Chapter 1

Japan: New Development of National Security Policy
In the general election of December 16, 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won 294 seats, returning to power together with the New Komeito Party after three years in opposition, and forming the second administration led by LDP President Shinzo Abe. Under the Abe government, significant changes in national security policy are being promoted, including the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC), formulation of the National Security Strategy, enactment of the Information Protection Law, formulation of new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and reconstruction of the legal basis for security. Supported by the National Security Secretariat, which is a permanent organization, the NSC will play an important role in dealing with matters related to national security. The NSC is not simply a forum for discussions among the participants. By functioning as a nexus between related government organizations, it is expected to improve the overall decision-making process regarding national security both substantively and formally. The first substantive decisions of the NSC were the formulation of the National Security Strategy, the NDPG for FY2014 and beyond (hereinafter “2013 NDPG”), and the Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2014 through FY2018 (hereinafter “2013 MTDP”), through which it set forth “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation” as the philosophy underlying the national security measures taken by the Abe government.

In view of the increasing severity of the security environment surrounding Japan, the NDPG for FY2011 and beyond (hereinafter “2010 NDPG”) was revised into the 2013 NDPG just three years after it was formulated. In this revision process, defense capabilities were assessed from the viewpoint of joint operations and proposals were made for the optimal overall improvement of functions and capabilities on which particular priority should be placed. As a result, a very specific course of action was indicated to allocate resources for strengthening the defense force with emphasis on enhancing rapid deployment capabilities while ensuring clear maritime and air superiority. Accordingly, the basic concept set forth in the 2013 NDPG is to build up a Dynamic Joint Defense Force with particular emphasis on readiness, sustainability, resiliency, and connectivity.
1. Establishment of the NSC and Formulation of the National Security Strategy

(1) A Security Policy Aimed at Progress

In the general election of December 16, 2012, the LDP won 294 seats, returning to power together with the New Komeito Party after three years in opposition, and forming the second administration led by LDP President Shinzo Abe. An important economic policy objective of the Abe government, known as “Abenomics,” is to return the Japanese economy to a growth trajectory through the “three arrows” of fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and long-term growth strategy. At the same time, the government is pursuing major reforms in national security policy. These reforms consist of measures such as the establishment of the NSC, formulation of the National Security Strategy, enactment of the Information Protection Law, formulation of new NDPG, and reconstruction of the legal basis for security.

While these measures can potentially bring about a great change in Japan’s national security policy, they do not represent the setting of a new agenda and most of them can be viewed as responses to the challenges posed to Japan since the Gulf War of 1991. Japan has of course responded in various ways to the increasingly complex security environment since the end of the Cold War. These responses include: the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992; successive efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the Dynamic Defense Force through the successive NDPG formulated respectively in 1995, 2004 and 2010; establishment of the Joint Staff Council in 2006; upgrading of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense in 2007; and enactment of laws such as the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001, the Iraq Special Measures Law in 2003, and the Anti-Piracy Measures Law in 2009. However, the reforms now being promoted do not stop at responses to specific circumstances or superficial changes, but pursue structural changes in the process of determining national security measures. While these changes are in one sense responses to challenges that have been continuously pointed out, they also represent a gateway to further major reforms in Japan’s security policy. Whether or not they will bring about changes that can be called “progress” of the national security policy will depend on our efforts from now on. (see “Future Challenges for the Reform of Japan’s Security Policy: Importance of the Intellectual Base.”)
The philosophy underlying these security policy measures of the second Abe administration is “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.” According to the National Security Strategy, this proactive contribution to peace is the fundamental principle of national security under which “Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a proactive contributor to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.”

However, the announcement of the National Security Strategy was not the first time that the second Abe administration set forth such an approach. In his speech at the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) held in Singapore on June 1, 2013, Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera commented on the Japanese government’s recognition of history: “In the past, Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Consecutive Japanese governments have humbly acknowledged such historical facts, expressed deep remorse and genuine apologies. Prime Minister Abe has also embraced the same position, which is shared by all Cabinet Ministers, including myself.” Regarding Japan’s basic approach to security policy, he said that the aim of this approach is “to enable Japan to make a more proactive and creative contribution toward regional stability,” and that “these efforts are crucial in pursuit of our national interest, which is in the maintenance and strengthening of an international order based on fundamental values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.” He also stated that “Japan’s national interest, which we have consistently pursued since after the end of World War II, is certainly not a narrow self-interest but is consistent with the interests of the international community as a whole.” Since this is essentially the “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation” set forth in the National Security Strategy, it can be said that the second Abe administration has consistently maintained this position.

(2) Establishment of the NSC
On November 27, 2013, the Diet passed a bill to establish the NSC, which came into being on December 4. The main point of the new NSC is the establishment of
“four ministers’ meetings” and “ministerial meetings for emergency situations” in addition to the “nine ministers’ meetings” inherited from the previous Security Council. At the four-minister meetings, the prime minister, chief Cabinet secretary, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of defense regularly hold substantive discussions on diplomatic and defense policies related to national security and determine the basic policy direction from a strategic viewpoint. At emergency situation ministerial meetings, the prime minister, chief Cabinet secretary, and ministers concerned discuss responses to important emergency situations. A new National Security Secretariat (NSS) was also established in the Cabinet Secretariat. In addition to serving as a secretariat of the NSC, the NSS will be in charge of formulating and coordinating the basic direction of diplomatic and defense policies relating to national security and the gathering and organizing of documents and information provided to the NSC.

Since it is modeled on the US National Security Council, the NSC is also referred to as the “Japanese version of the NSC” and is expected to serve as the “control tower” for security policy centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy. The first Abe administration also aimed to establish a national security council and submitted a bill for that purpose in 2007. While it has inherited the previous bill’s approach to four-minister meetings, the NSC officially launched in December 2013 differs from it in certain important respects, such as the establishment of emergency situation ministerial meetings, the positioning and role of the NSS, and the NSC’s relationship with the information sector.

Needless to say, the United States, which was the first country to establish a national security council as an advisory organ to the supreme decision maker, has a presidential system of government. In recent years, however, similar organs have also been established in countries with parliamentary systems of government, such as the United Kingdom and Australia. A major factor influencing this is the revision in many countries of the security policy decision-making process in light of the increasing speed of change in the twenty-first
century security environment and increasing need for strengthened coordination among security-related policy bureaus and advisory organs to the ultimate decision maker. The establishment of the NSC in Japan can be viewed as part of this trend.

Regarding the establishment of such an advisory organ, the following four important points will serve as an index for the evaluation of future operation of the NSC.

