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Richard Sorge and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941

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SHIMIZU Ryotaro, Center for Military History
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Introduction

With no prospects for ending war in Ukraine that began in February 2022, Russia continues to honor Richard Sorge, as the “greatest spy of the 20th century.” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in an interview with the Russian News Agency TASS that he joined the KGB (the Committee for State Security) because he admired spies like Sorge.¹ In another interview in 2000, Putin recollected that spy movies like *The Sword and the Shield* (Soviet Union, 1968) took hold of my imagination. “What amazed most of all was how one man’s effort could achieve what whole armies not. One spy could decide the fate of thousands of people.” “My notion of the KGB came from romantic spy stories. I was a pure and utterly successful product of Soviet patriotic education.”²

At a ceremony marking the handover of Sorge’s favorite map at his home in Tokyo, which had been in the possession of a Japanese researcher and was purportedly transferred to Moscow by the Russian cultural attaché, from the SVR (the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service) to the Russian Ministry of Defense, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu praised Sorge as having had a major influence on strategic decisions, playing an important role in planning the Red Army’s operations in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War.³ Furthermore, in January 2022, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that Sorge’s remains, which are buried in Tokyo’s Tama Cemetery, “will be reburied in the southern part of the Kuril Islands in southern Sakhalin Oblast.”⁴

On the other hand, the state of research materials related to the Sorge case has changed dramatically. It was in the 1960s that the four-volume “Contemporary Historical Materials: The Sorge Case” was published (the fourth volume was published in 1972) by Misuzu Shobo, which covered the Japanese side’s

¹ 「ゾルゲの胸像を続々と建立：あの大物スパイの名誉回復を急ぐプーチン政権の思惑」 [Building of Sorge busts one after the other: The Putin administration’s rush to restore the honor of the great spy], *PRESIDENT Online*, March 21, 2021. <https://president.jp/articles/-/44047>.

² Nataliya Gevorkyan et al., trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, *First person: an astonishingly frank self-portrait* (London: Hutchinson, 2000), 22, 42.

³ 「スパイ・ゾルゲの顕彰盛んに ロシア ゆかりの地図、国防省へ」 [Active efforts to honor the spy Sorge: Related map to be transferred to the Russian Ministry of Defense], *The Tokyo Shimbun*, November 29, 2019, <https://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/26893>. Russian Ministry of Defense Website, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12262990.

⁴ 「ゾルゲ遺骨、北方領土に埋葬計画 ロシア外相が明かす」 [Russian foreign minister reveals plan to bury Sorge’s remains in the Northern Territories], *Jiji.com*, January 27, 2022, <https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2022012701001>.

police and justice-related materials. This became the basic material that for the first time revealed the whole picture of the case. From around the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian side began to release materials. It then became possible to see the telegrams and correspondence that actually reached Moscow from among the telegrams that Sorge and others are believed to have sent from Tokyo to Moscow via “Wiesbaden” (the code word for Vladivostok).

The Russian researcher Andrey Fesyun carefully searched the archives of the former Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet Army General Staff and published a groundbreaking collection of documents covering the correspondence between Sorge (and the Soviet Embassy in Japan after Sorge’s arrest) and the Red Army intelligence headquarters in Moscow between 1930 and 1945.⁵ Of these documents, the recently published Japanese translation by NAGOSHI Kenro and NAGOSHI Yoko, compiles and provides detailed commentary on the 1941-1945 period. As for Japan, in 2018, the documents formerly in the possession of OTA Taizo, who held a key position in the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice and was one of the prosecutors for the Sorge case, were made available to the public at the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room of the National Diet Library.

I have already contributed a paper ([“The Sorge Case and *Kantokuen*: Between Mystification and Demystification](#)” for *NIDS Commentary*) addressing what are considered the two major achievements of the Sorge spy ring, namely the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the decision of the Imperial Conference in early July 1941. My paper covers the activities and information conveyed by the Sorge Spy Ring for the Japanese “Northbound” policy, particularly the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers (*Kantokuen*).

