NIDS China Security Report

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Contents

Preface ............................................................................................................................................. 1

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

China’s Efforts to Enhance Military Capabilities ........................................................................ 2
Multidimensional Features of Emerging China ........................................................................... 3

China's International Strategy .................................................................................................... 5

China’s World View .................................................................................................................... 6
Cooperation and Competition .................................................................................................... 7
Expanding Mission of the PLA .................................................................................................... 9

Expanding Area of Operations .................................................................................................. 13

Improvement of Blue-Water Capability .................................................................................. 14
Training Activities in the Surrounding Waters ......................................................................... 17
Participation in International Security Cooperation ............................................................... 20

Growing Role of Military Diplomacy ....................................................................................... 23

Working-Level Contacts .......................................................................................................... 24
Multilateral Military Diplomacy ............................................................................................... 26
Military Diplomacy toward Japan ............................................................................................. 28

Modernization of Military Hardware ...................................................................................... 33

Diversification of Equipment ................................................................................................... 34
China’s Enhanced Military Capabilities .................................................................................... 38

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 41

Column “Three Warfares” (Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfare) .................................... 10
Column USNS Impeccable Incident .......................................................................................... 19
The international community continues to keep close watch on China’s security policy and military trends. In Japan, too, the general public has grown more aware of the large impact that the rising military power of China will have on Japan’s national security. China, now the second largest economy in the world, has become an essential economic partner to Japan and other East Asian countries. At the same time, however, China has used its economic growth as leverage to increase military spending and move forward with the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The China’s military expansion without sufficient transparency, in tandem with the more assertive nature of the PLA, has raised concerns among neighboring and other countries. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010 indicated from this same perspective that China’s military trends are “of concern for the regional and global community.”

The *NIDS China Security Report* published by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) analyzes China’s security trends based on the independent perspective of NIDS researchers and is intended for a wide audience both in Japan and overseas. This year’s edition of the *Report* focuses on the intensifying activities of the PLA Navy and Air Force as well as China’s military diplomacy. It would be our great pleasure if this new report helps to enhance public understanding both in Japan and abroad of China’s security and military trends and to build momentum for deepening discussions further. The authors also hope that this report can contribute to the development of a stable relationship between China and Japan by broadening opportunities for exchange between the two countries in the field of security and defense. The report also discusses methods for defense exchanges between the two countries, expecting that such exchanges will be promoted.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Ministry of Defense or the Japanese Government. This report was authored by Masafumi Iida, Makoto Saito, Yasuyuki Sugiura and Masayuki Masuda. Editorial work was performed by Yuzuru Kaneko (editor-in-chief), Hiromu Arakaki, Sukeyuki Ichimasa, Nobu Iwatani, Yasuyuki Sugiura, Yasushi Sukegawa and Hiroshi Yamazoe. This publication is a translation of the Japanese version originally published in March 2011.

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*NIDS China Security Report* Task Force
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Introduction
China has achieved remarkable economic development under its reform and opening policies for over 30 years. The size of its economy has surpassed that of Japan to become second in the world, and the country has been establishing its place as a world power. The Chinese economy continues to grow and have an increasing effect on the global economy, and China has become an essential partner for Japan and other East Asian countries, the United States, European countries, and so on. China has very close interdependent relationships with the countries surrounding it, and many countries including Japan are finding benefits from building stable relations with China.

Nevertheless, at the same time, the rapid modernization of military strength by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is gaining the interest of regional countries and the international community as a factor which will have a major impact on the security environment in East Asia. The national defense budget announced by the Chinese government has increased more than 10% year-on-year for 21 consecutive years from 1989 to 2009, and the budget announced in FY2010 amounted to 519.1 billion yuan. The national defense budget announced by China has increased 3.7-fold over the past 10 years, and converted into US dollars, it has surpassed the defense-related spending of Japan to make it the largest among the East Asian countries.

Against the backdrop of this abundant national defense spending, the PLA is steadily moving forward with the modernization of its equipment. It is updating obsolete equipment and rapidly introducing cutting-edge equipment. A large amount of advanced equipment was revealed at the military parade which took place at Tiananmen Square on October 1, 2009 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For example, there were displays of land-based equipment such as airborne combat vehicles, amphibious combat vehicles, and satellite communications; aerial equipment such as airborne early warning and control systems, air refueling tankers, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and J-10 fighters; and missiles such as DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and DH-10 long-range cruise missiles. There has also been significant modernization of China’s naval equipment. For example, China has made progress in the deployment of a new class (Jin-class) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, the Shang-class of nuclear-powered attack submarines, the Luzhou-class and Luyang-class of Aegis-equipped destroyers, and the Jiangkai class of stealth frigates, and it is thought that China is also making progress in the development of aircraft carriers. In the area

Fig. 1 Changes in China’s Official Defense Budget

Source: Prepared from Defense of Japan 2010
Introduction

of space, the country is moving forward with the development of Beidou navigation system, and in January 2010, China announced that it had succeeded in testing a missile defense system. Along with such progress in the modernization of equipment, China is rapidly improving the power projection capabilities and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities of the PLA.

Multidimensional Features of Emerging China

Why is it that for the more than 20 years since the end of the Cold War China has consistently focused its strength on the modernization of its military power? What is China trying to achieve with such military power? Some point out that China, which has increased its economic power, is aiming to resolve the Taiwan issue and sovereignty issues with surrounding countries from an advantageous standpoint by strengthening its military power. In response to this, Chinese leaders and foreign authorities emergence that the country is moving down a road of peaceful development and that its rise will not become a threat to peace in the region and the world. China has repeatedly emphasized its peaceful intentions, stating that unlike the emergence of new great powers up to now which has led to war with the existing powers, China will participate in the current international order in a constructive manner and contribute to world peace.

The country explains the modernization of its military power from the same perspective. The leaders of the PLA and the military’s public media state that it is right for China to increase its national defense spending and modernize its military power because the country needs to step up its military capabilities in order to respond to international terrorist activities, international crime, and so forth. In fact, China has proactively dispatched personnel including troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Since December 2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been continuously participating in counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Such positive participation by the PLA in international security has garnered high praise in the international community. For example, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in its annual report Strategic Survey 2010 praises the escort operations by the PLAN in the Gulf of Aden, saying that the PLAN also made positive contributions to the supply of public goods.

Meanwhile, China recently has forcefully responded in particular to problems involving conflicts of interest with surrounding countries. In the South China Sea, where there are problems related to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with Southeast Asian countries, armed Chinese fisheries patrol boats have seized the fishing boats of other countries and have acted menacingly toward the patrol vessels of other countries. China has also hindered the activities of a US naval ship operating in international waters off the coast of Hainan. Furthermore, China strongly opposed the entry of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington into the Yellow Sea, which is international waters, in order to carry out joint exercises with the South Korean navy, and China carried out diversionary activities such as conducting live-ammunition drills near the Yellow Sea immediately prior to the exercises. The PLAN has repeatedly carried out military exercises in the South China Sea, and in July 2010, it conducted a large-scale exercises included the launch of many missiles.

In September, in Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands, an incident occurred in which a Chinese fishing boat rammed into a patrol vessel of the Japan Coast Guard, and the Japan Coast Guard arrested the captain of that boat. China gave a forceful response, including temporarily halting exchanges at the ministerial level, delaying negotiations regarding a treaty aimed at the joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea, delaying youth exchange activities in which Japanese students were to visit the Shanghai Expo, and dispatching a large number of fisheries patrol boats and patrol vessels to the East China Sea. Such actions by China do not appear to be consistent with the public statements by the Chinese government emphasizing cooperative relations with surrounding countries. The inconsistency between
public explanations regarding foreign policy and the
development of military power and the actual trends
regarding the PLA has created a sense of insecurity
among East Asian countries regarding the future
direction of emerging China. As such, the emergence
of China, particularly in terms of its military, may
have both positive impacts and negative impacts on
global and regional security.

The NIDS China Security Report has analyzed
the multidimensional features of the rise of China
from the perspective of security, and this report
also attempts to clarify the current status of the
PLA, which is moving forward with modernization,
and China’s intentions behind this. In writing this
report, analysis was carried out while referring to
public texts released by various countries such as the
Defense of Japan (Ministry of Defense), the Annual
Report on Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China (United
States Department of Defense), and China’s National
Defense (China’s State Council Information Office);
public media materials and published essays from
sources such as the PLA Daily and People’s Daily;
and public materials from Japan and abroad, such as
Jane’s Yearbook and Military Balance. The main
targets for analysis are the Navy, Air Force, and
Second Artillery Corps, based on an awareness of
the issue of how China, which is moving forward
with the modernization of its military, will affect the
security of Japan and East Asia.
China’s International Strategy
What kind of perceptions does China have regarding the international situation and security environment surrounding it? President Hu Jintao at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in October 2007 pointed out the world today is in the process of undergoing tremendous changes and adjustments, and he indicated an awareness that even though the international situation is stable overall, the world is not tranquil, and world peace and development are facing various difficulties and challenges. China, which is facing such an international situation, has indicated a policy of promoting the building of “a harmonious world of lasting peace accompanied by development.”

This “harmonious world” is a concept and a target regarding an ideal vision for the international community that President Hu has presented to the world. In September 2005, Hu in at a summit commemorating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations gave a speech entitled, “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity.” In this speech, President Hu states, “Seeking peace, promoting development, and providing cooperation represent the main themes of our times.” Nevertheless, he also gave a harsh view of the current state of the international community in regard to “peace” and “development.” He says, “Peace and development, the two overriding questions before the world, have not yet been fundamentally resolved. Local wars and conflicts caused by varying reasons keep cropping up. The hotspot issues in some regions remain complicated and thorny. The wealth gap between the North and South continues to widen. People in many countries are still being denied of the right to subsistence and even survival. International terrorists, ethnic separatists and religious extremists in some parts of the world remain rampant. Many cross-boundary problems such as environmental pollution, drug trafficking, transnational crimes and deadly communicable diseases have become more salient. All this has made our road towards universal peace and common development a bumpy and challenging one.” He then indicates a policy of countries cooperating to build a “harmonious world” in order to overcome these problems.

According to President Hu, there are four major efforts regarding the building of a “harmonious world.” The first is to “uphold multilateralism in order to realize common security.” Peace is the fundamental premise for achieving the goal of mankind’s development. War and conflict are disastrous to any country, be it big or small, strong or weak. All countries therefore should join hands in coping with global security threats. “We must abandon the Cold War mentality, cultivate a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, and build a fair and effective collective security mechanism.”

