Chapter 7

U.S. Security Policy for East Asia
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a watershed in the security policy of the Bush administration. The shift of which is generally described by a wide range of media as a departure from unilateralist foreign policy toward putting more emphasis on multilateralism. Prior to September 11, there was clear indication that, in comparison to the Clinton administration, the Bush administration was reluctant to forge a policy scheme based on multilateral cooperation. In fact, however, the Clinton administration paved the way for the Bush change of course in foreign policy. Particularly, Bush declared the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, showed a negative attitude toward negotiations on the Protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention or the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, a marked reluctance toward ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). The apparent inclination toward the unilateralist stance is often explained as “national interest”-based foreign policy. But since the terrorist attacks, the administration has been active in dialogue with various countries to secure their cooperation and support for U.S. military action, and has successfully secured the cooperation of other countries in multilateral organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

The eradication of terrorism is certainly an important policy objective, and along with the quiet acceleration of terror through the threat of use of organisms and toxins within the United States, it is inevitable that public attention will focus on “homeland defense.” But substantive structural change in the world, at least from the standpoint of U.S. policy on security in Asia, has not occurred since the events of September 11, nor have the various security problems facing East Asia been removed from the scene. Once issues related to the recent terrorist events settle down and attention returns to the issue of security in East Asia, we must look back on the events of 2001 and consider what kinds of conflicts will occur, how the events of September 11 and the post-September 11 global condition will transform traditional issues, and what factors are influencing the Bush administration’s promotion of a security policy review.
1. Resurgence of Unilateralism

(1) From Clinton to Bush

There were predictions from Bush’s campaign speeches alone that his administration’s policy would be criticized as “unilateralist.” He criticized the Clinton administration, stressing that in an environment where the loss of “physical” security and U.S. interest is anticipated, it does not seem rational to observe multinational agreements that do not directly contribute to U.S. security and interest. While Clinton carefully avoided making concrete decisions and promoted unilateralist policies with nuance fashion, Bush explicitly showed his disregard for multilateralism. For example, the Clinton administration was aware of the opposition from industry to the Kyoto Protocol on global warning when signing. Therefore, the Clinton administration carefully managed the process of ratification and entrusted the decision to the Bush administration, which explicitly stated their opposition to the protocol. As predicted, the Bush administration rejected to send the protocol to the Senate for ratification thereby provoking a controversy that the previous administration did not want to face. The Clinton administration also avoided making a decision on the deployment of a missile defense system, which was also a source of political controversy in the United States.

George W. Bush came into office inheriting important but unresolved issues from the previous administration. Without mature experience in foreign and security policy, Bush assumed office assigning foreign and security policy experts from the former Bush administration for advice and management. In the early days of his administration, those experienced experts were reported as having an inner debate regarding the direction and tone of the new administration. According to media reports, the security hardliners such as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had a large influence over security policy decisions, causing friction in the administration. Widely known disagreements between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Sec-
retary of State Colin Powell were part of the initial adjustment to coherent and unified foreign and security policy making. These debates subsided with the growing influence of Powell over foreign and security policies. In addition, due to a change in the Senate’s partisan configuration, the Republicans lost their majority in the Senate, which led to the replacement of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms with Joseph Biden. In many respects, the unilateralist tone of the initial phase has receded to a moderate one as things developed within the administration as well as in the Congress.

The political debate regarding the direction of foreign and security policy is nothing unique or original for the incoming administration. In fact, the testimony of Assistant Secretary James A. Kelly to the House Committee on International Relations suggests similarities and continuity between Bush’s security policies and those of the Clinton administration. It is true, however, that the Bush administration explicitly rather than implicitly views China as a competitor. Reflecting the mood in Washington, they emphasize the inspections of nuclear weapons programs of North Korea under the U.S.-North Korea Framework Agreement, and they continue attempts to sway China’s opposition to the missile defense problem. Those policies and tone fall short of being labeled as unilateralist foreign and security policy. However, the world has witnessed and felt the undercurrents of unilateralist thinking in the United States through the initial policy forming of the Bush administration, thus leaving other countries with a persistent impression that the administration is leaning toward unilateralism.

(2) The Impact of Unilateralism

Among the countries affected by the unilateralist stance of the Bush administration, South Korea had the most impact in the Asia-Pacific region. South Korean worries on the continuation of the engagement policy (Sunshine Policy) toward North Korea were a reasonable reaction since the apparent change of gear in the U.S. policy on North Korea. As the United States increasingly took a hard line on the mis-
sile and inspection issues with North Korea, South Korea was concerned that it might have to rethink this policy to ease the tensions in the peninsula through dialogue and exchanges. Its concern was reinforced by the fact that the United States declared that it was going to reconsider its policy on North Korea. However, the Bush administration did not largely deviate from the Perry initiative adopted by the Clinton administration except for slight emphasis added on the conventional force posture, missile development and human rights conditions in North Korea. With their provocative wording on issues on the peninsula, the Bush administration gave the impression that they would somewhat retreat from the Clinton administration’s stance of appeasement and would take a more concrete approach toward North Korea. When South Korean President Kim Dae Jung visited the United States in March 2001, Bush announced that North Korea was a threat and stressed top-level discussions with North Korea would be conducted only after their observance of the U.S.-North Korea Framework Agreement had been verified through inspections. The United States reviewed its North Korea policy prior to the May 2001 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group’s meeting and presented its conclusions to Japan and South Korea.

Countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were also concerned about a possible disengagement of the United States from European issues. The concern was reinforced by an interview with then Stanford University Professor Condoleezza Rice (currently national security adviser to the president) during the campaign, which referred to a possible U.S. withdrawal from the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. NATO countries were also uncomfortable with Bush’s positive stance toward the introduction of a missile defense system, arguing that the result of which would inevitably weaken the extended deterrence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella as well as lead to an expected negative reaction from Russia: offsetting its strategic vulnerability by increasing its strategic forces. At a news conference following the North Atlantic Council of foreign ministers in February
2001, Powell stated, “We are committed to ensuring that as we review our force posture in the Balkans, we do so in full consultation with our NATO allies.” He also emphasized the importance of consultation with allied countries upon promoting the missile defense (MD) program, including employing technologies and systems.

Either in response to the Bush administration’s early unilateralist position or based on their respective internal political demands, Russia and China strengthened their strategic relations. In March 2002, Russia made a declaration that it would build “strategic partnerships” with China and Vietnam, reaffirming its view that the MD system of the United States would pose a “main source of threat to world peace and stability.” Furthermore, China and Russia, along with the countries of Central Asia, announced the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on June 14, 2001, in Shanghai. China and Russia also signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation in Moscow on July 16, 2001.

Consequently, the dynamism among the great powers on the Eurasian continent has been on the move. Cooperation between China and Russia was resurrected out of their shared concern about the MD system and opposition to their self-defined U.S. “hegemonism.” Largely affected by the second expansion of NATO, the establishment of the strategic partnership between Russia and China is based more on a temporarily strategic calculation rather than lasting friendship. The bilateral tension originated in the history of two great nations is hardly reconcilable in a short period of time. The functional partnership is already shaken by Russia’s changing strategic calculation regarding MD. As long as Russia remains opposed to MD and aligned with China, it enjoys no room for compromise with the United States and would be structurally forced to take a fixed position of continuing to stress its opposition to ABM treaty revisions or withdrawal. Such a stance will tie the hands of Russia when it initiates research on the necessity of MD with NATO members. Furthermore, the opposition to the MD system with China would force them to reject the proposal
of the United States, which states the correction of the “offense” and "defense" balance of the strategic nuclear forces makes possible the reduction of deployable nuclear forces. The proposal has great merit for Russia, which suffers a heavy burden from the maintenance and development of its nuclear forces. However, the strategic partnership with China enmeshes Russia in a politically painful position. The United States enjoys wide room for political maneuvering under this situation. It is able to politically forge a divide in the China-Russia strategic partnership by forcing Russia to compromise in ABM Treaty negotiations and offering primarily financial benefits, or take unilateral action to improve U.S.-China relations despite China-Russia opposition. Following Bush’s December 2001 announcement that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty, China, Russia and India reportedly held a teleconference to discuss the matter. It shows that the United States has many cards to play in the great power dynamism in Eurasia, and the rest of the players are merely reacting to it.

