bill.

Such a mentality misled Indonesian society on the more crucial issues surrounding the proper ends of national CI. This could prove to be problematic, particularly given to the proliferation of espionage threats, where Indonesia has become more exposed than ever before. It would be very naive to believe that the need of rigorous CI is irrelevant in the democratic realm. Thus, the intelligence services should legitimately maintain confidential information from the public for fear that adversaries could also be informed.

---

1 See Article 112 and 113, Chapter I on Crimes against State Security, Indonesia’s Criminal Law. See also Article 44, Law No. 17/2011 on State Intelligence.
Changes in Strategic Perception of Future Warfare

The current geopolitical changes in East Asia along with rapid developments in defense technologies and the growing sophistication of military capabilities suggest that in the future the Indonesian military will fight in high-intensity conflicts and non-linear battlefields. The country’s defense guidelines have also underlined the importance of maneuverability and interoperability among the armed services.2

The advent of the information age further complicates the TNI’s contemporary operational environment. Satellite communication and video teleconferencing now enable top decision-makers and field commanders to acquire real-time information and interactive access to each other. Likewise, the adversaries have similar technological access and launch information warfare against friendly civilian and military targets. The information technology revolution has in effect resulted in a non-linear cyber battlefield, while blurring the levels of defense decision-making.

For more than a decade, Defense Ministry and TNI headquarters have attempted to transform the military establishment through selective arms modernization programs as well as doctrinal innovations. Looking at recent developments, there are at least three strategic trends in the Indonesian military’s transformation.

First, given the enormous threats Indonesia has to face, the TNI is likely to develop a multi-spectrum force structure in anticipation of high-intensity combat maneuvers and low-intensity missions, such as peace-keeping and humanitarian relief. Specifically, under the minimum essential forces (MEF) planning, the Defense Ministry aims to upgrade the military’s capabilities and operational readiness to a sufficient level to enable rapid force deployment to key flash points, including Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes and exclusive economic zones.3

Second, the ongoing arms dynamic in the region also places external pressures upon the TNI to keep up with the current military technological developments. Such a trend is apparent in Indonesia’s recent arms acquisitions, which includes multi-role combat aircrafts, anti-air defense systems, tactical submarines, missile-guided

---


frigates, multiple launcher rocket systems and, not forgetting, battle tanks.

Third, new requirements for future operations and the further sophistication of military technologies have infused a new dynamic in Indonesia’s military thinking. In the past, the TNI leadership tended to overvalue protracted guerilla warfare against a superior enemy with asymmetric means. Nowadays, however, protracted armed conflict has become obsolete as it causes high rates of human casualties and material losses. Achieving military victory with such dire consequences ultimately exhausts Indonesia’s national resources.

Given the atrocities of protracted war, many of Indonesia’s military officers have turned their attention to the subject of maneuver warfare and combined-arms. Maneuver-warfare proponents deem that the key to military victory is not found in direct confrontation or physical destruction of hostile forces. Instead, it stresses rapid dislocation through decisive combat maneuvers focused on the adversary’s “center of gravity,” defined here as critical vulnerability.

Maneuver-warfare theory also envisages the TNI commanders to mass their strength against the opponent’s critical vulnerabilities, such as their command and control systems, fire-support capabilities, logistic supplies and key terrains or facilities. The neutralization or disruption of such objectives would inevitably paralyze the strength of hostile forces at any given critical moment, thus rendering them useless and irrelevant to the fight. Ultimately, the logic of maneuver warfare demands the TNI leadership to develop a combined-arms doctrine, rather than single-system approach to address battlefield deficiencies. The development of maneuver-oriented doctrine would correspond positively to the aspiration of Indonesia’s recent defense guidelines for greater interoperability among TNI’s armed services and systems.

