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European Security and the British, French, and German Initiatives in Operational Domains

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Introduction

A number of events in recent years have reaffirmed the undeniable fact that the European Union (EU) is, ultimately, an assembly of sovereign states. For example, the UK and the EU have continued to engage in negotiations since the UK's referendum in June 2016 and the subsequent decision for the UK to exit the EU (Brexit), and even under Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who was inaugurated in July 2019, negotiations remain uncertain. Elsewhere, compromise between Germany and France was evident in the EU leadership negotiations from June to July 2019 as well, with the election of Ursula von der Leyen as President of the European Commission and Christine Lagarde as President of the European Central Bank.

Such facts demonstrate that, within the EU, which supposedly aims for supranational integration, there are still cases of major countries competing over leadership of Europe or having contradictory interests. In particular, countries are strongly cognizant of their sovereignty, and that is especially pronounced in the security field, where there is a high degree of intergovernmental cooperation.

Since the late 1990s, the EU has promoted the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).¹ However, as European security expert Luis Simon explains, an examination of the CSDP's history reveals that European security cooperation was forged by the UK, France and Germany, who coordinated their respective security policies and made concessions, while taking into account frameworks for bilateral cooperation and the North

American Treaty Organization (NATO), which includes the United States.²

Simon also points out the following general characteristics of the UK, France and Germany in the security field: (1) the UK coordinates Atlantic relations with consideration for relations with the EU but valuing those with the US above all else; (2) France seeks strategic autonomy for itself and Europe; (3) Germany takes a negative stance toward the use of force and values military-civilian cooperation during crisis management. It follows, therefore, that any interpretation of European security needs to take into account the aforementioned characteristics and analyze how these three countries are making concessions with one another.

Based on such discussions and taking also into consideration a NATO perspective, this paper seeks to elucidate how the European security initiatives led by the EU, as well as those by the UK, France and Germany, relate to each other, a subject that has come under the spotlight of late. That is to say, the main objective of this paper is to detail the initiatives promoted by the EU on the one hand, and those advanced by the UK, France and Germany outside the EU on the other hand, thereby providing a viewpoint for discussing the future of European security.

The most duplicated area among the initiatives of the EU, the UK, Germany and France is operational domains, within which there are clear discrepancies in the postures of each country. This paper will therefore mainly focus on initiatives in operational domains.

Changes in the European Security Environment

Prior to examining each initiative, this paper will touch upon changes taking place in the European security situation in recent years. As the main points, the discussion will focus on the US rebalance of the 2010s, Russia's posture after 2014, and the re-emerging debate on European autonomy following the UK's policy of exiting the EU since 2016 and the inauguration of the Donald Trump administration in the US in 2017.

First, with declining US commitment to Europe and the surrounding region following the clear rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific during the Barack Obama administration, Europe was forced to deal with the region on its own.³ Since 2011 around the same time, the fact that Europe needed to deal with the Arab Spring was also a major factor. For example, the intervention in Libya revealed a stark contrast between the active security stances of the UK and France, and the negative ones of other European countries. In addition, the US pointed out the serious capacity shortfall of Europe.⁴ Since then, discussions about Europe's burden-sharing within NATO, both in terms of responsibility and capacity, have gained even greater momentum than before.

Next, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 resulted in re-awareness about not only burden-sharing but also the need for collective defense in Europe. Following this, at the NATO Wales Summit in the same year, it was decided to establish the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) for urgent responses to crises of collective defense and to achieve the conventional target of member countries allocating 2% of GDP to military spending by 2024. Since then, the defense spending of Europe has been on an upward trend.⁵

As a result of the outcome of the UK's referendum in 2016 and the inauguration of the Trump administration in 2017, the discussion of burden-sharing and revival of collective defense led to controversy over European autonomy within Atlantic relations. Immediately after the UK's referendum, the EU released the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), its first strategy document in 13 years,

in which it mentioned European autonomy.⁶ Discussions of autonomy are nothing new, and there are various definitions of autonomy itself. Nathalie Tocci of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), who was involved in the draft preparation of EUGS, explained it as being "the ability of the Union to decide autonomously and have the means to act upon its decisions."⁷ Whether or not this is emphasized as being autonomy "from the United States" depends on the country, leader and scholar, but in any case, what is certain is that European autonomy implies mitigating EU reliance on the US, and the US has been concerned by it.