(3) “Unilateral” International Cooperation

The “national interest”-based approach toward foreign and security policy does not necessarily mean departure from multilateralism or a return to isolationism. Rather, the United States does not deny the functional utility of the multilateral organizations, but exploits them according to its own interest. For example, the United States encouraged the United Nations to endeavor to curtail the illicit transfer of small arms. The countries agreed upon a Program of Action concerning items such as the prohibition of illegal trafficking in small arms at the July 9-20, 2001, United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in New York. The United States did participate and cooperated actively in this conference, although the final agreement did not include the prohibitions on the domestic possession of small arms, reflecting the domestic opposition from the gun lobby in the United States. This was because of the U.S. refusal to compromise on this matter. Many nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGO) were critical of this point. However, the general conference was assumed to be successful with countries reaching agreement on regulating arms brokers, strengthening punishments based on each country’s export control provisions, and restricting the illegal capital sources such as “Conflict Diamonds.” These provisions synchronized with the U.S. interest, which had been promoted since before the conference. The United States viewed the matter related to small arms proliferation as an issue that had been long overdue while unilateral enforcement of these regulations bears no significant result and multilateral cooperation is desperately needed.

The United States also values the role of the United Nations in dealing with and resolving regional disputes throughout the world, such as those in Africa. The United States showed its respect for the United Nations by taking an active part in the General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS held from June 25-27, 2001, as well as its continued effort to combat infectious diseases. One notable feature of the U.S. cooperation with the United Nations is its decision to pay its financial share to the world body, which was withheld for years. Although the decision was made on condition that institutional reform of the United Nations is carried out, it is a remarkable development compared to the Clinton years when Senator Helms and the Republican Congress was vocally critical of U.N.-led programs and activities. Even Helms, who is known to have isolationist tendencies, accepted an invitation from Richard C. Holbrooke, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and delivered a historical address in which he announced, “The American people want the United Nations to serve the purpose for which it was designed” and argued for the necessity of U.N. reform. The sea change in the United States attitude toward the United Nations was quickly captured by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and he responded with initiatives, including revisions of budgetary allocation ratios among the member countries and a reconsideration of U.N. activities. The revision of U.N. activities regarding peacekeeping operations (PKO) is thought to be a prelude to the com-
Table 7-1. Key Multilateral Joint Exercises in Which the United States Participated in the Asia-Pacific Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maneuver Name</th>
<th>Maneuver Dates</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Observers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC 2000</td>
<td>May 30-July 5, 2000</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, Chile, Britain, Japan, South Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACIFIC REACH 2000</td>
<td>Oct. 2-14, 2000</td>
<td>Singapore, Japan, South Korea</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Indonesia, Britain, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEAM CHALLENGE 2001</td>
<td>TANDEM THRUST</td>
<td>Australia, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEAM CHALLENGE 2001</td>
<td>COBRA GOLD</td>
<td>Thailand, Singapore</td>
<td>Australia, South Korea, France, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Mongolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALIKATAN</td>
<td>Apr. 27-May 10, 2001</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific Minesweeping Exercise</td>
<td>June 11-22, 2001</td>
<td>Singapore, Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, Canada, China, France, India, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled based on the U.S. Department of Defense Web site and various news reports.


The Bush administration thought highly of the U.N. initiative for reform and called for Congress to submit delinquent U.N. payments. However, Congress has estimated the appropriate annual share for the United States in the total PKO budget allocations should be at a maximum of 25 percent. Therefore, they were not totally satisfied with the U.N. financial reform of the PKO budget allocation ratio, which set an incremental reduction of the United States share at 28.14 percent.
by January 2001, 27.6 percent by July 2001 and 26.5 percent by July 2003. Thus, the issue will not be resolved so easily even if the Bush administration strongly supports the U.N. plan.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the Bush administration does not overuse multilateral institutions; in fact, it is selective. For example, Avis Bohlen, assistant secretary of state for arms control, attended the U.N. Conference on Disarmament on October 15, 2001, and announced that the U.S. Department of Defense’s position refusing to ratify the Biological Weapons Convention remains unchanged after the events of September 11. As a natural reaction to the U.S. unilateralist approach, these policies provoked a negative reaction from U.N. member nations. At an election held at the May 2001 Commission on Human Rights, the United States lost its seat for the first time since the commission was established in 1947. Part of this result is due to the U.S.’s belated appointment and confirmation of Ambassador to Honduras John Negroponte as the U.N. ambassador to succeed Holbrooke, who resigned in January 2001. The longevity of the vacancy, which took until September 13, 2001 to fill, gave an indication to the world that the new administration has a passive attitude toward the United Nations, and it caused frustration among the member countries.

However, there is a clear contrast in the Bush administration’s attitude toward multilateral institutions compared to security cooperation with allied countries. The United States has enhanced its emphasis on joint operations and security cooperation since Bush came into office. As specified in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR: Second edition, following first edition in 1997. 1997 and 2001 editions are hereinafter referred to as QDR97 and QDR01, respectively), the U.S. military is working to promote joint operational capabilities with allies and friendly nations through peacetime joint exercises, and also to develop interoperability among their militaries, aiming to work effectively in times of emergency. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States maintains allied partnerships with Japan, South Korea and Australia (within the framework of the Security Treaty between Australia,
New Zealand and the United States). It maintains close security cooperation with the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The U.S. Pacific Fleet is promoting joint exercises and other activities with each country based on these alliances and security partnerships. The United States seems to be interested in building a framework for security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, as can be inferred from Powell’s speech at a meeting with Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in Australia in August 2001. Although the content of the speech was not necessarily well received by allied countries, the essence of the speech, the call for the establishment of an organization similar to NATO in the Asia-Pacific region, is worth considering.

It is undeniable that paramount criticism exists in the region of the assumption of a seemingly unilateralist style of U.S. cooperation based on its national interest, a form of multilateralism in some sense. The critics of the Bush administration cynically argue that the U.S. stance toward international cooperation is a minimalist approach, engaging in a limited amount of cooperation based on its own benefit. In fact, during the 2000 presidential campaign, Bush often used the phrase “a distinctly American internationalism” to describe his stance on foreign and security policy. Some describe this stance on international problems as “a la carte internationalism,” whereby the United States takes the initiative to solicit cooperation from allies only where it deems necessary, and in exchange tends to those allies’ interests and security needs. This approach is apparent in the Bush administration’s emphasis on a Japan-U.S.-South Korea policy cooperation framework for dealing with North Korea, and is clearly reflected in U.S. attempts to garner international support for its actions following the September 11 terrorist attacks.
2. Offense/Defense Balance: Arms Control and Asia

(1) Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty

The Bush administration made a bold step forward in arms control issues especially on MD and the ABM Treaty. A major concern of the administration’s security policy was the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The fact that the Cold War era threat of nuclear war receded as the Soviet Union was dismantled and reborn into democratic Russia changed the strategic concern of the United States from major nuclear war to asymmetrical threat from “rogue” states with WMD or terrorist organizations. This meant that a transformation of security policy was desperately needed. Therefore, the United States planned to make full use of its military and economic superiority as well as the current “relative peace” to develop a security policy for future generations. While the events of September 11 posed questions as to whether today’s condition is one of “relative peace,” they also demonstrated that concern over the danger of asymmetrical threats is completely accurate.

The Bush team insisted on more active promotion of the MD program during the campaign, and is pursuing its policy after assuming office. It should be noted that the Bush administration merged the National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs, and named the new entity “Missile Defense,” that is MD, since the distinction was somewhat based on political considerations. Merging the separate programs indicated that it would withdraw from the ABM Treaty, or at least saw the possibility of persuading Russia to revise the treaty. Bush says that his administration is considering various types of MD systems but has not yet chosen one, instead repeatedly declaring that research and development will continue. The MD program of the United States is considering the interception of missiles at three segments – the Terminal Defense Segment, Midcourse Defense Segment and Boost Defense Segment – and developing sensors to detect missiles at each segment. Since a massive
amount of cost is projected for MD development and deployment, the United States is expecting cooperation on technologies from allies and friendly nations to reduce the cost. In addition, the United States aims to jointly conduct information gathering, which is at the heart of the system, with countries sharing a common concern for the proliferation of WMD. Such cooperative development of the MD system is crucial to mitigate the criticism of “Fortress America.” The integration of the NMD (focused on homeland defense) and TMD (defense of allies and friendly countries as well as U.S. forces deployed abroad) partly contributed to this mitigation.