“The United Nations, as the core of the collective security mechanism, plays an irreplaceable role in international cooperation to ensure global security.” The Security Council “must be given the authority to properly maintain world peace and security.” “International disputes or conflicts should be settled through consultations and negotiations based on peaceful means.” “We should all oppose acts of encroachment on other countries’ sovereignty, forceful interference in a country’s internal affairs, and willful use or threat of military force.”

The second is to “uphold mutually beneficial cooperation to achieve common prosperity.” “Development has a bearing on the vital interests of the people of all countries, and also on the removal of global security threats from their sources. Without universal development and common prosperity, our world can hardly enjoy tranquility.” Accordingly, “economic globalization should benefit all countries, developing countries in particular, instead of leading to a more polarized world where the poor become poorer and the rich richer.” “The developed countries should shoulder greater responsibility for a universal, coordinated and balanced development in the world,” and should further open their markets, provide more technology transfer, and increase aid and debt forgiveness to developing countries.

The third is to “uphold the spirit of inclusiveness to build a harmonious world together.” “Diversity of civilizations is an important driving force behind human progress, and it is important for civilizations
China’s International Strategy

China emphasizes pursuing “a road of peaceful development” as a foreign policy for building a “harmonious world.” According to a document published in December 2005 by the State Council Information Office entitled “China’s Peaceful Development Road,” a peaceful international environment is needed in order for China to achieve its greatest challenge of economic development, and in order to build a peaceful environment, China must promote cooperation with foreign countries. The document also argues that the peaceful development of China will contribute to world peace and development, and states, “China did not seek hegemony in the past, nor does it now, and will not do so in the future when it gets stronger.”

This foreign policy of pursuing a “road of peaceful development,” was positioned as an important part of “foreign affairs in the new century and at the new stage” at the Central Work of Conference on Foreign Affairs meeting held in August 2006. At this meeting, it was emphasized, “In regard to development, the party’s primary mission of government administration and state promotion, we hold high the banner of peace, development, and cooperation and uphold independent foreign policies of peace. We will not waver in pursuing a road of peaceful development and we will develop foreign affairs in an omnidirectional manner. We will maintain and utilize this time period of important strategic chances, and we will protect the nation’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. We will cooperate in order to build a favorable international environment and beneficial external conditions in order to reform and open up China and to modernize and build socialism, and we must contribute to promoting the building of a

The “harmonious world” presented by President Hu seems to have the following two major characteristics. The first is the way that China understands the current world situation: due to the rapid progress of globalization, it is difficult for countries to unilaterally cope with various problems related to economics, politics, and security, and international cooperation is essential in order to achieve world peace and development. Accordingly, China emphasizes cooperation with other countries and the international community in order to achieve peace and development for itself. The second is China’s approach of attributing the factors behind the problems that the world is facing, such as the widening gaps in economic development and the outbreaks of conflicts, to the shortcomings of the current international order which is being led by advanced countries. China emphasizes “the realization of joint development,” which means support for developing countries, and “the democratization of international relations,” which means strengthening the international influence of developing and emerging countries, and it is saying that “development of the international political and economic order in a fair and reasonable direction” should be promoted.

Cooperation and Competition

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harmonious world with lasting peace and common prosperity.”

While China emphasizes “a road of peaceful development” in terms of diplomacy, President Hu has also presented a new policy regarding the role that the armed forces must play in terms of overall security. At an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission held in December 2004, he put forth “the historic missions for the PLA in the new period of the new century” of “three provides and one role.” More specifically, the armed forces will (1) Provide an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its ruling Position; (2) Provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of strategic opportunity for national development; (3) Provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests; and (4) Play an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development. The specific details regarding this are presented in a commentary by the editorial department of the PLA Daily (January 9, 2006). The following four paragraphs summarize the views conveyed in this commentary.

First of all, the position of the Communist Party of China as the ruling party faces various challenges. The ascendancy of Western advanced countries in terms of economics, science and technology, and military capabilities has put pressure on China, and there has been no change to the intention of such countries to aim to “Westernize” and “divide” China with hostile Western power. Therefore it is not possible to avoid inconsistencies and problems during this turning point for society. Calls for the “removal of party influence and political influence over the military” and “promoting state influence over the military” based on hostile Western power are coming between the Party and the PLA, and they are aimed at destabilizing the administrative position of the party. Under such conditions, in order for the Party to maintain its position as the ruling party, the military must collaborate with the party and obey the commands of the party.

Secondly, the first 20 years of the 21st century is a period of strategic opportunities for the national development of China. Nevertheless, at the same time, China is faced with various problems that could cause it to lose this period for strategic opportunities such as actions by pro-independence forces in Taiwan, the threat of terrorism, exposure to nontraditional security problems, and growing social inconsistencies. Building a safe environment is premised on creating a period for strategic opportunities and the military must work to build a safe international environment based on its capabilities.

Thirdly, in the time of globalization, major changes are taking place concerning the content and extensions of national interests due to the development of science and technology, the depletion of land resources, and other factors. The security interests of the nation are growing steadily accompanying the development of national interests. The security interests of the nation today are already expanding beyond the traditional areas of territorial land, territorial waters, and territorial air, to oceans, space, and cyber spaces. Protecting national interests in terms of oceans, space, cyber spaces, and so forth has become a new mission for the military of each country, and support for this is needed based on strong military power.

The forth point is that with the progress of globalization of economies and growing information networks today, relationships between nations are getting increasingly close. Now that the development of China has become inseparable from the development of the world, China must uphold “a road to peaceful development” and must contribute to world peace and development. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that the globalization of economies led by the Western advanced countries could cause friction and conflict with developing countries. China must take on more obligations and play a bigger role in various activities to maintain world peace based on significant capabilities.
Expanding Mission of the PLA

Of the four historic missions that President Hu Jintao gave to the PLA above, it seems that the ones that are of particular interest in terms of the objective of this report are the latter two. These are to provide a powerful strategic support in order to protect national interests, and to play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting joint development. They are of particular interest because they are related to the kind of effect that the PLA, which is moving forward with modernization and boosting its capabilities, will have on the security of Japan and other surrounding countries, East Asia, and the world.

As for the mission of providing powerful strategic support in order to protect national interests, attention should be given to the content of “national interests” as defined by China. As mentioned earlier, China recognizes that its national interests are expanding beyond territorial boundaries, to oceans, space, and cyber spaces. China says that protecting these expanded national interests is the new mission of the PLA. Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli states that in developing the navy, China is increasing the scope of its capabilities for building combat strength in light of the expanding territories of national interests, and China is moving toward core capabilities for building combat strength in light of the threats that are arising regarding national interests. An editorial in the PLA Daily concerning escort activities for merchant ships by the PLA Navy (PLAN) off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (January 4, 2009), points out that China has a huge strategic interest in the oceans, and emphasizes that under the conditions of globalization, nations cannot ignore detriments to security outside of their borders, and therefore measures and activities for security cannot be limited to the inside of national borders, so the security spaces of nations inevitably go beyond their territorial boundaries. Based on such an awareness, the range of activities of the PLA will naturally move in the direction of expansion.

If China demonstrates an important role in order to maintain world peace and promote joint development, the PLA will need to establish relationships with the militaries of the surrounding countries and international community, and it will have to act in accordance with its objectives. It seems that this is the reason that the PLA began to emphasize “military diplomacy” under the Hu administration. As President Hu pointed out in his speech at the United Nations, in the today’s world in which globalization is progressing, the promotion of cooperation with foreign countries has become one of the pillars of “military diplomacy” in light of the situation in which coping with terrorism and other nontraditional security problems has become a joint issue. This also connects with the “road of peaceful development” that China has emphasized in terms of diplomacy. Nevertheless, at the same time, China attributes global instability and income gaps between the north and the south to the existing international order, which is led by the Western advanced countries, and this seems to mean that the direction for aiming to reform such issues lies with “military diplomacy.” In describing the effect that the PLA, which is moving forward with modernization, will have on the security of East Asia, it is necessary to examine China’s “military diplomacy.”
Since their establishment, the armed forces led by the Chinese Communist Party have been conscious of the inferiority of their equipment and military force, and for this reason, have sought methods of ‘winning without engaging in war.’ Traditionally, the PLA has been particularly adept at psychological warfare, and believes that the psychological warfare it waged in the Sino-Japanese War, in China’s civil war, and in the Korean War was successful.

From lessons learned in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Second Chechen War and the war in Iraq, the PLA realized that the circumstances of psychological warfare change depending of the state of advancement of information communications and that acts of war must be lawful. In response, the PLA set forth in the PLA Political Work Rules revised in December 2003 that it would bring down the enemy by conducting the so-called “Three Warfares,” media warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare.

Media warfare provides a favorable field of media for waging psychological warfare and legal warfare, while legal warfare provides the legal grounds for media warfare and psychological warfare. The three warfares are indivisible. They are aimed at weakening the enemy through propaganda—an activity at which China is highly skilled—and as such can be regarded as a tactic of asymmetric war.

**Media Warfare**

Media warfare is an activity that seeks to stir up both internal and international opinion in order to encourage a fighting spirit in the country’s own armed forces and to weaken the enemy’s will to fight. This warfare utilizes a wide range of information sources such as newspapers, books, radio, television, the Internet and e-mail.

The tactics commonly used in such warfare include “priority strike” in order to influence the decisions of the enemy’s leadership class and political class and “information management” which disseminates favorable information and restricts unfavorable information. In recent years, the PLA has aggressively initiated policy measures relating to media warfare, introducing press office system at the ministry of national defense, establishing a defense ministry’s Website, and conducting training in handling the mass media throughout all military branches.

**Psychological Warfare**

The aim of psychological warfare is to crush the enemy’s will to resist. It principally takes the form of cognitive operations and psychological defense of the country’s forces, and pressures the enemy using propaganda, intimidation, deception and alienation.

Propaganda aims to change the enemy’s thoughts, positions, and attitudes through means such as radio, television, the Internet, recommendations to surrender, and the scattering of printed material. Intimidation tries to influence the enemy’s consciousness and will through military pressure such as military exercises and displays of advantageous strategic readiness and advanced military hardware. Deception seeks to delude the enemy by distorting the truth and thereby forcing the enemy into erroneous decisions and action. Alienation is intended to cause psychological suspicion and eccentricity between a country’s leaders and its citizens and between commanders and subordinates, and create opportunities that can be exploited by the forces. Psychological defense seeks to build a psychological defense line by boosting morale and by giving encouragement, counseling and treatment, and to suppress and eliminate the enemy’s psychological warfare activities.