However, with the UK, which values its relations with the US above all else and had blocked the development of the CSDP due to apprehensions about European security integration, planning to exit the EU, there was growing momentum for advancing the CSDP. Moreover, the arrival of the US president who says NATO is obsolete and even mentions withdrawal from the organization forced Europe to think seriously about its own autonomy. In other words, there is an increasing need in Europe to strengthen defense and growing momentum for achieving greater autonomy.

In light of this clear departure from the past, the EU established the European Defense Fund (EDF) for promoting the efficient use of defense spending among member countries. Furthermore, an agreement was reached on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) among 25 countries excluding Denmark and Malta. PESCO is advancing 17 projects covering three areas (capability development, operational domains, training and exercises) while receiving funding from the EDF, with the purpose of coordinating and raising efficiencies among the security policies of member countries. Although this was stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, no progress was made because of the UK's veto power. PESCO was finally realized due to the UK's policy to leave the EU.

With regard to the capability development within PESCO, there is little conflict among member countries because of the necessity of strengthening the assets and

defense industry of European countries. PESCO is still in the early stages, and although it does not cover the targets for capability development set by the EU, in the sense of providing a platform for improving economic rationality and interoperability, some praise it as an appropriate policy.⁸ On the other hand, in terms of operational domains, there are projects for crisis management using the EU's Crisis Response Operation Core (CROC) unit, but there has been no defined direction due to differences in the policies of participating countries.⁹

Duplication of Security Initiatives outside the EU

Initiatives in operational domains concerning European security are led not only by the EU, but also individually by the UK, France and Germany. The motivations of each country are reflected in these initiatives. This section will first introduce a framework led by Germany that postulates cooperation with NATO. This will be followed by an overview of the framework led by the UK that was agreed to be established at the same time as the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). Lastly, an overview will be provided on a framework led by France that has drawn much attention in recent years.

(1) [German-led] FNC¹⁰

FNC was advocated by Germany in 2013 and was adopted at the NATO Wales Summit held the following year in 2014. It is worth noting that, with this, Germany, which had previously taken a negative posture in the security field, noticeably shifted to a proactive one.

As background to this, the EU was beginning to share the US belief in the need to seriously address the issue of burden-sharing and rectify gaps in capabilities between the two. In addition, FNC also bears diplomatic significance, namely emphasizing a stance in which Germany is proactively involved in security.¹¹ It is believed that, in part to demonstrate such a stance,

Germany, which had devoted itself primarily to the EU's traditional civilian mission, advocated FNC as a NATO initiative for collective defense.¹²

Given this, initially, the main goal of FNC was to improve NATO capabilities. NATO also had announced the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), which coordinates and promotes capability development among member countries and European countries. FNC was envisioned as an initiative that would resolve the capability development issues pointed out in the NDPP.¹³ In addition, under FNC, provisions are in place for capability development over a long-term span, but the unique aspect within this provision is the formation of clusters centered on framework nations within NATO, and incorporating in them the assets of small- and medium-sized states. The objective is to compensate for deficiencies lacked by each country and streamline capability development.¹⁴

