Chapter 8

Japan—
Security Policy under a New Government
The year 2009 witnessed a sweeping change of government in Japan, with control passing into the hands of a coalition led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Regarding its security policy, some of the important agendas for the new administration were the issue of engagement for stabilizing Afghanistan, the review of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and the issue of relocating Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. Attaching greater significance to civilian support, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s cabinet announced that it would provide a new aid package to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but decided to terminate the refueling mission in January 2010. The Hatoyama cabinet also resolved to review NDPG in 2010, on the grounds that the historical change of government necessitated a thorough re-examination of a document so vital to national security. With regard to the Japan-US security relationship, the cabinet focused its attention mainly on the issue of relocating MCAS Futenma. After a long series of discussions, the cabinet agreed upon a policy of dealing with US military bases in Japan based on cooperation between the three coalition parties, but postponed making a final decision on a relocation site for MCAS Futenma.

The year was also marked by North Korea’s launch of a test missile and conducting of a nuclear test. These provocative actions galvanized the international community to take a concerted response, including through the passage of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1874 in June. For its part, the Japanese government submitted to the Diet a bill aimed at firming up the legal foundation for Japan to conduct cargo inspections of ships sailing to and from North Korea. It is widely hoped that the bill will be passed swiftly, partly because the mandate will enable Japan to make a practical contribution to unified efforts by the international community to untangle the North Korean nuclear weapons issue. However, there is no quick and ready solution for the issue of Pyongyang’s nuclear development program. As such, it is first necessary to steadfastly pursue diplomatic efforts toward denuclearizing North Korea, chiefly through the Six-Party Talks. In addition, it is vital to send a clear message to Pyongyang that the international community will not tolerate any situation in which some states attempt to gain an advantage at the expense of security for states that play by the rules. At any rate, if it is unlikely that a viable solution will emerge in the near future, Japan must pursue a course of action that can effectively deal with the risks posed by North Korea.
1. Impact of Change of Government

(1) Civilian Involvement in Afghanistan

The year 2009 will go down as a notable one in the history of Japanese politics. In the general election held on August 30 the DPJ, which had been the leading opposition party prior to the election, won 308 out of the total of 480 seats in the House of Representatives, the lower house of the Diet of Japan. In doing so it ousted the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to become the new ruling party. The LDP had held the reins of government continuously since its formation in 1955, except for an eleven-month period from 1993 to 1994.

The new administration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, which was inaugurated on September 16, faces a wide range of issues requiring attention. In the field of diplomacy and national security, these include the changing global balance of power resulting from the emergence of new powers, the long-term threat posed by terrorism, and North Korea’s nuclear development. Domestically, the new government needs to address the economic downturn and to reform the country’s political and administrative systems. Regarding security and defense, the most pressing and significant questions facing the government include how to devise a new policy toward the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, how to move forward the adoption of a new National Defense Program Guidelines, the highest defense policy paper of the government, and how to address the issue of relocating MCAS Futenma in Okinawa.

Following the September 11 attacks, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) engaged in refueling operations in support of a maritime interdiction operation in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as part of the country’s participation in the international effort to stabilize Afghanistan. In addition, Japan has been engaged in Afghanistan by playing a leading role in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) as part of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the wake of
the demise of the Taliban regime, providing $2.1 billion in humanitarian and reconstruction aid, and by sending civilians there for reconstruction assistance among other things.

Following the coming to power by the coalition government headed by the DPJ, the question of whether to continue SDF refueling operations in the Indian Ocean (OEF-MIO) became the hottest foreign policy issue in the country. After the September 11 attacks, the DPJ had opposed the ruling LDP-led coalition over the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which was intended to allow the refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. During deliberations on the bill, the DPJ maintained that the operation should require prior Diet approval, which the government did not accept, and in the end voted against the bill. At this point in time the DPJ was actually supportive of the very idea of conducting refueling operations in the Indian Ocean and approved the government’s operational proposal to implement such operations as provided for in the law. Thereafter, however, the DPJ opposed the extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2003, 2005, and 2006 on various grounds, including that insufficient explanation had been received as to the effects of the operations and that the operations lacked a proper exit strategy. As a result of the 2007 House of Councilors (upper house) elections, which brought a majority of the house to the DPJ, and the party’s continued opposition to the extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the government’s effort to extend the law collapsed, and thus the law expired on November 1, 2007. In response, the LDP-New Komeito ruling coalition submitted the Special Measures for Refueling Assistance Bill to the Diet. The bill was passed by the House of Representatives but rejected by the House of Councilors. After being passed for the second time by the lower house by a two-third majority, the bill became law on November 1, 2008, allowing the refueling operations in the Indian Ocean to resume on February 21, 2009 after a hiatus of just under four months.

Against this background, it was thought that there was little likelihood of the new DPJ administration continuing the refueling operations. In fact, however, the DPJ’s electoral manifesto did not mention the refueling operations. With an eye on its options following the assumption of power, the DPJ appeared to have deliberately adopted a stance that would leave it some room to maneuver by saying no more than that it would “not simply extend” the operations.

The basic stance of the new administration was not to focus too much on debates
about whether the refueling operation should be continued, but to undertake a comprehensive review of Japan’s entire involvement, including other options, with a greater emphasis on civilian aid. In line with this stance, in November 2009 the government announced a new aid package for Afghanistan and Pakistan, called the New Strategy to Counter the Threat of Terrorism.