**Trends of Military Intelligence Innovation**

The emerging nature of warfare and multiple military missions inevitably present new operational challenges for the TNI Intelligence Corps. First, instead of focusing on a specific threat, military intelligence now must be concerned about diverse adversaries with distinct capabilities and intentions.
Second, an echeloned and compartmentalized intelligence organization has become too rigid and redundant for an exceedingly complex and dynamic environment. Such a traditional structure is not only cost-inefficient but also too inflexible to swiftly support a full-spectrum of military operations ranging from high-intensity combat maneuvers to less/non lethal missions such as disaster relief.

Third, intelligence officers now must be able to exploit and leverage multiple sources of intelligence for timely, accurate intelligence production and rapid dissemination. They must also be well-versed in new operating procedures and understand intelligence requirements at every military echelon.

Fourth, military intelligence systems must be interoperable with overall military systems and those of national intelligence agencies. The inclusion of information technologies is therefore critical for all intelligence customers to have a common situational awareness.

Facing these operational challenges, the TNI has to modernize its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Material procurements are of course not cheap, and take a long time from conceptual development to production and fielding. But the infusion of more capable sensor technologies, data-mining and processing systems, agile assets, integrated networks and broadcast systems is crucial for force-multiplier and overall military effectiveness.

In addition to technological upgrades, Indonesia’s military intelligence should also undertake organizational and doctrinal innovations to meet a new spectrum of operational requirements. First, TNI requires a leaner and more responsive intelligence structure. It should adopt a “capabilities-based” and “threat-adaptive” organizational model to effectively function in a complex and rapidly changing environment. This model envisages the military headquarters to configure and assemble tactical intelligence units based upon the effects of their personnel and equipment capabilities for specific missions. In this way, it ensures that only relevant ISR capabilities are deployed for a given military operation while anticipating intelligence requirements at the tactical level.

Second, TNI headquarters should modify its procedures, tactics, and techniques
for timely, accurate intelligence production and rapid dissemination. The key will be the integration of information technologies into the military intelligence cycle. The idea is to enhance the connectivity between intelligence corps and tactical units to multiple sources of intelligence. Most intelligence collection assets—particularly those with potentials across services and units, reside at corps or higher echelons. Based on specific mission requirements, the TNI high-command could assign tactical intelligence units and/or extend the access of high-value ISR assets—including long-range aerial reconnaissance vehicles, to support tactical units. These methods should enable military intelligence headquarters to increase support between operational and tactical levels while maintaining effective command and control over strategic collection assets.

Third, TNI Intelligence Corps should update and broaden the scope of its personnel education and training. Military intelligence school also has to refurbish instructional methodologies and create a realistic environment for its cadets to be completely cognizant with their occupational specialties. With sophisticated ISR assets coming into its inventory, the TNI’s intelligence specialists must learn to operate network-centric data mining and processing systems. This full-spectrum training is essential to producing resourceful and adaptive military intelligence professionals.

Having said that, the overarching focus of innovations in military intelligence affairs is nothing but to multiply the operational potentials of TNI’s military assets. These innovations should in effect improve Indonesia’s overall military effectiveness for full-spectrum missions. In a nutshell, military intelligence is a key enabler to accelerate broader defense transformation in Indonesia.

**Trends in Military Logistics Innovation**

Indonesia’s recent defense guidelines have comprehensively outlined the government’s military modernization programs. Although those documents have specified a broad range of arms acquisition plans up to 2024, they still lack a clear vision on the development of a robust logistics support system and capabilities.

Logistics is the “life blood” of military affairs. It covers issues related to the supply, movement and maintenance of the armed forces. Logistical supplies are critical for
the operational readiness and sustainability of weapon systems on the battlefield. Without ammunition, fuel and spare parts, the battle tanks, artillery pieces, fighter aircraft and warships are just “paper tigers.” Moreover, logistical means available serve to connect numerous operational factors, including technology, the type of forces involved, weather and the geographical landscape. Their effective combination makes a range of military maneuvers possible, thereby allowing the commanders to exploit them to win a war or battle.