The first point is the policy area that should be covered. As stated above, the NSC is a forum for discussions on national security centering on diplomatic and defense policies. National security is a multi-faceted concept covering not only diplomatic and defense policies but also energy security, economic security, food security, and natural resource security. One challenge the NSC faces is how to cover such wide-ranging areas. For instance, one of the most important security issues for Japan is the rise of China. It is necessary to respond to this challenge comprehensively, not only in diplomatic and defense policies but also in coordination with trade, fiscal and other policies. Considering that, at the time of the Senkaku Islands incident in September 2010, China was also deploying trade policies such as rare earth export restrictions, the NSC should discuss the most suitable approach to coordination with economic fields.

The NSC basically defines national security in accordance with the traditional meaning of security centering on diplomacy and defense. During the Cold War, national security was viewed as being almost synonymous with military defense, but immediately after the end of the Cold War there was a lively debate in western academic circles about how national security should be defined, more specifically, about whether or not it should be given a broader definition. This debate can be broadly divided into three competing arguments: (1) The argument in favor of maintaining the status quo, taking the view that the importance of military threats remains the same as in the Cold War period; (2) the argument that only slight changes should be made because security policy should be limited to issues related to military measures, even though it might cover a wider range of threats; and (3) the argument calling for a major change to a concept that encompasses not only the military sphere but also areas such as human rights, the environment, economics, epidemics, crime, and social injustice.

Looking the security policies subsequently adopted by the major powers, each country’s security policy was built mainly in accordance with argument (2) above. Japan’s current approach to security through the NSC is basically in line with this.
Accordingly, the government takes the view that, since energy security or food security are objectives that should mainly be achieved by improving energy self-sufficiency or food self-sufficiency, which have hardly anything to do with military measures, such issues should not be dealt with as direct subjects of national security policy. Transnational crime, which is included among the security issues of the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, is viewed by Japan mainly as a public order issue and is therefore not defined as a security issue. On the other hand, considering that "as interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community" (2013 NDPG), it may be argued that, in the current security environment, security policy should be expanded into areas beyond diplomacy and defense. The National Security Strategy also states that it "presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security, including sea, outer space, cyberspace, official development assistance (ODA) and energy." As well as being an issue regarding which continuous efforts are considered necessary amid what is in a sense a tense relationship with the ministries and agencies involved in the process of implementing the National Security Strategy, this is also a point on which deeper discussions should be promoted in the intellectual community in order to enhance the intellectual base of national security, which is emphasized as an important objective in the National Security Strategy.

The second point is the strengthening of the system for effective interagency coordination. Particular attention must be paid to whether the NSC contributes to the reduction of "stovepipes" and to ensuring that the NSC itself does not create new stovepipe divisions. The NSS established recently in the Cabinet Secretariat is an organization that provides administrative support under the chief Cabinet secretary for the operation of the NSC. Headed by the NSS secretary general, two deputy secretary generals and three Cabinet councillors, the NSS is an organization consisting of about seventy outstanding staff members from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and other ministries and agencies related to national security. Various groups have been set up within the NSS to plan, formulate and coordinate policies according to policy themes related to regions and the various aspects of national security.

In running its NSC, the United States strives to operate through effective
interdepartmental communication by setting up multilayered meetings from secretary-level and deputy secretary-level meetings to working-level meetings, responding to issues across departments and agencies through responsive coordination, and dealing with unresolved matters by passing them up to the next level. In the Japanese NSC, four-minister meetings are held about once every two weeks and advice is provided by executive secretaries of the NSC (secretary general and deputy secretary generals of the NSS, bureau chiefs of each ministry). It is also important that, through the operation of the NSC, the NSS formulates plans and conducts overall coordination regarding matters involving multiple ministers and agencies and serves to reduce stovepipes. It is hoped that, through this daily operation, substantive discussions that are wide-ranging and prescient will be conducted and that it can be verified whether the system of interagency coordination is proceeding effectively and, in particular, that it will not create new stovepipes.

The third point is the relationship with the intelligence sector. When the NSS formulates policy plans or conducts overall coordination or when it implements related crisis management, timely and precise intelligence gathering and decision-making based on this intelligence are absolutely vital. To this end, while the NSS does not conduct the gathering and evaluation of intelligence itself, it has become responsible for summarizing and organizing materials from the intelligence sector. In view of the risk that bias in assessment and analysis based on policy preference may arise if the policy sector itself evaluates and analyzes intelligence, it is important to form a system for supplying all information necessary for decision making rapidly to the policy sector while maintaining the separation of the two sectors. These measures can therefore be considered appropriate. However, to ensure the precise formulation of plans within the NSS, attention should also be paid to whether the NSS can precisely gather various information including intelligence from related organizations and utilize it at the policy level. The reduction of stovepipes at the intelligence level will enable the NSS to provide a higher-quality “product,” and this provision of added value to policy will in turn help to break down stovepipes at the policy level.

The fourth point is the NSC’s role in crisis management. Under the current system, this has centered on the deputy chief Cabinet secretary for crisis management. While this basic structure will be maintained and no significant change will be made in the number of staff, emergency situation ministerial meetings have been established in the NSC whereby the prime minister, chief
Cabinet secretary and ministers of state most closely related to the situation in question will conduct dynamic and substantive deliberations. As a result of this change, while the deputy chief Cabinet secretary for crisis management will continue to be in charge of crisis management in general, the NSS will be in charge of the administration of the meeting in question.

In this respect, in the United Kingdom’s National Security Council, for example, the Council Secretariat is also in charge of crisis management while utilizing the existing organizational structure. In any case, it must be borne in mind that a drastic change in crisis management functions involves the risk of causing unforeseen problems. In view of this, the existing basic process of decision-making regarding crisis management has been maintained when establishing the NSC. However, it is an important task to ensure smooth coordination between the NSS and the crisis management sector so that they can cooperate closely in setting up an emergency situation ministerial meeting swiftly and appropriately in a serious emergency. It will be particularly necessary to promote the integration of human resources.

