Chapter 7

The United States—American Internationalism and Unilateralism
The focus of U.S. security policy during 2003 was use of force against Iraq and that country’s reconstruction thereafter. During public discourse, U.S. unilateralism and internationalism, and the raison d’etre of alliances for the United States, became the subject of debate. As of now, disputes continue in various quarters of the country. As is well recognized, at the heart of the debate has been the issue of how to view U.S. security policy.

Signs of change in the post-Cold War security policy of the United States were visible in the latter half of President Clinton’s second term. In 1998, the United States launched a limited strike on al Qaeda bases in Sudan and Afghanistan with cruise missiles in retaliation for the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. This was a manifestation of its revised security policy. Prior to the Bush administration, the “war against terror” had an important meaning in U.S. security policy. And at that time, the strategy and tactics it had adopted, and the rationale for them, had a tinge of unilateralism.

Through the “war against terror” declared after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and the process that led up to the use of force against Iraq in 2003, the United States has defined terrorists, terrorist groups, and states supporting them as entities operating outside the existing international order. By this logic, as President George W. Bush had said, if globalization promotes consensus among the countries of the world on terrorism, and if freedoms, democracy and human rights come to serve as the basis of world order, then actions taken to protect the world order can be justified. After September 11, international cooperation emerged, and countries of the world accepted the necessity of the “war against terrorism” as a norm for no other reason than a shared awareness that each and every nation had a stake in the common struggle for maintaining the world order.

However, many pointed out that the use of force against Iraq in 2003 has since shattered that sense of community. In the course of a debate conducted at the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2003, about the justifiability of the attack, the United States reportedly labeled some of the European countries that opposed the use of force as “old Europe.” Some in the United States attracted attention by characterizing Europe as a region benefiting from a Kantian peace, and charged that it was insensible to the fact that the United States was sustaining the peace. The term “old Europe” carries connotations suggesting differences in how the security environment in today’s world is perceived. In *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* released in
September 2002, President Bush said that the security mechanisms built up during the Cold War such as arms control and deterrence had outlived their relevance to the new strategic environment. The *Annual Defense Report* released in November 2003 outlined changes that have occurred in the force structure of the U.S. military and the role and function played by alliances. It also stressed the need not only to plan against known threats, but also to consider how the United States might be threatened and what portfolio of capabilities it will need to prevail.

It is often argued that the present international order is maintained by U.S. military power. However, the fact remains that international cooperation is essential to deal with various problems facing the international community today, and in fact, the security policy of the United States was formulated on that assumption. The Bush administration came under international criticism for curbing some of the policies pursued by the Clinton administration, but it has not abandoned multilateralism itself. On questions such as the environment, HIV/AIDS, sustainable economic development and smuggling, which the Bush administration defines as top priorities, the administration calls for international cooperation through various international organizations and mechanisms. There are areas in which the United States is adopting a high-profile cooperative stance in its war on terrorism. However, it is also true that the United States, which went to war against Iraq while complaining that the United Nations wasn’t doing its job properly, is taking pains to promote international cooperation.

1. The United States and the International Community after the Use of Force against Iraq: Dispute over “Empire” and International Community

   (1) The U.S. Perception of Security Threats, WMD and Terrorism

U.S. security policy for the new era has emerged in the past two years following September 11. There is no denying that the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., marked a sea change in the security perceptions of the United States and the world at large. Even though the potential risks were previously recognized, not enough had been done to prepare to deal with such threats. The period between September 11 and use of force against Iraq was a period for the United States to adjust its security policy to the new security paradigm and define and implement its new security policy.
The Bush administration articulated the principles of U.S. security policy in *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, released in September 2002, and President Bush further clarified the priorities of his administration’s security policy in his January 2003 State of the Union address. The address drew international attention for Bush’s condemnation of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein for defying the UNSC resolution requiring Iraq to disclose and abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development programs. However, the address contained remarks that had profound implications for U.S. security policy. President Bush emphasized that the threat posed by the WMD of outlaw regimes has significant impact on the peace and security of the international community. Those regimes might use them for blackmailing during diplomatic negotiations, or transfer WMD, their components, and manufacturing information to terrorist groups. Although preceded by discussion of domestic issues, President Bush devoted the most time to terrorism and WMD proliferation issues, showing how important these issues are to the U.S. security policy agenda.

In fact, the threat posed by terrorism and the dangers posed by the link between WMD and terrorist groups were recognized in the United States as critical security issues throughout the 1990s. This eventually culminated in the attack on Iraq. However, it was public recognition of the threat that emerged after September 11 that made it possible to go to war. The United States initiated military action in March 2003 to remove the Saddam regime and the threat of WMD, as well as to promote democracy in a country with a poor human rights record ruled by a dictator. However, the U.S. decision to resort to military action opened up it to many questions. The main question posed by the international community concerned the legitimacy of the use of force against Iraq, and whether this was consistent with the war on terror. As was often pointed out, it is difficult to assert that the former is a continuation of
the latter. As of December 2003, no evidence has been collected establishing that Saddam’s regime had been directly involved in September 11 or has sponsored the terrorist activity of the Taliban and al Qaeda. In this sense, it would be correct to characterize the use of force against Iraq as a preventive war to eliminate terrorist threats rather than a preemptive strike based on the right of self-defense. Therefore, it is fair to say that the difficulty of winning international support for the use of force against Iraq does not mean the loss of support for the war on terror but a failure of the international community to reach a consensus on how to justify the war on terror.