In the abovementioned paper, I pointed out that the achievements of the intelligence activities of Sorge and others have strong “mythological” elements that were formed during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, I also pointed out that clarification was progressing on the actual activities of the Sorge group as well as the global intelligence activities of the Soviet Union and the Comintern through newly disclosed materials from Russia and United States that a trend toward “demystification” could be seen.⁶

The future of Japan-U.S. relations in 1941 was an issue of great interest to the Soviet Union, which was then under heavy German offensive in the German-Soviet War. In this paper, I examine the relationship between the Sorge Spy Ring and the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States based on the recent developments in research on Sorge as described above.

1 Posthumous Recognition and the Film *Qui êtes-vous, Monsieur Sorge?*

It is highly likely that Putin, who was born in 1952, first learned of Sorge through the 1961 Japanese-French joint production film *Qui êtes-vous, Monsieur Sorge?* (Japanese Title: 『スパイ・ゾルゲ 真珠湾前夜』

⁵ А.Г.Фесюн, «Дело Зорге» телеграммы и письма (1930-1945), Центр гуманитарных инициатив, 2019.

⁶ Cf. 加藤哲郎 『ゾルゲ事件：覆された神話』 [KATO Tetsuro, *The Sorge Case: the end of a myth*] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2014), a study on the Sorge case that makes full use of materials from the U.S. side, including U.S. Army Military Intelligence Service (MIS) documents.

[*The Spy Sorge and the Night Before Pearl Harbor*])

The Sorge case, which was uncovered in October 1941 on the night before the outbreak of the Pacific War, involved an international intelligence mission consisting of Sorge and collaborators such as OZAKI Hotsumi secretly sending intelligence to Moscow on the start of the Russo-German War in June 1941 and the Japanese government's highest level policy making, including the decisions at the Imperial Conferences from July to September in the same year. The final arrests totaled 35 people, making this a case of espionage on an unprecedented scale in the intelligence history of Japan.

As Japan and the Soviet Union had concluded a neutrality pact and maintained diplomatic relations until August 1945, the Moscow had long denied that Sorge was a Soviet spy. However, in the Khrushchev era, Sorge was officially recognized as the first non-military "Hero of the Soviet Union" in November 1964, 20 years after his execution. The abovementioned film seems to have been one of the triggers for this.

KISHI Keiko, then-wife of director Yves Ciampi and an actress who appeared in the film herself, reflected on the film's production as follows:⁷

I was interested in the Sorge case and recommended the director that the film be made. The film was submitted to the Moscow International Film Festival, but it was rejected due to the customs censors because it was about a Soviet spy. However, the Soviet ambassador to France sent the film directly to Khrushchev, who asked why such a good film was not being shown. When the film opened simultaneously in 21 theaters in Moscow, it was such a big hit that black market tickets appeared for the first time in the Soviet Union. A statue of Sorge was erected in the town of Baku, his birthplace, and a commemorative postage stamp was issued. Then my husband and I were invited to the country, and they let us use a private plane to "see all of the Soviet Union."

The couple was treated as true national guests, and were guided around various parts of the Soviet Union using Khrushchev's private plane. A major Japanese newspaper reported on this situation on September 5, 1964, including an introduction of an article from the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Japanese report noted that the Kremlin had made its first public admission that the Soviets had dispatched spies, saying that the time had come to tell the truth about Sorge's immortal achievements. The article also stated that the dictator Stalin ignored the advance notice provided by Sorge on the start of Nazi Germany's attack against the Soviets. It was also noted that the French film *Qui êtes-vous, Monsieur Sorge?* by director Yves Ciampi was receiving attention as it was just before the premier.⁸ It is clear that the invitation extended to Ciampi and his wife KISHI Keiko as well as the film's release that included an on-stage speech was a national media event that was carefully prepared to coincide with the restoration of Sorge's honor.

The previews that preceded the public release of the film were attended not only by Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev, but also by former Defense Minister Georgy Zhukov and former GRU official Konstantin

⁷ 岸恵子・磯田道史「日本とパリの『愛のかたち』」[KISHI Keiko and ISODA Michifumi, "The 'shape of love' in Japan and Paris"], *Ooru Yomimono*, January 2018 edition, 162.