It is important not to overlook that the establishment of the NSC will have the long-term effect of systematically establishing the system for dealing with matters relating to national security, which will be greater than the short-term effect. Supported by the permanent secretariat of the NSS, the NSC will play an important role by meeting regularly in the course of dealing with national security issues. By functioning as a nexus between related organizations, it will not merely serve substantively and formally as a forum for discussion by its members but will also enhance the overall decision-making process of the nation regarding security. The significance of this cannot be underestimated. With the increasing severity of the security environment surrounding Japan, it is necessary not only to have a framework like the previous Security Council where the mere fact of its meeting was considered newsworthy, but a system whereby the NSC itself is built into the national policy-making system and conducts wide-ranging investigations in an effective and orderly manner. Conversely, the effect of establishing the NSC will not necessarily become evident in the short term, but in the long term it will make Japan’s security policy decision-making process more effective.
Future Challenges for the Reform of Japan’s Security Policy: Importance of the Intellectual Base

As stated in the main text, the Abe government has been implementing reforms mainly in the security policy-making process, such as the establishment of the NSC, reconstruction of the legal basis for security, and enactment of the Information Protection Law. However, discussion of this agenda did not begin with the Abe government. Ever since the Gulf War of 1991, which was a turning point in Japan’s national security policy, Japanese specialists have been discussing these matters. Since then, the policy opinions issued by think tanks with a high level of security policy expertise such as the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Japan Forum of International Relations and Tokyo Foundation have had the following points in common: (1) A Japanese version of the NSC should be established; (2) the right of collective self-defense should be exercised; (3) possession of conventional strike capability should be examined; (4) the Three Principles on Arms Exports should be relaxed; and (5) protection of secret information should be strengthened. The reforms that the Abe government is promoting or is expected to promote in the field of security policy are basically in line with the discussions held up to now. In this sense, they cannot be described as a new agenda.

However, the focus of these discussions is the pursuit of reforms in the means of security policy-making and execution of security policies, not the specific security policies Japan should pursue. For example, if the legal basis for security policy is reconstructed and this leads to the future emergence of policy choices that utilize the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in unprecedented situations, it will be even more necessary than before to indicate clearly the principles of these policies and what national interests their execution will serve. Moreover, if the Three Principles on Arms Exports are relaxed, it will be necessary to determine policies based on strategic questions such as the potential impact on the balance of power in regions to which arms are exported and the contribution this would make to Japan’s national interests.

Making a proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation set forth in the National Security Strategy is of course the guiding principle underlying these discussions. However, not only a general principle but also specific policy decisions must underlie strategic and substantive discussions regarding the security of Japan and the world. The establishment of the NSC is expected to deepen such discussions, but the NSC and NSS are essentially organizations to promote the qualitative evolution of Japan’s security policy and are not expected to dynamically enhance the strategic nature of this policy. In order for Japan to take a dynamic and proactive part in promoting order in the international community and reconciling the interests of both Japan and regional and global communities, it will be essential not only to change the means that can be used in policy decision-making and execution through the reforms being made in security policy, but also to promote more strategic and substantive discussions on what Japan should do through this reformed security policy. When this is realized, Japan’s security policy can
 Establishment of the National Security Strategy

The first substantive decision of the NSC was the formulation of the National Security Strategy, 2013 NDPG, and 2013 MTDP. Needless to say, the NDPG and MTDP are documents that existed prior to the NSC, but the National Security Strategy was formulated for the first time in Japan. From the formulation of the NDPG for FY2005 and beyond (hereinafter “2004 NDPG”), the NDPG took on the nature of the fundamental document regarding national security strategy, outlining Japan’s basic security principles and policy objectives. The National Security Strategy has now become the primary document outlining these principles and objectives. (see Table 1.1.)

It must be noted that NDPG, MTDP, and National Security Strategy are essentially different in their nature and aims. The NDPG and MTDP are documents for force development. The NDPG outlines the basic recognition of the situation, role of the defense force, fundamental approach to improving the system, and the required force structure. The MTDP outlines the specific programs for force development over the next five years based on the approach and objectives indicated in the NDPG. Since the force development is conducted according to how the defense budget is allocated and on decisions regarding what capabilities will be prioritized, the aim of these two documents is to determine the final order of priorities in the allocation of resources. In other words, their aim is to identify the particularly important issues even in the current fluid security environment and to list them in order of priority.

In the case of the National Security Strategy, on the other hand, the allocation
### Table 1.1. Comparison of contents of National Security Strategy and NDPG

#### National Security Strategy

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#### II. Fundamental Principle of National Security

1. Principles Japan Upholds
2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives

#### III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges

1. Global Security Environment and Challenges
   - Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation
   - Threat of International Terrorism
   - Threat of International Terrorism
   - Risks to Global Commons
   - Challenges to Human Security
   - The Global Economy and Its Risks
2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region
   - Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region
   - North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions
   - China’s Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas

#### IV. Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security

1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles
   - Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment
   - Building A Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan
   - Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan’s Territorial Integrity
   - Ensuring Maritime Security
   - Strengthening Cyber Security

2. Strengthening the Japan-US Alliance
   - Further Strengthening of Japan-US Security and Defense Cooperation in A Wide Range of Areas
   - Ensuring A Stable Presence of US Forces

3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community

4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community

5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues

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Source: Japan Ministry of Defense.
of resources is not intended to be determined from the document itself. Therefore, unlike the NDPG and MTDP, its aim is not necessarily to determine an order of priorities of investment. Its most important objective is rather to provide a comprehensive outline of the security challenges that should be considered in Japan’s present situation and to indicate the basic thinking of the policy responses to each of these challenges. In this sense, the National Security Strategy is required to provide an overall picture. Based on its definition of security centering on diplomacy and defense, it widely covers the related security challenges, sets forth “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation” as the underlying approach to responding to these challenges, and fulfills its primary role from this perspective.

The proactive contribution to peace that forms the basis of the National Security Strategy is the underlying philosophy of contributing “even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community” while achieving Japan’s “own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region” resulting from the recognition that Japan alone cannot maintain peace and security in the current increasingly complex and severe security environment.

However, this approach was not rolled out for the first time in the National Security Strategy. A similar approach can be seen in the reports of various experts’ advisory groups set up in the course of formulating NDPG over the years. Examples of these are: (1) the multi-dimensional security strategy recommended in a report entitled The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century (Higuchi Report) drawn up by the Advisory Group on Defense Issues prior to the formulation of the NDPG for FY1996 and beyond (hereinafter “1995 NDPG”) combining “promotion of a multi-dimensional security cooperation on a global and regional scale,” “enhancing the functions of the US-Japan security relationship,” and “maintenance of a highly reliable defense capability” based on the assertion that Japan “should play an active role in shaping a new order”; (2) “the integrated security strategy” pursuing the two security aims of improving Japan’s defense and the security of the international community by combining the three approaches of Japan’s own efforts, cooperation with allies, and cooperation with the international community set forth in the report by the Advisory Group on Security and Defense Capability before the formulation of the 2004 NDPG; and (3) the concept of a “peace-making nation” set forth in the report Future Concept of Japan’s Security and Defense Capability in a New Era:
Aiming to Become a Peace-Building Nation submitted by the Advisory Group on National Security and Defense Force in a New Era prior to the formulation of the 2010 NDPG. Japan’s think tank community too, particularly the policy opinion Proactive Contribution to Peace and the Ideal Form of the US-Japan Alliance published in 2009 by Japan Forum of International Relations, has set forth arguments leading to the proactive contribution to peace of the National Security Strategy, such as the proposal for “a doctrine of proactive contribution to peace to replace the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’,” pointing out that “Japan’s security cannot be discussed merely in terms of the defense of national territory; it is guaranteed through its deep relationship with regional security and global security.”