In fact, the use of force against Iraq had a strong impact on international security. It demonstrated to potential adversaries and terrorist groups that their misdeeds would encounter strong opposition from the United States and the international community. By demonstrating U.S. determination to use force, the United States added credibility to its words. In other words, the strategies for dissuading potential adversaries also had the potential to impact on other countries and groups thought to be contributing to international instability. Removing the repressive regime from Iraq was one means to this end. Therefore, as U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said in April 2003 that there were no plans for further military action in the region, it is unlikely that the United States will attack other countries for the purpose of overthrowing their leadership or for the purpose of imposing democratic values. In the case of Iran’s secret nuclear weapons program, the United States is satisfied with the initiative of Europe and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On the question of North Korea, it aims at solving the problem through multilateral talks with the four countries surrounding North Korea. Iran and North Korea are the countries President Bush referred to in his State of the Union address of 2002 as part of “an axis of evil.” They are suspected of developing WMD and condemned for massive domestic human rights violations. When asked why the United States is taking a different approach to these two countries than to Iraq, the Bush administration mentioned Iraq’s repeated violations of UNSC resolutions, its relationships with terrorist groups, its involvement in the proliferation of WMD, and the difference in strategic environment. This demonstration of U.S. military capability in Iraq helped curb Libya. In December 2003, Libya announced that it will disclose records relating to its WMD development and indicated its willingness to accept special IAEA inspections of its WMD facilities. Libya further announced it was abandoning its WMD program. Although the Libyan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Aug. 2</td>
<td>Iraq invades Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
<td>The UNSC adopts Resolution 678.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 3</td>
<td>The UNSC adopts Resolution 687.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Sept. 16</td>
<td>Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri notifies UN Secretary General Annan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of his government’s decision to allow the resumption of UN weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>inspections “without conditions.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 10</td>
<td>Both Houses of the U.S. Congress adopt a resolution authorizing the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. government to use force against Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 5</td>
<td>The UNSC adopts Resolution 1441.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 13</td>
<td>The Iraqi government notifies UN Secretary General Annan that it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>accepts the return of weapons inspectors under the terms of Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1441.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 27</td>
<td>The UNMOVIC resumes inspections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 7</td>
<td>The Iraqi government submits to the UNSC a declaration concerning the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>disposal of WMD (obligated under Resolution 1441).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Jan. 20</td>
<td>U.S. President Bush orders the establishment of the ORHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 5</td>
<td>U.S. Secretary of State Powell makes a presentation on the Iraqi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>situation at the UNSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 18</td>
<td>The UNSC holds open debates to discuss the Iraqi situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 24</td>
<td>The United States, Britain, and Spain submit a preliminary draft of a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>new resolution to the UNSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 7</td>
<td>The United States, Britain, and Spain submit a revised draft of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>new resolution to the UNSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 12</td>
<td>Britain submits a draft side statement in a bid to win more support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for the new resolution at the UNSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 16</td>
<td>The United States, Britain, and Spain hold an emergency summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>meeting in the Azores.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 17</td>
<td>The United States, Britain, and Spain declare their intention not to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>seek a new resolution. U.S. President Bush issues an ultimatum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ordering Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>country within 48 hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 18</td>
<td>The British House of Commons passes a government-sponsored motion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>authorizing the use of force against Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 20</td>
<td>U.S.-led coalition forces start military operations in Iraq. The</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese government adopts Action Guidelines for Responding to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Issue of Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 9</td>
<td>Coalition forces capture Baghdad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 1</td>
<td>U.S. President Bush declares that major combat operations in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>have ended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 12</td>
<td>Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, presidential envoy to Iraq (appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>on May 6) and administrator of the CPA arrive in Baghdad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 22</td>
<td>The UNSC adopts Resolution 1483.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
government does not admit it, the psychological impact of the use of force against Iraq on Libya’s decision is undeniable. It may also be pointed out that adoption of a preventive war as an instrument of security policy has made it easier for the United States to promote the war on terror and nonproliferation efforts.
Figure 7.1. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

U.S. military installations around Iraq before the OIF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name of installation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 Incirlik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Malatya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>3 Ali Al Salem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Doha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>5 Prince Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>6 Al Udeid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>7 Al Seeb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Data from the Web sites of the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and media reports.
In a broader sense, the use of force against Iraq was one aspect of the war on terror. It is true that the war itself is partly to address long-held U.S. concerns and realize U.S. aspirations to alter the strategic landscape of the Middle East in its favor. However, breaking the networks of state and non-state actors engaged in terrorist activities as a preventive measure was also deemed important in the post-September 11 security environment. In the case of Iran and North Korea, the major focus of U.S. security policy was on the risk of WMD proliferation. While no explicit link between Iran or North Korea and al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiah (JI) has been established, the adoption of a strategy of regime change through military measures, which was the case with Afghanistan and Iraq, is highly unlikely.

Despite the success of the preventive war doctrine in Iraq, at least in the initial stage of the war on terror, the international community feels uncomfortable with this new U.S. doctrine. This is because some of the tactics used in its war on terror are similar to those employed to prevent the proliferation of WMD. It is true that preventive war served as a precedent that facilitates a solution to these problems. However, creating a precedent that justifies a preemptive strike or a regime change as a means of self-defense, might tempt other countries to follow suit and justify a military solution based on self-interest. To distinguish the use of force pursuant to normative principles from one based on self-interest is extremely difficult. A country may wage war against another for its own interests and claim that its actions are based on globally accepted normative principles.

In fact, the war on terror and the prevention of proliferation of WMD are so intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. The devastating consequences of WMD in a terrorist action would be so great that prevention of their use is a critical challenge for every country. In addition, the international community is also concerned with the disruption of the existing political and economic order by terrorist activities. Herein lies the significance of the condemnation made unanimously by the member countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the Future, which was adopted by APEC on October 21, 2003, declared that for the purpose of “Enhancing Human Security,” APEC members would strengthen joint efforts to curb terrorist threats against commercial aviation to ensure the safety of air passengers. Implicitly, the declaration calls for a security through development, that might be beneficial and promising for
prevention of terrorist activities.

The issue of WMD proliferation presents a difficult challenge for the international community. The current state of globalization makes it difficult to control the spread of manufacturing technology and know-how concerning WMD, since highly sensitive dual-use technologies exist that can be used for both commercial and military purposes. However, policymakers must realize that excessive control of international technology transfer for the purpose of nonproliferation may harm the healthy development of the international economy. Therefore, the nonproliferation policy must gauge the appropriate balance between regulation and free trade. The U.S. government’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002 stated that the United States must comprehensively and seamlessly pursue the three pillars of the national strategy: counterproliferation (interdiction, deterrence, defense, and mitigation); nonproliferation (active nonproliferation diplomacy, multilateral regimes, nonproliferation and threat-reduction cooperation, controls on nuclear materials, U.S. export controls, and nonproliferation sanctions); and WMD consequence management.

In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations on June 4, 2003, John R. Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and international security said that in dealing with proliferation of the post-Iraq war world, the United States must pursue a “forward” policy, tools of which include economic sanctions, interdiction, and credible controls of illegal export of WMD-related materials. Based on the recognition that countries and groups having an ambition to acquire WMD are incapable of developing WMD on their own and have to rely on external sources for resources and technology, the policy he has outlined is designed to tighten the surveillance of the process of acquiring such resources and technologies by such countries and groups. In May 2003, the United States enforced sanctions on the China North Industries Group (NORINCO) and the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group of Iran. It exemplified the tough stance that the United States will take, including trade sanctions, toward companies that have illegally engaged in transfer of WMD-related goods and technologies.

The Bush administration has labeled those challenging the existing political and economic world order as entities operating outside the existing international norm, and condemns them as a common threat to the international community. However, treating terrorists and terrorist groups in the way they
treat “criminals” as defined by domestic laws is inaccurate and inappropriate. Nevertheless, the United States will face the issue of legal justification under international law even if it justifies its military action against another country on grounds of violations of human rights or the suspicion of developing WMD. In general, there is little room for winning legal legitimacy for such military action under the current system of international laws and norms, and attempts to observe complex formalities in order to win international endorsement are time-consuming and often fruitless. Indeed, this was the point to which Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld referred in a remark he made in September 2003 regarding the inadequacy of the United Nations and international law.