The essential factor to the deployment of the MD system was the consent of NATO countries, since they explicitly stated their concern about being put in strategically vulnerable positions. The United States strived on a number of occasions to persuade NATO nations of the importance of MD and allay their concerns. For example, in May 2001, a special mission headed by Wolfowitz was dispatched to Europe, and Powell explained the U.S. policy to the North Atlantic Council of foreign ministers. At the same meeting, France and Germany opposed the U.S. program and the council failed to make a joint declaration to define missile attacks as the common threat. Facing opposition from some countries in Europe and Russia, and especially after Bush’s visit to Europe and the U.S.-Russia summit, Powell subsequently toned down his stance concerning the ABM Treaty. He stated that judging from the pace of research and development, the United States needs a few more years for research before reaching a point where it would become irreconcilable with the ABM Treaty. Powell pledged that the United States would not rashly withdraw from the ABM Treaty before it became necessary to do so. However, the terrorist attacks changed the assumption regarding the MD system, and after a temporarily halt in the negotiations, Bush announced that the United States had officially notified Russia of its intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on December 13, 2001. It should be noted that the terrorist attacks discounted Russia’s contention of the unlikelihood of such attacks.
The ABM Treaty was concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972 and later revised. It contains a provision saying that it is possible for either party to withdraw from the treaty six months after notification. As a part of reconsideration of Cold War era strategic policy, the Bush administration engaged in negotiations with Russia to reorganize the bilateral relationship, arguing that the strategic environment had significantly changed after the Cold War, assuming a pre-emptive nuclear strike from Russia is no longer likely. Therefore, the Bush administration pursued either nullification of the ABM Treaty with Russia or negotiations to revise the treaty to enable the MD program. These negotiations have become the prime focus of the security policy of the Bush administration. Although the bipartisan agreement never came to be, the U.S. Congress did exert some pressure on Russia, which functioned as a negotiation tactic for the administration. For example, the Congress initially deleted the budget request of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) based on the Nunn-Luger Amendment for fiscal year 2002. The CTR budget was dropped in part due to concerns that the fund may enable Russia to secure funding for renewed development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and military modernization plans, instead of the original purpose of the program. However, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations decided November 14, 2001, to re-establish the CTR funding in the budget proposal for the disposal of Russian nuclear arms.

The U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty affected China, though it was not a signatory of the treaty. Chinese concern over the MD program comes from strategic as well political concerns. If a truly effective missile defense system, was introduced in the U.S. homeland and to the Asia-Pacific region, China considered it would neutralize their second-strike capability, thus forcing it to accept an inferior strategic position. China also was concerned that the possible introduction of the MD system to Taiwan would encourage it to declare independence. Lacking the legitimacy to engage in negotiations with the United States, China was left out of the process and had to face the
reality emerging from U.S.-Russia negotiations on the ABM Treaty. While China and Russia established a strategic partnership, China’s destiny was in the hands of Russia, which might have a chance to compromise with the United States. Unfortunately for China, Russia did reach an agreement with the United States and China’s options have been limited to either developing its own missile defenses or maintaining offensive weapons that exceed the capabilities of the U.S. MD system. This intricate strategic position of China is reflected in the reports that the United States accepted an increase in the strategic nuclear weapons of China. Although the factual accuracy of the report is less than trustworthy, it shows how China is being pushed into a corner. It also shows how the United States is delicately crafting its policy toward relations with Beijing.

A comprehensive review of nuclear strategy including the MD system (which was advanced for the nominal purpose of correcting the balance between “offense” and “defense”) was taken up on the agenda of the U.S.-Russia summit at the G-8 Genoa Summit and at subsequent talks between the two countries. Finally, at the November 2001 U.S.-Russia summit, President Bush announced that the United States would make a unilateral reduction of deployable strategic nuclear warheads. At a post-summit news conference, Bush announced that the United States would reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 1,700-2,200 during the subsequent 10 years. In response, President Putin announced that as long as the two countries conclude a reliable and verifiable agreement, Russia would “try to respond in kind.” In a rebuttal to Bush’s address of December 13, 2001, Putin called for both parties to reduce warheads by 1,500-2,200, effectively expressing his tacit consent for U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty while calling for cooperation with the United States in the area of nuclear arms control.

This approach was somewhat unique in the history of nuclear arms control, since Bush did not refer to official verification measures. More often, arms reductions in the absence of verification measures and a
legally-binding framework can easily lead to an inducement of subsequent military expansion. Therefore, it was natural for Bush to face domestic opposition to the proposed unilateral armaments reduction. For example, Sen. Biden argued that mutual arms reduction in the absence of a treaty amounts to nothing more than a “handshake,” and that the United States would lose its ability to estimate Russia’s strategic armament situation. After several discussions between the United States and Russia following the November U.S.-Russia summit and the December announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, both countries agreed to the importance of creating a framework to officially consolidate a new strategic relationship (the United States moderately so, and Russia more clearly so), foreboding the emergence of a new post-ABM Treaty arms control framework.

The “Nuclear Posture Review” submitted to Congress in December 2001 outlines the result of the review. Its summary of the content was released to the public in 2002. As expected, and as was the case in the previous QDR and “Nuclear Posture Review” publications, the document contained no reference to changes in the three-pillar system of nuclear strategy, which is ICBM, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and strategic bombers. However, according to the summary, the nuclear triad was supplemented by conventional forces and missile defense, so that nuclear weapons become part of the security system, not the dominant asset in its strategy.

(2) “Homeland Defense” and Nonproliferation Policy

The nature of the nonproliferation policy changed dramatically after the Cold War, and Bush’s security policy is constructed on a premise different from that of the Cold War. During the Cold War era, the nonproliferation policy was aimed at maintaining the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, with growing proliferation of WMD technologies assisted by the globalization and spread of market economy around the world, its policy can no longer maintain the assumption that sophisticated technologies are
controlled by like-minded states. Therefore, the scopes and means of the policy have greatly altered the strategic situation in the world. The Bush administration newly classified weapons containing any of five devices – chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or enhanced high explosives – as CBRNE weapons, and emphasized the necessity of keeping these weapons out of the hands of terrorist organizations. There was also consensus in the international community that the importance of counterproliferation policies and defense against proliferated WMD is crucial to the peace and stability of the international order.

There are two facets to security policy for dealing with a world where proliferation has taken place: the determination of hostile powers, and military response to those powers. QDR01 set forth the former in its reference to a “beyond post-Cold War” era, where no clear enemies threaten the United States, but rather entities exist that influence U.S. interest through the use of hostile military power. In responding to the military potential of the aggressive actors, the United States must retain its superiority in its military operations. In addition, the United States must possess the ability to respond to asymmetrical threats like terrorist and other organizations with destructive capabilities. Therefore, upon countering the unspecified target with unknown capabilities, the United States should not solely focus on the hostile intention of the actors, but focus on their “capabilities.” And the latter elements give credibility to the theory of “homeland defense.” Originally, it gained notoriety when *U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*, the final report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission), was published February 15, 2001. However, its significance was refocused particularly after the events of September 11.

On September 20, 2001, Bush announced the establishment of the “Office of Homeland Security” in the White House. The purpose and the mission of the Office was to coordinate and direct the policies of all related organizations and local governments based on a comprehensive defense strategy. The main objective of this policy was to re-
Homeland Defense

The 1997 edition of the QDR predicted that by the year 2015, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons may have proliferated, and that organizations who have a hostile attitude toward the United States may use asymmetrical means to attack U.S. territory. The National Defense Committee that performed the QDR study notes that the importance of homeland defense will grow since the potential means of attacking U.S. territory between 2010 and 2020 include the use of strategic nuclear weapons, terrorism, information warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, and attacks on key infrastructure. The committee proposed that the United States should focus on the development of missile defense, utilize the military reserve forces and Department of Defense resources to combat terrorism, and defend against future use of WMD.