In that sense, the process of arms modernization should naturally go hand in hand with innovations in military logistical affairs. As military planners seek to develop new war-fighting concepts with newly procured weapons, they ultimately have to upgrade the capabilities and proficiency of combat support units to deliver logistical supplies. In relation to that, there are five key issues for Indonesia’s military planners to develop the TNI’s logistics support system and capabilities.

First, logistics need to derive from war-fighting concepts. Different styles of warfare entail different logistical arrangement and capabilities. For decades, the TNI’s leadership has established a logistical network to anticipate protracted guerilla warfare against a superior enemy. This network rests on overt and covert institutions to maintain political conformity and mobilize resources in wartime.

Nowadays, a highly dynamic threat environment has placed new demands for rapid force deployment to key flash points. Meanwhile, the vast maritime domain and diverse landscape of the Indonesian archipelago make such military maneuvers difficult. These operational requirements are logistical in nature. Hence, the TNI leadership should gradually transform its current logistics establishment, with its emphasis on strategic and tactical mobility, to allow force projection throughout the archipelago.

Second, the solution to logistical problems lies in developing a flexibility to deploy combat elements and supplies in an effective manner. Given the operational challenges of future military maneuvers, military logisticians must optimize the technological developments of transportation as a means in terms of speed, distance, and tonnage.
Typical barriers to sea lift are undeveloped seaports and natural obstacles, such as soft sandy beaches, marshes, swampland, and loose surfaces. Modern amphibious vessels, including air cushioned and roll-on/roll-off catamaran landing crafts offer greater speed, payload, and accessibility to most of Indonesia’s coastlines and ports. The acquisition of these technologies would enhance the TNI’s amphibious assault capabilities and inter-island mobility to transfer troops, heavy armor, and supplies.

An increased demand for rapid force deployment means the growing role of airlift capabilities. Recent aviation advances have increased the cargo capacity, operational range, and versatility of aerial transportation to support airborne operations. Under specific terrain, weather and threat conditions, the potential distance and payload requirements suggest that short take-off and landing aircraft appear more appropriate to resupply ground forces than rotary-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft.

Third, diversifying supply networks is a crucial measure to avoid major logistic breakdowns. Multiple accesses to logistical resources would minimize the chances of the enemy completely disrupting material supplies to friendly forces. Airbases and naval bases are among the critical logistic assets to sustain military forces in a theater of war. While devoting some defensive measures to protect these assets from enemy raids, TNI’s logisticians must prepare complimentary means or alternative facilities to maintain the healthy flow of supplies to fighting units. These include the development of mobile offshore base and dual-function national infrastructures, such as commercial freighters, railways, and highways.

Fourth, the actual logistics requirements of military operations are likely to exceed peacetime planning and estimates, not less. Given that the sustainability of their unit is at stake, field commanders have every reason to be wary of having logistics shortfalls in wartime. Indonesia’s “minimum essential force” (MEF) is still an under-developed concept for military logistics planning. Amid the absence of actual military threats and financial constraints, the developers of “tables of organization and equipment” may unwittingly overlook some critical aspects of logistics that appear only in real-time operation. Hence, the biggest challenge for military logisticians is to delve deep into the logistical details of the MEF capabilities based on future war-fighting concepts.
Fifth, logistics success is a matter of preparation and training. Because there is no substitute for real knowledge of combat situations, military logisticians must rehearse their detailed logistics plans under realistic conditions. Proper exercise would minimize poor logistics performance that ultimately causes the armed forces to run unacceptable risks in wartime.

The nature of the Indonesian archipelago demands a joint operation among the armed services. As each military branch and unit raises different problems and offers various opportunities, the effectiveness of logistical supports becomes critical to execute and sustain such operation. To understand the implications of their respective advantages or disadvantages, military logisticians must closely examine the way that they work together under specific operational conditions. In brief, for the armed forces to gain a full advantage of war-fighting capabilities, they must invent innovative ways to wed their logistical assets with the operational requirements of their military strategy and order of battle.