As the second pillar, since 2014, the operation of a multilateral force centered on the German force was added to a function of FNC. Since 2014, when Russia's direct threats to Europe emerged, it goes without saying that a deterrence framework for NATO on the eastern flank would inevitably be controversial. Since then, the deterrence framework has been expanded through the above-mentioned VJTF and the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) that deploys forces mainly from the US, the UK and Germany to Baltic countries and Poland in rotations. Based on this NATO framework, FNC created a mixed force mainly comprising German forces, whose purpose is to serve as follow-on forces supporting NATO's VJTF and others.¹⁵ This point relates to the first pillar of capability development, with the purpose believed to be immediate contribution to both NATO's NDPP and deterrence framework. Now, 21 countries have participated, including countries in Central Europe, in addition to countries around Germany and Northern Europe. (The countries participating in each initiative are listed in the end notes of this paper.)¹⁶

(2) [UK-led] Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)^{1 7}

The UK leads the framework known as JEF. The predecessor of JEF was a rapid reaction force for crisis management planned in the 1990s, but the plan was shelved as there was no surplus capacity due to the war in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s. This plan was developed into JEF based on the agreement reached at the NATO Wales Summit in 2014.

The UK's *Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010* explains a need to restructure the capability of British forces in order to achieve the goal of maintaining the UK's international influence, and future use of military force will be more selective to protect the country's national interest. As part of this, the review indicated the need to establish a high readiness force.¹⁸ In 2012, the first discussions on the creation of JEF were initiated in the UK, which later resulted in its creation at the NATO Wales Summit.

JEF carries strong connotations of establishing a framework for rapid response force under the leadership of the UK. Between 80 and 90 percent of the troops are contributed by the UK, and while JEF can be operated by British forces alone, it is expected to be operated jointly with 10 countries including the UK, with Northern European and Baltic countries being the main participants.¹⁹ The UK and these countries have experience cooperating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, and the relationships built through such cooperation contributed to the creation of JEF. Therefore, the initial supposed area for JEF deployment was around Europe, including the Middle East. However, since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, collective defense in Europe has been incorporated as JEF's main task.²⁰

In addition, the reason the UK cooperated with other countries through JEF is that individual interests aligned among the UK, Eastern Europe, and Northern Europe (including Baltic nations). For example, in the UK in 2012, when JEF became a talking point, the issue was

how to maintain capacity while significantly reducing national defense spending as part of austerity measures. As a result, the UK intended to compensate for declining capacity by using cooperation in JEF and increase the level of the UK's leadership through such cooperation. In addition, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015* stated that the trend of reducing defense spending should be reconsidered, and clearly indicated a stance of focusing once again on security policy.²¹ Given this reboot of security policy in the UK, it appears that countries participating in JEF expect the UK's commitment to the territorial defense of member countries.²²

JEF can be a preliminary framework for the invocation of NATO's Article 5, which is the clause on collective defense, and it can serve a role as assisting burden-sharing within NATO.²³ At the same time, flexible cooperation with other organizations, such as the UN, the EU, and the coalition of the willing, is also assumed. In addition, JEF was established to create a force that combines existing military force over a short period of time, instead of aiming for new long-term capability development. Already, as of July 2018, it had acquired full operational capability among participating countries.²⁴

(3) [French-led] European Intervention Initiative (EII/EI2)

EI2, led by France, fundamentally concerns crisis management, which differs on several fronts from the initiatives of the UK and Germany, which are mainly intended as deterrence against Russia and for territorial defense. In addition, EI2 was first announced in 2017, and it was established following the result of the UK's referendum and fissures appearing in PESCO.

EI2 is a framework for an improved system for implementing intervention at the necessary place and time for European security. The ultimate purpose is to foster Europe's strategic culture²⁵ and pursue strategic

autonomy. Therefore, EI2 involves fostering cooperation in four fields as follows: 1) strategic foresight and intelligence sharing, 2) scenario development and planning, 3) support to operations, and 4) lessons learned and doctrine.²⁶ In addition, EI2 does not entail new capability development or creation of a rapid response force, but rather a framework for supporting the EU, NATO and the UN flexibly in case of a crisis.