⁸ *Mainichi Shimbun*, September 5, 1964.

Kolganov. After that, a committee was set up to examine Sorge's achievements, interviews were conducted with Sorge's former colleagues, archives were examined, and the GRU and KGB each submitted a report on the study. After the ouster of Khrushchev, who had ordered the study, Sorge was officially recognized as a Hero of the Soviet Union. It has been pointed out that this was due not only to Khrushchev's own desire to de-Stalinize the Soviet Union, but also that at this timing soon after the Berlin Wall was built, Sorge was convenient as an "icon" embodying patriotism to the Soviet Union despite being from eastern Germany (his birthplace was Baku, Azerbaijan).⁹

2 Did Sorge Know of the Attack on Pearl Harbor?

The plot of *Qui êtes-vous, Monsieur Sorge* is a highly fictionalized adaptation of the historical facts. In the film, Sorge receives secret orders from the Soviet GRU to conduct espionage with the German Embassy in Tokyo as his footing. He cleverly evades a search by Colonel Fujimori, the head of the Japanese Army's "counterintelligence department." After sending a telegram to the Soviet Union with information about Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union and that Japan had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union, Sorge and the others are arrested. After the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, Colonel Fujimori visits Sorge's cell and proudly tells him about the successful attack on Pearl Harbor. However, Sorge had already sent a message to Moscow about an "attack on Pearl Harbor in early December." The film then asserts that Sorge's fate was negotiated among world leaders, and that his life and death are still shrouded in mystery.¹⁰ Thus, the film's story is that immediately before his arrest, Sorge provided information to the Soviets that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union, as well as about the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States due to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

However, the theory that the Sorge spy ring had detected information about the attack on Pearl Harbor prior to his arrest and conveyed it to Moscow seems to have originated in the United States. According to research by SUDO Shinji, this theory was spread as a form of the "Roosevelt conspiracy theory" which purported that President Franklin Roosevelt knew in advance about the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This conspiracy theory began when the *New York Daily News* published an exposé on May 17, 1951 by John O'Donnell, a Washington political reporter, quoting Sorge's confession that indicated that information about the attack on Pearl Harbor had been conveyed to Washington from Moscow. Although statements made by members of the Sorge spy ring to police, prosecutors, and a preliminary judge after their arrest did not indicate that they passed information about the attack on Pearl Harbor on to Moscow, O'Donnell claimed that among the investigative materials seized by the occupying forces was an undisclosed confession from Sorge, which was kept by the U.S. Department of the Army. According to this confession, Sorge had reported to Moscow in October 1941 that Japan had plans to attack Pearl Harbor within 60 days. The Kremlin conveyed this to Washington, President Roosevelt and top military officials such as Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark were informed. Since no one other than O'Donnell had seen the Department of the Army file in question, Sudo concludes that it is absolutely

⁹ Owen Mathews, *An Impeccable Spy: Richard Sorge, Stalin's Master Agent* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 350.

¹⁰ *Kinema Junpo*, July 1961 edition, 123.

unthinkable that Sorge knew of the attack on Pearl Harbor before his arrest.¹¹

In addition, the Chinese researcher Yang Guoguang states that Japanese who worked with Sorge and Ozaki during their time in Shanghai and participated in intelligence activities for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including NAKANISHI Tsutomu, a member of the Research Department of the South Manchuria Railway Company(SMR), and NISHISATO Tatsuo, a news agency reporter, received information in November 1941 that the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy was to assemble at “Hitokappu Bay on Etorofu Island” and conveyed this to the CCP.¹² However, in June 1942, after being arrested in the “CCP Spy Ring Case” which the investigating authorities saw “inseparably linked” to the Sorge case, Nakanishi said in his confession that he conveyed on December 4 or 5 to the CCP that his conclusion in his analysis of the situation within the SMR Research Department was that Japan would make a new proposal and continue negotiations with the United States after seeing the Soviet offensive in the Russo-German War at the end of November.¹³ On the other hand, Nakanishi admitted that he conveyed to the CCP an “overview of the organization of the Southbound force of the Japanese Army” among the top-secret information sent to the SMR headquarters from its Shanghai Office.