This issue, which the United States has persistently raised through the use of force against Iraq, is closely related to the question of how the international community defines “legitimacy.” In the Kosovo war, NATO forces attacked Serbia without the authorization of the UNSC but pursuant to a decision by NATO. Unlike the case in Iraq, despite the lack of a clear UN mandate, European countries did not criticize the U.S. decision to attack Serbia. Moreover, European countries were relatively silent on Russia’s attack on Islamic forces in Chechnya, compared to the Iraq case. However, France and Germany severely criticized the U.S. invasion of Iraq as “an unjustified exercise of military power,” despite the fact that many countries, including the United Kingdom and Japan, supported it. A feud over the justifiability of the use of force in Iraq by U.S. forces has thus come to the surface; fueled by the latent rivalry between the United States and Europe, these European countries question the justifiability of the role played by the United States in international affairs.

(2) American Internationalism: The Foundation of Prosperity and Its Limits

To criticize recent U.S. behavior in international affairs and label its actions as unilateralist is both misleading and counterproductive when analyzing U.S. foreign policy. In reality, the Bush administration pays due respect to the role, norms, capabilities, and accomplishments of international organizations. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Bush administration attaches importance to the UN role in carrying out its foreign and security policies. Although there is a complex calculation based on self-interest, the U.S. tendency to emphasize the importance of the United Nations is obvious, if one looks at issues of Iraqi reconstruction as well as nonproliferation of WMD.
Kim R. Holmes, assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, asserted that true to the principle of U.S. policy toward the United Nations, he believed that member countries of the United Nations should live up to the vision of its founders, contribute to international peace and security, and provide their people with freedoms, health and economic opportunities. He argued that while reserving the right to act in its self-defense whenever necessary, the United States will promote effective multilateralism and seek good stewardship of UN resources. In a press briefing held in September 2003, immediately prior to the opening of the UN General Assembly, Assistant Secretary Holmes said that he planned to pursue a number of initiatives on funds to be contributed to HIV/AIDS, on sustainable development, on cybersecurity, on cloning, on the protection of women’s political rights, and on curbing the UN budget, and declared that U.S. policy to be actively pursuing multilateralism in these fields.

Judging from the U.S. trade balance, it is apparent that U.S. economic prosperity rests on peace and prosperity of the international community, which makes the country’s unilateralist policy unfeasible and unrealistic. As declared on repeated occasions, unlike the empires that have existed in the past, the United States has no territorial ambitions and is determined to act as a benign leader. The U.S.-led international order is sustained by the expansion of free trade and democracy, and it has been claimed that such international order conforms to the founding doctrine of the United States. Under the Bush administration, U.S. dependence on foreign investment has increased. Indeed, this reliance on external sources has become a driving force behind the involvement of the United States in international affairs. In order for the United States to maintain its balance of payments, it is necessary to maintain a system that encourages the inflow of foreign capital. For this structural reason, there is strong incentive for the United States to engage in maintaining international peace and stability, and promoting international cooperation.

The internationalism pursued by the United States is succinctly summed up in the preface by Secretary of State Powell to the August 2003 issue “American Internationalism” of the State Department electronic journal, *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*. In it, Powell said that “we will not join a consensus if we believe it compromises our core principles. Nor would we expect other nations to join in a consensus that would compromise their core principles,” suggesting that the United States will not force it on other countries. At the same time he
said that the United States will exercise leadership where necessary, and that “a look around the globe shows that the United States has spared no effort to reach an international consensus and that it has been working intensively with allies and partners on every continent.” It may be said that this is the true nature of President Bush’s claim, referred to on many occasions as a “distinctly American internationalism.”

However, the internationalism advocated by the Bush administration will run into difficulties should the United States determine to lead without gathering an international consensus. The issue is especially keen following military action, or in nation building, when the United States wishes to gain a pledge of international commitment to such operations. As is evident from the difference in response shown by European countries to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq, unilateral action harms the reputation of the United States and stiffens domestic opposition in each country cooperating with the United States. To deal with such developments, President Bush issued an executive order in January 2003 to establish an Office of Global Communications within the White House Office for the purpose of utilizing the most effective means for the U.S. government to ensure consistency in messages that will promote the interests of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, and build support for, and among, coalition partners. (It was actually established in 2002.) This effort shows the resolve of the Bush administration to come to grips in earnest with the fear that diminishing foreign confidence in the United States may have an adverse effect on its diplomatic and security policies.

On the domestic front, the approach the Bush administration has taken to waging war on terror is imposing a heavy burden on the United States. More specifically, by the very nature of the war, which continues without a clear end in sight, various restrictions imposed on U.S. citizens at home threaten to become a permanent feature. In November 2003, former Vice President Al Gore criticized...
the Patriot Act for allowing federal agents to “sneak and peek” at citizens’ private records, enter citizens’ homes in secret, and hold citizens indefinitely without access to legal counsel or a hearing without a formal judicial procedure. He expressed concerns that the war on terror may excessively restrict freedoms of U.S. citizens, and charged that the Bush administration was using the law to concentrate its power.

The major aim of the war on terror is to create a situation or environment in which no terrorist activities can take place, rather than targeting specific political entities. Therefore, the international community is required to examine the means adversaries employ to carry out terrorist activities and effectively deal with them on a continuous basis. This leads to problems that are inherent in the war on terror. In other words, as subjective views influence the international community’s judgment, domestic support and international cooperation, which have been built for the execution of the war on terror, tend to weaken gradually with the passage of time or changes in sensitivity to the threat of terror. To be sure, it may be possible to uncover international terrorist organizations under the leadership of the United States. It is also possible to step up international pressure on terror-sponsoring countries through international cooperation. However, as it is impossible to completely eliminate terrorist activities, the United States and the international community realize again the difficulty in continuously maintaining the unity of awareness necessary to keep up the struggle.

2. The Security Policy of the United States and Its Instruments

(1) U.S. Security and International Cooperation

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) argues that in the absence of major threats to the United States, it has sufficient time to develop military means suited to the future security environment of the United States. At the same time, it says that the United States must take steps necessary for conducting the war on terror. Overall, these two proposals suggest that the United States is now in a position to build a long-term posture concurrently with the implementation of short-term measures.

One policy worthy of special mention among others dealing with the problem of proliferation of WMD is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
In a speech delivered at the Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003, President Bush said that the United States, together with a number of its close allies, would press ahead with the PSI to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technology. Since then, meetings to work out plans for realizing the PSI have been held in Spain, Australia, France and Britain, and at the third meeting held in Paris in September, eleven countries participating in the PSI agreed on a Statement of Interdiction Principle. Since the announcement of the PSI, participating countries conducted maritime interdiction exercises off Australia and in the Mediterranean aimed at preventing the proliferation of WMD.

The Bush administration made clear that the PSI was built on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of WMD, including existing treaties and regimes, that it was aimed at implementing the UNSC Presidential Statement of January 1992, and that it was not inconsistent with the G8 Declaration on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and with the Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement signed at the U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, D.C., on June 25, 2003. It also called for cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used by proliferators. It said that the PSI was open to all interested parties, and that participating countries were requested to extend cooperation in ways consistent with their national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, such as the UNSC. The Statement of Interdiction Principles specifically defines the activities to be carried out by member states of the PSI, and encourages other countries to the initiative. Worthy of special mention is a passage that states in no uncertain terms that countries participating in the PSI will search ships carrying suspected cargo and seize illegal weapons or missile technologies.