Continuity with intellectual trends regarding Japan’s security policy can thus be found in the recently formulated National Security Strategy. On the other hand, a unique aspect can be discerned in comparison with the national security strategy documents of other countries, particularly the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. This is its approach to the relationship between military means and other means. The United States’ National Security Strategy formulated in 2010 points out the increase in challenges involving military means and lists military strength, intelligence, diplomacy, development, and homeland security and resilience as the order of priorities with respect to the means of implementing its security policy. Similarly, the United Kingdom’s National Security Strategy of 2010 places particular emphasis on defense, deterrence, security in a broad sense, alliances and partnerships, and structural reform. The detailed means for realizing this strategy are described in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), which states that “the Armed Forces are at the core of our nation’s security.”

Australia’s National Security Strategy published in 2013 states that defense is the main item of national security, that the protection of the nation and its citizens is the government’s most important responsibility in maintaining national security, and that the Australian Defence Force is of essential importance for this purpose. Regarding the means for implementing security policy, it lists defense, intelligence, diplomacy, development, enforcement of the law, and border control. The distinctive feature of these three national defense strategies is their clear policy of building national security policies with military strength as their central pillar.

On the other hand, in the section titled “Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security,” Japan’s National Security Strategy first stresses that Japan needs to “strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities.”
From this viewpoint, it calls for the enhancement of “Japan’s resilience in national security through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities,” giving equal weight to defense and diplomacy and emphasizing the importance of economic and technological strengths as their basis. Based on this, the Strategy presents the following various policy means as concrete “strategic approaches centering on diplomatic and defense policies”: (1) Strengthening diplomacy for creating a stable international environment; (2) building a comprehensive defense architecture to firmly defend Japan; (3) strengthening efforts for the protection of Japan’s territorial integrity; (4) ensuring maritime security; (5) strengthening cyber security; (6) strengthening measures against international terrorism; (7) enhancing intelligence capacities; (8) defense equipment and technology cooperation; (9) ensuring the stable use of space and promoting its use for security purposes; and (10) strengthening technological capabilities.

In this context, while the Strategy states that the “overall strengthening of diplomatic capability is critical to ensure the security of Japan,” it also points out that “Japan’s defense force is the final guarantee of its national security,” underlining Japan’s approach of pursuing national security by combining diplomatic policy with defense policy. Of course, the order of statements in a national security strategy does not necessarily reflect the order of policy priorities. However, compared to the national security strategies of the United States and Australia, in which military means are mentioned first, followed by information and then diplomacy, and that of the United Kingdom in which the SDSR, a detailed description of the means employed, states that military strength is the core of national security, the role of the defense force in Japan’s national security can be interpreted as being more relative to other factors than in the cases of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.

In international political science, an approach that emphasizes power is known as “realism” and one that emphasizes cooperation through relations of economic interdependence and diplomacy is known as “liberalism.” As shown in the section titled “Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment,” which states that the “key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment and prevent the emergence of threats,” Japan’s National Security Strategy can be viewed as taking the standpoint of liberalism that emphasizes cooperation through diplomacy, rather than realism emphasizing the
balance of power. This can also be interpreted as a continuation of Japan’s intellectual trends regarding national security and as being quite different from the national security strategy documents of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, which are clearly written from the standpoint of realism.

(4) Future Challenges for the National Security Strategy

In the past, it was often pointed out that Japan should formulate not only the NDPG but also a national security document modeled on the United States’ National Security Strategy. This primary national security document has now been formulated and the basis of security policy formed, but it is nevertheless no more than a document. In particular, since the National Security Strategy is not a document that serves as a basis for the allocation of resources like the NDPG and MTDP, the danger that it might end up as mere rhetoric cannot be ignored. For example, in his book Good Strategy, Bad Strategy, Richard Rumelt, a professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, and a business consultant who analyzed both economic strategy and security strategy, made the criticism that the United States’ National Security Strategy formulated by the Bush government in 2002 could not be called a strategy because it was a mere wish list of high hopes with no indication of specific means for achieving realistic objectives. If Japan is going to develop its diplomatic and defense policies with the National Security Strategy as its primary document, it will be necessary at least to consider the best approach to its national security system based on an awareness of the problems pointed out by experts in the United States, which has long experience in the formulation of national security strategy documents.

In his memoirs published in 2012 after his retirement as senior director for East Asian affairs on the US National Security Council in the first Obama administration, Jeffrey Bader was critical of the role of strategy documents. Bader pointed out that, although the National Security Council, Department of State, and Pentagon regularly announced global strategies, these were hardly ever referred to when crises occurred and that actual policy decision-making was not based on such documents but on the accumulation of tactical decisions made on the spot. In an article titled “Strengthening U.S. Strategic Planning” in the Winter 2007–08 edition of The Washington Quarterly, Aaron L. Friedberg, a former deputy assistant for national security affairs for Vice President Dick Cheney in the Bush government, wrote: “The purpose of a national strategic planning process is not
to produce a single, comprehensive document or an assortment of paper plans for subsidiary challenges, or to prepare for an endless array of specific contingencies. The proper aim of such a process is not really to generate plans at all, but rather to inform and support the deliberations of top executive branch officials as they make strategic decisions.” Quoting former President Dwight Eisenhower’s observation that whereas “plans are useless...planning is indispensable,” Friedberg argues that, rather the drafting of documents itself, it is much more important to make top decision-makers broadly aware through the planning process of what kinds of decision need to be taken and what contingencies need to be considered.

Discussions of this sort in the United States should serve as a source of reference in the future operation of the NSC and the formulation of diplomatic and defense policies based on the National Security Strategy. As stated above, the NSC is expected to play a major role in strengthening the system for effective coordination and cooperation among ministries and agencies, reducing “stovepipes,” while ensuring that the NSC itself does not create new stovepipes. However, it will be important not simply to call for the strengthening of the system for coordination and cooperation among ministries and agencies in strategy documents but also to strengthen this system of cooperation through the actual process of formulating these documents. Furthermore, the publication of strategy documents will serve to make clear, both in Japan and overseas, which challenges the government considers important at that time and the direction of its efforts in response to these challenges. In this sense, strategy documents are also an important tool for communication for both domestic and overseas audiences regarding the nation’s basic thinking on policy.