The PLA is not only incorporating psychological warfare in troop training but is also developing equipment for exclusive use in psychological warfare.
Legal Warfare

Legal warfare seeks to ensure the legality of the use of force and strategic action of the country’s forces while exposing the illegality of the enemy and blocking intervention by third countries. The aim is to place the country’s army in the position of leader and the enemy in the position of passive recipient militarily. Legal warfare does not seek legal victories; in the final analysis, it is a means of augmenting military strategy.

In recent years, China has engaged not only in passive legal warfare—simply complying with international law—but has also shown a marked inclination toward a more aggressive version of legal warfare: forestalling its rivals by creating rules that are advantageous to China, through such means as applying its own interpretations to international law and enacting domestic laws on that basis.
Expanding Area of Operations
Improvement of Blue-Water Capability

With China’s security interests steadily growing, the area of operations of the PLA is currently expanding, and such operations have gone beyond China’s own territorial boundaries to include surrounding regions such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean and Africa. The content of such activities is diverse and includes the implementation of military exercises in blue waters and brown waters, the implementation of air-to-air refueling of combat aircraft in the South China Sea, the deployment of air force affiliated combat aircraft outside of the country for participation in joint drills, and participation in international security cooperations as represented by counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The PLA is greatly improving its ability to carry out more sophisticated operations.

At the present stage, efforts by China aimed at the peace and stability in the international community are being welcomed, but the rapid increase in the activities of the PLA is causing concern for surrounding countries and related countries, including Japan and the United States. For example, as will be covered later on, among the activities of Chinese ships and aircraft affiliated with the PLA and other government agencies, there appear to be cases which are disturbing from the perspective of the safety of navigation. When China says that there is “freedom of navigation” in international waters, it is not completely consistent, as there are cases in which it justifies its own activities in waters close to other countries and criticizes the activities of other countries in its own brown waters. Nevertheless, the Chinese government is not necessarily giving sufficient attention to such concerns of other countries, and it sometimes takes a stance of criticizing the other countries for their lack of understanding.

In light of this point, while China has indicated a cooperative stance on international affairs as it expands the area of operations of the PLA, based on the content of such activities and related statements, it seems that there is a possibility that China is not necessarily sharing international norms.

As the PLA proactively develops its activities, trends related to the navy are particularly noteworthy. When the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in 2007, Chairman of the Central Military Commission Hu Jintao stated regarding the PLA Navy (PLAN), “We will improve our overall operational capabilities in brown waters and will gradually shift to the defense in blue waters. We will improve our operational capabilities in blue waters and protect our territorial waters and maritime interests. We will ensure the safety of strategic routes for maritime industries, maritime transportation, and energy resources, which are developing day-by-day.”

Furthermore, on April 15, 2009, Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli stated on the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the PLAN, “Going forward we will carry out ordinary training in blue waters, and the five divisions of the navy (ships, submarines, aircraft, coastal defense, and naval brigades) will carry out training in faraway oceans each year organized into a number of military units.” As such, at the level of the party and military leaders, increasing the activities and operations of the PLAN has already become a determined path.

In fact, looking at the trends of the Navy’s activities, it appears that the navy has been focusing its strength on increasing its capabilities in faraway oceans since before statements at the leadership level like the one presented above. Even in terms of the activities of the PLAN in the area around Japan, there are the following examples. In November 2004, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine engaged in underwater navigation in Japanese territorial waters; in September 2005, five ships including destroyers...
navigated near the Kashi gas field; in October 2008, four ships including destroyers passed through the Tsugaru Straits and circled near Japan; in November 2008, four ships including destroyers passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island on a course to the Pacific Ocean; and in June 2009, five ships including destroyers passed through the southwestern islands and entered waters 260 km to the northeast of Okinotori Island. In light of this series of actions, the directive by President Hu Jintao in 2007 and the comments by Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli in 2009 seem to have been formulated after-the-fact regarding the increasing activities of the PLAN.

Furthermore, the navy’s approach to training appears to have changed since 2000. For example, in 2003, it was reported that the navy would carry out its “first mixed formation training.” “Mixed formation training” refers to a formation combining destroyers and frigates, and this means that the PLAN started incorporating the concept of fleet systems into its training. In other words, it seems that the navy has taken its first step in efforts to adapt to modern naval combat.

Subsequently, there has been remarkable development of the content of drills and training. In the latter half of 2004, PLAN’s air units began long-distance flight training, and it has been repeatedly reported that various types of aircraft engaged in training for simultaneous attacks against ships as a part of maritime combat training. Around the same time there have been reports on joint training for ships and aircraft. Up to 2003, the PLAN had placed only the same types of ships in groups, but currently

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**Fig. 2  Main activities of Chinese Navy in waters near Japan**

- **October 2008**: A Sovremenny-class destroyer and four other warships pass through the Tsugaru Strait (the first Chinese naval warships to conduct this operation). The ships subsequently circled Japan.
- **November 2004**: A Chinese nuclear submarine travels submerged through Japanese territorial waters.
- **October 2006**: A Song-class submarine surfaces near the USS Kitty Hawk supercarrier.
- **September 2005**: Five warships including a Sovremenny-class destroyer pass by the Nansei Islands and advance to a location approximately 260km northeast of Okinotori Island.
- **November 2006**: Four warships including a Luzhou-class destroyer pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance into the Pacific Ocean. Three of the warships circle the Kashi gas field extraction facilities.
- **October 2008**: Five warships including a Luzhou-class destroyer pass by the Nansei Islands and advance to a location approximately 260km northeast of Okinotori Island.
- **November 2008**: A Chinese nuclear submarine travels submerged through Japanese territorial waters.
- **April 2010**: 10 warships including a Kilo-class submarine and Sovremenny-class destroyer pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance into the Pacific Ocean. While passing between the islands, an MSDF escort ship is buzzed on several occasions by a Chinese carrier-based helicopter.
- **September 2009**: A Chinese Navy vessel seizes a Vietnamese fishing boat.
- **March 2009**: A Chinese survey ship, fishing trawler and other vessels approach the USNS Impeccable, an ocean surveillance ship. Some of the Chinese ships harassing the vessel with obstructive behavior.

Source: Prepared from data of Japanese Defense Ministry
it is carrying out training for integrated operation of various types of equipment including not only ships, but also aircraft, and this trend is accelerating.

The development of training activities for navigation in blue waters by the PLAN in 2009–2010 seems to be in line with such trends. From March through April, six ships affiliated with China’s North Sea Fleet passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, went through the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines, and entered the South China Sea to carry out training. As part of this training, a newly-developed “Shenyang” destroyer commissioned in November 2006 was given its first assignment to carry out training in navigation in blue waters.

In April 2010, a group of ships affiliated with the East Sea Fleet including two destroyers, three frigates, four submarines, one support vessel, one submarine support vessel, and one tug boat, passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and then proceeded east to the Pacific Ocean. In the waters of the Pacific Ocean, they then carried out training and offshore supplying. An article carried in the PLA Daily stressed the significance of actual-troop confrontation exercises in oceans by military forces, and stated that drills and training were carried out with a focus on command, coordination, technology, and logistic support, and these were aimed at improving maritime maneuvers and overall logistic support capabilities. The article also states that the group also carried out training regarding the so-called “three warfares” of media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare, and antiterrorism and counter-piracy training.

Furthermore, the PLAN is focusing its strength on antisubmarine training. This training fleet affiliated with the East Sea Fleet was accompanied by two Kilo-class submarines, and it is thought to have carried out antisubmarine training in deep waters of the Pacific Ocean. Nevertheless, when the fleet was confirmed to the south of Okinawa, the two Kilo-class submarines were navigating on the surface, and they were accompanied by a submarine rescue vessel and an ocean tug boat. Based on the operations of this fleet, it seems that the PLAN had the intention of demonstrating a large-scale operation to the outside. Nevertheless, the fact that the fleet was accompanied by a submarine rescue ship implied the presence of submarines, even though the greatest weapon of submarines is their stealthiness, so considering that it is common sense for the fleet to carry out its activities as covertly as possible, it appears that the PLAN still does not have confidence in its operation of submarines.

This series of activities by the PLAN brought about a significant response in Japan. The Chinese foreign ministry gave a simple explanation, saying, “The PLAN recently carried out routine training in international waters.” The Chinese Ministry of National Defense also stated, “Carrying out ordinary training in international waters is in line with international law. This applies to all countries. There is no reason to be suspicious.” Nevertheless, the training fleet affiliated with the East Sea Fleet has carried out actions that threaten the safety of navigation in international waters. On April 8, 2010, while the training fleet was carrying out drills in the East China Sea, a Chinese ship-based helicopter came abnormally close (approximately 90 m horizontally and approximately 30 m vertically) to the “Suzunami,” an Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) escort ship which was conducting warning and surveillance activities. Furthermore, on April 21, another ship-based helicopter came abnormally close (approximately 90 m horizontally and approximately 50 m vertically) to the “Asayuki,” an MSDF escort ship which was conducting warning and surveillance activities for the fleet in the Pacific Ocean. The Government of Japan lodged a protest regarding these dangerous actions to the Chinese government. Nevertheless, the Chinese Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua stated, “What would Japan think if PLA warships persistently followed Japanese military exercises?” and “I would like Japan to act while thinking from a perspective of mutual understanding.” He thus responded by criticizing the series of warning and surveying activities by Japan.

On July 3, 2010, a PLA naval fleet consisting of one destroyer and one frigate entered the Pacific Ocean from the East China Sea and proceeded south. The next day on July 4, the Japanese Joint Staff Office announced the fact that the PLA fleet had passed by, and in response, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense stated, “The passing of a PLA naval fleet through the Miyako Strait recently is a navigational activity that is in accordance with international law.
and China believes that it is not necessary for Japan to go to the effort of announcing this information.”