The underlying assumption on which the new strategy is based is as follows: while stabilization operations by ISAF have had a certain degree of success and international efforts are underway to rebuild the country, the dividends of peace have not been extended to the whole territory of Afghanistan, and a large section of the population continues to give their support to militant groups for various reasons, including economic ones. Moreover, Taliban activities have been on the increase recently, the security situation is deteriorating, and there has been no significant improvement in the standard of living. Based on this assessment, the tasks facing the international community are divided into three. First, top priority must be given to improving security and putting in place the machinery of government. To this end, it is imperative to strengthen Afghanistan’s security forces, notably the police. Second, political initiatives are required if the security situation is to be improved. Specifically, it is vital for the stabilization of the country that efforts are made, under the lead of the Afghan government and with assistance from the international community, to reintegrate moderate factions among the militants into the country’s political life. Third, it is essential to bring more stability to the daily lives of Afghans and build a solid economic foundation, thus allowing improvements in infrastructure in the areas of agriculture and village life that ordinary Afghan citizens can see with their own eyes. In addition to the above, the new strategy incorporates the basic principle that what is most effective is to help Afghans improve their capability to tackle problems on their own and that the international community should remain behind the scenes.

Against this backdrop, the government proposed a new aid package for Afghanistan involving a maximum of approximately $5 billion over roughly five
years starting in 2009. The plan centers on the following three basic elements. The first is to help enable Afghans to fulfill their responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. By providing assistance to the Afghan National Police (ANP), Japan aims to help improve security conditions in the country and contribute to state-building by the Afghans themselves. The second element is to provide assistance in re-integrating anti-government forces into society and achieving a long-term reconciliation between the tem and the government. In this effort, too, it is essential for the government of Afghanistan to take the lead. Japan will participate from the initial stage in designing the system, and will give financial aid to enable job training for former combatants as well as to finance small-scale development projects to create new jobs. The third element is to provide assistance to such areas as rural and agricultural development, infrastructure including the field of energy, education, and health care, which in turn will build a basis for sustainable and autonomous development in Afghanistan. The scope of this aid plan is not limited to Afghanistan: it incorporates the idea of promoting development in all Central Asian countries that share borders with Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the refueling operations by Japan’s Maritime SDF came to an end in January 2010 as a result of the expiration of the Special Measures for Refueling Assistance Law. The New Strategy to Counter the Threat of Terrorism, however, is not intended to show the final form of Japan’s involvement engagement in Afghanistan and the government keeps exploring options for sending people to the country beyond its primarily economic assistance pending on the changing conditions in Afghanistan.

As typified by the latest Afghanistan strategy of the United States, which was announced in December 2009, all countries involved now stress the importance of enabling Afghans to govern themselves. However, Afghanistan is a country that has seen three decades of conflict since the Soviet invasion in 1979, and it will not be easy to build a national government that can govern the whole country. The restoration of security is a prerequisite for this goal, and to this end the United States is increasing the number of troops deployed in Afghanistan in the context of its new strategy.

Particularly important are efforts to improve the operational effectiveness of the Afghan National Army (ANA) through the Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), whereby ISAF forces mentor Afghan troops while conducting joint operations. Regarding the ANP, a similarly structured Police Operational
Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) are now active. However, it remains the case that unless parallel efforts are made to improve the daily lives of the people through reconstruction programs and other steps to create an adequate social infrastructure, a sustainable stabilization of Afghan society will not be realized.

Against this backdrop, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are assuming an increasingly important role. As of December 2009, twenty-six PRTs are deployed throughout Afghanistan, charged with the task of improving the social infrastructure at the provincial level and getting medical treatment systems up and running among other things. In considering options for Japan to make personnel contribution to help Afghanistan, how to coordinate its activities with those of the PRTs will be of vital importance. Possible options may include: (1) cooperating with an existing PRT led by other countries by sending a small-scale medical or engineering unit of the SDF; (2) expanding civilian reconstruction support to the PRTs through the dispatch of civilian personnel, as seen in the case of the Lithuanian-led PRT in Chaghcharan; or (3) the formation of a Japan-led PRT to undertake reconstruction work with a focus on civilian assistance. In order to actively engage itself in the stabilization of Afghanistan, Japan needs to carefully examine all these and other options from a wide variety of angles.

(2) Review of National Defense Program Guidelines
The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) is the highest-level document for Japan’s defense policy, laying down the roles, missions, and basic force posture of the SDF. Based on the NDPG, the Mid-Term Defense Plan sets out specific figures for defense procurement for a period of five years. The current NDPG, entitled “Defense Plan Guidelines for Fiscal 2005 and After,” was adopted in December 2004. While it maintained the Basic Defense Force Concept where appropriate, the document introduced a new defense force concept centered on the realization of multifunctional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities. One of the key features of the current NDPG is that, unlike previous ones that did not mention any timeframes for revision, the timeframes for revisions are spelled out in specific detail. The targets of the documents are intended to be achieved within ten years in general. The document also states that it “will be revised after five years or in the event of a significant change in the situation, taking into consideration trends in the security environment, technological progress and other relevant factors at the time.”
The year 2009 was the fifth year after the current NDPG was drawn up in 2004. Moreover, the security situation had undergone significant changes after the approval of the current NDPG. Japan and the United States adopted their Joint Strategic Goals in February 2005; the two countries reached an agreement on a roadmap for the realignment of the US Forces Japan (USFJ) in May 2006; North Korea launched a missile in July 2006, followed by a nuclear test in October the same year; China conducted tests of an antisatellite (ASAT) missile in January 2007; the Japan Defense Agency became the Ministry of Defense, and international peace cooperation activities by the SDF were redefined as part of their primary mission in January 2007; and in March 2007 the Japan and Australia issued a Joint Security Declaration.