A key characteristic of EI2 is that it accepts only “able and willing states”²⁷ as participating countries. Currently it comprises 10 countries.²⁸ France’s dissatisfaction with the EU can be read from this wording, and this can be viewed as one factor behind the creation of EI2. Originally, France had been critical of the EU’s lack of support for crisis management in North Africa, where France mainly implements crisis management operations. The general decision-making process of the EU, which France views as too slow, has also caused French frustration.²⁹ Such dissatisfaction could also be seen in relation to PESCO, which was initially expected to promote advancements in the EU’s security policy, and the discord between France and Germany was particularly serious. This was because while Germany is aiming for a framework that enables more comprehensive participation by EU countries without setting high criteria for participation in PESCO, France has advocated a framework only for willing and able states, by establishing strict participating rules prioritizing efficiency.³⁰ Such French frustrations can be seen as a factor behind the establishment of EI2. Thus, EI2 is placed outside the framework of the EU.

European Security and the Initiatives: Problems and Potential

In light of the situation whereby European countries are implementing various initiatives concerning a post-Brexit world, what kind of state will emerge in the future of European security? The current issue is how to

coordinate the policies and initiatives of each country so as to ensure that they are not duplicated or untenable, including the perspectives of NATO and the EU.

At such times, the key point is Franco-German relations. Certainly, it seemed that EU security policy made advancements through collaboration between Germany and France after the UK’s referendum. However, confrontation between Germany and France over PESCO has been observed over time. As a result, it would be appropriate to express such differences as a part of their long-standing fissure on the fundamental strategic level.

Germany wanted to incorporate EI2 into PESCO, but France refused, and in the end Germany compromised and participated in EI2.³¹ This was for Germany to avoid a loss of trustworthiness by refusing again to cooperate within a European security initiative, and if viewed in a more positive light, it can even be interpreted as a contribution to fostering a strategic culture of Europe, which is the purpose of EI2.³² However, under EI2, which is considered to have fewer restrictions for securing flexible actions, doubts remain as to whether Germany would be able to wield influence over France. Moreover, Germany presumably believes EI2 is merely a tool for France to wield its influence.³³ In addition, it is unclear if EI2, an initiative led by France, which is aiming for a different direction to Germany in the first place, will ultimately be an effective framework with Germany having been accepted as a participating country.³⁴ The above fissure is serious, and looking ahead it is difficult to believe that the direction of Germany and France will converge.

In addition, Germany and France face their own individual problems. Germany has certainly shown a proactive stance concerning security and, in particular, collective defense in recent years. However, given the strict constraints on military force from its population and the Bundestag, which may also be considered to be its strategic culture, as well as the marked declines in its

capability in recent years, other European countries will continue to have doubts about German leadership in European security.³⁵ France, too, has firmly maintained a posture of leading the EU's security, and as its strategic culture, it has a very significant interest in the Mediterranean and North Africa regions. However, it is still questionable whether France is seriously committed to a deterrence framework in Eastern and Northern Europe including Baltic states.³⁶ The fact that North Africa is considered the main region for EI2's activities illustrates the aforementioned point. Such postures have caused Eastern European, Northern European and Baltic countries, who are facing the threat of Russia, to place less faith in Germany and France.

The second point is the position of the UK. The UK, which left the EU, is not participating in PESCO. As such, policy-wise, the UK will be unable to stop the progress of the EU's CSDP and PESCO. As of today, however, the power of the UK remains vital to European security, and thus, there is an unavoidable fissure between European countries that want to include the UK and the EU's PESCO that does not.

For example, from the standpoint of Eastern European, Northern European and Baltic countries, which cannot fully rely on the commitment of Germany and France to the framework for deterrence, the UK can be a trustworthy partner for Europe. For this reason, for those countries, the decision of the UK, which has cooperated with them for many years on security issues, to exit the EU comes as a major shock politically and psychologically, as it shares similar values with them with regard to the EU. Although it is crystal-clear that NATO is the primary actor in collective defense, meaning that a majority of countries participating in JEF will not be affected by Brexit, the role of JEF in connecting these countries with the UK is growing in relative importance. Finland and Sweden, which are not members of NATO, participated in JEF in 2017, which likely indicates the importance of the UK for Northern

Europe and Baltic states.