As such, the PLAN has been working to normalize training in blue waters in order to boost its ability to carry out maneuvers in blue waters, and the activities of the PLAN in surrounding waters are increasing and expanding. This has led surrounding countries and related countries to take an interest in the effect that the expanding naval activities of China will have on their safety of navigation and security. The activities of the PLAN must be based on international practices and norms so that they do not cause concern for other countries. Nevertheless, at this point in time, as covered above, the activities of the PLAN, including ship-based helicopters of the PLAN coming abnormally close to Japanese escort ships, have raised concerns among surrounding countries and related countries. In regard to concerns held by surrounding countries and related countries, the Chinese government has taken an approach of responding by criticizing the awareness and actions of the other countries. Therefore, China needs to make an effort to dispel such concerns based on the nature of its specific naval activities.

Meanwhile, in 2010, there have been a number of notable developments regarding the improvement of PLAN’s integrated operational capabilities in brown waters.

Firstly, in the South China Sea in July 2010, the South China Sea Fleet conducted a large-scale of live-ammunition training exercise in the South China Sea together with a large group of warship from the North Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet. According to the PLA Daily, the drills included combined-arms precision strikes on the sea in complex electromagnetic environments, air operations by air units, and comprehensive air defense and antimissile drills for ship fleets at sea also in complex electromagnetic environments. The newest flagship destroyers possessed by each fleet affiliated with the PLAN have also participated in the drills, and not only Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli, but also Chief of the General Staff Chen Bingde inspected the fleets onsite, emphasizing, “We need to pay close attention to the development of situation and tasks, so we need to make solid preparation for military struggle.” The devotion of the strength of the PLA to such drills appears to exemplify the fact that China is focusing on the South China Sea.

It can be inferred that the reason why the PLAN is focusing on the South China Sea is that it is aiming to resolve territorial issues in its own favor regarding the Spratly Islands, which is an outstanding problem with Southeast Asian countries, based on the flaunting of overwhelming military power.

One characteristic of the actions of Chinese military planes in the region is the proactive conduct of air refueling tankers. For example, in May 2009, J-8 intercept fighter carried out air-to-air refueling over the South China Sea. In June of the same year, combat aircraft of an air division affiliated with the Guangzhou Military Region conducted air-to-air refueling in formation for the first time and then engaged in training in blue waters. Furthermore, in July of the same year, fourth generation J-10 fighters dispatched to the South China Sea carried out training on air-to-air refueling.

Based on the implementation of this series of air-to-air refueling training activities, it seems that China’s PLA is aiming to secure air mastery in the South China Sea by expanding the area of operations of its military planes, as frictions increase with surrounding countries regarding maritime interests in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, considering that the PLA still does not have the equipment...
to be able to carry out air-to-air refueling for the Su-30 fighter, there are still limits to the operations of military planes in the South China Sea. Therefore, China develops a large military transport aircraft and modifies it to a tanker.

This increase in activities by the PLA in the South China Sea is causing concern for surrounding countries and related countries. For example, on July 23 2010, prior to the drills by China, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated at a ministerial meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Hanoi, Vietnam, “The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.” She also warned against activities by the PLAN in the South China Sea and stated, “The United States encourages all of the parties to agree upon a full code of conduct through cooperative diplomatic processes.” In response to this comment by Secretary of State Clinton, China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated that the remarks are “virtually an attack on China,” and that “there is no problem with the freedom of navigation.”

Meanwhile, in the East China Sea, China’s East Sea Fleet carried out live ammunition drills off the coast of Zhejiang from the end of June through July 2010. In mid July, the PLAN conducted anti-ship missile drills in the East China Sea and carried out live ammunition drills there in August. It also announced that it conducted live ammunition drills again in the Yellow Sea from September 1 through 4.

In tandem with the implementation of these drills, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ma Xiaotian responded to plans for joint naval drills by the US and South Korean in international waters of the Yellow Sea with the participation of the US aircraft carrier George Washington in July 2010 by saying, “We strongly protest their implementation in territory so close to our territorial waters.” A spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry stated, “Our standpoint is consistent and clear. We firmly oppose military ships and military planes of foreign countries conducting activities in the Yellow Sea.

Fig.3 Example of flight pattern of Chinese military planes in the vicinity of Japan

Source: Prepared from Defense of Japan 2010
Expanding Area of Operations

USNS Impeccable Incident

The obstructive behavior by the Chinese Navy and other ships affiliated with Chinese government agencies against the United States Navy surveillance ship USNS Impeccable, which took place in March 2009, is a typical example of China interpreting the boundaries of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in a selective manner and violating the international norm of freedom of navigation.

In international waters approximately 70 nautical miles south of Hainan, five Chinese ships (a naval information-gathering ship, a fisheries patrol boat of the Bureau of Fisheries, a State Oceanic Administration oceanographic research vessel, and two fishing trawlers) surrounded the USNS Impeccable as it was conducting its routine duties. The Impeccable sprayed water at the Chinese ships in order to protect itself from their approach, but the ships nevertheless closed in to a distance of approximately eight meters. The Impeccable’s navigation was hindered by the dumping of wood materials and other objects in its path, and poles were used in an attempt to snag the Impeccable’s towed sonars.

The US Embassy in Beijing lodged a formal protest over the incident, and the US Department of Defense called a meeting with the military attaché of the Chinese PLA residing in Washington D.C. to express its grievances. A US Department of Defense spokesman stressed that under international law the US military is able to conduct activities in waters beyond the territorial sea of another state, including within EEZs, without prior notification or consent.

Meanwhile, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry responded by citing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, and the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Foreign-Related Maritime Scientific Research, and stated that “the Impeccable engaged in activities in China’s EEZ in the South China Sea without China’s permission. China has lodged solemn representations to the United States. We urge the United States to take effective measures to prevent similar incidents from occurring.” In response to this statement by China, Chief of Naval Operations Gary Roughead of the United States commented during a visit to China for an event commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Navy that there are still discrepancies between the interpretations of the United States and China concerning EEZ laws.

In the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, only “scientific surveys” are discussed within the section on exclusive economic zones, and there are no provisions on military activities. If China continues to treat its EEZ in the same manner as its territorial waters, this will restrict freedom of navigation and raise concerns among surrounding and affiliated countries, including Japan and the United States. At a press conference during the ARF ministerial meeting in July 2010, US Secretary of State Clinton stated that the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation within the South China Sea, suggesting that the United States is truly concerned.

Chinese ships appear in front of the USNS Impeccable (U.S. Navy)
and China’s coastal waters that undermine China’s security interests.”

It appears that this clear statement by China of its opposition to activities by the US navy in the Yellow Sea along with the series of drills conducted by the PLAN in line with this, is an attempt by China to restrict the activities of the US navy in its own surrounding waters. In March 2009, when Chinese ships including ships of the PLAN hindered the activities of the USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea, China emphasized that it could restrict the activities of the US navy in its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In July 2010, the marine regions where China called for the US navy to cease activities were “the Yellow Sea and other waters close to China.” This definition is vaguer than EEZ, and it can be interpreted in a wider range of ways. As China moves forward with modernizing its equipment and improving the power projection capabilities of its navy and air force, the fact that the country has started to disapprove of the free navigation of the US navy in its surrounding waters seems to imply that it is “aiming to establish maritime control in the East China Sea and South China Sea inside the so-called ‘first island chain,’ and is seeking to block access to China by the militaries of foreign countries.”

China’s assertions about its surrounding waters are inconsistent with the logic behind the justification of its own activities in the waters surrounding Japan and in the Pacific Ocean based on the “freedom of navigation” in international waters. As the PLAN aims to improve its overall operational capabilities in brown waters, surrounding countries and related countries are becoming concerned that the increase in activities and operations by the PLAN is aimed at military intimidation in regard to territorial issues. Explanations by China have not succeeded in dispelling such concerns.

On the other hand, it is not the case that China is completely ignoring the concerns of surrounding countries and related countries and international opinions. Prior to ASEAN-related summit meetings held in Hanoi, the Chinese ambassador to ASEAN called for resolving issues in the South China Sea through bilateral negotiations, and was critical of involvement by Japan and the United States. Nevertheless, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao who participated in the meeting emphasized an approach of continuous dialogues with the ASEAN countries. He said that such dialogues would include effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed in 2002 and advocating future cooperation toward the formulation of a creating “code of conduct.” He also worked to dispel concerns and uncertainties regarding China by aiming to further strength economic cooperation. When it was announced that the United States and South Korea would be carrying out joint drills once again starting on November 28 2010 in response to North Korea’s artillery shell attack on the Yeonpyeong Island, the Chinese foreign ministry announced that “China opposes military exercises inside its EEZ.” Even though China continued to maintain its position on limiting the military exercises of other countries in its own EEZ, it was in fact acquiescent regarding drills in the Yellow Sea, which it had opposed up to that time.

Participation in International Security Cooperation

Currently, the PLA has been demonstrating an internationally cooperative attitude toward international security. It appears that a factor behind such activities by the PLA may be that China intends to boost its operational capabilities and power projection capabilities through participation in a series of international security cooperation. Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli stated in an interview at the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the PLAN, “The PLAN will incorporate the development of noncombat capabilities in all areas of naval modernization and preparations for military conflicts. We will incorporate operational capabilities in blue waters and power projection capabilities into our system for the development of the military capabilities of the navy. We will incorporate, scientifically plan, and implement the improvement of specialized capabilities related to noncombat activities, such as maritime emergency search and rescue, into the overall development
of naval strength.” The participation of China in international security cooperation does not only demonstrate the country’s cooperative attitude toward the international affairs. It might also appear that China is carrying out such activities with the intention of boosting the capabilities of the PLA.

China’s escort activities in the Gulf of Aden that it has been carrying out continuously since December 2008 are particularly of note. As of December 2010, China has dispatched fleets consisting of maritime military ships and supply ships seven times to the waters off the Somalia. The dispatched units are replaced about every three and a half months. The dispatched fleet include special forces units and the new “Kunlun Shan” large-scale amphibious landing ship. Chinese fleet carry out escort activities for not only Chinese ships, but also the ships of other countries, including Japanese ships, dispatch and recovery operations using amphibious landing ships, counter-piracy drills using amphibious landing ships and special forces units, and training on dropping off special forces units from helicopters. After missions have been completed some ships make friendly visits to European countries and Asian countries. Furthermore, “Daishandao” hospital ships have been dispatched on “Harmonious Mission” to surrounding waters, and have providing physical examinations and so forth in Somalia and countries bordering the Gulf of Aden.