Against this background, the administration of Prime Minister Taro Aso convened in January 2009 the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (hereinafter, “the Council on Security”), a panel of experts chaired by Tokyo Electric Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata, to obtain a wide range of opinions on proposals for improving the nation’s security and defense capabilities in preparation for a review of the current NDPG. The Council on Security discussed such issues as the international security environment, problems involving the Japan-US alliance, SDF activities under the Act concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations and Other Operations, the defense industry and Japan’s technological base, as well as other factors that support Japan’s defense capabilities, and plans to reorganize the SDF in the future. Its final report was submitted to the prime minister in August 2009.

The report sets out three goals: (1) maintaining Japan’s security; (2) preventing threats from materializing; and (3) maintaining and strengthening of the international system. It also indicated four possible approaches: (1) Japan’s own efforts; (2) cooperation with its allies; (3) cooperation with other countries in the region; and (4) cooperation with the global community.

On this basis, the report proposed a comprehensive, multilayered, and effective strategy under the name of the Multilayered Cooperative Security Strategy, which includes efforts to develop cooperative relationships while removing possible causes of confrontation and danger. The report pointed out that, due to the great diversity of threats that Japan faces or may face, covering differences of type and magnitude, it is practically impossible to distinguish peacetime and emergency, and the majority of situations fall somewhere in between. The report therefore
counseled efforts to maintain a multifunctional and flexible defense force, as set out in the NDPG, and the setting of a clearly delineated order of priority for dealing with the various threats and problems that Japan faces. The current security environment is characterized by constant military activities in such fields as counter-terrorism, peace-building in failed states, and anti-piracy. In this context, there is an increasing need to conduct humanitarian and stabilization operations that can be located somewhere between war and peace. As the Council on Security’s report argues, Japan needs to improve its capability in these fields.

However, the Council on Security’s report requires more detailed examination regarding a number of important points. First, there is the question of the combination of the three objectives and four approaches mentioned above. In the report of the previous Council on Security and Defense Capabilities chaired by Hiroshi Araki, which paved the way for the 2004 NDPG, two goals were paired with three approaches. The goals included (1) the defense of Japan and (2) improvement of the international security environment, while the approaches were (1) efforts by Japan on its own, (2) cooperation with Japan’s ally, and (3) cooperation with the international community. Hence, while adding another goal and approach, it can be said that the 2009 report is based on the similar notion comprehensive security strategy put forward by the 2004 report.

However, the 2009 report’s combination of three objectives and four approaches would create a total of twelve (3 × 4) “fields” in which Japan’s security policy would have to be applied, which is twice that in the case of the previous 2004 report (2 × 3). The 2009 report itself recognizes that “the three goals overlap in many areas and cannot be completely separated. The same is true for the four approaches.” This raises a concern that the minute subdivision of the policy framework in this fashion could destroy the clarity that was originally demanded. Moreover, there is no indication of the way in which each of those twelve fields will impact on Japan’s security, or the degree of that impact. In other words, there is no guide to which fields should be accorded priority treatment. (The same problem was seen in the previous Araki report.) As the NDPG is a document that defines Japan’s basic defense posture, it is essential to be a clear guide on the order of priority for the allocation of resources. More elaboration is needed on what sort of framework or categorization is appropriate for the purpose of setting a clear order of priority in Japan’s defense posture.

The 2009 report proposes that Japan should pursue a “multilayered cooperative
security strategy,” but what this exactly means remains unclear. In the main body of the report, the description “comprehensive, multilayered, and effective strategy” is employed, but the individual terms are not defined. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific region presents a wide range of security concerns, and while solutions to some problems are conceivable via regional cooperation, Japan’s choices for partners in dealing with problems that could lead to armed conflict are strictly limited, and Japan may need to rely on deterrence in the context of the Japan-US alliance. That is to say, both cooperation and deterrence play important roles in Japan’s security. However, the report does not make clear the relationship required between policies adopted to facilitate cooperation and those adopted to facilitate deterrence, or how these two sets of policies should be coordinated.

As a result, if deliberations were held on a new NDPG on the basis of this report by the Council on Security, further debate on the points examined above would probably be required. The Hatoyama government decided to postpone the adoption of a new NDPG until the end of 2010, instead of the end of 2009, on the ground that a review of the NDPG is a weighty issue that involves the security of the nation and that requires more time, especially in view of the historic change of government. Meanwhile, the current Mid-Term Defense Plan, which was adopted at the same time as the current NDPG, expires at the end of fiscal 2009 (i.e., March 31, 2010). As an interim measure, the cabinet on December 17 adopted a guideline on defense procurement for 2010 fiscal year to allow the drafting of the next Mid-Term Defense Plan to incorporate the results of the NDPG review. This constitutes the basis for the fiscal 2010 defense budget, which will be based on the current NDPG, and places emphasis on the maintenance of Japan’s ability to deter various threats or respond swiftly and effectively to hostile actions, as well as measures to further stabilize the regional security situation and contribute to improving security on a global scale.