The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century was established to address security issues from a more long-term perspective with a comprehensive standpoint. The commission was scheduled to submit three reports. In its first issue, in November 1999, it predicted the proliferation of WMD among groups, including non-state actors, would further endanger the U.S. homeland and that increasing backlash against U.S. policy could lead to the use of WMD within the United States. And in its final report, which was published in January 2001, it made suggestions in three specific areas to secure the U.S. homeland: First, a multi-tiered homeland security strategy based on prevention, defense and response; second, the establishment of an Office of Homeland Security and the reorganization of government bodies related to national security, supposed to include the National Intelligence Council for its analysis on threats to the homeland; and third, cooperation between the administration and legislature toward the enactment of policies.

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush announced a state of emergency on September 14, 2001, called up the reserve forces and strengthened domestic security. He further announced October 8 the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security in the White House and the formation of a Homeland Security Council within the National Security Council. The Department of Defense appointed Army Secretary Thomas White as homeland security chief October 2, and on October 26, assigned responsibility for air and sea homeland defense to the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) for the purpose of creating a system that can quickly and effectively respond to requests for assistance.
cover from damage caused by the terrorist attacks, and confront and prevent the continued threat of attack to the U.S. homeland. Bush appointed Tom Ridge, former governor of Pennsylvania, as this office's first director, showing that domestic vulnerability had become a keen concern for the administration. In fact, homeland defense will continue to be necessary, since the Bush administration decided to increase the number of nuclear power plants, whose construction had been frozen after the Three Mile Island accident, in order to decrease emissions of carbon dioxide. The decision was part of the counterproposal to withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol. The terrorist attacks may divert attention from the negative aspects of power plants to their vulnerability, especially to suicide attacks.

However, the real utility of the Office of Homeland Security in dealing with assumed danger is unknown. Even if we discount the infancy of the organization, the organizational complexity has been pointed out as a problem. The Office of Homeland Security solicited the cooperation of various governmental organizations, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Guard Forces and the Customs Service, while each of the organizations retains its own legal oversight. Likewise, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are expected to play a significant role in homeland defense, but they too are still under the authority of the Department of Justice, the White House and the Department of Health and Human Services, respectively. Without direct administrative authority over those institutions, the projected utility of the Office of Homeland Security seems to be limited. The ability of the Homeland Security Council (which exercises command authority over the Office of Homeland Security) to coordinate the activities of these various organizations will determine its effectiveness, but the scope of the role of this organization is undetermined.

Besides identifying the hostile powers and making a military response to such threats with regards to the issue of proliferation of
weapons, including WMD, the Bush administration is making an active commitment to nonproliferation policy. The U.S. emphasis on the nonproliferation policy is inherited from the Clinton administration, which repeatedly stressed its importance. However, Bush made a renewed commitment to a policy that diverges widely from its predecessors. For example, newly appointed Undersecretary of State John Bolton announced at a March 29, 2001, Senate hearing that “I personally consider that sound, verifiable arms control agreements and energetic nonproliferation strategies can and should be critical elements of American foreign policy.” Judging from his statement, the nonproliferation policy of the Bush administration would not be based on treaties and international consensus, thus taking a different approach from that of the Clinton administration.

The nonproliferation policy of the United States would lose its effectiveness if international coordination among the countries capable of producing and exporting weapons and technologies is not established. Furthermore, a lack of coordination between the countries will make the prevention of proliferation difficult and ultimately escalate military tension in various regions of the world. But the issue of arms transfer has grown complicated by the lack of established means for hindering the “freedom” of countries that do not share security interests with the United States. The matter has become more controversial since the United States maintains a negative attitude toward being bound to multilateralism and international treaties. In reconsidering its nonproliferation policy, then, the United States is mainly focusing on ensuring the effectiveness of exerting direct pressure via bilateral talks on countries that export goods such as missiles and CBRNE-related items as a means of halting such activity.

(3) The Response from East Asian Countries

Russia, China and North Korea are the countries of main concern for their proliferation activities in Asia. There are two discernable aspects on this issue: the importation of arms into these countries from
external sources, and weapons and related technologies proliferation originating from these countries. Taking the April 2001 U.S.-China EP-3 aircraft incident as an example, analysis on images captured by a reconnaissance plane indicate that air-to-air missiles installed in China’s J-8 II fighters were *Pythons* manufactured by Israel using U.S. technologies. China is reported to be active in arms imports from Russia and the Ukraine, and it is said that it introduced *Song*-class submarine manufacturing technologies from France. Furthermore, Russia and North Korea agreed in late April 2001 that Russia would supply North Korea with upgrades to its obsolete missiles, which were supplied during the Soviet era.

The export of WMD technologies and weapons from these countries in particular gained serious attention in the United States, since such exports to destabilized regions would worsen the regional military balance and raise the antiaccess capability of the countries concerned. The issue of Russia exporting missiles and nuclear reactors to Iran, and countries like China and North Korea exporting arms to Middle Eastern countries were especially seen as a problem. Russia has called for the United Nations to eliminate economic sanctions to rationalize its exports to Iran, which is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allows inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Russia argues that it has a legitimate reason and responsibility to cooperate with Iran’s peaceful nuclear development as a nonnuclear state based on Article 5 of the NPT. Further, China denies allegations made by the U.S. State Department that it transferred weapons and other arms to Cuba in June 2001. The U.S. government as well as Congress is paying close attention to the issue, which is why Sen. Biden visited China in August 2001 to meet President Jiang Zemin to discuss China’s suspected missile parts exports to Pakistan.

At the meeting of Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in June 2001, Japan, the United States and South Korea issued a joint statement containing an outline of North Korean policy. This policy
noted the issue of missile exports from North Korea represents a major concern for the three countries and support for the missile talks with the United States and North Korea. It is reported that during a May 2001 visit by an EU delegation to North Korea, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il declared North Korea would not halt weapons exports to Middle Eastern and other countries, although it would fulfill its promise to cease missile testing until the year 2003. The United States thinks the inflow of WMD to the Middle East is a major source of instability, and sees North Korea as a threat in this context as well. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the slowdown in U.S.-North Korean negotiations can partly be attributed to the policy of North Korea.

3. China: “Competitor” or “Partner”?

(1) Collision and Recovery

The statement of then-candidate Bush calling “China a competitor, not a strategic partner” symbolizes the mood in U.S. society of the late 1990s and beyond. Indeed, the speech was probably the most widely known of the Asia-related issues raised during the 2000 presidential election. The Republican Party has traditionally been more sympathetic to Taiwan than China, and there were expectations that the Bush administration’s China policy would dramatically shift from that of Clinton’s, who pursued a policy of “engagement,” encouraging China’s ascent to a position as a regional economic power. In fact, although the Bush administration will label its China policy as “engagement,” discernable difference between Clinton’s versions of the policy can be inferred from their description of China as a competitor. Likewise, Secretary of State Powell, Assistant Secretary Kelly and other senior government officials in charge of foreign and security policy repeatedly declared at Senate confirmation hearings that China is neither an enemy nor a partner, but rather a competitor.

The essence of regarding China as a competitor would mean that
the U.S. policy toward China will be determined by the Chinese behavior in the future, not by the precondition under which the United States perceives it as a potential threat. The complexities and delicacies of the U.S.-China relationship developed as Bush unveiled his security policy, and the sustainability of the policy came under the spotlight as the two countries worked through several points of contention.

On April 1, 2001, a U.S. EP-3E and a Chinese J-8 II fighter collided in midair near Hainan Island. China seized the damaged U.S. aircraft after it conducted an emergency landing at the Chinese military base on the island. The issue developed into political turmoil, since China demanded an official apology and reparations from the United States, which in turn asked for the immediate return of its plane and crew. After several rounds of negotiations, the United States sent a letter including the wording of the “apology” to China on April 10, the content of which was carefully considered so as to preserve the “face” of both sides. The U.S. crewmembers were detained for 11 days. China refused to return the aircraft to the United States for several months. The bilateral tension was heightened by the deep-rooted criticism against China in the United States. The U.S. view of the incident was that the aircraft had incurred undue damage due to Chinese intimidation and that the crewmembers had been illegally confined. However, recalling the incident after the negotiations were concluded, Bush told reporters that he had remained optimistic during the negotiations, anticipating no military confrontation between the two countries.