In the past, it was said that crew members in the PLAN psychologically could not endure sea trips of more than a week. Nevertheless, a Maritime Self-Defense Force official of Japan engaging in escort activities in the Gulf of Aden together with Chinese ships highly praised the Chinese personnel, saying, “They have now improved their operation capabilities at the sea, and they are carrying out missions on par with those of Japan.”

Through a series of escort activities, it appears that the PLA is attempting to move forward with international cooperation with other countries. The PLAN is currently sharing information with ships that have been dispatched from other countries, and it is engaging in meetings among commanders. It is also carrying out joint escorting, joint drills, and the mutual dispatching of officers. In response to a suggestion by the PLAN, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force engaged in consultations regarding methods and approaches concerning escorting with the PLAN on two occasions in April and May 2010. In January 2010, at a related consultative meeting held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, a Chinese representative stated that China would participate in joint operations by a multinational force. In that same month, China joined the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) group concerning executing piracy countermeasures led by Europe and the United States and expressed an interest in co-chairing the group. The chairman of the group praised China saying, “We welcome China’s expression of its intention to collaborate.”

As such, through international security cooperation off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN is using every possible opportunity to carry out various drills and training that will contribute to further increasing its capabilities, and it is demonstrating to other countries its ability to conduct activities. Through such activities, China is aiming to dispel the concerns of other countries, and to increase its diplomatic presence in the international society as well.
Growing Role of Military Diplomacy
The Hu Jintao administration has positioned the PLA as one of the nation’s diplomatic resources in order to push forward with the building of a ‘harmonious world’ and as a result has strengthened the nation’s military diplomacy. In China, military diplomacy is understood as external contact, negotiations and struggle executed by defense authorities and armies, but in reality military diplomacy is being implemented unambiguously as part of the country’s diplomatic strategy. The Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs held at the end of August 2006 confirmed that the vision of ‘pushing forward the building of a harmonious world’ was considered as a diplomatic goal of China. The Conference also emphasized that the leadership of the Party will form the key to China’s overall diplomatic strategy. That is, the Conference stressed that “The entire Party and entire nation must align its thoughts and awareness with the assessment of the central party concerning the current international situation, align these with the foreign affairs policy presented by the central party. As such, the Conference made it clear that the PLA People’s Congress, People’s Political Consultative Conferences, local governments and private-sector organizations would be included in the external affairs of the country under the leadership of the party.

As a result of this conference, the PLA Conference on Foreign Affairs was held in September 2006, where National Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan once again confirmed, “The armed forces’ foreign-related work is an important component of the Party and state’s foreign-related work.” He encouraged all the departments concerned to conduct studies on the strategy of military diplomacy. The specific details of the discussions held within the Chinese administration and the PLA on military diplomacy remain unclear, but according to Defense Minister Liang Guanglie, China’s new military diplomacy has been developed to include not only the symbolic interaction with foreign militaries fostering trust centered on high-level friendly contacts to date, but also the emphasis of multilateral contacts and of working-level contacts that contribute to concrete problem resolution.

With regards to working-level contacts, the China-Gabon joint humanitarian medical rescue operation known as “Peace Angel 2009” was held in June 2009. The joint operation took place in Ogooue-Ivindo Province in Gabon with 66 medical workers from the PLA participating. The operation was divided into the three stages of specialized training, rescue operation and medical salvage. During the rescue operation stage, the team jointly diagnosed and treated nearly 20,000 patients and performed more than 300 operations in four regions of Gabon.

Additionally, the PLA and Singaporean Armed Forces held a joint security training operation also in June 2009 at a comprehensive training base located in Guilin, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Code named “Cooperation 2009,” the joint exercise, which focused on the prevention and emergency handling of nuclear, chemical and biological terror attacks, consisted of three mixed formations including reconnaissance, decontamination and rescue. Exercises were conducted for a period of nine days in the three stages of theoretical discussions, joint training and comprehensive training. This marked the first joint security training conducted by the PLA with a foreign military. The Foreign Affairs Office of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense gave the exercise high marks as it opened up new opportunities for working-level contacts with foreign militaries.

From the end of June to early July 2009, the PLA held a joint peacekeeping training exercise together with the Mongolian People’s Army called “Peacekeeping Mission 2009.” This marked the first time the PLA held a joint training exercise for international peacekeeping operations with a foreign military. In addition to theoretical discussions on peacekeeping missions, the joint training included exercises such as the guard and defense of camps, and the transportation of equipment. The PLA Daily pointed out that the joint training exercise, “Indicates that bilateral contacts and cooperation between both armies has entered a completely new phase,” and positioned the implementation of peacekeeping joint training exercises as an indicator of the evolution of the two armies’ relationship. Additionally, the PLA
Daily reported that the aim of “Peacekeeping Mission 2009” was to “Enhance the capacity of both China and Mongolia to execute international peacekeeping duties together.” Moreover, given the fact that deputy chief of general staff of the PLA Ma Xiaotian emphasized this joint training exercise, “Reflected the joint desires of China and Mongolia to continue to jointly support regional as well as global peace and stability and to create an environment together for harmonious development,” this may indicate that the PLA was considering the future possibility of a joint dispatch of personnel on UN peacekeeping missions.

The development of this highly practical military diplomacy indicates that PLA’s international cooperation activities have achieved a certain level of success as evidenced by China’s efforts to modernize its military capabilities, deploy troops for UN peacekeeping missions and participate in international rescue activities, each of which have boosted the confidence of the PLA. For example, a researcher of the PLA National Defense University has shown an understanding regarding the fact that in recent years the PLA has clearly strengthened its abilities and skills in various fields, in effect strengthening the level of its confidence in implementing military diplomacy.

**Fig.4 Current UN Peacekeeping Operations (as of October, 2010)**

![Diagram of UN Peacekeeping Operations]

Source: Data from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
As for international peacekeeping missions, China indicated to participants in the China-ASEAN Peacekeeping Seminar hosted by Chinese Ministry of National Defense in Beijing in November 2007 its intention to provide ASEAN its expertise amassed in the deployment of troops on UN peacekeeping missions by an engineering brigade dispatched on the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), visit with delegations from ASEAN. In fact, at each peacekeeping work conference hosted by PLA in 2007 and 2009, the success of troop dispatchment on UN peacekeeping missions to date was confirmed, while China emphasized the importance of not only “Go out” (Zouchuqu) but also “Bring in” (Qingjinlai). That is, in addition to dispatching troops on UN peacekeeping missions, this indicates that the will of the PLA is to expand its external dialogue and cooperation in the field of international peacekeeping.

Another feature of China’s recent military diplomacy is that it is consciously strengthening the utilization of multilateral platforms. According to Senior Colonel Huang Xueping, spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, especially in 2009 with the 60th anniversary of the PLAN and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), China has “undertaken multilateral military diplomacy activities” and “achieved many successes.” A naval parade to mark the 60th anniversary of the PLAN was held in April 2009 by the PLAN in Qingdao, Shandong Province in which 21 foreign military vessels representing 14 countries participated. Regarding the naval parade, the PLA Daily and other Chinese media outlets emphasized that all vessels of China’s navy were built domestically and that the parade demonstrated to the international community China’s growing confidence that it has successfully built a naval force suitable of a responsible power of international society.

In addition, in November 2009, the International Forum on Peace and Development was held in commemoration of 60th anniversary of the PLAAF. The Forum was held in Beijing and it welcomed air force delegations representing 32 foreign countries. President Hu Jintao, in an address to the air force delegations in attendance, stated “The Chinese Air Force will use mutually beneficial and win-win relationships to build a safe and harmonious space environment and promote human peace and development of noble causes,” stressing the PLAAF’s stance toward external cooperation. Furthermore, PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliang stated, “Using Joint military exercises with traditionally friendly nations and joint training exercises as a breakthrough, we would like to gradually expand the scope and fields of cooperation with air forces around the world,” indicating a more specific picture of the external cooperation required of the PLAAF. In other words, the PLA has attempted to illustrate its stance that emphasizes external cooperation by utilizing multilateral platforms.

This approach is consciously being utilized in a variety of fields. For example, in the field of international peacekeeping, the Peacekeeping Center of the Ministry of National Defense established in June 2009 hosted the Beijing International Peacekeeping Operations Seminar in November 2009. Seminar participants included 110 government and military officials from 21 countries as well as the UN, European Union (EU), African Union (AU), ASEAN, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Non-Aligned Movement. The Seminar held roundtables on UN capacity building and Multilateral Military Diplomacy

Aegis-class cruiser USS Fitzgerald visits Qingdao to participate in a naval review ceremony (U.S. Navy)
and methods for improving the training standards of peacekeeping units, while the day after the Seminar concluded the training of specialist units to be deployed on UN peacekeeping missions was opened to seminar participants, with the engineering brigade exhibiting land mine removal and backhoe operations.

Furthermore, the Peacekeeping Center provides a platform for external exchange as well as educational training of Chinese and foreign UN peacekeeping personnel (commanders, military observers and general staff). As part of its educational training programs, the Center hosted an one-week educational training course at the end of September 2010 for 19 PLA major generals and senior colonels. This course was the first of its kind to be co-hosted by China and the UN. Deputy Director of the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, Zhang Li, stated that the establishment of an educational training course for high ranking commander at the Peacekeeping Center is not only an “advantage for strengthening cooperation and exchange between China and the UN in the field of training,” but also an “advantage for developing a PLA training structure for peacekeeping missions, and so we would like to press forward with PLA capacity building for peacekeeping missions,” stressing the importance of external exchange and educational training.

Additionally, an international conference to coordinate cooperation on escort missions in the Gulf of Aden was held in Beijing in November 2009. The conference was a meeting of the first working group under the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia established based on UN Security Council resolution 1851. Discussions included how to segregate duties and cooperate in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden. As for this meeting, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu stated, “China holds an active and open attitude on international cooperation in escorting vessels. Within the framework of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, we are ready to partake in various forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with all related countries and organizations so as to jointly safeguard peace and tranquility in the Aden Gulf and Somalia waters.”

External exchange and cooperation for combating piracy first crystallized in the form of information exchange. In 2009, Chinese naval vessels that had been dispatched to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden held mutual visits and exchanged information with escort ships of the United States, EU, Russia, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and South Korea. In addition, at the end of April 2010, Senior Colonel Zhang Wendan, commander of the 5th escort taskforce met with Captain Takanobu Minami, commander in charge of counter-piracy operations for the Japanese MSDF 4th escort taskforce on the Chinese missile destroyer “Guangzhou” where they mutually introduced their activities.