In the run-up to the NDPG revision in 2010, discussions on the following tasks are of particular importance: making clear an order of priority to policy issues; reexamining the significance of Japan’s involvement in global security issues; advancing debate on how Japan should respond to the rise of China; exploring what needs to be done to acquire defense capabilities for situations that lie in the middle ground between emergency and peacetime; and examining the most appropriate size of the country’s defense spending.
In January 2009 Barack Obama was inaugurated as president of the United States, ushering in the nation’s first Democratic administration in eight years. During the administration of George W. Bush from 2001 to 2009, many experts in Japanese affairs were appointed to organs of government such as the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. During the campaign, a number of Japanese observers expressed concerns about the new administration’s policies on Asia and Japan, as compared with the previous administration. However, with the appointment of the key personnel in the Obama administration, these fears proved to have been unfounded. For example, in the Defense Department former Lt. Gen. Wallace Gregson was appointed as assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs. He had previously served as Okinawa area coordinator for the USFJ. In the State Department, meanwhile, Kurt Campbell was appointed as assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Campbell had previously served as deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. In addition, Derek J. Mitchell was appointed principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, while the post of deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs went to Michael Schiffer. All of these officials are well-versed in Japanese affairs, having lived in Japan or having had previous involvement with the Japan-US alliance. In addition, the China expert James Steinberg was appointed deputy secretary of state, and Jeffrey Bader as special assistant to the president and as the NSC senior director for Asia. These appointments clearly indicate the importance attached by the Obama administration to Asia and the Japan-US alliance.

In fact, at a meeting held in May 2009, Japanese Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates agreed to promote consultations between the two countries regarding the United States’ Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Japan’s NDPG. In the same month, immediately after North Korea had conducted a nuclear test, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallace Gregson visited Japan for talks with Japanese officials regarding a coordinated stance against Pyongyang, indicating Washington’s desire to consult closely with Japan.

It was against this background that the DPJ achieved victory in the general
election of August 30, paving the way for the establishment of a new coalition
government led by it. The DPJ’s electoral manifesto contained the following
statement regarding the Japan-US alliance: “Build a close and equal Japan-US
alliance to serve as the foundation of Japan’s foreign policy. For this purpose,
having developed autonomous foreign policy strategy for Japan, determine the
assignment of functions and roles between Japan and the United States, and work
positively to fulfill Japan’s responsibilities in this regard.” It also states that the
party will “Propose the revision of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement.
Move in the direction of re-examining the realignment of the U.S. military forces
in Japan and the role of U.S. military bases in Japan” Since its inauguration, the
Hatoyama administration has focused on the latter issue—the roadmap agreed on
in 2006 for realigning the USFJ. In particular, the administration has pushed
forward with an inquiry into the issue of relocating MCAS Futenma, which had
been treated as the top-priority issue by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa
(SACO) in 1996 and in the 2006 USFJ realignment roadmap. During this period
the United States continued to accord Japan-US talks a high degree of importance.
Following the visit to Japan of Defense Secretary Robert Gates in October 2009,
President Obama paid a visit in November, at which time he explained the US
stance on the issue and set up a Japan-US cabinet-level working group to facilitate
a speedy resolution of the matter. After numerous discussions, at a special cabinet-
level committee meeting on basic policy held on December 15 it was agreed that
members of all three coalition parties would cooperate in dealing with the issue.
However, the question of where MCAS Futenma would be moved to was postponed.

It needs to be recognized that the realignment roadmap was intended to reduce
the burden of the USFJ’s presence on the Okinawan community. According to the
roadmap, the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF),
which is stationed in Okinawa, would be moved to Guam. This would entail the
transfer of 8,000 Marines, but the plan depends on progress in the construction of
an alternative facility to take the place of MCAS Futenma. The roadmap covers
not only MCAS Futenma but also the return to Japan of land south of Kadena Air
Base, including Camp Kuwae, Camp Foster (formerly Camp Zukeran), the
Makiminato Service Area, facilities in Naha Harbor, and the No. 1 Kuwae Tank
Farm Army Oil Storage Facilities. These plots of land to be returned are located
in the south of Okinawa Island, where economic activity is vigorous, and thus the
use of the returned land can be expected to yield considerable economic benefits.
The question may therefore be not one of simply easing the burden of the USFJ’s presence on the community, but of actually providing an opportunity for further development of the local economy.

The original SACO agreement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma was prompted by the fear of a strong public backlash against the Japan-US relationship in the event of an accident causing civilian casualties. This concern is particularly acute as MCAS Futenma is located in a densely populated area. Because of this, talks leading up to the agreement received the strong support of Secretaries of Defense William Perry in the Clinton administration and Donald Rumsfeld in the Bush administration. The Japanese and US governments saw such an agreement as a means of maintaining deterrence while simultaneously easing the burden on the population of Okinawa. Viewed from this perspective, it is evident that, in the period leading up to the completion of the relocation, every possible measure needs to be taken to lessen the danger of MCAS Futenma.

2. Japan’s Security and Extended Deterrence

(1) The Growing Awareness of the Nuclear Weapons Issue
One of the defining features of the Cold War was mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War removed the specter of an all-out US-Soviet nuclear war that could annihilate the whole world. In the past few years, however, interest in the question of nuclear weapons has been increasing again, albeit in forms completely different from that seen during the Cold War.

The causes of this rising interest are varied, but first and foremost is the recognition that the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a major threat to international security. Specific causes of concern include nuclear tests by North Korea and suspicions regarding Iran’s nuclear development program. Recently, fears have been growing that nuclear weapons or fissile material could fall into the hands not only of countries that have been dealt with through existing non-proliferation regimes, such as Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but also of non-state actors, including terrorist groups. In these circumstances, measures to ensure the security of nuclear facilities have become even more important.