Indeed, there are pros and cons to this initiative. For example, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan criticized this, saying that boarding and searching foreign vessels violates international law. On the other hand, France and Germany, which had obsessively insisted on adopting a new UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, have actively participated in the PSI notwithstanding doubts about the consistency with the UN position on the issue.

The PSI is clearly descended from the Counter Proliferation Initiative (CPI) announced by then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin of the Clinton administration in December 1993. Comparison of these two initiatives shows
that the PSI contains a substantial part of the CPI. However, what distinguishes the PSI from the CPI is that the former contains specific measures including interdiction for preventing the proliferation of WMD and attaches special importance to international cooperation. Although some Japanese media reported that the PSI is aimed primarily at North Korea, it is fair to say that their reports oversimplify the PSI. This initiative must be seen in the context of a change in the policy for controlling WMD-related exports that has been discussed since the late 1990s. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report released in October 2002 pointed out the problems involved in the existing export control regime, and advocated the necessity of a new policy and effective measures to strengthen control, and the necessity to build a new regime to support such a policy and measures. The PSI can be taken as one such measure. If the PSI is focused exclusively on North Korea, it could very well hinder the progress this initiative could make otherwise.

The next area worthy of note is nation-building and stabilization operations. The Bush administration tends to negate the remarks and statements made by the Clinton administration, and “nation building” is a typical example. President Bush criticized the Somalia and Haiti operations conducted by the Clinton administration in its early days by saying that the involvement of the United States in conflicts or in the nation building of other countries that had no bearing on the national interests of the United States had undermined the morale of U.S. service members and had squandered necessary resources. Even after September 11, President Bush declared that the United States would refrain from getting involved in the nation building of other countries.

Despite the Bush administration’s initial reluctance, however, it is changing its perception of nation building because of the difficulties it is facing in reconstructing the government and economy of Iraq. Indeed, there was broad consensus in the United States that in order to eradicate terrorism, assistance for achieving the social stability of a country suffering from grinding poverty is the most essential and appropriate policy. Reflecting the discussion in the United States on how to position the nation-building mission within the security policy, debate has centered around the question of whether the United States should play a leadership role in democratizing Iraq or whether it should press ahead with nation building within a UN-led framework. The former school of opinion argues that the restoration of social order in Iraq needs the continuous involvement of U.S. forces, while those who hold the latter opinion maintain
that the United States should limit its involvement to a bare minimum and let the international community cooperate in its nation building under the leadership of the United Nations.

The Bush administration is vacillating between these two views. In an address delivered at a meeting of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in November 2003, President Bush argued that the United States should play an active role in spreading democracy in the Middle East, while declaring in the same breath that his administration would turn over control to Iraqis at the earliest possible date, and called on the United Nations to get involved in the creation of a new Iraqi government. The United States has promised to transfer the sovereignty to the Iraqi people in June 2004, but President Bush was noncommittal on whether he will keep troops in Iraq or not. In a press interview held in November 2003, President Bush explained that the United States was proceeding on two separate tracks—political and security. This means that until such time as the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) presses ahead with democratization and establishes a new government in June 2004, the United States will give the IGC political advice and keep troops in Iraq. On this question, the so-called neoconservatives, which include U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, are calling for the continuous stationing of U.S. forces in Iraq and assert that the United States should expand democracy across the Middle East using Iraq as a model. From a somewhat different perspective, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said in a speech delivered in New York in February 2003 that postwar reconstruction would be carried out largely through the self-help efforts of the Iraqis.

Inseparably connected with the nation-building and stabilization operations is the implementation of a policy designed to eliminate the root cause of conflict. As the nation-building and stabilization operations are compulsory measures in nature, implementation of such policies gives rise to various problems. Importance is attached to this approach in the belief that if the areas relating to the security of the people—poverty, diseases, and violation of human rights—are left unremedied, it will turn countries plagued by such problems into breeding grounds of terrorism. Eradication of international terrorist networks is important for the war on terror, but neutralizing the causes of terrorism is no less effective.

In the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) released March 2002, the U.S. government said that it seeks to increase current levels of core
development assistance by 50 percent over the next three years. The MCA chooses three areas—good governance, the health and education of the people and investment in education, and the promotion of a sound economic policy that supports business startups—as its priorities, and plans to contribute funds to projects for dealing with the HIV/AIDS problem and the economic development of African countries. The policy of the Bush administration, which attaches importance to development and humanitarian aid, adds different characteristics to the policy of the Clinton administration, which had tended to cut back on foreign aid. At a hearing held at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 2003, Administrator Andrew S. Natsios of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) explained the foreign aid policy of the United States and said that the MCA was only one piece of the foreign aid policy of the Bush administration to spur development, alongside World Trade Organization (WTO) trade-liberalization negotiations, HIV/AIDS initiatives and humanitarian assistance. In May, USAID has unveiled a trade-capacity building initiative, and also announced that it would create a system necessary for developing countries to participate in the global trading system and help them build infrastructure. This was in line with the policy—included in the Doha Ministerial Declaration issued at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001—that multilateral trade liberalization efforts lead to economic growth and development.

This approach is directly aimed at achieving the stability and prosperity of developing countries through the promotion of economic development. Pursuit of this objective will facilitate the achievement of a number of policy objectives—the realization of political objectives (democratization) and effective response to global problems, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). One may see this policy as a manifestation of liberal internationalism, although it may also be criticized as an attempt to pull developing countries into a U.S.-led international political and economic order. The Bush administration is actively pushing its approach by increasing its aid to help improve the health problems of developing countries under the Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003 and by unveiling (by Secretary of State Powell) an outline of its aid plan on International AIDS Day. In addition, the United States announced various aid programs for the implementation of the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, adopted at a conference held in August–September 2003, and the Monterrey Consensus,
adopted at the International Conference on Financing for Development held in March 2002. It should be noted that these international efforts are designed to take wide-ranging approaches that include partnerships between donor and developing countries, international agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and multinational corporations.

---

**Neoconservatism in the United States**

One topic that has received particular attention in 2003 is the influence of neoconservatism in the United States. Neoconservatism caught the eye when Jewish members of the Democratic Party who had been alarmed by the influence of the new left movement and the growing leftist tilt of the Democrats, rallied around President Ronald Reagan.

This political group, which had sought to establish U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union and ensure the triumph of American values over communism during the Cold War, did not acquire strong influence in the political center during the presidency of President George H. W. Bush and President Bill Clinton. Under the present administration of President George W. Bush, however, many neoconservatives came to occupy key positions, and their agenda is directly reflected in the security policy of the United States. It is wrong, however, to say that politicians such as President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, whose political beliefs are considered close to the traditional conservatism, have converted to neoconservatism. Rather, the present administration should be seen as a coalition of political groups of various stripes, and neoconservatives should be considered as just one political faction.