This incident focused attention on the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement concluded between the United States and China in 1998. This agreement stipulates an annual meeting between military officials from both sides to discuss a code of conduct in maritime affairs of both militaries. Negotiations on the EP-3E incident were discussed within this framework, which allows for the convening of an emergency meeting “for the purpose of discussing special problems related to the activities of both countries’ naval and air forces.” This agreement played an important role in military dialogue between the United States and
China, when both countries recognized the narrowness of the communication channels between the two countries. Since the United States is expected to continue its military and intelligence gathering activities near China’s coast, it is important to note the possibility that the framework regulating both parties’ activities may transcend naval activities in the future and refer to other military activities.

(2) The Taiwan Issue

The EP-3E incident has also been noteworthy in terms of China-Taiwan relations because the timing of the incident coincided with a U.S. decision to export arms to Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act of the United States. Arms sales to Taiwan always cause delicate political problems in the U.S.-China relationship. In 2001, the pro-Taiwan faction of Congress in particular pushed aggressively to secure approval for Taiwan’s requests for Aegis-equipped destroyers and Patriot PAC-3 missiles, surface-to-air guided missile air-defense systems. Particularly with regards to the export of Aegis-equipped destroyers, there was a report that General Dynamics was lobbying aggressively to fill the procurement gap from 2005-2007 with Taiwan exports. The Bush administration, however, declined the proposal, noting that shipbuilding takes considerable time before the finished product can be exported, as well as the lack of training the Taiwan Navy had received in operation capabilities dealing with the latest systems.

The Bush administration finally authorized an arms package including four Kidd-class destroyers, eight diesel submarines designed to counter blockades and invasions, 12 P-3C patrol aircraft and an unknown number of MH-53E minesweeping helicopters in 2001. However, it deferred export of the Aegis system (specifically, export of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer) so as not to further increase the tensions with China especially after the EP-3E incident. It must be noted that Taiwan worried that U.S.-China negotiations over the EP-3E may influence the U.S. decision to sell arms to Taiwan. Nevertheless, the Bush administration’s decision to refrain from the export of the Aegis
system was intended to strike a balance between its desire to fulfill its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act while avoiding a further escalation of tensions with China. After the 2001 arms sales, Bush declared a change in policy whereby future arms sales to Taiwan would be conducted not on a fiscal year-by-year basis, but rather on a flexible as-needed basis.

The Taiwan issue poses a political dilemma for the United States. On the one hand, the United States perceives Taiwan as a democracy whose political transformation was encouraged by the United States, but the political, economical and military significance to China is growing rapidly as China embraces the market economy. Therefore, whether it will stand by while an undemocratic China absorbs a democratized Taiwan against the will of its people is a serious issue for the United States. This problem lies at the heart of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and it is continuously raised at occasions when the United States has to make a decision on whether to provide means other than the export of defensive weapons to ensure the security of Taiwan. It became clear during China’s 1996 missile tests in the Taiwan Strait that a U.S. military response to Chinese military intimidation can be reasonably expected. Therefore, the recent debate in the United States over the elimination of “strategic ambiguity” and an emphasis on “tactical ambiguity” is worth noting. Bush declared in April 25, 2001, interviews with ABC and CNN that he would step further into this issue than in the past, and that while maintaining a “one China” policy, he would do “whatever it takes” to aid the self-defense of Taiwan in the event of an attack, although he did tone down his statements later.

However, there have been no dramatic changes to U.S. policy of assisting Taiwan in the event of an invasion by China while refraining from endorsing Taiwanese independence. Nor has the Bush administration altered the structure in which it reinforces Taiwanese military power in accordance with changes in the status of Chinese military strength. Nevertheless, although the United States has not used the Taiwan issue as a card in negotiations with China since the EP-3E
incident, it is evident that in strengthening relations with Taiwan, the United States is sending a clear message of opposition to Chinese military action. On July 19, 2001, Adm. Dennis C. Blair, commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, revealed for the first time that the United States and Taiwan have conducted private military talks on seven occasions since 1997. While this announcement is an indication of how political dialogue between the United States and Taiwan has progressed, it also serves as evidence of how transparent U.S. strategy has become. However, should dialogue and economic exchange further progress and economic interdependence deepen between China and Taiwan, the tone of that relationship may change dramatically. The impact of this change is an issue that must be considered carefully in the future.

(3) Toward Global-Level Conflict?

It is important to pay close attention to the question of whether the U.S.-China relationship will lead to global-level conflict. In fact, many in the United States share a recognition of China’s increasing influence in international organizations along with moves to boost its military capacity. Such rising influence can be interpreted as either offensive or defensive. With regard to developments in the U.S.-China relationship in international organizations, some blamed lobbying by China and Cuba for the loss of the U.S. seat on the United Nations Human Rights Commission, for example. Prior to the election, President Jiang Zemin of China visited the nations of Central and South America to strengthen security relationships, a move that was of concern to the United States. Talking to reporters in Bangkok on May 16, 2001, Adm. Blair touched on the Hainan Island EP-3E incident and China’s provocations of the Australian Navy in the Taiwan Strait as he noted that China’s actions are closely related to Asia-Pacific security issues, and that it is necessary to carefully watch China to determine whether it will take cooperative action or stick to its confrontational stance.

We can hear from the United States, however, that it is too early to
implement a “containment” or “encirclement” policy toward China, since it is not an immediate threat to the United States, but rather a potential threat in the future. Therefore, provoking China is not a realistic strategy at this moment for it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The groups opposed to implementing such a policy argue that reversing the so-called engagement policy of the Clinton administration would force China to take an adversarial position toward the United States. The Bush administration is well aware of the delicate balance between engagement and containment policy toward China. Therefore, the United States tries to maintain channels of dialogue with China. For example, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who ordered a re-examination of military exchanges with China at the time of the Bush inauguration, promptly denied media reports that he had developed a policy whereby military exchanges would in principle be halted between the two countries. He announced that the United States and China had agreed that exchanges between the two countries would be considered on an individual, as-needed basis.

However, it is undeniable that the U.S.-China political relationship is loosing the optimism obtained during the Clinton administration. In fact, opportunities for U.S.-China military exchange and dialogue are decreasing. This bilateral relationship tends to be marked by disagreement over various issues, some of which evolve into points of contention. Both countries exercise great caution as they work to avoid the escalation of such contention into confrontation. Meetings between government heads of the two countries occurred on several occasions, namely, Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s visit to Washington in March 2001 and the U.S.-China summit between Bush and Jiang Zemin on the occasion of the APEC gathering. At these meetings, the two countries discussed a broad range of issues, with talks during Qian’s visit touching upon issues including the sale of arms to Taiwan and the detention since February of a Chinese-American professor by Chinese authorities. They also discussed China’s trade in organs from executed prisoners (an issue raised in June by Congress) and terror-
ism (at a bilateral summit prior to the APEC meeting in Shanghai). Despite Rumsfeld’s statements, however, the decline in the number of military level exchanges between the two sides since the Clinton era seems to indicate a clearly passive U.S. stance with regard to such exchanges.

Nevertheless, the Bush administration has stated several times that it does not at this moment regard China as an immediate threat. Indeed, China has demonstrated a conciliatory stance toward U.S. concerns, as evidenced by its release of the Chinese-American professor prior to Powell’s July 2001 visit, its success at not aggravating the bilateral relationship with regard to the EP-3E incident during Powell’s visit, and instead continuing ordinary dialogue on matters including nonproliferation, human rights and economic problems. Particularly with regard to the nonproliferation issue, there were other positive signs. China welcomed a team of representatives from various U.S. government agencies led by Vann H. Van Diepen, acting deputy assistant secretary for nonproliferation, for a round of working-level talks with the United States from August 23, 2001, on the issue of missiles.