In addition, maintaining cooperative relations with the UK is also important from the perspective of the initiatives of both Germany and France. For example, in terms of Anglo-French relations, some point out the differences in relations with the US and policy towards Russia,³⁷ but apart from these differences, there are many cases where the basic direction of their security policy is the same. This is embodied by the treaties signed by the UK and France in 2010 for defense and security cooperation, based on which both countries have moved forward with cooperation concerning nuclear facilities and the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF).³⁸ The fact that France places EI2 outside the framework of the EU also means that it intends to maintain EI2 as a flexible framework for security cooperation with the UK post-Brexit.³⁹

There are also many commonalities observed in both the EI2 and JEF. Both do not require compulsory participation in operations, and swift decision-making will be possible, while the platforms for support can be determined flexibly. In addition, although the main assumed area for deployment of EI2 and JEF differ, similar to the UK, in recent years France has also moved to forge relations with Northern European and Baltic countries through EFP and EI2, albeit not to the same extent, and there is unlikely to be a great divide between JEF and France. And, for the UK as well, if it aims to be a Global Britain after Brexit, namely "a country with the self-confidence and the freedom to look beyond the continent of Europe and to the economic and diplomatic opportunities of the wider world,"⁴⁰ nothing negative could come from cooperation in crisis management through EI2. Therefore, it is natural to think that Anglo-French security cooperation will continue in the future as well.

As for the UK and Germany, in both cases, their most important relations are arguably with the United States and with France, with Anglo-German relations coming

next.⁴¹ Meanwhile, although the UK, similar to other countries, has praised Germany's posture toward security in recent years, it remains skeptical. On the other hand, after Brexit, NATO will be the only framework for Germany to cooperate with the UK regarding operational domains. However, Germany will need to take the lead in PESCO, a framework without the UK, as the essential leading power of the EU.

Nevertheless, given the growing importance of territorial defense, there is sufficient possibility to advance cooperation in this field. For example, regarding the UK's JEF and the second pillar of Germany's FNC, affinity can be identified in the context of contributing to NATO's collective defense. If a NATO member country or JEF participating country were invaded, JEF forces would serve as a "bridge" until NATO invokes Article 5 and responds, and later, it can be assumed that FNC forces would provide support as a follow-on force. Currently, the UK and Germany are major countries that deploy their forces to the Baltic countries on a rotation basis through NATO's EFP. This is nothing more than a technical scenario in nature, but in the sense of compatibility with NATO's deterrence framework, cooperation between the UK's JEF and Germany's FNC can be anticipated.

Conclusion: Future Focus

This paper reviewed the current state of European security from the standpoint of initiatives led by the UK, France and Germany, identifying points of concordance and contradiction between each country's policies, independent of the growing momentum of the EU's security policy in recent years, including PESCO. That is to say, the future focus will be how each country's initiatives vis-à-vis the EU and NATO relate to one another, and, as will be evident therefrom, Anglo-Franco-German relations after Brexit.

For example, PESCO currently includes projects related to both collective defense and crisis management,

leading some to argue that, structurally, FNC and EI2 could be incorporated into PESCO.⁴² However, the problem is not a question of structure, but ultimately one regarding whether or not each country would endorse such an integration.

France will likely not give up its leadership position in crisis management. Meanwhile, due to domestic constraints on security policy, Germany is limited to emphasizing involvement in collective defense. It is difficult to imagine that France, which wants flexible and swift decision-making along with maintaining relations with the UK, would want EIS to become part of PESCO. As for the German-led FNC, although there is certainly some affinity with PESCO, it is originally a NATO framework that includes capability development. Therefore, transferring it to an EU framework would likely result in suspicions from the US, which is the leading player in NATO leader and concerned about being excluded from European defense industries and markets. This would also preclude the option of flexible cooperation with the UK, which plans to exit the EU. Furthermore, it could result in further discord with France, which is skeptical about PESCO. Thus, it is likely not a realistic option.