In view of this, it will be important to make efforts to make concrete and realize the recently formulated National Security Strategy, treating it not as a code written in stone but as something that is subject to constant revision. Even if it does not lead to revision, the formation through study of this document of a common awareness among decision makers and the promotion of communication with experts and practitioners in various fields both in Japan and overseas are important challenges.
2. The New NDPG: Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

(1) NDPG after the Cold War: Pursuit of Effectiveness

On December 17, 2013, the 2013 NDPG and 2013 MTDP were determined together with the National Security Strategy by the NSC and the Cabinet. The NDPG is the basic document of Japan’s defense strategy. Based on an analysis of the security environment and an outline of the role, posture, and structure of the defense force, it indicates the composition of armed forces in an annex table. Since the NDPG was first formulated in 1976 during the Cold War, it has been formulated in 1995, 2004, and 2010. This is therefore the fifth NDPG. Until now there has been no National Security Strategy, so one of the roles of the NDPG, particularly since the 2004 NDPG, has been to outline Japan’s basic approach to national security. However, since the National Security Strategy has been simultaneously formulated this time, it has taken over the role of outlining the basic approach and the NDPG has been formulated in conformity with this.

Partly because it was formulated during the Cold War, the first NDPG was not revised for nineteen years. Since then, the period until the formulation of a new NDPG has become much shorter: it was nine years after the 1995 NDPG, six years after the 2004 NDPG, and three years after the 2010 NDPG. This can be said to reflect the dynamic changes in Japan’s security environment that have occurred since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In particular, the NDPG since 1995 have in common the consistent pursuit of improved effectiveness of the defense force, such as the enhancement of readiness. Against this background of a dynamically changing security environment, it has become important to pursue not only the static deterrent effects that spring from the very existence of the defense force that has been developed, but also actual effects through the operations of the SDF. The 1995 NDPG emphasized response to an unpredictable and uncertain security environment, extending the role of the defense force from Japan’s own national defense to “response to large-scale disasters and various other situations” and “creation of a more stable security environment.” The 2004 NDPG emphasized response to “new threats and diverse situations,” stating that the new roles of the defense force are “effective response to new threats and diverse situations,” “preparations to deal with full-scale invasion” and “proactive efforts to improve the international security environment.” In addition, the Defense White Paper published in 2005 indicated a change in direction “from
deterrence to response.” The 2010 NDPG set forth the concept of a Dynamic Defense Force based on continuous and strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, cooperation for regional security, and improvement of the global security environment. These developments are consistent efforts to improve the effectiveness of the defense force, and the 2013 NDPG can be viewed as a continuation of these efforts. (see Table 1.2.)

On the other hand, the 2013 NDPG contains one clear change from the 2004 NDPG and 2010 NDPG. This is the fact that, while these two NDPG were formulated amid a continuing trend of reductions in defense spending, the 2013 NDPG increased the defense budget through the 2013 MTDP formulated at the same time. The 2004 NDPG was to some extent formulated in response to the Security Council and Cabinet decision regarding the introduction of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in December 2003, but in view of the severe fiscal situation it was decided to promote the development of the BMD system without increasing defense spending. Specifically, it was decided to make cuts in the “Cold War-type” armored warfare capabilities of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the air superiority capabilities of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). Among these, since armored warfare capabilities were originally designed against an amphibious invasion by large-scale mechanized units of the former Soviet Union, it was hard to view them as capabilities for which resources should be given priority allocation in the twenty-first century security environment. However, considering that maritime and air superiority are indispensable for island defense and that the military balance has subsequently changed with China’s rapid strengthening of its maritime and air capabilities, this decision in the 2004 NDPG to reduce ASW and air superiority capabilities has come to have great significance.

The Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2006, which was set forth by a Cabinet decision of the Koizumi government to indicate the basic direction of the national budget, stipulated the target of a primary balance surplus by 2011. Regarding defense, it stated that “in the current severe fiscal conditions and further rationalization of spending across the whole government, efforts will be made to develop an efficient defense force through further radical rationalization and improvement of efficiency in defense spending” and that “over the next five years, the national (general account) budget
### Table 1.2. Comparison of contents of NDPG (Trend in NDPG Contents)

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Source: Japan Ministry of Defense.
including personnel expenses will be held to a nominal growth rate of zero or less.” This policy was continued in the 2010 NDPG formulated under the coalition government centering on the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The MTDP formulated at the same time as the 2010 NDPG stated that total defense spending over the next five years would be based on maintaining the same defense spending as in fiscal 2010 in every subsequent year. However, the 2010 NDPG alluded several times to the need to improve efficiency in view of the severe fiscal conditions and actual spending in the main budget excluding the supplementary budget was reduced every year. (see Figure 1.1.)

Under the 2013 MTDP, however, based on the assumption that about 700 billion yen would be raised from procurement reform, the decision was made to raise defense spending to 24.7 trillion yen over five years. This amount was calculated according to the price in real terms for fiscal 2013. Converted to an annual rate, it is equivalent to a real-term increase of 1.8 percent in defense spending. The 2013 NDPG is thus very different from the other two NDPG formulated in the twenty-first century, at least with regard to the increase in defense spending over the first five years covered by the 2013 MTDP. Of course, defense spending is only a figure representing the total amount to be spent. In defense policy it is particularly important to determine an order of priorities and how resources should be allocated. From this viewpoint, the order of priorities in the 2013 NDPG was established emphasizing maritime and air superiority based on an assessment of capabilities based on joint operations. Accordingly, it set forth the concept of building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force.

(2) Strengthening of Deterrent in Gray-zone Situations
The recognition of the international security environment underlying the 2013 NDPG is that the security situation around Japan is becoming more severe as a result of the continuous strengthening of China’s armed forces and intensification of its maritime and air activities and the progress of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. This does not mean that antagonism between nations is considered to be intensifying as in the Cold War era. However, from a global perspective, the 2013 NDPG states that “there are ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries as well as an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests,” and that such gray-zone
Figure 1.1. Defense budget trend from 2003 to 2014

Source: Japan Ministry of Defense.
situations in the Asia-Pacific region “tend to linger, raising concerns that they could develop into more serious contingencies.”

Pointing out that “there are a growing number of so-called “gray-zone” disputes—confrontations over territory, sovereignty and economic interests that do not escalate into wars,” the 2010 NDPG recognizes the importance of responding to security challenges in the gray zone between peacetime and contingencies. The 2013 NDPG continues to place emphasis on this response to gray-zone situations and displays an awareness that the risks of such situations lingering or escalating are increasing.

In other words, the 2013 NDPG recognizes that, compared to the time when the 2010 NDPG was formulated, the “gray” of gray zones is turning to a deeper shade. In this sense the important point is how deterrence regarding security challenges in gray-zone situations—described as “dynamic deterrence” in the 2010 NDPG—is redefined.