NISHISATO Tatsuo, who is said in Yang’s book to have written a letter to Nakanishi informing him of the “assembling of the fleet in Hitokappu Bay,” also confessed after his arrest that he provided the CCP with an estimate of the Japanese army and navy’s oil reserves and his view that based on his observations of the developments in the situation, a war between Japan and the United States would be inevitable. However, he did not mention information on the attack on Pearl Harbor. Based on the above, it is inconceivable that information on the attack on Pearl Harbor was communicated from Nakanishi and Nishisato to the CCP.

3 Newly Released Materials

According to Fesyun’s *Sorge Files*, after his definitive report in mid-September 1941 that there would be no invasion of the Soviet Union that year, the focus of Sorge’s reports shifted to negotiations between Japan and the United States, which had deteriorated due to U.S. economic sanctions against the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina.

The third KONOE Fumimaro Cabinet, at its Imperial Conference on September 6, decided to complete preparations for war by the end of October under the determination that the Empire would not decline war against the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands in order to ensure its own survival and self-defense (Guidelines for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy). Although Japan was working so that its demands would be met through the concurrent diplomatic negotiations, it set a deadline

¹¹ 須藤真志『真珠湾〈奇襲〉論争：陰謀論・通告遅延・開戦外交』[SUDO Shinji, *The Pearl Harbor ‘surprise attack’ debate: conspiracy theories, delayed notifications, and diplomacy at the outbreak of war*] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2004), 134-136.

¹² 楊国光『ゾルゲ、上海ニ潜入ス：日本の大陸侵略と国際情報戦』[Yang Guoguang, *Sorge sneaking into Shanghai: Japan’s invasion of China and international intelligence warfare*] (Tokyo: Shakai Hyoronsha, 2009), 188.

¹³ 福本勝清編『中西功尋問調書：中国革命に捧げた情報活動』[FUKUMOTO Katsukiyo ed. [*Nakanishi Tsutomu interrogation report: Intelligence activities dedicated to the Chinese revolution*] (Tokyo: Akishobo, 1996), 269. Nakanishi said in his confession that at that time, it was a common view in Shanghai that a war between Japan and the United States would not occur for the time being, and that the Shanghai Weekly, a legal newspaper of the CCP, also repeatedly stated this view until December 8.

for the negotiations with the United States.

Through information from the upper echelons of the Konoe Cabinet passed on by Ozaki, Sorge communicated about the process of the Japan-U.S. negotiations and the intensifying conflict and division within the Japanese ruling class over policies toward the Soviet Union and the United States. On September 14, Sorge sent a report that he had learned that the Japan-U.S. negotiations could possibly reach an agreement, even if only temporarily, due to further progress. However, the GRU in Moscow, which was under heavy German attack at the time, did not let down its guard against Japan, as it considered not only Sorge's information but also that from "Chongqing government officials" in China, and thought that a compromise between Japan and the United States was possible. The GRU's special report, "The Struggle of the Japanese Ruling Class over Foreign Policy," was sent to the Soviet Union's top leaders, including Stalin, Molotov, and Beria.¹⁴

On October 16, the Konoe Cabinet, which had stalled in the negotiations with the United States, resigned en masse. General Hideki Tojo was appointed Konoe's successor as prime minister. In response to the Emperor's instructions to reverse the decision of the Imperial Conference on September 6 and to engage in diplomatic negotiations, the Tojo Cabinet formulated two proposals for negotiations with the United States titled Draft A and Draft B. Draft A reiterated the principle positions of the Japanese government, while Draft B was to restore mutual commercial relations to the status quo before the asset freeze and for the United States to promise to supply oil in exchange for a commitment by Japan and the United States and to not advance their armed forces into South Asia and the South Pacific except for French Indochina. In other words, the two countries would shelve their principle positions and attempted to coordinate diplomatic relations for the time being in order not to aggravate the crisis created by the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina at the end of July and the subsequent U.S. economic sanctions.