In other words, as long as Germany and France intend to maintain flexible cooperation in operational domains with the UK post-Brexit, the more realistic option will be ad hoc cooperation through NATO while utilizing the affinity with the UK and JEF, rather than incorporating EI2 and FNC into PESCO.

Here it must be noted that the capability development aspects of PESCO have also come under the spotlight in the debate on European autonomy, but they have not been covered in this paper, which focuses only on initiatives concerning operational domains. As discussed in the introduction, there is little discord between EU member countries when it comes to capability development, as this leads to the growth of defense industries and improves economic rationality as well as

interoperability. Therefore, if the UK opts for a hard Brexit, it is certain to face difficulty in accessing Europe's defense industries and markets, which would greatly reduce its importance. Furthermore, if its economy suffers a serious blow from a hard Brexit, the UK would be forced to reduce defense spending, and, as a result, its value in operational domains would decline. Under such circumstances, it is certainly possible that relations between the UK, France and Germany may change.

In other words, looking ahead to European security in

the future, the EU could advance capability development under PESCO in the pursuit of European autonomy. Nevertheless, as before, in terms of applying those capabilities and operational domains, the UK, France and Germany will need to coordinate with one another through NATO and their individual initiatives. In addition, the outcome of Brexit negotiations are also worth monitoring from a security standpoint, as this will affect the role of the UK in relation to both capability development and operational domains.

¹ Strictly speaking, CSDP began when the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon came into effect. However, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that had been gradually developed since 1999 served as the foundation of CSDP. As such, the beginning of CSDP was noted as around the late 1990's in this paper.

² Luis Simón, "Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma," *Security Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2017, pp. 197-201, 210.

³ Luis Simon, "Europe, the rise of Asia and the future of the transatlantic relationship," *International Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 5, 2015, pp. 972-975.

⁴ Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer, "Towards a 'post-American' alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya," *International Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 2, 2012, pp. 322-323.

⁵ Lucie Béraud-Sudreau & Bastian Giegerich, "NATO Defence Spending and European Threat Perceptions," *Survival*, Vol. 60, No. 4, 2018, pp. 53-55.

⁶ European External Action Service, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, June 2016.

⁷ Nathalie Tocci, "Interview with Nathalie Tocci on the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy," *The International Spectator*, Vol. 51, No.3, 2016, p. 3.

⁸ Alice Billon-Galland and Yvonne-Stefania Efsthathiou, "Are PESCO projects fit for purpose?" *European Defence Policy Brief*, IISS, February 2019, pp. 2, 10.

⁹ Sven Biscop, "European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance," *Survival*, Vol. 60, No.3, 2018, p. 169.

¹⁰ Framework country in this context refers to a major country with the scale to command small to medium sized countries in Europe. As Italy, Germany, and the U.K. were said to be the framework countries of FNC at the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, strictly speaking, JEF is also part of it. However, as per current convention that FNC is mainly used to refer to the framework led by Germany, this paper follows the same practice. Moreover, there is not yet a confirmed Japanese translation for FNC, as such, the term "framework country concept" is a translation used here by the author.

¹¹ Håkon Lunde Saxi, "British and German initiatives for defence cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept," *Defence Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2017, pp. 180-181.

¹² Robin Allers, "The framework nation: Can Germany lead on security?" *International Affairs* vol. 92, No. 5, 2016, p. 1170.

¹³ Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "The Framework Nations' Concept and NATO: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era or Missed Opportunity?" *NATO Research Paper*, No.132, 2016, pp.17-18.

¹⁴ Eva Hagström Frisell and Emma Sjökvist, "Military Cooperation Around Framework Nations: A European Solution to the Problem of Limited Defence Capabilities" *Försvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI)*, 2019, pp. 15-21.