Deterrence can be defined as operating by making the other party aware of one’s intentions and capabilities through both the static aspect consisting of the deterrent effect of the existence of a defense force and the dynamic aspect that places emphasis on the deterrent effect of the defense force by continually demonstrating its effectiveness in operation. The dynamic deterrence set forth in the 2010 NDPG pays particular attention to the dynamic aspect of deterrence, recognizing the importance of responding to the above-mentioned gray-zone disputes that do not lead to armed conflict. This concept of deterrence is based on the thinking that it is important not only to develop the capability to respond to a contingency, but also to promote the continuous operation of the defense force in normal times to make the other party aware of one’s intentions and capabilities and ensure the effectiveness of deterrence.

More specifically, an important pillar of the dynamic deterrence set forth in the 2010 NDPG was “the continuous and strategic implementation of ISR activities” now that “organizations, including military forces, are becoming more active on
a regular basis in the surrounding region” (Defense Ministers’ Statement). In particular, its aim was to deter expansionist operations by neighboring countries by making them aware that there was no physical gap in Japan’s defenses through continuous presence patrol-type ISR activities directed against attempts to achieve “opportunistic creeping expansion” such as the accumulation of “fait accompli” in the surrounding sea and air space. Accordingly, the most important constituent of dynamic deterrence was the capacity to conduct continuous ISR activities. However, it should be noted that this approach focused on deterring the occurrence of a gray-zone crisis. In the security environment in which the 2013 NDPG was formulated, not only have serious gray-zone situations already occurred, but it is feared that these situations will linger or even escalate. Therefore, although it remains as important as ever to respond to gray-zone disputes that do not lead to armed conflict, it is particularly important to control the risk of escalation when promoting effective deterrence and responding to such situations. From this viewpoint, it is now thought necessary to revise the concept of dynamic deterrence.

The necessary elements for this strengthening of deterrent in gray-zone situations are: (1) situational awareness capabilities for rapidly responding to deliberate or accidental escalation and real-time information sharing and seamless response with related organizations including those of the United States; (2) ability to conduct various operations to convey clearly Japan’s intentions regarding a situation and to make the other party aware that Japan possesses the capability to respond in the event of deliberate or accidental escalation; and (3) ability to respond effectively when escalation actually occurs. Of these, (1) is included in the dynamic deterrence set forth in the 2010 NDPG. In addition to maintaining continuous ISR activities, it will be necessary to strengthen the ISR posture when the occasion demands and to develop both capabilities and systems and organizations for a seamless and rapid switch to a posture for response.

However, (2) and (3) cannot necessarily be included in the concept of dynamic deterrence. It is thought that (2) will be pursued through flexible deterrence options (FDO) that strengthen deterrence by swiftly conducting military operations, including exercises in response to the development of a situation, in order to send a signal to the other party. This element was not included in the 2010 NDPG. It will, for example, require the preparation of various options for responding to small-scale escalation and, depending on how the situation develops, the operation of these capabilities in visible form in order to influence the other
party’s recognition. In this regard, the 2013 NDPG states that “Japan will regularly conduct persistent ISR activities and…the SDF will conduct strategic training and exercises in accordance with the development of the situation and swiftly build a response posture including advance deployment of units in response to the security environment and rapid deployment of adequate units. Thus Japan will demonstrate its will and highly developed capability to prevent further escalation.” This demonstrates that these kinds of FDO are included in the building of deterrence in gray-zone situations called for in the 2013 NDPG.

Item (3) is another element that was not fully realized in the concept of dynamic deterrence set forth in the 2010 NDPG. Although the 2010 NDPG took the approach of “focusing not only on ensuring the quality and quantity of equipment, but also on increasing the SDF’s amount of activity” (Defense Ministers’ Dialogue), the Dynamic Defense Force is a concept that does not contain the idea of developing defense capabilities to maintain “quality and quantity” and has come to focus on “amount of activity” rather than quality and quantity. Nevertheless, it will be essential to improve not only the SDF’s amount of activity but also the quality and quantity of equipment in order to enhance the effectiveness of deterrence in gray-zone situations in an increasingly severe security environment.

(3) Capability Assessment Based on Joint Operations and Emphasis on Maritime and Air Superiority

In improving quality and quantity, it is necessary to determine a clear and appropriate course of action in order to allocate resources effectively within the limited defense budget. The specific methodology adopted in the 2013 NDPG to achieve this is capability assessment based on joint operations. Various capability assessments have already been conducted, but these have basically been done separately by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. Conducting capability assessment based on joint operations among the three services of the SDF is a new measure that takes into account the fact that joint operations have already been significantly developed in the SDF and aims to determine the best overall development of the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized. Specifically, this is the Japanese version of the “capability-based planning” adopted in defense force development in the United States (see East Asian Strategic Review 2012, p. 255). As stated in the 2013 NDPG, “The SDF will maintain an appropriate structure to effectively fulfill the above-mentioned roles of defense forces. As such, Japan
Japan

has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies to identify the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized in order to pursue more effective build-up of the defense force.” (see Figure 1.2.)

Based on the results of these capability assessments, the 2013 NDPG states that, “in the defense capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation.” Thus the 2013 NDPG very clearly indicates the specific direction of resource allocation for

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**Figure 1.2. Image of defense force development based on capability assessments**

Image of defense force development based on capability assessments

Defense force aimed at in New NDPG, Mid-term Defense Program

Prioritization of function and capability development based on results of capability assessments, etc.

Defense force
Upon completion in FY2013

Capability assessments, etc.

Source: Japan Ministry of Defense.
developing the defense force, giving clear priority to capacities to ensure maritime and air superiority with an emphasis on developing rapid deployment capabilities in line with this superiority. Accordingly, it indicated the functions and capabilities to be emphasized as follows: (1) ISR capabilities; (2) intelligence capabilities; (3) transport capability; (4) command and control, and information and communications capabilities; (5) response to an attack on remote islands; (6) response to ballistic missile attacks; (7) responses in space and cyberspace; (8) responses to major disasters, etc.; and (9) responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities.

Based on these priorities, the 2013 MTDP has indicated the specific details of developing the defense force. These place the greatest emphasis on ensuring clear maritime and air superiority. The average shares of each SDF in the main equipment procurement costs in the MTDP from 1991 to 2011 were 39 percent for the MSDF, 35 percent for the GSDF, and 26 percent for the ASDF. In the 2013 MDTP, however, the shares are 40 percent for the MSDF, 34 percent for the ASDF, and 26 percent for the GSDF, showing that the shares of the ASDF and GSDF have been reversed.