The dialogues do not guarantee dramatic improvement in the bilateral relationship. Considering that no substantial results were attained during these nonproliferation talks, and also because the United States continues to suspect China of exporting WMD technologies and missile parts to the Middle East, the issue of nonproliferation is expected to forge new developments in U.S.-China relations. At the same time, it is also very possible that bilateral dialogue on military issues will lose momentum. After September 11, the war against terrorism temporarily eclipsed China issues as it occupied center stage in U.S. security policy. But as we move into 2002, we cannot deny the possibility that relations between China and terrorism-supporting nations will become a source of contention with the United States.

(4) China’s Accession to the WTO

The economic relationship between the United States and China
continued its course of stable development. China’s domestic repression of Falun Gong and various dissident groups, as well as human rights movements, did not affect the Bush administration’s support for Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was approved at the November 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha. It appears that the United States views Chinese accession to the WTO as a way of integrating China into the market economy and inducing democratization. But while the United States has approved Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), waived the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of the 1974 Trade Act and taken other steps to strengthen commercial relations with China, new concerns have been increasing. Specifically, the United States was concerned that the “rich nation, strong-army” kind of causality might appear in the Chinese military, as it gained WTO membership with a possible acquisition of civilian technologies from advanced countries and repurpose them for military use.

Such problems are often cited when discussing the negative aspects of so-called globalization. If globalization stimulates global homogenization as the result of the cross-border movement of people, goods, knowledge and information, and their accompanying interactions, then it will naturally encounter two types of “phenomena.” The first is a rise in nationalism to resist globalization, and the second is the difficulty of politically managing commercial relations under globalization. The former phenomenon is commonly seen in democratizing countries. Even if China introduces a market economy and eventually embraces democracy in a theoretically ideal manner, it will experience a political backlash driven by forces opposed to the market democracy; political instability in China will arise due to friction between rural and urban regions within the country, since the latter is more exposed to the values of Western liberal democracy while the former prefers traditional socialist values. Additionally, should China develop a version of democracy based on values that diverge from those of Western society, it may challenge the Asia-Pacific security
order that the United States and Japan are pursuing.

From the second phenomenon of globalization, China might perpetuate its military advancement by using globalization to freely acquire advanced Western technologies. It has been pointed out that in a world where the line between military and civilian technologies is not clearly drawn, Chinese companies may attempt to acquire military technologies from Western countries, particularly the United States, through normal economic relations. As mentioned in the Cox Report and Rudman Report, there are innumerable examples of illicit Chinese attempts to acquire U.S. technologies. In September 2001, for example, a Chinese company in Florida was prohibited from exporting goods on suspicion that it had been sending rocket parts to China. Again in November, McDonnell Douglas was fined for having submitted false and misleading statements about the end use and end users of machine tools exported to China.

It is conjectured that supplies of advanced technologies important to security will increase, which will mean that China can import such items from various sources, not only the United States. The trend will develop as China is integrated into the global economy. In working to reinforce controls of such items, like-minded states must share a view that China is a security threat, and states concerned about Chinese military influence as well as those possessing security-critical products and technologies must work together and impose strict controls. Yet even the United States does not explicitly state that China is a threat while the nations of Europe feel only slightly concerned about this problem. Unfortunately, the advancement of globalization in the absence of an awareness of China as a security threat may serve only to heighten a sense of malaise that China is a potential threat. Therefore, countries concerned about the future of China must begin to consider what constitutes an appropriate relationship between security and the economy, particularly from the standpoint of interaction between China and the global economy.

(1) The Origins of a Review

The basic framework of the security policy of the Bush administration was outlined in Bush’s speech at the Citadel in South Carolina on September 23, 1999. In this speech, Bush emphasized the need for the United States to become capable of facing information warfare and other “wars of the future” by renewing the “bond of trust” between the president and military, developing the ability to respond to new threats including cyber attacks, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and terrorism, and introducing innovative technologies to the military. As part of this strategy, Bush commissioned a review of U.S. security policy after taking office. Under the authority of Rumsfeld, Director Andrew Marshal of the Office of Net Assessment at the Department of Defense assembled teams of experts from about 20 fields and managed this review.

Bush’s policy platform during the presidential campaign and the results of Rumsfeld’s security policy review were embodied in the ideas he presented in an address at the National Defense University on May 1, 2001. He stated that a security policy based on the concept of deterrence as emphasized during the Cold War was “no longer enough,” and stressed the importance of defense and active nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies. He also stressed the need for “new concepts of deterrence,” which reject the threat of nuclear retaliation as the sole means of deterrence. He argued instead for a reduction in the incentive for proliferation, that cooperation with allies to halt the acquisition by states and organizations concerned is crucially important, and for the development of a means to defend against the use of WMD. Bush further stated that to this end, the United States would not be restricted by existing treaties and that further cuts in nuclear weapons would be possible if the United States develops an effective defense system. At the May 25, 2001, graduation ceremony
of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, he also emphasized the need to transform the U.S. military by introducing new weapons and improving the management of the armed forces.

Bush had argued on February 13, 2001, at Norfolk Naval Air Station in Virginia that the actions of terrorist organizations possessing WMD are “less predictable,” and that the military must adapt to ensure “mobility and swiftness” to respond to the increasing unpredictability and diversity of such threats. He announced that in the realm of the army, “heavy forces will be lighter…light forces will be more lethal”; the air force should enhance aircraft and unmanned systems that would be used to improve the U.S. ability to conduct precise airstrikes; the navy should expand its information networks and maximize military ability to “project power over land.” Finally, in the realm of space, Bush said that the United States would bolster its ability to protect its satellite network.

(2) A “Blueprint” for National Defense Strategy

One might find in the Bush administration’s basic tone a mixture of a position that the United States is able to build a security environment as the world’s sole superpower, and a desire to preserve U.S. military advantage and build a world order based on that advantage as the United States defines its post-Cold War role. QDR01 outlines the strategy developed through a review of nearly every aspect of national defense strategy. The QDR was released following the publication of the 1991 Base Force Review and 1993 Bottom-Up Review as part of a reconsideration of national defense strategy and the force needed in a post-Cold War era. In releasing the QDR, the United States conducted a comprehensive review of potential threats to the United States as well as the national defense strategies and the structuring of force to deal with such threats. The first QDR was released in May 1997 under the Clinton administration. The 2000 Defense Authorization Act calls for the document to be prepared every four years thereafter, with the next edition to be compiled and submitted to Congress by the end of September
The basic idea behind the QDR01 was not to base U.S. military structure on existing weapons systems and budgets; rather it focused on national interest and strategies to pursue that interest. It is a “blueprint” for the Bush administration’s national defense strategy.

However, QDR01 may not be a new guideline for the Bush administration’s security policy, but rather a document that summarizes various initiatives developed since Bush took office. In contrast to QDR97, QDR01 does not contain a thoroughly detailed analysis of the structuring of force. The concepts introduced throughout the document also do not go beyond those that have been described by government officials in the Bush administration. Rather, QDR01 synthesizes concepts announced on various occasions into a single strategy.

Although there was concern that the release of QDR01 would be delayed because of the terrorist attacks, the document was published as scheduled. The many references to the terrorism issue in QDR01 indicate that the content was revised immediately prior to publication, though the outline does not seem to have dramatically changed. Statements on regional security developments in Asia, such as the passage noting that “the possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region,” show how the document avoids directly naming China. In working to secure a unified front with China to combat terrorism, the document is careful to avoid wording that may alienate China.

QDR01 outlines four objectives in the U.S. pursuit of national security: (1) “assuring allies and friends”; (2) “dissuading future military competition”; (3) “detering threats and coercion against U.S. interests”; (4) “if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.” The document outlines a basic approach to strategies to achieve these four objectives based not on military power that assumes specific regional “threats” (as in QDR97), but rather on the arrangement of military power with attention to U.S. “capabilities” to respond to a broad range of situations and response to “capabilities” that bring about “threats.” Following his inauguration, Bush first identified an improvement in
the treatment of the military as a necessary step toward implementing this strategy. He announced that there would be a reduction in the burden of the overloaded military operations, an augmentation of budgetary allocations for salary increases and reorganization of welfare-related institutions.