The second cause of this growing interest in the nuclear weapons relates to problems involving the United States’ strategic nuclear forces that have surfaced
in the last few years, particularly since the latter part of the Bush administration. The aging of nuclear warheads is seen as an especially serious problem. The designed lifespan of US nuclear warheads used to be approximately twenty years, but even the W88 warheads for use with Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles—which are supposed to be the newest—were produced more than fifteen years ago, while the oldest of B61 air-dropped bombs for use by strategic bombers are already almost thirty years old. For these reasons, the United States is designing and implementing Life Extension Programs (LEP), under which components that have degraded due to age are replaced. The Bush administration thus pursued a plan known as the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), which was intended to completely revamp the design of existing warheads and thereby provide a long-lasting nuclear forces for the future. However, the RRW ran into strong opposition from Congress, which terminated budget appropriations for the plan from fiscal 2008. To pursue a radical revision of the US strategic nuclear posture, Congress established through the fiscal 2008 National Defense Enabling Act the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture, to which twelve bipartisan experts were appointed, and affixed an addendum to the act requiring the Department of Defense to conduct a Nuclear Posture Review in 2010 (the first since 2002). In these ways, the United States began a fundamental review of its nuclear strategy in 2008 and 2009.

A third reason for the rising interest in nuclear weapons involves the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1991 and expired in December 2009. Talks on a follow-on treaty had been held, but no agreement was reached prior to the expiration of the original treaty (for a detailed explanation, see Chapter 1). Subsequent to START I, in 2002 the United States and Russia (the inheritor of the Soviet Union’s nuclear forces) signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or the Moscow Treaty). This treaty, however, does not include provisions for monitoring and verification, which are regarded as essential for arms control and disarmament agreements. The Moscow Treaty was meant to employ monitoring and verification provisions provided by START I. Therefore, with the expiration of START I, the only existing monitoring and verification measures ceased to exist. Even though the United States and Russia are no longer in a state of Cold War confrontation, they both still possess strategic nuclear forces overwhelmingly larger than those of any other country. Consequently, arms control and disarmament agreements
between the two countries hold an enormous significance for global security, and thus there has been great interest in the talks between them on a follow-on treaty to START I.

A fourth reason lies in the growing trend toward nuclear disarmament. In 2007 and 2008, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, George Schultz, and William Perry jointly published in the *Wall Street Journal* a couple of articles arguing for moving toward a “world free of nuclear weapons.” This proved to be the trigger for a growing public debate on nuclear abolition, including the Global Zero nuclear disarmament campaign, as well as discussions on concrete steps, such as by the International Committee on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament commenced through a joint initiative by the governments of Japan and Australia. Interest in nuclear disarmament increased still further following a speech given in April 2009 in Prague by US President Obama, in which he outlined his vision of a world without nuclear weapons. However, while President Obama in this speech called on the world to aim at the abolition of nuclear weapons, he also stated that the United States would continue to possess nuclear weapons as long as the threat of nuclear attack existed. He also talked about the maintenance of the “extended deterrence,” and it should be recognized that the speech did not constitute a statement of intention to unilaterally reduce or abolish nuclear weapons while ignoring international security situations. The stance adopted by President Obama in this speech is basically identical to that maintained by Japan. While Japan, too, looks forward to a future world at peace and free without nuclear weapons, it continues to rely on the US nuclear deterrence to protect it against the threat of nuclear attack.

While in this way the nuclear weapons issue was being debated on the world stage, in Japan the “secret agreements” issue surfaced. This refers to the suspicion among the media and public that ever since the signing of the Japan-US Security Treaty, the two countries have made agreements that have not been published mainly regarding nuclear weapons. This issue has been brought up many times over the years. Following the change of administration in September 2009, the Hatoyama government has shown a willingness to tackle this issue, and intra-government investigations were launched at the instigation of Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, leading in November 2009 to the establishment of a committee of experts to investigate the issue. The committee was set up to examine the evidence for four suspected secret agreements, namely an agreement regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory and an agreement
relating to combat operations in the event of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, both suspected to have been made in January 1960 at the time of the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty; and, an agreement on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory in the event of an emergency and an agreement by Japan to bear the costs of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, both suspected to have been made in 1972 at the time of the reversion of Okinawa. The committee’s finding will be made public.

Against this backdrop, one of the central themes from the viewpoint of security policy is how to pursue nuclear disarmament when nuclear weapons are proliferating at the same time. Of particular concern to Japan with respect to global nuclear disarmament is how to maintain the credibility of US extended deterrence in light of the security environment where the country is surrounded by a North Korea that continues to pursue nuclear development and a China that is pushing ahead with inscrutable modernization of its armed forces, including its strategic nuclear forces.

(2) Future Questions relating to Extended Deterrence under the Japan-US Alliance

The term “extended deterrence” refers to the guarantee by a nuclear-armed state to an ally that it will use its nuclear weapons in a retaliatory strike against any country that launches a nuclear attack against the ally, which is meant to deter such an attack from happening. In such cases, the credibility of the commitment of the nuclear-armed state to the retaliatory attack is of vital importance. In the case of basic deterrence, i.e., deterrence of an attack against one’s own country, the credibility of the deterrence depends on the country’s resolve and capabilities, as well as on the extent to which these are correctly understood by the potential aggressor. In the case of extended deterrence—deterrence of an attack against an ally or friendly country—the credibility of the deterrence depends not solely on the determination and capabilities of a country in defending itself, but on its willingness to defend the allied country, and its ability to do so, as well as on the degree to which these are understood correctly by the potential aggressor.

In the case of countries such as the United States, which possess large-scale strategic nuclear forces, there is virtually no doubt whatsoever about their technical ability to deter attacks, either against themselves or against an ally or friendly state. For this reason, the most significant determinants regarding the credibility
of US extended deterrence is the level of determination of Washington to defend the ally or partner in question, and whether such determination is clearly recognized by the potential aggressor. In reality, it can be argued that the main factor that will decide whether the potential aggressor believes that the United States is determined to defend the ally in question is the degree to which both sides enjoy a close political relationship. Therefore, as long as a reasonable size of nuclear arsenal is maintained, the level of the credibility of extended deterrence would not be influenced by the number of strategic nuclear weapons. According to the agreement between the United States and Russia on a framework for negotiations on a follow-on treaty to START I, the number of warheads for each side would be between 1,500 and 1,675. With nuclear forces on this scale, the credibility of the United States’ deterrence would not be questioned on the grounds of capability.