(4) Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

In place of the Dynamic Defense Force set forth in the 2010 NDPG, the fundamental concept set forth in the 2013 NDPG is the Dynamic Joint Defense Force. As explained above, this further advances the orientation emphasizing effectiveness that the SDF has pursued since the end of the Cold War. It differs from the Dynamic Defense Force in the following ways: (1) more thorough application of the approach of joint operations; (2) prioritization of air and maritime superiority as well as rapid deployment capabilities; (3) clear emphasis on the strengthening of command and control, and information and communications capabilities; and (4) attention paid to establishment of wide-ranging logistic support infrastructure (training and exercises, operations bases, education of personnel,
defense production and technology infrastructure, research and development, intellectual base, etc.) including strengthening of coordination with local public communities and the private sector. The aim of the Dynamic Joint Defense Force is to build a more effective defense force that can dynamically conduct various activities according to circumstances, with particular emphasis on readiness, sustainability, resiliency, and connectivity.

Readiness and sustainability have been included in previous basic defense force concepts. While the aim of readiness is to respond effectively to the sudden occurrence of various contingencies or rapid development of a situation, sustainability is an indispensable attribute, particularly for responding to gray-zone situations that tend to become protracted. Resiliency and connectivity are attributes that have been given special mention in the Dynamic Joint Defense Force for the first time. Resiliency places emphasis on further strengthening the infrastructure for displaying the capabilities of the defense force while ensuring that it has sufficient “quality” and “quantity” to carry out its various operations. Connectivity places emphasis on coordination with government and other organizations, local governments, and the private sector from the viewpoint of building a comprehensive defense structure, while aiming to further strengthen Japan-US cooperation, including revision of the Japan-US Defense Guidelines (see “Revision of the Guidelines”) and the deterrence and response capabilities of the US-Japan alliance. In other words, the Dynamic Joint Defense Force incorporates the new orientation of emphasizing quality and quantity and places emphasis on the coordination with related organizations necessary for the seamless response that is indispensable when responding to gray-zone situations. The word “joint” in the Dynamic Joint Defense Force concept has two meanings.

**Revision of the Guidelines**

At the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) meeting held in Tokyo on October 3, 2013, Japan and the United States agreed to revise the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation (hereinafter “the Guidelines”) and to complete this work by the end of 2014. The Guidelines were first formulated during the Cold War in 1978 and were revised in 1997 in response to changes in the security environment resulting from the end of the Cold War and the nuclear crisis on the
Korean Peninsula beginning in 1993. If it goes ahead as planned, this will therefore be the first revision of the Guidelines for seventeen years.

The Guidelines are guiding principles for defense cooperation between Japan and the United States under the Japan-US security structure. For example, the 1978 Guidelines outlined the principles for Japan-US defense cooperation regarding “posture for deterring aggression,” “actions in response to armed attack against Japan,” and “Japan-US cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan.” The 1997 Guidelines outlined the framework and direction of the roles and cooperation of Japan and the United States under the headings of “cooperation under normal circumstances,” “actions in response to armed attacks against Japan” and “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan.” The role of the Guidelines is to provide this kind of framework, conduct decision making through decisions made at the 2+2 meetings, and conduct concrete defense cooperation based on this framework. In short, the Guidelines is an indispensable document for implementing the specifics of the defense cooperation that forms the basis of the US-Japan alliance.

Up to now, revisions to the Guidelines have reflected revisions to the NDPG. The first NDPG was formulated in 1976 ahead of the first Guidelines in 1978, and the 1995 NDPG was formulated in 1995 ahead of the revision of the Guidelines in 1997. Although the Guidelines themselves were not revised, the Joint Statement of the 2+2 meeting in October 2005, which indicated the direction of cooperation regarding roles, missions and capabilities, was drawn up in response to the 2004 NDPG. In this sense, in view of the revision of the NDPG in December 2013 in response to the increasing severity of Japan's security environment, the revision of the Guidelines is inevitable.

When the Guidelines are revised, the following two points should be examined. The first point is cooperation in the new fields of space, cyberspace, and BMD. In 1997, not only space and cyberspace but even BMD were fields in which there was still no concept of US-Japan cooperation and joint technological research had not begun. In view of the importance of these fields in present-day security, it is very important to promote substantive cooperation based on the Guidelines. The second point is systematization of the cooperation structure in gray-zone situations. Through the 1997 Guidelines, a “comprehensive mechanism” was set up for bilateral cooperation such as joint strategic planning and a “bilateral coordination mechanism” was established to coordinate the operations conducted by Japan and the United States. Of these, the coordination mechanism for conducting cooperation at the operational level in US-Japan defense cooperation was only to be put into operation in “situations in areas surrounding Japan,” that is, Japanese contingencies and “situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.” As a result, even after the Great East Japan Earthquake, when Operation Tomodachi was conducted, the coordination mechanism could not be officially put into operation. Under the current approach, the coordination mechanism also cannot be operated in the “gray-zone” situations emphasized in the 2013 NDPG, which are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty or interests. Considering that a permanent coordination
While it basically refers to the emphasis on joint operations themselves, it also refers to conducting capability assessments based on joint operations and allocating resources from the viewpoint of joint overall optimization. The word “dynamic” does not simply mean the strengthening of mobility and transportability. It can refer both to the strategic and tactical maneuvers or movements of armed forces before and after or during armed conflict, or to swift operations in response to contingencies. The 2013 NDPG states that “the defense force also must be an effective one that can respond more seamlessly and flexibly and dynamically conduct a diverse range of activities through joint operations.” In view of this, the “dynamic” in Dynamic Joint Defense Force can be considered to mean swift action in response to the situation. This is clear from the fact that maritime and air superiority are given the highest priority in the development of the defense force, with rapid deployment capabilities to be promoted in line with this.

As stated above, this is an extension of the SDF’s continuous efforts since the end of the Cold War to strengthen deterrent and response capabilities by improving the effectiveness of the defense force. However, the form of defense force set forth in the 2013 NDPG differs both from that of the 2004 NDPG which, under the strong impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, positioned ASW and air superiority capabilities as “Cold War-type equipment” and sought to reduce them, and that of the 2010 NDPG which, while recognizing that the balance of power was changing with the rise of China, did not face such a severe security environment as at present. Bringing to a halt to the long-continuing trend of defense spending reductions and based on the orientation of the “quality and quantity” of the defense force determined through an assessment of capabilities based on joint operations, it is the appropriate form of defense force for 2013, aiming to strengthen defense capabilities with the highest priority placed on maritime and air superiority.
Comprehensive Improvement of Response Capability against Ballistic Missile Threats

Japan’s establishment of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system began with the Security Council decision in 2003 to introduce a BMD system providing a multi-layered defense posture consisting of Aegis, a sea-based upper-tier defense system, and Patriot PAC-3, a ground-based lower-tier defense system. The BMD system, including radar and command and control systems, was steadily introduced from the 2004 NDPG onwards and its development was completed according to the initial plan with the fiscal 2011 budget.