As for Soviet intelligence operations against the United States regarding the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, we know about the activities of an agent of the NKVD (the Soviet People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the predecessor of the KGB) against Harry Dexter White, a special advisor to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, who prepared the original draft of Hull Note. Agent "Pavlov" met with White in May 1941 and conveyed the Soviet demands of the United States, the gist of which was that in exchange for the withdrawal of Japanese troops (the Kwantung Army) from Manchuria, the United States would accommodate Japan in its securing of industrial resources. These demands were incorporated into the draft prepared by White of the U.S. counterproposal to Japan's diplomatic relations coordination plan (Draft B). The November 17 Morgenthau Draft incorporated items including the United States unfreezing Japanese assets in the United States as well as cooperation for Japan securing raw materials in exchange for Japan's withdrawal of all troops from China, Indochina, and Thailand, and the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from Manchuria except for two or three divisions needed as a police force.¹⁵

¹⁴ アンドレイ・フェシユン『ゾルゲ・ファイル 1941-45：赤軍情報本部機密文書』[Andrey Fesyun, *Sorge Files 1941-1945: Confidential Documents of the Red Army Intelligence Headquarters*], trans. NAGOSHI Kenro and NAGOSHI Yoko (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 2022), 209, 302.

¹⁵ 須藤眞志『ハル・ノートを書いた男：日米開戦外交と「雪」作戦』[SUDO Shinji, *The man who wrote the Hull Note : the*

The item on Manchuria would be deleted from later State Department drafts. However, the inclusion of conditions related to Manchuria, in which the United States had no vital interests, in the negotiation plan with Japan was odd, and it is reasonable to consider this to be the result of Soviet maneuvering. Even after mid-November, it is understandable that the focus of Soviet maneuvering was to avert a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union from the Far East.

On October 4, 1941, Sorge reported that it was certain that Japan would not invade the Soviet Union that year. This was the final correspondence sent from Sorge.¹⁶

4 The Final Unsent Message

However, Sorge's final telegram draft that had not been sent was found in his home when it was searched by investigators. Recently released documents related to Ota Taizo include a record of an "item found as a result of the search of Sorge's home (unsent draft)."¹⁷ The translation is as follows.

According to information acquired from various Japanese authorities, if Japan does not receive some sort of satisfactory response from the U.S. side by the 15th or 16th of this month to Japan's request to start negotiations, the Japanese government will either resign or be fundamentally reorganized. Whether the Japanese government resigns or is reorganized, it will mean that war with the United States will break out in the near future, either this month or next month. [Abridged] In any case, the issues of the United States and Southbound are far more serious than the Northbound issue [the underlining is by the author].

In this final message that was never sent, Sorge and others predicted with astonishing accuracy the national policy of the Japanese government and the consequences of Japan-U.S. relations. In addition, at the end, Sorge and telegraph technician Max Clausen expressed a strong desire to return to the Soviet Union or Germany.¹⁸

We [Sorge and Clausen] are watching with deep sympathy the heroic war you are waging against Germany, and we greatly regret that we are here, where we are of no interest or importance to you. [Abridged] We believe that since we are accustomed to our work, we can manage to cross the border to your country, or go to Germany to start a new assignment, whatever it takes. We await your reply.

diplomacy before the war between Japan and the United States and the 'Snow' operation] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1999), 154-155.

¹⁶ Fesyun, *Sorge Files*, 312.

¹⁷ 『ゾルゲ事件史料集成：太田耐造関係文書』第6巻 [Historical materials on the Sorge case: Documents Related to Ota Taizo, vol. 6] (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 2020), 298-299. As for the reason why this last message was not sent, Clausen stated that he refused to send it because he was tired of intelligence activities and had lost enthusiasm for communism, while Sorge stated that he was sure he handed the draft to Clausen on October 15 or 16, but took it back to update immediately after the news came out of the shake-up of the Cabinet. Robert Whyman, *Stalin's Spy: Richard Sorge and the Tokyo Espionage Ring* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 268-269.

¹⁸ 『ゾルゲ事件史料集成：太田耐造関係文書』第6巻 [Historical materials on the Sorge case: Documents Related to Ota Taizo, vol. 6], 298-299.