Policies advocated by neoconservatives are succinctly spelled out in two books published by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). PNAC has been proposing the security policy for the next Republican administration through its publications, *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* and *Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century* (online publication). PNAC advocates an increase in defense spending and the dualistic theory of good and evil in formulating a security policy, the mounting of a preemptive strike in carrying out such security policy, the adoption of a policy for regime change, the introduction of missile defenses, and the expansion of the policing role of the military. Of the many publications by neoconservative columnists, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* authored by Robert Kagan, senior fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2003, which pointed out that the difference in perception of security was behind today’s U.S.-European relations, remains fresh in the memory.

One of the possible reasons for the boost in the political clout of neoconservatives in the U.S. government is that the September 11 terrorist attacks brought to the fore a threat they had long been warning about, and attention has since focused on the policy they advocated for dealing with the new threat. Throughout the period from Operation Enduring Freedom in
Transformation is a concept embracing a large number of elements. In a speech delivered at The Citadel, South Carolina, on December 11, 2001, three months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush stressed the necessity for future policy requirements of promoting transformation, while at the same time fighting the war on terror. In January 2002 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld announced six items as major goals of transformation, namely, (a) to protect the U.S. homeland and its bases overseas, (b) to project and sustain power in distant theaters, (c) to deny American enemies sanctuary, (d) to protect U.S. information networks from attack, (e) to use information technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces, and (f) to maintain unhindered access to space. Transformation is a broad concept covering all levels of involvement of forces ranging from the operation of troops (joint operation of troops and the implementation of mobile operations) to the development and procurement of weapons (the use of special operations forces and the building of missile defenses).

On March 20, 2003, the United States, along with the United Kingdom,
initiated an attack on Iraq. This involved the largest U.S. ground force in action since the Gulf War of 1991. It included the Third Infantry Division, one of the United States’ heavy divisions, serving as the spearhead of the offensive. Toward the end of July, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, who reportedly differed with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld over the estimated troop strength needed for the occupation of Iraq and the introduction of the Crusader artillery system, retired from service. Against this backdrop, attention was focused on how these developments will influence the direction of transformation. At issue were the questions of whether the existing structure of a division—a division comprises three combat brigades, plus support units—should be changed; whether modernization and upgrades of heavy-armored vehicles—the M-1 Abrams main battle tank and the M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle that were so effective in the invasion of Iraq—should be continued; and whether the funds needed for the modernization of these heavy armored vehicle should instead be used for an early introduction of Stryker Interim Armored Vehicles.

On August 1, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, who had served in special operations forces and had retired from active duty in 2000, was appointed as chief of staff of the U.S. Army in place of Gen. Shinseki. Believing that sustained overseas deployment has become the norm, not the exception, Schoomaker felt the necessity to increase the modularity of units so that personnel and equipment can be flexibly combined, and incorporated into a joint force in accordance with each mission. Even before being sworn in a chief of staff Schoomaker had suggested that the traditional divisional structure should be changed. Underlying his view was the realization that, with twenty-three out of thirty-three combat brigades of the U.S. Army already committed in some form, the United States cannot sustain an army that way indefinitely.

In a speech delivered at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) on October 7, Schoomaker expressed his view that “our Army must move toward modular capabilities-based unit designs nested within the joint network.” And he said that the army would start reorganization with the Third Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division that had played an active role in the military operations against Iraq. Under the current force structure, one division is made up of three combat brigades. The new plan proposes to divide a division into five smaller brigade units of action (BUA) without changing the overall number of troops in a division, and modular BUAs will be organized into division-level units of employment (UE) depending on missions
assigned to them. UE headquarters may accept a standing joint-force headquarters element, or perform functions as a joint task force or joint land-component command headquarters. According to Schoomaker, reorganization of the present brigades into smaller BUAs is aimed at making it possible to train the same soldiers more cohesively, deploy them as teams, bring them home as teams, enhance the solidarity and capability of units as a whole, and make it easier for individual soldiers to envision their prospects.

On the question of which plan—the modernization of the existing heavy armored vehicles or the introduction of Stryker Interim Armored Vehicles—should be given precedence, Congress has decided to give equal priority to both. The FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act that was signed into law November 24 granted an appropriation for the M-2A3 Bradley upgrades and M-1A2 Abrams system enhancement program upgrades. The Department of the Army dropped a request for funding for these programs in its FY 2004 budget request. This decision is based on the assessment of Congress that these heavy armored vehicles had played a critical role in the military action against Iraq, and that termination of their upgrades would make them obsolete and undermine the industrial base of heavy armor. Congress also approved an appropriation for the procurement of 301 Stryker Interim Armored Vehicles to field the fourth Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) out of six SBCTs currently planned and an appropriation of $35 million for the fifth and sixth SBCTs.

Transformation efforts implemented in 2003 include introduction of the
National Security Personnel System (NSPS). Many have voiced serious concern over the Department of Defense (DOD) civilian human capital management system and called for fundamental reform. The NSPS is designed to respond to these calls. The DOD leadership had also been aware of the problem and stated that DOD personnel management is still burdened by the micromanagement and bureaucratic processes of the industrial age, making the DOD unable to deal promptly with terrorists, who move fast and strike anywhere. Under this system, a large number of essentially nonmilitary jobs, which should be performed by a civilian workforce, fall on uniformed personnel of the U.S. military. This puts further stress on the strained human resources of the U.S. armed forces, which have been engaged in a war on terror worldwide. The introduction of the NSPS is aimed at releasing uniformed personnel from this burden. In submitting its legislative proposal for the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act to Congress, the DOD stated that a more responsive civilian personnel management system is necessary and that it is in the process of preparing a legislative proposal for such a system on its own.

On April 11, 2003, the DOD submitted to Congress a proposal to establish an NSPS, which was included in a legislative proposal for the Defense Transformation for the Twenty-First Century Act. Some members of Congress opposed the proposal on the grounds that the NSPS would undermine the job security of DOD civilians. In the end, however, a clause relating to the NSPS was incorporated into the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act. This Act enabled the DOD to speedily effect hiring, assignment, promotion, advancement, and removal of civilian personnel according to its own standards, and empowered the secretary of defense to change job classification, pay administration, and performance management. The DOD officials praise the enactment and say that flexible civilian personnel management helps it to secure talented people.

The NSPS will be phased in over the next two years (FY2004-FY2005). It is also reported that the DOD plans to transfer 20,000 military jobs to civilians by the end of fiscal 2005 under a new DOD personnel system.