The closeness of the political relationship between Japan and the United States can be measured by US oral commitment to extended deterrence to Japan, as part of its declaratory policy, and this has been confirmed on numerous occasions in the past. Following the nuclear test carried out by North Korea in 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice confirmed the United States’ will to use the “full range” of its capabilities to defend Japan. The US commitment to the defense of Japan was again confirmed by the joint statement issued following the meeting of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (the “two-plus-two”) in 2007, and by statements from Secretary of State Clinton and President Obama in 2009 following a missile launch and nuclear test conducted by North Korea.

For this reason, as long as the Japan-US relationship remains stable, there is no compelling reason for concern over the reliability of Washington’s political commitment to extended deterrence to Japan. Consequently, as things stand, what Japan needs to do to maintain the reliability of US extended deterrence is to continue its efforts to create an even closer political relationship between the two countries, including cooperation over defense issues, and to continually confirm the US commitment at the declaratory policy level. The joint statement issued by President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama following their meeting in November 2009 mentioned that consultations would be held on the issue of extended deterrence. Conducting such talks between the two sides is thought to be an extremely effective means of maintaining and strengthening the reliability of extended deterrence. Thus, assuming that efforts continue to be made to maintain
this kind of close cooperation between Japan and the United States, it is unlikely that the credibility of US extended deterrence against nuclear attack on Japan will be impaired in any way, including in the event that nuclear disarmament moves forward globally.

However, it is probably advisable to consider problems relating to the credibility of extended deterrence separately from the effects on the global security environment of changes in the balance of nuclear forces among nuclear-weapons-states. For example, in its interim report issued in December 2008, the US Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture (referred to above) points out that if the United States and Russia were to sharply reduce their strategic nuclear forces, there would be a danger that this could act as an incentive to other countries to increase their nuclear forces, as they would see an opportunity to achieve parity with the US and Russia. As explained above, the foundation of an extended deterrence is a close relationship between the protector and the protected. Even in the event that other countries achieve parity in terms of nuclear forces with the United States and Russia, this alone would not automatically decrease the credibility of the US extended deterrence. At the same time, however, if a situation materializes in which three countries possess approximately equal strategic nuclear forces, the calculations involved in assessing the nuclear power balance will become rather difficult.

In the event that three hypothetical countries—we shall call them A, B, and C—all possess approximately equal strategic nuclear forces, if B and C formed an alliance, this would put A in a markedly inferior position in terms of the balance of power, and the same applies for other combinations. Thus, in such an equal three-way situation, it would be extremely difficult to realize a stable balance of nuclear forces. Moreover, it would put major obstacles in the way of achieving the sort of process that the United States and Russia have pursued since the end of the Cold War, i.e., maintaining strategic stability while gradually reducing the total scale of nuclear forces. In fact, such a situation would severely reduce incentives for disarmament, and could very easily lead to a nuclear arms race. This would destabilize the international security situation across the entire globe.

Scott Sagan of Stanford University argues that when states in a confrontational relationship achieve a situation of mutual deterrence, even if they are able to avoid a high-intensity war that would escalate into a nuclear conflict, low-intensity conflicts will continue to simmer and even multiply until the reasons for the
confrontation are removed. We need to imagine a scenario in which a country whose political relationship with the United States is insufficiently stable, or which cannot reach an understanding with the US regarding the desirable international order to be maintained, achieves parity in strategic nuclear forces with the US. In such a case, even though a certain degree of stability will be achievable at the level of strategic nuclear forces, this does not mean that low-intensity conflicts on a limited, regional scale between them will also be prevented. This question, too, is not directly connected with the credibility of extended deterrence. However, we need to take into account the possibility that in the wake of the successful reduction of nuclear arsenals by the US and Russia, another nuclear-armed state would see this as a good opportunity to achieve parity in strategic nuclear forces. In the event that this third country expands its nuclear forces, this would be likely not only to endanger the global security situation, but also to cause instability in the security situation at the regional level.

In view of these considerations, if we aspire to “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” in the words of President Obama, mutual nuclear disarmament between the United States and Russia is not enough. We must find and implement an effective mix of policies that make nuclear weapons expansion difficult, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Naturally, efforts will also be required to stabilize political relations between the major powers. None of these aspirations or efforts conflicts with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence.

3. North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Development and Japan’s Security

(1) North Korea’s Missile Launch, and Japan’s Issuance of a Ballistic Missile Destruction Order
The year 2009 saw major new moves with regard to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles. Firstly, North Korea announced that it would be launching an artificial satellite, and on April 5 it launched what most observers believe to have been a ballistic missile. Then on May 25 the country announced that it carried out its second nuclear test. Finally, on July 4 it launched seven ballistic missiles in sequence.