The Bush administration also indicated that it would conduct a review of the national security strategy, which has been frozen since the introduction of the “Regional Defense Strategy” during the senior Bush administration of 1989-1992. While the utmost priority is attached to U.S. homeland defense, QDR01 also states that U.S. national interest is tied to global stability. It states that the role of the U.S. military’s forward deployment continues to contribute to the maintenance of stability. Forward deployment plays the vital role of “forward deterrence,” which prevents the actualization of threats, and also seeks to build a force that can repel invasions with minimal reinforcements in the event that deterrents fail. QDR01 announced an organization of force not according to the former two major theater war (MTW) doctrine, but rather on a regionally tailored basis. The document further states that the United States will “raise the capability of forward forces, thereby improving their deterrent effect,” and enabling a “reallocation of forces now dedicated to reinforcement to other missions.” QDR01 thereby “shifts the focus of U.S. force planning” away from response to two possible MTWs on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East. The new focus is on the deterrence of aggression in critical regions and the ability to secure a “decisive victory” in one of the regions through regime change or occupation.

QDR01 considers it highly likely that large-scale military competition will erupt in the Asian region. It notes the relatively low presence of U.S. military bases and facilities compared with the vastness of the region, and less assurance of access to each country’s facilities bring weaknesses in the U.S. forward deterrent strategy. QDR01 therefore argues the importance of securing greater access to ports, airports and other facilities, and building a system capable of sustained operations
in remote locations. With regard to U.S. forward-deployed forces in the Asian region, QDR01 proposes that the navy raise the presence of its aircraft carrier battlegroup in the Western Pacific and “consider options” for the additional deployment of three to four surface ships and attack submarines. It calls for the air force to draft plans to increase forces in the Indian Ocean, Middle East and Pacific region, and ensure infrastructure for refueling and logistics to support operations in the Pacific. Finally, it recommends that the Marine Corps secure training fields in the Western Pacific region.

Asian nations recognize that the current U.S. military presence contributes to the stability of the region, but it is unclear whether they embrace an expansion of that presence. Nations that accept U.S. military presence increasingly complain about crimes and accidents involving U.S. military personnel, so reluctance in accepting the expansion is inevitable. In addition, there are some countries that warn of the growth of U.S. influence in the region. Therefore, any permanent expansion in Asia must unfold with careful attention to these concerns. The United States is considering securing port and airport access to enable military projection in the event of an emergency. Particularly with regard to the issue of securing access, the role of members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), like Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand is expected to become more important.

The need for capability to respond to multiple small-scale contingencies (SSCs) such as PKO participation and intervention in ethnic conflicts is also emphasized in QDR01. QDR97 outlined a force structure to respond to two MTWs possibly occurring in Northeast and Southwest Asia, but the United States has also responded to SSCs in areas like Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. Because today’s force structure was not designed to respond to conflicts in such areas, it is of concern, especially among the security community, that a future increase in these sorts of missions will affect the readiness of the U.S. military. For that reason, QDR01 aims to structure force that can flexibly respond to a variety of missions, including SSC-related activities.
As previously mentioned, with a rise in asymmetric threats, defense of the U.S. homeland has been accorded the highest priority among U.S. military duties. Homeland defense had been emphasized since the first drafting of the QDR, but its significance was clearly reconfirmed with the terrorist attacks. The future role of the U.S. Department of Defense in homeland defense has yet to be clarified, but force restructuring and organizational changes toward arranging force for homeland defense have been implied. One can also expect changes in resource allocation toward weapons development and U.S. requests for burden sharing among allies. In this way, we should pay attention to how a change in priorities concerning the role of the military will affect the national defense strategy.

QDR01 was drafted under the concept that future threats to U.S. national interest due to aggression by conventional force are unlikely to occur while incidences of force via asymmetric means such as ballistic missiles and terrorism are increasing. The terrorist attacks demonstrated how difficult it is to predict when or where an asymmetric threat will arise. The United States needs not to focus solely on specific regions or individuals as threats and prepare to deal with those threats, but rather construct capabilities based on the possible means that such parties may employ.

Therefore, the security policy review notes the importance of developing a next generation of weapons systems. The Bush administration proposes weapons systems and strategic ideas to enable the United States to “conduct a war on American terms.” The administration also announced research and development spending increases of $20 billion from 2002 to 2006 and an allocation of 20 percent of federal research funding to the development of next-generation military technologies. The administration further indicated its intent to correct the abovementioned balance between “offense” and “defense” in the nuclear arena, stressing that nuclear arms would be reduced to the minimum levels required to ensure U.S. security. The administration linked its announcement of the MD program to these concepts.
As discussed in QDR01, the United States aims to adopt innovative technologies so as to transform the military into a future-oriented organization. The U.S. military, based upon threat perception during the Cold War, is now considered incapable of adequately responding to information warfare and other dangers of a new era. And unlike the Gulf War, future wars will be marked by short preparation periods while threats such as ballistic missiles may make it impossible to depend on the support or sufficient logistical capability of forward bases. For this reason, the United States stresses the importance of developing the ability for quick-response, long-range precision attacks in distant areas.

(3) Intelligence and Space

Two other areas of the Bush administration’s security policy review must be pointed out: a review of intelligence organizations and changes in space policy. Even since before the terrorist attacks, there was growing concern that the declining capability of intelligence and operations by the CIA was hindering the execution of U.S. foreign and security policies. For example, the Peruvian military downing of a plane carrying U.S. missionaries April 20, 2001, is known to have been caused by linguistic confusion in communications between the CIA and the Peruvian military, a sign that Spanish-speaking human resources within the CIA have grown scarce. There was concern at the time of the Clinton presidency about a weakening of intelligence gathering based on human resources (HUMINT). In his National Security Decision Directive 5, Bush directed Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet to reinforce U.S. security intelligence gathering capabilities.

Secretary of State Powell is also critical of a weakening of intelligence organizations particularly in light of their inability to anticipate the terrorist attacks of September 11. Following the attacks, Congress passed a resolution to increase the budget for these organizations. Though actual figures were not disclosed, Bob Graham, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, announced a decision to
increase the fiscal 2002 budget related to the hiring of new intelligence agents and wiretapping capabilities. Congress also announced in December 2001 that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence would conduct a nonpartisan inquiry into the activities of intelligence organizations with regard to the terrorist attacks. Just as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor prompted the United States to review its intelligence capabilities, so is the United States expected once again to conduct such a review.

As former chair of the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld is bullish about a review of space policy. The commission’s report was completed in January 2001 and proposes the development of space weaponry to prepare for future wars that will be fought in space. Rumsfeld further announced to the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 8, 2001, an organizational review of space policy to “promote and protect” U.S. interests in space. He also announced that the Air Force Space Command, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and other bodies related to the space command would be reorganized under the Department of the Air Force, thereby extending jurisdiction to the air force over the development of laser weapons for use in ballistic missile attacks, and military exercises, equipment and intelligence gathering for defense in space.

On the other hand, the allocation of resources to implement the Bush administration’s national defense strategies is an issue. A massive budget is required to renew aging weapons, reform the military and implement an MD program. However, Bush has expressed his intent to enact sweeping tax cuts, and despite the fact that the United States is showing signs of an economic recovery, the question of dramatic increases for national security funding is expected to generate widespread debate. And even with increased funding to respond to the recent terrorist attacks, resources still need to be allocated to other important U.S. capabilities. Whether a budget can be secured to reform the military so that it can respond to new threats will depend on the
course of future developments.

Some praise QDR01 for successfully articulating the direction of the Bush administration’s national defense strategy. Others note that important decisions related to the essence of this policy have yet to be made. QDR01 barely touches upon the specific nature and scope of a U.S. force posture. Furthermore, it has not answered the question of whether to continue or halt key weapons programs as it awaits the results of reviews for each program. The structure of military forces and budgetary allocation reflecting the QDR will be actualized by the 2003 budget proposal, and it will establish how power will be consolidated across each branch of the military.

The Bush administration must work with a limited budget to devise a security policy that strikes a balance between currently necessary capabilities and reform geared toward the future. As Rumsfeld admits, QDR01 is “not so much an end but a beginning.” It is important to pay close attention to developments in how the Bush administration clarifies national security policy.