The Bush administration is also reviewing policies relating to nuclear weapons. The United States notified Russia that it was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in December 2001, and the treaty lost effect in June 2002. In addition, the United States made public in January 2001 findings of its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and declared that it would
discard its Cold War approach to nuclear deterrence. More specifically, the United States has ended the relationship with Russia that was based on mutual assured destruction (MAD) and changed its policy of excessive dependence on offensive nuclear weapons. It has also declared that it will transition to a new triad of credible non-nuclear and nuclear response options, multiple-layered missile defense, and responsible infrastructure that makes these two systems possible. In May 2002 the United States concluded the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty), with Russia, under which they agreed that they would reduce the aggregate number of nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,000 for each party by December 31, 2012.

With the restrictions imposed by the ABM Treaty thus lifted, the Bush administration announced in December 2002 it will begin fielding initial missile defense capabilities, including ground-based interceptors in Alaska, in 2004. The FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act authorized $9.1 billion for missile defense.

What attracted greater attention in 2003 than missile defense was the resumption of research into low-yield nuclear weapons that was authorized by the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act. The Spratt-Furse Provision of the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act had banned the U.S. government from research and development that could lead to the production of a new low-yield nuclear weapon. Representative John Spratt (D-SC), one of the authors of this provision, observed that thanks to his provision, which was introduced prior to the NPT Review and Extension Conference, U.S. efforts to persuade non-nuclear countries to give up the idea of possessing nuclear weapons have paid off and have made the indefinite extension of the NPT possible. In September 1991, then-President George H. W. Bush (senior) decided to withdraw land-based tactical nuclear weapons from overseas U.S. military bases, and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft. In a comment he made on this decision, Representative Spratt stated that reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the security policy of the United States was one of the objectives of his provision.

The FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act was a factor in broadly, if not basically, reorienting the security policy of the United States. The act did authorize research although it did not lift the restrictions on the development and production of low-yield nuclear weapons. It also contains provisions that repeal the Spratt-Furse provision, authorize appropriations for the Advanced
Concepts Initiative (funding for the research into low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons), and shorten test-readiness posture (the period from the date on which the president orders a nuclear test to the date on which the test is conducted) from twenty-four–thirty-six months to eighteen months. As Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declared, the primary objective of this decision was to pursue the technological feasibility of using nuclear weapons as combat weapons, not as a deterrent.

A report by the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Systems Technology for the Future U.S. Strategic Posture may provide an explanation of why this happened. This task force was established in November 2000 under the Clinton administration, and was charged with the responsibility for reviewing the likely nature and evolution of potential future strategic challenges to U.S. advanced technologies for nuclear weapons systems and non-nuclear weapons systems. An outline of this report is introduced in the October 22 issue of *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (*JDW*). It says the United States is wasting too many financial and human resources just to sustain Cold War-era nuclear weapons, an aging stockpile of declining relevance, by gradually replacing their parts. It further points out that the United States spends large sums of money on stockpiling nuclear weapons the strategic importance of which is declining. Thus the DSB report proposes a searching review of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship Program being carried out to maintain the reliability and safety of the stockpiled nuclear warheads. It also suggests that the United States should expedite the development of deep-penetrating nuclear weapons that are capable of destroying military facilities and weapons buried deep underground. The report further recommends that new nuclear arsenal offer enhanced nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapons and neutron bombs.

The proposals of the DSB are based on a realistic calculation of today’s security environment. Source entities of potential threat are highly likely to hide their WMD research and development facilities deep in the ground. The same may be said of bases of terrorist organizations. In order to destroy such facilities, U.S. forces must use weapons that can penetrate deep in the ground and destroy them. In such cases, the United States can demonstrate its will and capability and shake the resolve of its adversary by developing weapons that can inflict a crushing blow to the adversary without causing collateral damage.

However, a report released by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) on October 28, 2003—*Nuclear Weapon Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D,*
Advanced Concepts, Earth Penetration, Test Readiness—raised several questions about the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear weapons. It points out that since the weapon’s ability to penetrate the ground is limited, its ability to reduce collateral damage is also limited. It also points out that the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear weapons for destroying biological or chemical agents is uncertain because adversaries could counter earth-penetrators by burying their facilities deeper underground. Moreover, such nuclear weapons would have a ripple effect on the existing norms of nonproliferation. Even if such nuclear weapons are introduced as warheads for missile interceptors, as some suggest, it is debatable whether this will improve their effectiveness in intercepting ballistic missiles over missile interceptors equipped with conventional nuclear warheads. The report also indicates that even a system of low-yield nuclear weapons, if used to intercept incoming ballistic missiles, would throw a large amount of radioactive debris into the atmosphere over the United States.

The FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act attaches importance to research, but it does not authorize the deployment of such weapons systems. It is difficult to predict future developments, but as far as one can gather from the debate conducted in 2003, the act is focused on the acceleration of technological research. Whether or not the United States will actually develop a weapons system that could spark a moral debate remains to be seen.

3. Alliance with East Asia: “Regional Assets” in a World Strategy

(1) Changing Security Environment and Alliances
A series of documents—the INSS Special Report, The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership (also known as the Armitage-Nye Report) released in October 2000; the September 2001 QDR; and The National Security Strategy of the United States of America of September 2002—claimed that the strategic focal point of the United States lay in the Asia-Pacific region. However, until now, the Bush administration has not articulated its Asia-Pacific policy in a formal document. Some analysts observe that the announcement of an Asia-Pacific policy by the Bush administration has been delayed on account of its failure to reach an administration-wide consensus on policies toward North Korea and China. On his way to and from an APEC summit meeting held in October 2003, President Bush visited a
number of Asia-Pacific countries to discuss the North Korean issue, the war on terror, and a free trade agreement. A series of statements he made during his visits to these countries offers a clue to U.S. security policy toward the Asia-Pacific region.

The Bush administration’s security strategy outline is delineated in the column “Our Asia Strategy” in the October 24, 2003 issue of the Wall Street Journal, contributed by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. In her column, Rice explained that President Bush had sent a clear signal during his trip to the Asia-Pacific that: “Not only are we in Asia to stay, we are working with our allies and partners across the region to advance alliances, promote open trade and investment, and bolster the forces of democratic change and tolerance in ways that seemed unachievable only a few years ago.” Rice further stressed that the centerpiece of the president’s strategy is the United States’ strong forward presence and its commitment to its allies and that its presence and partnerships are the starting point for building a lasting framework for economic growth and cooperation. At the same time, she urged China to play a constructive and central role in the Asia-Pacific region by dealing with the North Korean issue and counter terrorism. Rice also referred to multilateralism in the region and said that underpinning U.S. security initiatives including those proposed at a APEC summit in October 2003 was a commitment to advancing U.S. prosperity through greater trade, investment, and economic cooperation across the region.