On the occasion of the missile launch in April, the SDF stood ready to implement
the destruction of a ballistic missile in accordance with the provisions of the amended Self-Defense Forces Law of 2007. The background to this included North Korea’s notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on March 12 that it was preparing to launch a satellite, and that as part of these preparations it had designated parts of the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean as danger zones. This was reported by the Korean Central News Agency, North Korea’s state media. On receiving this report the SDF stepped up its level of alert for intelligence-gathering and surveillance. Then, on March 27, the Japanese government issued an order for steps to be taken to destroy a ballistic missile as provided for in Article 82-2, Paragraph 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

The provision allows the minister of defense, in the event that it is suspected that a ballistic missile has been launched or it is feared that such a missile will be launched, or it is feared that in the event of an accident parts of a rocket used to launch a satellite may fall onto Japanese territory, particularly if there has been a sudden turn of events and such a ballistic missile or rocket is seen to be heading toward Japan, to issue an order—in accordance with procedures that have been approved by the prime minister—for the destruction of said incoming object so as to prevent the loss of lives or damage to property on the Japanese territory. Specifically, if a ballistic missile, rocket used in launching a satellite, or satellite itself is observed to be heading for Japanese territory, the SDF, in response to an order received from the minister of defense, will attempt to destroy the incoming object using SM-3 (Standard Missile 3) missiles launched from an Aegis naval vessel or PAC-3 Patriot ground-based missiles. When the order for destruction measures was issued in March, the minister of defense issued an order for the implementation of the destruction measures during the period up to April 10, and the SDF deployed Aegis vessels and PAC-3 batteries accordingly.

The missile launch was carried out by North Korea at around 11:30 a.m. on April 5, 2009, and at around 11:37, after what is believed to have been the separation of the rocket’s first stage, the rocket passed over Japan’s Tohoku region at a height of 370–400 kilometers and fell into the Pacific Ocean. As no object was observed to be falling toward Japanese territory, destructive measures under the SDF Law were not implemented.
(2) Developments in International Cooperation—UNSC Resolution 1874 and Its Implementation

The international community presented a united front in response to this sequence of provocative acts by North Korea. On May 26, the day after North Korea’s nuclear test, the government of South Korea—which had taken a cautious stance on the Proliferation Security Initiative—officially announced the country’s full participation in the initiative. On June 12, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1874, in which the UN recognized that the conduct of a nuclear test by North Korea presented a clear threat to international peace and security, calls all the member states of the UN to act in accordance with Chapter VII and implement measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter. The UNSC also severely criticized the nuclear test and called on North Korea to: refrain from nuclear tests or the launching of rockets employing ballistic missile technology; stop all activities related to ballistic missile programs; scrap all nuclear weapons and programs; and immediately halt all activities relating to nuclear weapons. The UNSC sanctions against North Korea include a stricter arms embargo and stricter measures for the inspection of cargo (exports from or imports to North Korea) suspected of including prohibited items (nuclear material, missiles, other weapons), and for prevention of the transfer of funds to North Korea through the freezing and monitoring of assets. The resolution also called on member states to prevent the granting of new aids or trade-related official assistance to North Korea. Measures also included the strengthening of the UNSC’s Sanctions Committee.

In response to UNSC Resolution 1874, the so-called Cargo Inspection Bill was submitted to the Diet for the purpose of strengthening the country’s legal framework to enable implementation of the resolution. With respect to cargo inspections under Resolution 1874, the actions that the government of Japan can take under the existing rules and regulations are limited to: the prohibition of all exports to and imports from North Korea under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law; the conduct of surveillance activity under normal circumstances, and the issuance of warnings to suspicious
vessels and the monitoring of such vessels under the Law for the Establishment of the Ministry of Defense; the boarding and inspection of vessels under the Japan Coast Guard Law; the arrest of persons believed to have committed violations of other Japanese laws; and the conduct of close liaison with other countries with respect to information on the vessels concerned or the cargo they carry.

With some exceptions, existing Japanese laws do not allow the Japanese authorities to inspect vessels paying a call at a Japanese port or passing through Japanese territorial waters for cargo items prohibited under UNSC Resolution 1874, or to seize and dispose of such prohibited items, except in cases where the said cargo is classified as imports to, or exports from, Japan. The exceptions referred to above include permission under the Japan Coast Guard Law for Japanese officials to board and inspect vessels that have put out from a North Korean port on suspicion of violations or potential violations of Japanese law, such as carrying biological or toxin weapons, chemical weapons or materials that could be converted into chemical weapons, anti-personnel mines, or other weapons as defined in Japan’s Sword and Firearms Control Law. In international waters, however, the scope for action of the Japanese authorities is still further restricted. The Japanese authorities are permitted to board and search a vessel only in the event of suspicion that a Japanese national is suspected of carrying chemical weapons or anti-personnel mines, and then only with the consent of the country whose flag the vessel flies.

For these reasons, the Cargo Inspection Bill was drafted by the government under Prime Minister Taro Aso in order to allow the Japanese security forces to take all necessary measures to implement UNSC Resolution 1874, including inspection for prohibited items, and, where found, their impounding. The Cargo Inspection Bill passed the House of Representatives, but had to be scrapped because the lower house was dissolved before the bill was voted on in the House of Councilors. Following the formation of the Hatoyama government after the general election, an almost identical bill was submitted to the extraordinary session of the Diet.

In this new bill, a provision relating to the SDF contained in Article 9, Clause 2 of the previous bill was deleted. However, since the original provision did not definitively grant any new powers regarding SDF operation, the two bills can be said to be identical in substance. However, the new bill did not reach the voting stage in the extraordinary Diet session, but remained under deliberation. The
passage of this legislation is believed to be indispensable for the effective implementation of UNSC Resolution 1874, and to enable the international community to work together to solve the North Korean nuclear issue, the sooner the Cargo Inspection Bill becomes law the better.