When the PLAN initially participated in counter-piracy measures, the significance of dispatching vessels based on a UNSC resolution was stressed in China, but a sense of wariness about constantly dispatching vessels and participating in a cooperation framework led by Europe and the United States was still strongly rooted in the county. In January 2010, however, China announced that its navy would participate in multilateral joint military operations together with the United States, NATO and the EU. China also participated for the first time in the SHADE meeting on counter-piracy measures which was held in Bahrain also in January 2010. SHADE is an international framework jointly headed by European Union forces and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Participation in this international framework was a more proactive attempt by China to show its navy’s cooperative stance toward combating piracy.

The reason behind the active participation in and utilization of multilateral platforms found in China’s military diplomacy is to appeal widely, yet specifically, that as the country has rapidly strengthened its nation and military power the execution of this power will be used to stabilize the current international order and to cast aside “China threat” arguments. Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA Ma Xiaotian emphasized at an annual conference of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies held at the end of 2009 that purpose of China’s military diplomacy can be found in China’s active contributions to regional and global stability.

On the other hand, however, it is thought that the purpose of China’s multilateral military diplomacy is for the country to take the lead in international
frameworks. For example, China requested to be the chair of SHADE in November 2009, and on the country’s participation in SHADE in January 2010, the Ministry of National Defense stressed the need to adopt a rotating chair system and that China could potentially act as this chair.

Additionally, it should be pointed out that the purpose of China’s military diplomacy is not found solely in the nation’s intent to show its cooperative stance and build up a friendly international opinion. Some researchers of the PLA National Defense University are proponents of positioning military diplomacy as a means to gaining counterparty compromises in international negotiations, based on the “non-violent use of military force.” This argument has evolved into a debate that finds in military diplomacy a function to prevent the crystallization of tendency to believe real and latent rivals want to start conflict, and points out as a condition to possessing commensurate military power that military diplomacy is a premise for retaining the notion and resolution to use actual military force when required. China’s external pageantry of military force through military diplomacy is not only an effort to illustrate the cooperation and openness of the PLA, but is expected to act as a deterrent by demonstrating externally the PLA’s view that it has steadily increased its military capabilities and can execute these when required. In addition, this debate suggests that the PLA is deepening its confidence toward the modernization of its military power and can be evaluated as a change in the conventional deterrence theory in China that is based on China’s relative military force.

Given this discussion, China’s military diplomacy will weigh heavily on each of those countries where China establishes a favorable military power balance, and in this context, the PLA can be expected to improve its transparency to a certain extent. For example, the PLA has established a defense and security dialogue mechanism with the defense authorities of 22 countries, nearly all of these same mechanisms created after the year 2002 are with countries in the immediate geographic vicinity of China, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. Some military exercises implemented by the PLA have been disclosed and opened to these countries.

This does not contradict with China’s efforts to strengthen its military diplomacy and military power; rather it means the two are inextricably linked.

Discussion on China’s military diplomacy toward Japan tend to start from the context of a political relationship of trust between China and Japan. In other words, these discussions position the advancement and potential of cooperation in the fields of national security and defense exchange as an extension of the political relationship between China and Japan, while China feels that improving and developing the political relationship between the two nations is a prerequisite for cooperation and exchange between defense authorities. These discussions have also indicated that one reason why defense exchange between Japan and China has been limited in nature is the lack of strategic mutual trust at the national level. Concerns toward the trends of both countries’ militaries and national security policies as well as the issue of differing views of history are evidence that strategic mutual trust is lacking. If strategic mutual trust is lacking between China and Japan, then the unambiguous purpose of China’s military diplomacy toward Japan would then be the building of a relationship of trust politically.

However, given the modernization of China’s
Growing Role of Military Diplomacy

military power, especially the expansion of area of operations of the PLAN, as well as the increase in China’s use of fourth generation fighters, the possibility cannot be denied that an “unforeseen circumstance” could occur between the PLA and the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) in either the sea or air. In April 2010, MSDF escort ship Suzunami, while on alert in the East China Sea, and MSDF escort ship Asayuki, while at sea south of Okinawa, were buzzed by a PLAN carrier-based helicopter that flew at a horizontal distance as close as 90 meters. After the incidents, Japan lobbied a protest with the government of China that both represented dangerous actions. Based on this, it has come to the point where China-Japan military diplomacy and defense exchange now requires a crisis management function. The Japan-China Joint Press Statement released during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Japan in April 2007 specified that one field of cooperation both Japan and China aspire to “establish a communication mechanism between the two defense authorities” in order to “prevent the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances at sea.” Furthermore, at the China-Japan defense ministers meeting held at the end of August 2007, an agreement was reached to establish a Joint Working Group to set up a communication mechanism between the defense authorities of each nation. In April 2008, the First Meeting of the Joint Working Group was held in Beijing, and then the Second Meeting was held in Tokyo in 2010 in which discussions were held on this communication mechanism at sea and technical issues.

From the standpoint of crisis management, however, it will not be a simple task to move forward with establishing a communication mechanism between the defense authorities of China and Japan. On his visit to China in February 2007 former Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga was told by National Defense Minister at the time Cao Gangchuan, “The PLA has never had a direct hotline with other countries, so we need to coordinate domestically.” His statement of “coordinate domestically” is thought to carry two meanings. First is coordination among relevant government organizations. The communication mechanism to be set up between China and Japan carries the purpose to “prevent unforeseen occurrences at sea,” but Chinese related government organizations include not only the PLAN, but also the State Oceanic Administration, Maritime Safety Administration, China Maritime Surveillance Force, the Fishing Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Administration of Customs. As a prerequisite to establishing a communication mechanism with Japan, China will need to coordinate with each of these organizations.

Another aspect of coordination is the command system within the PLA. According to media reports, a possible counterparty of the communication mechanism from the Chinese side is the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense. However, the Foreign Affairs Office acts as a window for external negotiations, and as such no direct relationship of command authority exists with the PLA units. Consequently, in circumstances where a nimble response is demanded to avert a crisis, the effectiveness of a communication mechanism that uses an external office, such as the Foreign Affairs Office, will be limited greatly in an actual crisis.

According to a crisis management perspective, the communication mechanism must use a counterparty that can get in contact more directly with military, while security standard must also be shared across military units. However, the significance stressed by the Chinese side of establishing a communication mechanism with Japan is the “promotion of mutual trust,” and not from the context of crisis management. Additionally, according to a press release from the Japanese side, during the meeting between Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and his Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie in Hanoi, Vietnam in October 2010, which was after the maritime collisions between a Chinese trawler and Japanese patrol boats near the Senkaku Islands, both “reaffirmed that there is need to establish a communication mechanism at sea between the defense authorities of China and Japan as soon as practical.” The PLA Daily and People’s Daily and other major Chinese newspapers, however, did not report on the maritime communication mechanism. Instead they reported on the “commitment to strengthen their mutual relationship” as well as the statement made by Chinese defense minister on pushing forward with the sound development of defense exchanges between China and Japan. Here, the intent of the
Chinese side was clearly evident to prioritize defense exchanges with Japan in order to build a relationship of trust politically. Also, the Chinese side notified the Japan side of the “postponement” of the plan for a MSDF training squadron to make a port call in Qingdao on the day prior to the meeting between defense ministers of the two countries.

In addition, the exploration of a collaborative relationship under the keyword of nontraditional security represents another characteristic of Japan-China defense exchanges in recent years. In the discussions held between the defense ministers of both countries in August 2007, China and Japan agreed to gradually consider exchange activities in the area of nontraditional security including topics such as coping with natural disasters. The statement made by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and Chinese President Hu Jintao to “consider possibilities for cooperation in such areas as United Nations peacekeeping operations and disaster relief activities” in May 2008 was recorded in a joint press statement. Furthermore, on the occasion of Japanese Defense Minister Hamada’s visit to China in March 2009, both ministers concurred that “Japan and China should exchange opinions on issues common to both countries including PKOs, natural disaster relief, and counter-piracy operations at sea. In particular, both should promote possible cooperation in areas of information exchange on counter-piracy operations taking place off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.”

These agreements suggest an expansion in the areas of cooperation and progress has been made in discussions. In other words, although the scope of collaboration was initially said to be natural disaster management only, when President Hu visited Japan, the topic of UN PKOs, and when Japanese Defense Minister Hamada visited China the area of counter-piracy operations were each added. In addition, the level of exchange and cooperation that is anticipated to be actualized has been shifted from “gradually consider” to “consider” and finally “promote,” which suggests the defense authorities of both countries have become more proactive toward achieving defense exchanges in the area of nontraditional security.

Given this development, at a meeting between the Chinese Defense Minister and Japanese Defense Minister Kitazawa in November 2009, the two reached a consensus to hold joint exercises concerning search and rescue at sea at an appropriate timing. In addition, the two ministers also decided to hold discussions in order to share experience and promote cooperation in nontraditional security areas, such as disaster relief and UN PKOs. This covers the exchange of opinions to promote actual cooperation between Japan and China, including implementing joint training exercises related to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Defense exchanges between Japan and China are gradually progressing, as seen from the perspective of establishing a mutual relationship of trust. Besides the continued discovery of new themes of cooperation under the keyword of nontraditional security, the institutionalization of exchange between troops and working-level officials has started, while mutual courtesy calls by naval vessels have also taken place. In addition, a consensus has been reached regarding the implementation of Senior Officials Defense Dialogues as well as exchange between the army corps of the Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) and those of the PLA. In June 2010, Commander of the Jinan Military Region, Fan Changlong, made a courtesy call on the Headquarters of the Middle Army of GSDF located in Itami, Hyogo Prefecture.