However, in view of North Korea’s steady improvement of its nuclear and missile capabilities, it has become necessary to proceed with the second phase of BMD system deployment. The objective of deployment up to the present has been the building of a minimum defense posture covering the whole of Japan’s territory. Having completed this stage of development, it is now necessary to set specific objectives for future development in line with the current security environment.

The new NDPG indicates the specific development objectives of enhancing the readiness, simultaneous engagement capability, and sustainable response capability of the BMD system to counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capabilities. These objectives point to the course of action for resolving today’s challenges of the BMD system in view of the current security environment.

Firstly, as far as enhancing readiness is concerned, considering that Japan’s current BMD posture depends on the deployment of Aegis destroyers and Patriot PAC-3 missile firing units, one theoretical problem is the gap between detection of a missile launch, preparation and deployment of interception posture. Since the launch of a ballistic missile normally requires various preparations, it seems unlikely that no sign at all of a launch can be detected. However, in addition to Scud and Nodong missiles, North Korea is thought to be developing the Musudan missile, a new medium-range ballistic missile which can reach every part of Japan. It is difficult to detect in advance specific signs, such as launch location and timing, of such missiles mounted on transporter-erector-launchers.
(TEL). Considering missile launch preparations cannot be detected until immediately beforehand, there are also many operational difficulties involved in maintaining a defensive posture of high readiness 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

The rational response to such problems is to enhance intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities. The introduction of new equipment that can continuously cover most of Japan is expected to be very effective in supplementing these functions should an emergency arise. From this perspective, the introduction of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system or a ground-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore) will be considered.

Secondly, considering the quantitative expansion of North Korea’s ballistic missile force, it is important to enhance capabilities for simultaneous engagement. As a specific measure, an increase in the number of sensors, interceptor assets, and missiles can be considered. The new MTDP calls for the construction of two Aegis destroyers and acquisition of new-type interceptor missiles. The addition of these new equipment such as THAAD or Aegis Ashore systems can be expected to further enhance quantitative interception capabilities. Future challenges will include the strengthening of networks linking sensors with interceptor missiles and the steady raising of the limits of simultaneous engagement capabilities of increased interceptor assets by building systems to maximize their performance.

Thirdly, when North Korea attempts to raise tensions in the region through provocative acts using ballistic missiles, this tense situation does not necessarily return to normal in a short period of time. In order to respond to the prolongation of such crises, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity for continuous response. In Japan's current BMD posture, in which Aegis destroyers play a major role, it will be particularly necessary to ensure the rotation of Aegis destroyers. However, in view of the need maintain a balance with other missions amid Japan’s increasingly severe security environment and the difficulty of maintaining a high alert status over a long period, further strengthening of the Aegis destroyer fleet and the rotation of crews posted on long missions with a high level of tension will also have to be considered. In this sense, strengthening continuous response capability by increasing the number of Aegis destroyers from six to eight will have great significance.

Even with such improvements to the BMD system, it still has substantial limitations, such as the inability to destroy all incoming ballistic missiles if their number exceeds that of the interceptor missiles in the BMD system and the difficulty of responding to a simultaneous launch of an extremely large number of missiles. For example, at the press conference held to announce the publication of the Interim Report of the Defense Posture Review Commission on July 26, 2013, Minister of Defense Onodera stated that “if a series of attacks is aimed at Japan, we as the organization in charge of security ought to consider the use of our striking capabilities to attack enemies’ military bases and strategic bases for the sake of self-defense.” In accordance with this approach, the main text of the 2013 NDPG states that: “Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrence of the US-Japan alliance as a whole, Japan will study its response capability against the means of launching ballistic missiles by enhancing its own deterrent and response
This demonstrates Japan’s recognition that, in view of North Korea’s nuclear development and missile deployment, it is necessary not only to further develop the BMD system, but also to comprehensively improve capabilities for responding to North Korea’s ballistic missiles, including response capability against the means of launching ballistic missiles.

This means studying how to promote the comprehensive improvement of Japan’s ballistic missile response capability in line with the traditional exclusively defense oriented policy and to strengthen the deterrent of the US-Japan alliance as a whole. In other words, based on the strategy of responding to a ballistic missile attack through the BMD system, Japan will examine its response capability against the means of launching ballistic missiles in the event of a series of attacks, as pointed out in the above-mentioned statement by Minister of Defense Onodera. This examination of response capability against the means of launching ballistic missiles does not mean a “preemptive strike” using military force at a stage when no military attack has been initiated against Japan. As a result, it is thought that this will not lead to what deterrence theory refers to as “lack of crisis stability”—a situation in which the countries involved both fear a preemptive strike by the other, resulting in strong psychological pressure to make the first strike; according to deterrence theory, once a crisis occurs it escalates easily and is difficult to control. Up to now, this ability to strike the means of launching ballistic missiles has been called “strike capability against point of origin,” but considering that future examination of this question will be based on the fundamental approach outline above, it can be surmised that it will henceforth be referred to as “response capability.”

The concrete investigation to be undertaken by the government will focus on several points. Firstly, an important issue it must consider is the division of labor with the BMD system and with the United States. Then it should consider not simply whether to purchase missiles or fighter aircraft, but also include considerations such as ISR capability and logistic support capability. For example, bearing in mind the “Scud Hunt” campaign by the United States in the Gulf War, it would not be easy to physically destroy the means of launching ballistic missiles mounted mainly on TEL. On the other hand, if it is possible to block a coordinated attack, such as a simultaneous launch of many ballistic missiles, through the tactical capability to strike missile launch means, this could contribute to increasing the BMD interception success rate even if it does not result in destroying ballistic missiles above the ground. As far as specific means are concerned, various combinations can be considered. However, although responding to ballistic missile threats with ballistic missiles may provide a certain level of deterrence, it poses problems not only regarding the precision required for response capability, but also regarding the objectives and regional security to be studied, such as lack of stability in a crisis due to the high speed of a missile attack and the possible impact on efforts toward international non-proliferation.

These are only a few of the points that should be discussed in future examination of response capability against the means of launching ballistic missiles. While taking into consideration the operational, technological and cost aspects, it is now essential to promote comprehensive ballistic missile capabilities and take whatever measures are necessary.”
Japan

engagement capabilities in coordination with the BMD system and to strengthen the overall deterrence of the US-Japan alliance so that it contributes to the security of the region.