(3) Future Handling of the North Korean Nuclear Issue—The Importance of Cooperation between Japan, the United States, and South Korea

The suspicion that North Korea was engaged in a nuclear weapons development program began to surface in the early 1990s, marking the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis. Since then, many approaches to this issue have been tried. These include the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea in 1994, engagement of Pyongyang by the US government during President George W. Bush’s first term, based on the precondition of “the comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons programs (CVID),” and the approach under the second term of the Bush administration, which stressed “action for action.” All these approaches have failed to lead to a nuclear-free North Korea. Many reasons for these failures can be cited, but at the very least, what is clear is that there is no quick and ready solution to this problem. That being so, it will require a great deal of persistent effort, and many different policies may have to be adopted.

To find a solution to this issue, it goes without saying that patient and persistent diplomatic efforts will be required, centered on the Six-Party Talks. In particular the international community needs to show to Pyongyang that even if North Korea carries out further provocative acts, such as missile launches or nuclear tests, that will only strengthen the solidarity of the international community in its efforts to achieve a nuclear-free North Korea and the security environment surrounding North Korea will never improve. The agreement on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula reached at the Six-Party Talks in September 2005 is seen as the starting point for future negotiations. It is vital, however, to make Pyongyang understand that simply implementing this existing agreement and sitting down at the negotiating table will not be enough to warrant the withdrawal of the sanctions imposed on North Korea by the international community, or the provision of economic assistance. In particular, it is significant to maintain the principle that the international community will not tolerate any situation in which rogue states
get rewarded at the expense of security for nations that play by the rules. Furthermore, while pursuing cooperation on this issue with all the countries involved, Japan needs to be prepared for a sudden change in the situation at any time.

On the assumption that there will be no quick solution, it will be necessary to take measures to manage the risks posed by North Korea. From this standpoint, there are three essential tasks. First, we must inhibit North Korea’s ability to develop its nuclear weapons and missile technology to the point of actual weaponization. Specifically, all members of the international community must work together to enforce the cargo inspections and financial sanctions against North Korea on the basis of UNSC Resolution 1874, and must strengthen international cooperation in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons through such means as export control and the Proliferation Security Initiative. Second, it will be important to put in place a credible deterrence against possible escalation by Pyongyang of its acts of provocation. For this purpose, Japan should not only deploy its own defense capability, but also cooperate more closely with the United States and South Korea. Third, we must strengthen cooperation with all countries concerned in preparation for sudden and unforeseen changes in the situation, such as the possibility that North Korean society may descend into a state of chaos.

Important keys to the effectiveness of all these measures will be bilateral cooperation between Japan and the United States and trilateral cooperation among them and South Korea. The Lee Myung-bak administration’s adoption of policies stressing the importance of the South Korea’s alliance with the United States is seen by most observers as having a positive effect on security in the region. Against this backdrop, the defense ministers of the United States, Japan, and South Korea held their first-ever three-way talks on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue (an annual meeting of defense officials and experts) in Singapore in May of 2009, at which they discussed cooperation among the three countries in responding to North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, among other issues. Following this, the three countries held talks at the director-general level in July to discuss further trilateral cooperation in the field of defense. Steady progress has been made in this type of cooperation, and if they can continue to clearly demonstrate their unity vis-à-vis North Korea, this is likely to greatly improve the ability of the region as a whole to deal with a wide range of situations arising out of the North Korea issue. On that basis, attempts should be made to persuade China to become
more closely involved in this issue via the Six-Party Talks or other means, as part of persistent overall efforts to realize the denuclearization of North Korea.

The Changing Security Environment and the Role of Forward-Deployed Military Forces

In light of the current security environment, how should we evaluate the idea that, rather than stationing large-scale forces permanently in Japan, the United States should deploy them only when a crisis arises?

Firstly, we must take into consideration the fact that the role of military has changed significantly since the Cold War era. Scenarios for the use of US forces in Japan are no longer limited to high-intensity armed conflicts involving Japan directly or occurring in areas close to Japan. Particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, where many and varied security issues exist, the kind of military activity that characterizes situations which cannot be classified either as “peacetime” or “emergency” are assuming ever greater importance. Such activities include: counter terrorism or counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; humanitarian aid and disaster relief; maritime security operations, such as antipiracy missions; exercises aimed at strengthening cooperation between the countries in the region; and day-to-day surveillance. In view of the security environment characterized by these activities, it would seem that the concept of maintaining only military bases without significant numbers of troops in peacetime, and deploying US forces to Japan only when a crisis occurs, is somewhat impractical.

Additionally, even if we hypothesize a high-intensity armed conflict directly involving Japan or occurring nearby, it should be pointed out that it is not envisaged for the US forces continuously stationed in Japan to engage in fighting in any given situation. As it is clear from an experience of military operations by the United States since the end of the Cold War, when an emergency occurs somewhere, the United States deals with it by drawing troops from wherever they are stationed around the world. In light of the fact that not all the forces needed to deal with a crisis are continuously stationed in Japan, it can be argued that, in a sense, the United States already practices the strategy of stationing troops in (or, more accurately, “deploying to”) Japan only in an emergency.

Moreover, the question of when the United States would decide to redeploy the troops is a crucial issue. If some sort of crisis broke out in East Asia, the correct timing for a decision to redeploy US troops to Japan would prove to be difficult. If the decision were taken too soon, this might of itself escalate the situation. Alternatively, if the United States were to hesitate out of fear that a miscalculation could cause an escalation, it might then be too late. In this sense, the crucial question is how to realize what is known in deterrence theory as “crisis stability.” In addition, as the number of countries possessing anti-access capabilities is growing, it is possible that there will be an increased risk of US forces being physically prevented from redeploying. Taking all these factors into consideration, it would seem more sensible to maintain a certain level of US forces permanently in the region as a deterrent.