Since September 11, security cooperation between the United States and Asia-Pacific states has expanded in various forms. One factor that seems to be pressing the United States to achieve these goals is its awareness of the growing disparity among countries in the wake of globalization. According to this argument, many of the countries sponsoring terrorism and posing a threat to the security of their neighbors are those that have failed to reap the benefits of globalization. It is said that people in countries with undemocratic regimes suffer from widespread poverty and poor health, and that these societies may harbor terrorists. In terms of geographical distribution, many of the countries that have been left behind by globalization are located in the Caribbean, Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The security strategy of the United States is designed to engage militarily and economically with the issues facing these “borderline countries”—countries located between those left behind by globalization and those enjoying the
benefits of globalization—and to prevent them from falling into the former
category by supporting their security. It is said that Mexico, Brazil, South
Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Turkey, Thailand, Pakistan, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Indonesia come within this category. This classification is the
same as the “Arc of Instability” referred to in the September 2001 QDR, and
the list of countries accords with those mentioned as critical regions in the
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) drawn up in 1992 by Paul Wolfowitz, who
was then serving as under secretary of defense for policy in the George H. W.
Bush administration.

In dealing with this problem, the United States is taking a multilayered
approach that combines alliance, multilateral cooperation among the countries
of the region, and a coalition with these countries in such a way as to best solve
the given issue. This approach is aimed at working with existing allies and
traditional friends, transcending regional implications, in response to changes
occurring in the global security environment. In this context, the United States
attaches importance to its alliances with five countries in the region, namely
Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. At a U.S.-Japan
Security Consultative Committee (also known as Two Plus Two) meeting held
in December 2002, the two countries agreed on measures to be taken to prevent
the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles, on policies regarding the
problems of Iraq and North Korea, and on the role China should play for the
stability in the region. The common interest and views on these issues, both
agreed upon during the meeting, forms the framework of U.S.-Japan security
relations in 2003. During Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to
the United States in 2003, and President Bush’s Japan visit in the same year,
the two leaders confirmed that security cooperation between the two countries
had not merely regional but also global significance. It may be said that the
decision of the Japanese government to send the Self-Defense Forces to Iraq on
a humanitarian and reconstruction mission has greatly contributed to the
deepening of the security relationship between Japan and the United States.
Where U.S.-Australian relations are concerned, the United States expressed its
deep appreciation of the cooperation Australia had extended in the use of force
against Iraq and in the war on terror. When U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage visited Australia in August, he thanked Australia for its
“splendid support,” declared his support for the effort Australia had made to
stabilize the situation in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, and
spoke highly of Australia’s decision to have military-to-military ties with Indonesian special forces. Although some Australian lawmakers heckled President Bush during his speech, U.S.-Australia relations have been good on the whole.

Since September 11, the United States has been stepping up security cooperation with two “borderline countries” in Southeast Asia—the Philippines and Thailand. Pursuant to an agreement reached during a U.S.-Philippine summit meeting May 19, 2003, the United States declared its cooperation with the Philippines in its operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group. More specifically, it includes: counterterrorism equipment and training; development assistance to conflict areas; establishment of a combat engineering unit; military support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)-led operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group; support to the AFP’s mobility (twenty UH-1H helicopters); a comprehensive review of Philippine security needs and U.S. support for the AFP’s modernization and reform; and extension of “major non-NATO ally” status to the Philippines. At a meeting with Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra on October 19, President Bush told the prime minister that the United States was willing to grant “major non-NATO ally” status to Thailand. Both the Philippines and Thailand received the “major non-NATO ally” status on October 6 and December 30, respectively. It is also noteworthy that President Bush mentioned that Indonesia is a vital partner in the war on terror.

At a series of meetings on the “Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative,” the United States has been discussing with South Korea the possible rearrangement of the U.S. military commitment to South Korea. There has been much speculation about what the United States is really aiming at through this new initiative, which includes: appeasing anti-U.S. sentiment among South Koreans, which was sparked by an accident that killed two Korean teenage girls; a change in the role of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) as a “trip wire”; and a change in the posture of the USFK with an eye on the possibility of the
unification of the two Koreas. However, according to testimony given by Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command Gen. Leon J. LaPorte before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2003, the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative is designed to closely examine the roles, missions, capabilities, force structure, and the stationing of U.S. forces, and to explore the possibility of an alliance that has the right balance for the future. Furthermore, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz explained that in order to sustain a strong alliance over the long run, it was necessary to reduce unnecessary burdens on both sides. In a joint statement issued after a U.S.-South Korea summit meeting held in October, U.S. and South Korean leaders said that the relocation of U.S. forces in Korea would be pursued through careful consideration of the Korean Peninsula’s security environment. In response to a question asked by Yonhap News of South Korea in November, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stated that even if the United States fell short of troops in Iraq or the number of U.S. troops in South Korea was reduced as a result of relocation, the United States would continue to maintain its alliance with South Korea and strengthen it by introducing more powerful and sophisticated military equipment. The United States may possibly be reviewing its alliance with South Korea and considering whether to pull out or reduce its troops in South Korea, but it does not appear to be planning to weaken its commitment to the alliance.

(2) Forward Deployment within the Framework of Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Region

The United States is inclined to build multilateral cooperative relationships in the Asia-Pacific region. Institution-building in the Asia-Pacific has a long record of disappointment. Therefore, the U.S. effort in formalizing the cooperative framework is an issue-based approach with emphasis on the minimum common denominator among countries in the region.

As noted earlier, in the case of the North Korea, the United States is seeking to solve the problem through multilateral cooperation. The United States calls for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear program. The United States is aware of the risks associated with employing a unilateral approach on this issue, so it has been seeking a diplomatic solution involving the countries concerned. High-ranking officials repeatedly stress the feasibility of this approach. When Secretary of State
Powell visited Asian countries in February 2003, he stressed the importance of the multilateral approach to the problem of North Korea. Also, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, often labeled as hardliner in the Bush administration, said in May that the North Korean problem should be addressed on a multilateral basis. Not only did he confirm this approach at the six-party talks that discussed the North Korean problem but also the United States, Japan, and South Korea have confirmed it as their common approach at the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). Russia and China also showed some interest in the issue of dismantling the North Korean nuclear program, while emphasizing a peaceful resolution. Backed up by a multilateral consensus for a peaceful resolution to the issue, the United States indicated a willingness to give written assurance of its nonaggressive intentions toward North Korea. However, the United States is not moving forward to bring this issue before the UNSC. This is perhaps due largely to the consideration that putting the North Korean nuclear development issue on the international agenda might not have positive consequences at this time, given the expected opposition of China to discussing it at the UNSC.

In 2003, multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region in the war on terror has advanced. For instance, the United States asked countries in the region to join the Container Security Initiative (CSI). The initiative, which was announced in January 2003, consists of four elements: (a) establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers; (b) prescreening containers before they arrive at U.S. ports; (c) using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers; and (d) developing and using smart and secure containers. In general, countries in the Asia-Pacific responded favorably. Malaysia and China declared their participation in the CSI in January and July 2003, respectively. In March, Japan initiated a test run of the CSI mechanism at the port of Yokohama, and conducted subsequent tests at the other CSI ports in Japan—Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe. The CSI was also put into operation in Singapore in March, and in Hong Kong in May. In August, a CSI office was opened in Busan, South Korea.