¹⁵ Ranier L. Glatz and Martin Zapfe, "Ambitious Framework Nation: Germany in NATO: Bundeswehr Capability Planning and the 'Framework Nations Concept'" *SWP Comments* No. 35, 2017, pp. 4-5.

¹⁶ The 21 participating countries of FNC are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland.

¹⁷ As there is not yet a confirmed Japanese translation for Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), the translation used in this article is coined by the author.

¹⁸ HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, October 2010, pp. 15-19.

¹⁹ The 10 participating countries of JEF are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

²⁰ Håkon Lunde Saxi, "The UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)," *IFS Insights*, May 2018, p. 3.

²¹ HM Government, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*, November 2015.

²² Tormod Heier, "Britain's Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends?" in Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary, eds., *The United Kingdom's Defence After Brexit: Britain's Alliances, Coalitions and partnerships*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 205.

²³ Heier, "Britain's Joint Expeditionary Force," p. 193.

²⁴ David Reynolds, "Shaping the future: The UK's Joint Expeditionary Force," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 19 February, 2019.

²⁵ There are many definitions of and controversies over strategic culture. For example, to succinctly summarize the discussions of noted authors such as Snyder and Gray, it can be thought of as the philosophy and mode of action concerning power derived from people's understanding their country's historic experience and political and geographical factors learned via education and imitation, which influences the formation of that country's national security policy. Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*, R-2154-AF, RAND, 1977, p. v.; Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1981, p. 22.

²⁶ Ministère des Armées, *Letter of Intent between the defence ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom concerning the development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2)*. 25 June, 2018.

²⁷ Ibid. p. 2.

²⁸ The 10 participating countries of EI2 are Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

²⁹ Niklas Nováký, "France's European Intervention Initiative: Towards a Culture of Burden sharing," *Policy Brief*, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, October 2018, p. 4.

³⁰ Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, "Can France and Germany make PESCO work as a process toward EU defense?" *Policy Brief*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, No.33, p. 2.

³¹ Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, "PESCO: The German Perspective," *Policy Paper*, Armament Industry European Research Group, February 2019, p. 13.

³² Nováký "France's European Intervention Initiative," p. 17.

³³ Christian Mölling and Claudia Major, "Why Joining France's European Intervention Initiative is the right decision for Germany," EGMONT The Royal Institute for International Relations, 15 June 2018. <<http://www.egmontinstitute.be/why-joining-frances-european-intervention-initiative-is-the-right-decision-for-germany/>>

³⁴ Nováký, "France's European Intervention Initiative," pp. 17-18.

³⁵ Håkon Lunde Saxi, "British and German initiatives for defence cooperation," p. 186.

³⁶ Riina Kaljurand and Piret Kuusik, "Waiting For Godot? Estonian Perception of Germany in the Security of the Baltic Sea Region" in Andris Sprūds and Elizabete Vizgunova, eds., *Perception of Germany in the Security of the Baltic Sea Region* (Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2018) p. 65.

³⁷ Benjamin Martill and Monika Sus, "Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or 'French connection'?" *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 20, No. 4. pp. 857-858.

³⁸ Alice Pannier, "The Anglo-French defence partnership after the 'Brexit' vote: new incentives and new dilemmas," *Global Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 5, 2016, pp. 481-490.

³⁹ Simon W. Duke, "The Competing Logics of EU Security and Defence," *Survival*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2019, p. 132.

⁴⁰ Theresa May, "Britain after Brexit: A vision of a Global Britain," Speech at Conservative Party Conference, 2 October 2016. <<https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-parties/conservative-party/news/79517/read-full-theresa-mays-conservative>>

⁴¹ Håkon Lunde Saxi, "British-German Defence and Security Relations After Brexit: Quo Vadis, 'Silent Alliance'?" in Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary, eds., *The United Kingdom's Defence After Brexit: Britain's Alliances, Coalitions and Partnerships*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 142.

⁴² Biscop, "European Defence," pp. 175-176.

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