Conclusion

As confirmed above, the Sorge spy ring very accurately predicted that the conflict in principle between Japan and the United States was fundamental and would lead to the outbreak of war within a month or two. However, there is no evidence to date that they had identified Pearl Harbor, Hawaii as Japan's attack target. It is another "Sorge myth" that Sorge reported the information of the attack on Pearl Harbor to the Soviet Union, which was then transmitted to the United States.

After the Russo-Japanese War, the Imperial Japanese Navy set the U.S. Navy as the target of its naval power development since the "Imperial National Defense Policy" enacted in 1907, and its basic concept was known as "interceptive operations." The gist of the interceptive operations formulated in 1936 called for the Japanese army and navy to cooperate at the outbreak of the war to capture the islands of Luzon and Guam and neutralize the naval bases there. After this, they would reduce the main forces of the U.S. fleet in the middle of the Pacific Ocean by submarine and air attacks, and then to use the western Pacific Ocean as a decisive battleground to destroy the fleet, mainly through night battles with fast battleships.

In January 1941, YAMAMOTO Isoroku, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet since 1938, insisted on an attack on Hawaii using the full strength of the aircraft carriers and on-board air units at the beginning of the war, and had an operation plan drafted. He strenuously persuaded the commanders and staffs under his command of the Combined Fleet and finally obtained their approval.¹⁹ In the meantime, from September 11 to 20, a war game was held at the Imperial Japanese Naval War College with attendance by the Chief of the Operations Department of the Navy General Staff and others, and a certain understanding was reached on the necessity and feasibility of a surprise attack on Hawaii. Finally, on October 19, the Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, NAGANO Osami, gave his consent to Yamamoto's plan, overcoming the opposition of the Operations Department of the Navy General Staff, which was opposed to the Hawaii operation with six aircraft carriers and their air units, due to concerns about the shortage of strength for Southbound operations.

The third Konoe Cabinet resigned on October 16, and Tojo's Cabinet was formed on October 18. OZAKI Hotsumi, who was considered a member of Konoe's inner circle, was arrested between October 14 and 15, and Sorge was arrested on October 18.²⁰ The dissolution of the Konoe Cabinet which had attempted to

¹⁹ 防衛研修所戦史室『戦史叢書 ハワイ作戦』[Office of War History, National Institute for Defense Studies, *Military history series: Hawaii operations*] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1967), 38, 105, 114.

²⁰ For a discussion of the date of Ozaki's arrest date, see 孫崎享『日米開戦へのスパイ』[MAGOSAKI Ukeru, *Spies for the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States*] (Tokyo: Shodensha, 2017). The book is useful for its in-depth examination of the circumstances surrounding the arrests of Ozaki and Sorge. However, while the book suggests that the arrests in the case were the cause of the dissolution of the Konoe Cabinet and that the prosecutors and military police authorities had the intention to overthrow the Cabinet, this paper posits that the cause was the stalemate in the Japan-U.S. negotiations.

YOSHIKAWA Mitsusada, the chief prosecutor in the Sorge case, recalled that he received the Justice Minister's approval to arrest Sorge in order to take advantage of the timing of the shake-up of the Konoe Cabinet. 「このひとあのひと探訪記 吉河光貞さん (1)」[Records of visiting for various people, Yoshikawa Mitsusada-san, part. 1], *Hoso*, November 1972, 21-22. It can be seen that the investigating authorities decided to arrest Ozaki and Sorge with the presumption that the Konoe Cabinet would be dissolved.

resolve the crisis through a summit meeting with President Roosevelt, the arrest of those involved in the Sorge case, the appointment to Prime Minister of Tojo who was considered a hardliner against the United States in Japan and abroad, and the approval by the top naval leaders to launch a surprise attack on Hawaii were a series of related developments. Despite the Emperor's desire to reconsider national policy that he expressed when the Tojo Cabinet was formed, the gearwheels had begun to turn toward the war with the United States.

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プロフィール

profile

SHIMIZU Ryotaro, Senior Fellow,
Military History Division,
Center for Military History

Areas of expertise: History of international
relations, politics and military affairs in
modern Japan

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直 通 : 03-3260-3011

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F A X : 03-3260-3034

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