Other examples of enhanced security cooperation in the war on terror include: the establishment of the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-terrorism in Kuala Lumpur by ASEAN; and the U.S. Pacific Command’s establishment of a permanent Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter Terrorism in Hawaii. These cooperative relations have led to the adoption of “enhancing human security” as an objective in a statement of the
APEC summit meeting held in Bangkok. Thus, U.S. involvement in multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, though not predominant during the Clinton administration, has been greatly enhanced under the Bush administration, based on common interests in the region.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military transformation is adding another element to the policy calculus involving alliances and multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Concerned about a possible U.S. withdrawal from the region, Asia-Pacific countries are closely watching the development of the military transformation and its implications for the alliances. The United States has begun to discuss with South Korea the relocation of U.S. forces at “Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative” meetings. Japan is not indifferent to developments in the Korean peninsula, since the increasing likelihood of a relocation of USFK bases may influence the situation concerning U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa. Some argue that the military posture of the United States in Japan might change as a result of military transformation. However, the proposed relocation of U.S. forces in Korea should be viewed in the context of the capability-based security policy pursued by the Bush administration. Therefore, a change in the military posture does not necessarily mean a hollowing-out of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said on November 18, 2003 that the idea of measuring capability by counting numbers was a twentieth century concept, and that what was critical was not quantity but capability. Secretary of State Powell also stressed in Brussels in December that a relocation of U.S. forces did not change the level of U.S. engagement.

The network of U.S. alliances forms the basic core of U.S. world strategy. In the Asia-Pacific, particularly, U.S. relations with the five allied countries in the region constitute the foundation of U.S. security strategy there. On the other hand, military action taken in Afghanistan and the use of force against Iraq have highlighted the critical importance of the role played by a “coalition of the willing,” which forms on an issue-by-issue basis and complements existing alliance networks.

Military transformation affects not only U.S. military capabilities themselves but also U.S. forward-deployment strategy and its relations with its allies. In a speech given at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on December 3, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith stated that transformation was designed not just to improve the performance of weapons by introducing new technology, but a broader concept that aimed at
reorganizing the United States’ worldwide defense posture by updating the type, location, number, and capability of the U.S. military forces, and the nature of its alliances. According to him, the United States has transformed its relationship with Russia, is transforming NATO, has deepened alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, and is transforming U.S. military capabilities. After accomplishing these objectives, he said, the United States would transform its global posture in tune with the changing security environment of the twenty-first century. He also stated that it was necessary to make possible the rapid deployment of U.S. forces to the relevant areas as events require, because, unlike in the Cold War era, these forces were unlikely to fight where they were based. Therefore, reviewing the role of existing alliances and the building new alliances and cooperative relationships will be critical.

One of the major goals of the military transformation is to enable the United States to deploy forces anywhere in the world within seventy-two hours. Critical to this is that its forward-deployed forces are able to operate flexibly. This may lead to a sweeping change in the function of U.S. forces stationed overseas. It is true that if the present U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are a guide to the future, then reconfiguration of military bases may be a reasonable option, thereby reducing the political cost associated with forward stationing and representing a better investment in future combat capabilities.

The North Atlantic Council was held in December 2003 and NATO defense ministers discussed how they should carry on defense cooperation within NATO with an eye on the progress of military transformation in the United States. At that meeting, the defense ministers discussed the NATO Response Force, the streamlining of the Alliance’s command structure, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high-threat environment, NATO’s efforts to improve capabilities through the PCC, efforts by the European Union (EU) to enhance European capabilities through the European Capabilities Action Plan, and research into the missile defense system. A new form of defense cooperation would require countries concerned to deal with new threats concurrently with their respective territorial defense. However, United States and its allies differ over the way they perceive such an alliance and what they expect from it. The United States views the forward deployment strategy as part of its global security policy, while U.S. allies see it from the perspective of their own national security and regard it as an arrangement that should contribute to
that security. This divergence of views shows up particularly in Japan. In adjusting to these different perceptions, the United States should establish cooperative alliances that suit its new missions without lowering the level of its involvement in the security of the region.

At present, in addition to more than 100,000 troops deployed in Iraq, the United States has more than 200,000 troops deployed around the world, and has 20,000 troops on standby at sea. It maintains extensive military installations in key region including the Asia-Pacific. U.S. forces conduct more than 170 military exercises a year with other countries. The United States has to come up with a logic that can justify such extensive involvement in security cooperation with the rest of the world, despite changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. When the Clinton administration was in power, the “rogue states” offered a reason to justify its involvement. However, as is often pointed out, given the overwhelming U.S. military dominance and the level of threat these rogue states pose to the United States, the necessity of maintaining this level of military posture against rogues states has been questioned. It was feared that by diverting so many military and economic resources to dealing with these states, the United States might not have enough resources left to deal with the rise of a true competitor capable of challenging its leadership in the world. Taking this further, the argument goes that it is hardly reasonable to devote so much time and resources to negotiation with host countries at such high political and economic cost, only to maintain the existing engagement policy.

On the other hand, the forward deployment strategy has generated great benefit to the security policy of the United States. By establishing a permanent base in a potential conflict zone, the United States can demonstrate to surrounding countries its commitment to the security of the region. This implies that, in times of peace, the United States develops close political ties with the ally that hosts the base, and with surrounding countries. The U.S. military presence will work as deterrent. Forward-deployed forces can deal with a conflict in the area they are stationed in more cost-effectively and quickly than those sent over long distances. Take a conflict occurring in the East Asian region, for instance. Deploying troops from bases in Japan and South Korea would be much quicker than deploying troops from Guam, Saipan, and Hawaii. Furthermore, the United States views its relations with the Asia-Pacific as critical to its economic prosperity—more so given, in part, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. Needless to say, the United States stands to reap certain benefits from getting involved in the affairs of
the Asia-Pacific regardless of the change that may occur in its military posture under the forward deployment strategy.

It appears that the focal point of U.S. security policy for the Asia-Pacific region is shifting from the defense of its allies and traditional friends to accelerating the economic prosperity of the region. Under these circumstances, interest in removing elements that hinder economic growth—terrorism, smuggling, and environmental problems—is mounting. Therefore, better predicting what problems might threaten the security of the region has taken on a growing importance in U.S. security policy. For instance, if the behavior of North Korea is predictable, the United States is highly unlikely to resort to a “surgical” solution. The idea of China as a threat, much trumpeted in the second half of the 1990s, has faded away in the second half the Bush administration’s term so far, probably because the behavior of China has become highly predictable: China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and showed that it respected the norms of conduct of the various arms control regimes. However, the United States is also interested in maintaining the flexibility of its own conduct along with the predictability of the security environment. Flexibility of conduct is at the root of U.S. strategy and is the basis for its external behavior that has been sarcastically called “unilateralism.” In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is likely to call on its allies and friends to guarantee the flexibility of its conduct. As Under Secretary of Defense Feith remarked, the United States is asking its allies and friends to form a strategic footprint, while they are pressed to come up with a reason to justify it.