However, China has not presented its discussion on areas such as the continued implementation of defense exchanges that are independent of the political situation and establishment of a communication mechanism for the purpose of crisis management. If political relations worsen on the Chinese side, defense exchanges will be used as a means for China to express its political intentions. China’s military diplomacy toward Japan remains in the stage of fostering political trust.
**Growing Role of Military Diplomacy**

Table 1  Exchanges and cooperation agreed upon at the Japan-China Defense Ministers' Meeting (November 27, 2009)

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ongoing mutual visits by Defense Ministers of both sides</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Ongoing mutual friendship visits by PLA Chief of General Staff, Deputy Chief of General Staff, commanders of each service and Japanese chiefs of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Annual Japan-China defense officials consultations</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Exchange between the army corps of the GSDF and those of the PLA (starting in 2010)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Ongoing mutual port visits of the navies of both countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Holding joint exercises concerning search and rescue at sea; sharing experience and cooperation with regard to humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and UN peacekeeping operations</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Prompt organization of the 2nd Joint Working Group Conference for establishment of a maritime communications mechanism between Japan-China defense authorities*</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Holding staff talks and exchanges with various departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Strengthening cooperation between Japan and China in multinational security frameworks</td>
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* The 2nd Joint Working Group Conference held in Tokyo on July 26, 2010.
Modernization of Military Hardware
The PLA is currently in the process of a major transformation. The former PLA was a pre-modern military force which compensated for outdated equipment by operating on vast battlefields with huge numbers of troops. However, under a policy of reforms and door measures spanning more than 30 years, China has attained remarkable economic development and is pushing forward with a rapid modernization of the PLA. In this part, we review the direction and current state of China’s military equipment modernization focusing on the PLAN, PLAAF and Second Artillery Corps, forces which are exerting a major influence on the security of Japan and other neighboring countries.

**Submarines**

In the 1950s, China introduced the WHISKEY-class and ROMEO-class diesel-electric attack submarines (SS) under an agreement with the former Soviet Union, and proceeded with knockdown production of these vessels (a method of production whereby a country imports the main parts and performs assembly domestically). In the 1960s, as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, China began domestic production of the parts no longer supplied by the Soviets. At the end of the 1960s China began development of the MING-class SS based on domestic production technology used for the ROMEO-class, and in the mid-1990s launched the SONG-class SS developed based on the MING-class. The SONG-class used European engine and sonar technology.

Although China’s development of a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) apparently took many years, in the 1970s it launched the HAN-class SSN and in the mid-1990s developed its successor, the SHANG-class SSN with the assistance of Russia. SHANG-class technology was based on the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic submarine (SSBN) launched in 2004. The JIN-class submarine is expected to carry on board the 8,000km-range JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

In 1993 and 2002, China purchased a total of 12 KILO-class diesel-electric attack submarines from Russia. The eight submarines (Type 636) purchased in 2002 incorporated advanced quieting and carried on board SS-N-27 cruise missiles with a range of 180km. The YUAN-class SS launched in 2004 featured a hull apparently influenced by the KILO-class and was second in China to the KILO-class (Type 636) that generates little noise. It was also equipped with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system which allows a submarine to navigate underwater for long periods without surfacing or using snorkels to replenish air. In addition, the YUAN, SONG and SHANG-classes of submarine were equipped with the 40km-range YJ-82 cruise missile. It is likely that these will be replaced in the near future by the CH-SS-NX-13 cruise missile currently under development.

**Destroyers**

In the 1950s China introduced the KOTLIN-class of destroyer from the former Soviet Union and developed the LUDA-class based on that vessel, incorporating improvements up to the 2000s. In the second half of the 1980s, China developed the LUHU-class destroyer, which was the first ship to be equipped with a surface-to-air missile (SAM), the HQ-7, which used Western technology. LUHU-class
Modernization of Military Hardware

destroyers were also equipped with patrol helicopters. In the latter half of the 1990s China developed the LUHAI-class destroyer based on the LUHU-class.

In 1997 and 2002, China purchased two SOVREMENNY-class destroyers from Russia. This class of destroyer was equipped with 160km-range the SS-N-22 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile and the 25km-range SA-N-7 surface-to-air missile.

As a result of development based on the hull of the LUHAI class destroyer from 2000, China launched in 2003 the LUYAN-II-class destroyer, which was equipped with large-scale phased array radar produced in China, the 100km-range HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile and the 280km-range YJ-62 anti-ship missile. At the end of 2004 China launched the LUZHOU-class destroyer, a ship equipped with the 150km-range SA-N-20 surface-to-air missile manufactured in Russia and the 160km-range YJ-83 anti-ship missile.

**Frigates**

In the 1950s, China manufactured by knockdown production LIGA-class frigates purchased from the former Soviet Union, and in the 1960s, thanks to domestic production of parts and the addition of improvements, built the CHENGDU-class frigate. China also developed the JIANGDONG-class based on the LIGA-class and then the JIANGHU-class frigate. The JIANGHU-II class, produced in the 1980s, carried Western-manufactured equipment, and later Western technology was adopted for subsequent variants. The 1990s saw development of the JIANGWEI-class frigate, which was based on this technology and equipped with surface-to-air missiles and a patrol helicopter. At the beginning of the 2000s, China developed the large, JIANGKAI-class stealth frigate. The JIANGKAI-II-class, which could be mass produced, was equipped with intermediate-range HHQ-16 SAMs and a data link.

**Aircraft Carriers**

China has up to now purchased four aircraft carriers from overseas and has conducted research into their structure and technology. China first studied the hull of the MELBOURNE purchased from Australia in 1986, then dismantled it. China later bought the MINSK and KIEV from the former Soviet Union and then placed them in a military theme park. The VARYAG, which was purchased unfinished from Ukraine in 1998, underwent painting and other modifications after arrival in Dalian in 2002, and has been in the process of refurbishment since April 2009. An actual-size model of the aircraft carrier was reportedly built in October of 2009 at the facilities of the Wuhan Ship Design and Research Center.

In September 2008, China began training carrier pilots at the Dalian Naval Academy. As for carrier-based aircraft, it has also been reported that China is involved in consultations with Russia regarding the sale of the Su-33 and it has developed airframes based on the J-11.

The Chinese government does not officially acknowledge that it builds or possesses aircraft carriers of its own. However, in 2009, Defense Minister Liang Guanglie stated that China was the only major country without an aircraft carrier and could not be expected not to have one forever. He added that China will decide on possession of an aircraft carrier after considering various factors including economic development, the level of construction technology, and national security—thus not denying the possibility that China intends to build and possess aircraft carriers.

**Fighters**

In the 1950s, China introduced MiG-17s (J-5) and MiG-19s (J-6) from the former Soviet Union and, after making improvements, produced them in large numbers domestically into the 1980s. In 1961, China was permitted by the Soviet Union to produce MiG-21s domestically, but when China-Soviet relations soured, Soviet engineers were called home. Consequently, China began production of the J-7
from exemplars and parts and components previously delivered from the Soviet Union. While China continued to make improvements in the J-7 up until around 2000, it developed the J-8 in the mid-1960s with a view to achieving high fighter performance based on the J-7. Meanwhile, the J-8II, which was developed in the 1980s, featured a twin-engine and major airframe modifications such as an air intake on the side of the aircraft’s fuselage instead of on the nose. The J-8II spawned many variants. For example, the J-8F, developed from the latter half of the 1990s, was equipped with an updated engine and a new radar. It also incorporated other performance improvements such as the ability to launch PL-12 air-to-air missiles (AAM) with BVR (beyond visual range) capability. In addition, J-8D/F/H fighters could be refueled by the H-6U aerial refueling tanker possessed by China.

The focus of the modernization of fighters was the introduction of fourth-generation aircrafts. In the mid-1990s, China began development of the fourth-generation fighter J-10 based on Israel’s LAVI. The engine and avionics (on-board electronic equipment) of this aircraft were manufactured in Russia, and the plane made its first flight in 1998. Although the J-10’s combat radius is short, in recent years airframes equipped with an aerial refueling probe have been developed.

In the early 1990s, China purchased the fourth-generation fighter Su-27 from Russia, and in 1996 commenced knockdown production of these planes. Production of 200 aircraft was initially contracted, but after delivery of the parts and components for 100 planes, the remainder was cancelled. China then began production of the J-11B, improving the engine, radar and avionics. In addition to being equipped with the PL-12 air-to-air missile with BVR capability and the PL-8 IR-homing air-to-air missile, the J-11B can be equipped with the YJ-91 anti-radiation missile with passive radar homing (a system which senses radar waves emitted by the target and is guided in that direction) and laser-guided bombs.

Furthermore, in 1999 and 2001, the ground attack capable fighter Su-30MKK was introduced from Russia (to the PLAAF), and the Su-30MK2 was introduced to the PLAN in 2002. The Su-30MKK is equipped with the Kh-31P anti-radiation missile with passive radar homing and includes the 110km-range Mod1 and the 200km-range Mod2. It is also capable of aerial refueling.

The proportion of all of China’s fighters accounted for by fourth-generation fighters in 2000 was only 3.7%, but with the decommissioning of some older planes, fourth-generation planes accounted for 10% in 2005 and has risen to about 28% in 2010.

In November 2009, PLAAF deputy commander He Weirong was interviewed on China Central Television (CCTV) and indicated that China was now developing fifth-generation fighters and that it is expected that 8-10 years will be required before these fighters can be deployed. On January 11, 2011, the J-20 “fifth generation fighter” underwent its first test flight in Chengdu, Sichuan Province.

**Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)**

In 1997, China and Israel signed an agreement for the purchase by China of an AWACS equipped with Phalcon radar manufactured by Israel, to be mounted on the airframe of a Russian-made A-50 AWACS furnished by Israel. In 2000, however, the United States voiced strong opposition to this agreement and demanded cancellation, and as a result Israel canceled the sale, China subsequently developed radar domestically and refurbished the IL-76 large transport aircraft, which is the basis for the A-50,
Modernization of Military Hardware

Completed it as the KJ-200.

China also developed the KJ-200 based on the Y-8. The KJ-200 is equipped with balance beam radar similar to the Erieye radar manufactured by Sweden.

Aerial Refueling Tankers
China began research into aerial refueling technology in the 1970s and accomplished its first successful aerial refueling operation in 1991. The refueling aircraft China possesses is the H-6U, which is a converted H-6 bomber. However, this aircraft can only refuel the J-8D/F/H and J-10 fighters. In order to acquire aerial refueling capability for the Su-30 fighter, China made an agreement to purchase the IL-78 from Russia in 2005, but Russia has yet to deliver the aircrafts.

Ballistic Missiles
In the latter half of the 1950s China began development of the DF-2 missile based on the R-2 missile introduced from Russia, but later, due to the souring of relations with the Soviet Union, China no longer received support and consequently moved ahead with its own development of ballistic missiles.

In the 1980s, China developed two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM): the DF-11 with a range of 280-350km and the DF-15 with a range of 600km. The DF-15 includes three versions: DF-15A, which has improved accuracy, DF-15B, with a MaRV, and DF-15C for underground attack purposes. By the end of 2009 it appeared that more than 1,000 DF-11s and DF-15s had been deployed on the shore opposite Taiwan.