5. Terrorism and U.S. East Asian Security Policy

(1) The “Significance of Japan”

The Bush administration has brought new momentum to the Japan-U.S. security relationship. Even before the new administration came into office, the U.S. emphasis on the Japan-U.S. security alliance was anticipated. The Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University hosted a study group of security specialists that led to the October 2000 publication of The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership (commonly known as the Armitage-Nye Report). Many of the authors of this report later assumed important positions in the Bush administration, therefore it seems only natural that Japan became the focus of U.S. policy for Asia. Indeed, during a speech announcing his appointment of Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr. as ambassador to Japan, Bush declared, “We
send the very best people to Japan because the United States has no more important partner in the world than Japan.” He also stated, “Our alliance is rooted in the vital strategic and economic interests that we share. It is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in Asia.”

Somewhat different from the previous redefinition of the Japan-U.S. security partnership in the 1970s and 1990s, the United States withheld from exercising direct pressure on Japan, and sent an indirect message to resolve a problem hindering effective Japan-U.S. security cooperation. In other words, it was left to Japanese initiative to improve the relationship, since most of the problem was laid on Japanese domestic politics. Rather, the so-called “pro-Japan” Bush administration is focusing on techniques to communicate U.S. expectations toward Japan to play an important role within U.S. East Asia strategy by strengthening frameworks. The U.S. stance is evidenced by the convening of the June 30, 2001, Camp David Japan-U.S. summit between President Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. This was the first Japan-U.S. gathering at Camp David since the Reagan-Nakasone talks in 1986. Furthermore, as the last leader of a developed country to visit Washington following the terrorist attacks, Koizumi expressed his condolences for the victims and announced that Japan would cooperate with U.S. action against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In response, Bush expressed strong respect for Koizumi’s visit and Japan’s seven-point program for cooperation.

The United States also appreciates Japan’s efforts to take part in securing U.S. military bases in Japan, including the Diet’s swift passage of an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law after Koizumi’s visit to the United States. However, the United States appears to be cautious that these steps were taken quickly following then Ambassador to the United States Shunji Yanai’s report to Japan that Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage had called for Japan to “show the flag.” Although these words were not meant to exert “gaiatsu” (pressure from abroad) on Japan with regard to security cooperation, as Japan-U.S. cooperation expands
in the future, a perception of “gaiatsu” may reawaken a “Phantom of Pacifism” and cause domestic discord in Japan. Even though Ambassador Baker indicated his “disappointment” at Japan’s decision not to dispatch Aegis-equipped destroyers to the Indian Ocean, he praised the Diet’s approval for Self-Defense Forces response measures based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.

The term “show the flag” originally came into use as naval terminology, but this sort of language has been employed more frequently by the United States in its efforts to jolt Japan out of its passivity toward cooperation on security matters with the United States. The phrase was used to incite Japanese cooperation during the Vietnam War and Gulf War, but attracted little attention at the time in light of the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Armitage’s “show the flag” statement generated so much attention largely because of changes in the U.S. approach to its East Asia policy combined with the “trauma of the Gulf War” within Japan.

(2) “Hub and Spoke” Relations

As previously mentioned, Japan and South Korea were expected to assume special status in U.S. Asia-Pacific policy prior to the terrorist attacks. After Bush’s May 1, 2001, address to the National Defense University, high-ranking officials of the U.S. government visited several concerned nations to explain a new U.S. security policy based on the MD program. The United States considered Japan an important country with regard to this matter, and dispatched Armitage to Tokyo on May 8. He was not able to meet Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, but in response to questions from the media during his visit, he stated
that Japan’s security-related issues a “lack of consensus on collective self-defense is an obstacle,” indicating his hope for a policy change in Japan. After Japan he visited South Korea and reconfirmed the importance of U.S.-South Korean relations.

By advancing its bilateral security relationships with Japan, South Korea, and Australia in this manner, the Bush administration is reinforcing its U.S.-led “hub and spoke” system of relations. The administration has also been working since before the terrorist attacks to strengthen cooperative relationships with India and ASEAN countries. Some argue that this is a part of a U.S. “encirclement” policy for China, but it is not necessarily accurate. While strengthening its linkages with current military allies, the United States is working through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which Vietnam recently joined, to secure a framework for security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region.

Furthermore, multilateral cooperation is emerging based on the U.S. security alliance and existing forum. The nations that participated in the October 2001 APEC summit in Shanghai reaffirmed their commitment to international cooperation to combat terrorism, indicating a potential shift in emphasis for this forum from economic to political cooperation. Although such moves are experimental, the United States appears to be working to build an Asia-Pacific region security order through a multitered, complementary approach based on bilateral alliances and multilateral dialogue.

6. The Terrorist Attacks and the Aftermath

Like President Roosevelt’s speech following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Bush’s September 20, 2001, address to a joint session of Congress will surely be remembered as one of history’s most memorable speeches. While fully communicating the U.S. world view, this speech also effectively mobilized the U.S. public for a war against terrorism. Specifically, Bush defined this battle as “the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom,” and as “civilization’s
fight.” He also stressed to the nations of the world that, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” This sort of world view pitting civilization against savagery, and eliminating the concept of neutrality, seemed at first a curious one. But as Bush positioned these issues against the backdrop of the terrorist attacks, his ideas have not been widely debated.

In a manner similar to the U.N. Security Council Resolutions, if terrorism is recognized as a threat to global security, then it becomes less necessary to question the form that it takes. However, if attacks in response to terrorism are to be conducted based on rights of self-defense and rights of collective self-defense, then the possibility of a contradiction between international law, which is ever-conscious of states as the subject of war, and the question of the legal validity of actual deeds cannot be denied. In terms of the need to overcome these issues, Bush’s positioning of the post-September 11 developments as a “new war” was a very meaningful development. From this standpoint, one could say that Bush’s definition of the battlefront not as something distant from the homeland, but as something that exists in every place on earth, was an accurate description.

However, the exercise of military force following the terrorist attacks has also met with skepticism. Rep. Barbara Lee, the sole dissenter to the Congressional Resolution to Authorize Force, argued, “I am convinced that military action will not prevent further acts of international terrorism against the United States.” There have also been other criticisms that the United States has developed social ideas that give rise to terrorism. These issues must be heeded as security policy is devised in the future.

Furthermore, there are issues that have not been explicitly raised in U.S. security policy, but represent an implicit agenda as the Bush administration reviews its security policy. For example, a diversity of opinions has arisen with regard to the need to extend the “zero-casualty” policy for U.S. military victims in the exercise of military force and environmental policy to the targets of U.S. military attacks as
well. These arguments include calls to develop technologies and strategies that will enable attacks to destroy exclusively military capabilities. Even in policies aimed at preventing poverty and chaos caused by underdevelopment, the introduction of “neo colonialism” whereby developed countries assume responsibility for the maintenance of stability in countries under such conditions is being debated in policy circles. It would be overly optimistic to expect all of these to be achieved, but we can fully expect dramatic changes to U.S. security policy in response to changes in the global order and international norms after the terrorist attacks.

Within this changing strategic environment, U.S. security policy for Asia-Pacific countries seeks to maintain the status quo. Many countries have discovered the benefit of maintaining the current strategic environment because the situation surrounding the future of China is unclear and the United States is holding off on actively forecasting that future. However, the United States implicitly accepts the inevitability of China’s military and economic rise, and appears to be considering themes such as how to hedge future wars and ensure U.S. military advantage in the event of war. Ensuring U.S. technological advantage is the most important issue particularly in an era of globalization. In an environment where the military and economic limitations on military spending growth are apparent, the United States is working to move beyond these limitations by introducing missile defense and building a system of cooperation with allies, and pursuing a variety of other approaches.

While the remark that “the world changed on September 11” has
been used in an inflammatory manner and all eyes are on military action against the Taliban regime, none of the issues related to security policy pursued before the terrorist attacks have changed. Rather, as in past wars, we have learned new political and military lessons from this “new war,” and response to the next “danger” will probably develop as an extension of past issues. In that sense, it is necessary to pay attention to how lessons from the terrorist attacks are reflected in U.S. security policy toward Asia in 2002 and beyond.