China has developed intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM), including the 2,500km-range DF-3 and the 4,750km-range DF-4 in the 1960s and the DF-21 solid-propellant road mobile missile with a range of 2,150km in the 1970s. The DF-21 is developed from the JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and includes DF-21A with an extended range of 2,500km, DF-21B with an improved terminal guidance system, and the 1,700km-range DF-21C, with a MaRV. China also has been developing the 1,500 km-range DF-21D missile which is designed to target Aircraft carriers.

China’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) over the years has included the 12,000km-range DF-5 in the 1960s and the solid-propellant, road mobile DF-31 with an 8,000km range in the latter half of the 1980s. The DF-31 includes the extended-range DF-31A (14,000km), which already seems to have been deployed.

China’s SLBM capability consists of the outmoded JL-1, 12 of which can be carried on-board the XIA-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, of which China appears to possess only one and whose combat deployment is regarded as doubtful. As a successor to the JL-1, China has been developing since the 1990s more than 8,000-km range JL-2, which is based on the DF-31 and can be equipped with three or four multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).

Long-range Cruise Missiles
China embarked on development of long-range cruise missiles in the latter half of the 1970s. At the 60th anniversary military parade held in 2009, the 1,500km-range mobile type DH-10 cruise missile was displayed publicly. It appeared that China deployed as many as around 500 DH-10 cruise missiles by the end of 2009. The DH-10 probably uses Tomahawk and Kh-55 technology and can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads. An air-launched variant is also under development.

Capabilities in Outer Space
In January 2007, China fired an anti-satellite weapon directly at one of its antiquated weather satellites orbiting at a height of 864km and destroyed it. The missile used was a ground-launched MRBM which appeared to have been equipped with a kinetic

DH-10 long range cruise missiles

(Photo: Kyodo News)
warhead (a warhead which collides with the objective and destroys it with kinetic energy). Similar tests appeared to be conducted in July 2005 and February 2006 but appeared to have failed. It is also believed that China is developing anti-satellite weapons that use lasers and microwaves.

In January 2010, China conducted a test on ground-based mid-course (the stage when rocket engine fuel combustion ends and the missile is carried out of the atmosphere by inertial flight) missile interception technology. Although China has not clarified the details of this test, it has declared that the experiment was in accord with its defense policy which is defensive in nature and that its position regarding missile defense will not change.

China's Enhanced Military Capabilities

The following is a discussion of the areas in which the modernization of China’s military hardware has enhanced the country’s military capabilities, beginning with six key improvements in the PLAN,

(1) Improvement in the quieting technologies for submarines and enhancement of attack capabilities
(2) Development of advanced submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(3) Improvements in destroyers’ attack capabilities, anti-submarine capabilities and fleet air defense capabilities
(4) Diversification of uses of frigates (used not only for coastal defense, but also for open ocean attack, and anti-submarine warfare)
(5) Preparation for possession of aircraft carriers
(6) Introduction of fourth-generation fighters to PLA Naval Aviation.

These improvements contribute to a strengthening of long-range penetration, precision strike capabilities and strategic deterrent capabilities. The PLAN is now able to conduct activities over a broad expanse of sea, and it possesses equipment that allows it to take on missions in international cooperation activities in remote areas.

Its amphibious capabilities are still under development. The large YUZHAO-class landing platform dock (LPD) KUNLUNSHAN was commissioned in 2008 and the second vessel in this class, the JINGGANGSHAN, has also recently been launched, attracting interest in China’s forthcoming moves in terms of equipment with the capabilities.

Since the 1980s, the PLAN has maintained a strategy of offshore defense, but in 2009 PLAN commander Wu Shengli declared that the PLAN has included overseas mobilization and strategic power projection capabilities in its system of building the forces. This “far sea defense” brings to mind the idea that if China possesses an aircraft carrier, an expanded area of sea could obtain air support.

The following three improvements in the PLAAF are also areas of concern.

(1) Expansion of the combat radius of fighters and strengthening of precision strike capabilities
(2) Introduction of AWACS
(3) Plans to acquire aerial refueling capability for fourth-generation fighters

As with the PLAN, these improvements represent a strengthening of long-distance mobility and precision strike capability. China has deployed AWACS in recent years, and the operations of AWACS expand the area of activity of combat aircrafts at sea and also enable ground and marine forces to share information. If this information sharing is realized, it will probably contribute significantly to establishing infrastructures for joint operation by China.

With its small number of large transport aircraft, the long-range air transport capabilities of the PLA are limited. At present, the large transport aircraft
possessed by China is 18 IL-76. Guo Boxiong, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, has pointed out that the development of a strategic transport capability is an urgent priority. In November 2009, Hu Xiaofeng, president of Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), revealed that China was developing a IL-76-class large military transport aircraft. Up to now, China has not had the ability to develop a large transport aircraft, but is moving ahead with this development despite the obvious problems presented by these planes’ large size and weight, airframe structure, and engine. Cooperation with Ukraine in the establishment of a merged company has been reported as a possibility. If China succeeds in the development of a large transport aircraft, it could possibly modify the resulting airframe for use in aerial refueling tankers in the future.

The following two improvements in the hardware of the Second Artillery Corps merit attention.

(1) Changeover of warheads to MIRV or MaRV, and improvements in guidance systems
(2) Possession of long-range cruise missiles

These improvements represent a strengthening of missile precision-strike capabilities. In addition, all of China’s ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles can be equipped with nuclear warheads. Nevertheless, China is firm in its policy of never using nuclear weapons preemptively and maintains the position that the use of nuclear weapons is, in the final analysis, for defense purposes alone.
Conclusion
It is fair to say that China is not fully satisfied with the current international order. At the 17th Communist Party Congress held in October 2007, Hu Jintao declared that China would work to make the international order fairer and more equitable, suggesting that China does not necessarily intend to uphold all aspects of the current international order. Moreover, China sees the first 20 years of the 21st Century as presenting an important period of strategic opportunity for its national development, and aims to proceed with economic globalization and reap maximum benefit from the relatively stable international environment. At the same time, China attributes the factors behind the frequent outbreak of conflict and expanding North-South disparities to the current international order which is being led by the advanced Western nations. As a result, China has presented “harmonious world” as a new concept of order to replace the current one and regards the realization of world harmony as a long-term goal. China advocates a “Peaceful Development Road” as the basic aim of its diplomacy and stresses that China will achieve development by building a peaceful international environment based on cooperation with other countries. At the same time, China believes that “Peaceful Development Road” and “Harmonious World” form an indivisible relationship, a goal to be sought after and realized in partnership.

China has adopted as a diplomatic guidelines to follow the path of “Peaceful Development Road,” which envisions an all-encompassing role for cooperation. On the other hand, China sees the mission of the PLA and the armed forces as securing China’s expanding national interests and fulfilling a role in achieving world peace and cooperative development. In recent years, China has moved beyond the past definition of its national interest as protecting its territory and national sovereignty in order to preserve its national security and now believes in the need for protecting its new national interests, which are expanding both geographically and in substance. The role to be fulfilled by the PLA does not end at blocking the independence of Taiwan and preventing Taiwan from splitting off from the mainland. The new missions of the PLA now include protecting the import routes for the resources and energy that are essential for sustainable economic development, and ensuring maritime interests. The expansion of the national interests that must be protected requires an improvement in the PLA’s power projection capabilities to far-off places and blue waters.

The PLA is rapidly modernizing its equipment, with especially large improvements in the capability of the navy, air force, and Second Artillery Corps to project force and execute precision attacks. Thanks to this progress in modernizing its hardware, the PLA has acquired the capability to take on new roles in addition to blocking Taiwan’s independence and preventing intervention by third countries in Taiwan’s emergencies; the PLA’s new role is ensuring the stability of sea-lanes and maritime interests as well as international security cooperation and disaster relief. While enhancing its ability to operate in far-off locations, the PLA is expanding the area of its operations and conducting activities on a higher level. Especially in the seas surrounding China, such as the East China Sea and South China Sea, the PLA Navy conducts long-term, large-scale training exercises, and fighters perform long-distance training exercises with aerial refueling. These expanding operations of the PLA present a new, not-previously-encountered situation to countries neighboring China and are causing these countries to be truly concerned about their security.

In the oceans of East Asia, where the PLA conducts its active operations, China faces issues concerning sovereignty and jurisdiction with many neighboring countries. In light of China’s use of force to expand its control of the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands in the 1970s and 1990s, countries in the region are naturally growing increasingly concerned about the growing PLA’s presence in these waters, which has expanded its ability to operate in far-off territories. Japan, which has a number of issues to contend with involving China, faces the same situation regarding the borders of EEZ in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the PLA’s ways of operations are sometimes incompatible with the standards and customs shared by the international community, such as freedom of navigation, and this is a factor causing the countries of the region to have concerns about the growing PLA’s presence in these waters, which has expanded its ability to operate in far-off territories. Japan, which has a number of issues to contend with involving China, faces the same situation regarding the borders of EEZ in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the PLA’s ways of operations are sometimes incompatible with the standards and customs shared by the international community, such as freedom of navigation, and this is a factor causing the countries of the region to have concerns about the PLA’s expanding operations. China’s attempt to restrict action by foreign military forces in EEZ is a development that is particularly worrisome not only to East Asian countries but to the
The necessity of building a stable relationship with China, which has boosted its overall national strength and has become a major world power, is a vital interest for East Asian countries, including Japan, and building such relationships is an essential requirement for the peace and development of China. For the sake of increasing the welfare of the East Asian region as a whole, China must recognize the fact that East Asian countries are alarmed by its actions relating to security and need to take concrete steps to allay these concerns. For China, it would be desirable to actively expand its military diplomacy toward surrounding countries, and through these expanded dialogues, clearly convey an intention to resolve sovereignty-related issues peacefully. China should also see that the PLA exercises restraint in its activities in the surrounding area, and act in a way that does not cause anxiety among the countries concerned.

In light of positive cases where China has sought active involvement in international security cooperation such as in resisting piracy in the Gulf of Aden off Somalia, China is expected in East Asia to share international norms and to contribute to maintaining and strengthening these standards and the current international system. From this perspective, it is likely that the countries of the region are counting on China to seek earnest and active involvement in dialogue for the common goal of ensuring the stability and peace of East Asia.