

## Briefing Memo

### China's Peacekeeping Diplomacy: The Gap between Principles and Reality\*

MASUDA Masayuki

China Division, Regional Studies Department

#### **Introduction**

In October 2021, China marked the 50th anniversary of the restoration of the lawful seat of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the United Nations (UN). As part of commemorative events, the 20th Lanting Forum was held in the Foreign Ministry in June, where State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi gave a keynote speech. Wang Yi stressed China's efforts to maintain an international system with the UN at its core.<sup>1</sup> He said, "Over the past five decades, holding high the banner of multilateralism, China has firmly safeguarded the UN-centered international system, upheld the international order underpinned by international law, and bolstered the central role of the United Nations in international affairs." Wang also spoke about China's contributions to security, development, and global issues. He used China's active participation in UN peacekeeping operations as the symbol of its contribution in the area of security, emphasizing, "China has honored its responsibilities for upholding world peace."

Since 1990, China has dispatched a total of more than 50,000 personnel on UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>2</sup> As of August 31, 2021, China ranks 10th out of 122 contributing countries with 2,263 peacekeeping personnel (2,170 troops, 48 staff officers, 17 individual police, and 28 experts), which is the largest number among permanent members of the Security Council.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, China's contributed 15.21% of the UN peacekeeping budget (2020/2021) ranks second after the United States' 27.89%.<sup>4</sup> As Beijing points out these facts, it recognizes that "the Chinese troops of this new age have become the factor and force that serves as the key to UN peacekeeping operations, and we are pouring even more positive energy into world peace and development."<sup>5</sup>

This paper begins with a summary of policy development in China since the early 2000s in order to clarify China's political context of troop dispatch for UN peacekeeping operations. It offers the characteristics of China's policy and approach to UN peacekeeping in recent years.

#### **Troops Contribution in the early 2000s: Increased Sense of Crisis<sup>6</sup>**

China's contributions to UN peacekeeping activities have steadily increased and diversified in the early 2000s.<sup>7</sup>

In April 2003, China dispatched peace keeping force to the Democratic Republic of Congo consists of 218 peacekeepers, including a 175-member engineering company and a 43-member medical company.<sup>8</sup> In December that year, the Chinese contingent consisting of an engineering company, a transportation company and a medical company with a total of 558 troops was dispatched to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).<sup>9</sup> Moreover, during September and October 2004, Beijing sent its first Formed Police Unit (FPU) of 125 officers to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The FPU is trained and equipped to act as a cohesive unit capable of accomplishing policing tasks.

In the background of China's bold course of troop deployment at the beginning of the 2000s, which later became normalized, lay a serious concern about the possibility that the authority and role of the UN was declining. Notably, the fears of China's leadership were heightened following the Kosovo crisis at the end of the 1990s and the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of Yugoslavia, which took place in a way that evaded the UN's authority. In the UN Security Council Summit Meeting in September 2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin emphasized that the issue of "how the UN can maintain international peace and security more effectively" was becoming "an urgent challenge." Moreover, Jiang criticized the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as a violation of the principles of the UN Charter. In this context, Ambassador Qin Huasun of the Permanent Mission to the UN expressed China's intention to "play a broader and deeper role in UN affairs" to strengthen the authority and role of the UN Security Council.

The Chinese government had studied the feasibility of the continuous deployment of troops since the second half of the 1990s. In May 1997, the Chinese government made the decision to, in principle, participate in the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS). However, it took almost five years for China to actually register in 2002. In 1997 when Ambassador Wang Xuexian of the Permanent Mission to the UN announced the Chinese government's decision, he said, China would contribute to UNSAS in military observers, civilian police as well as engineering, medical, transportation and other logistic contingents.<sup>10</sup> However, he did not touch upon the timing of China's registration or any deployments, merely alluding to "an appropriate period."

The internal movements of the Chinese government relating to troop deployment came to light from 2001. In December that year, the Peacekeeping Affairs Office was newly established in the Ministry of National Defense (this was reorganized as the Peacekeeping Affairs Center in June 2018). The office was responsible for the unified coordination and management within the army regarding the troop dispatch for UN peacekeeping operations. In January 2002, China finally registered its capabilities available for UN peacekeeping operations with UNSAS. Under this arrangement, China had a 525-troop engineering battalion, a 35-troop medical unit and two 80-troop transport companies.<sup>11</sup>

By normalizing the deployment of troops, China was attempting to maintain the role of the UN and its peacekeeping operations. At the same time, China strove to maintain the integrity of its principled position

concerning the deployment of personnel on UN peacekeeping operations——respecting national sovereignty, non-intervention in the internal affairs, and non-use of force——by limiting its dispatches to logistic force.<sup>12</sup>

### **The Deployment of “Combat Forces” in the 2010s: Proactive and/or Prudent Engagement?**

A critical next step was Beijing’s decision to send a “combat force” in pursuit of a UN mandate in the early 2010s. There had already been gradual debate about the feasibility of sending operational forces on UN peacekeeping operations within China since the second half of the 2000s. The first Peacekeeping Work Conference was held in June 2007. Participants from the PLA and State Council discussed ways of protecting peacekeepers and peacekeeping troops.<sup>13</sup> At the Peacekeeping Work Conference of June 2009, General Chen Bingde, member of the Central Military Commission and chief of general staff of the PLA, emphasized that, “It is necessary to further improve the ability for prompt disposition of unexpected incidents as the occasion requires, ensuring security and stability.”<sup>14</sup> In November that year, Senior Colonel Kui Yanwei, deputy director of the Peacekeeping Affairs Office, told the media: “If the UN makes a request (to China) to dispatch combat forces, we will put forward proposal to the decision-makers.”<sup>15</sup>

At this time, the opinions of military sector were still divided regarding sending combat forces overseas. Professor Wang Baofu of the Strategic Institute of PLA National Defense University indicated his understanding of Senior Colonel Kui’s remark: “He expresses that China is ready to dispatch combat forces.”<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, Major General (retired) Peng Guangqian noted that “the possibility [of deploying combat forces] is not that large.”<sup>17</sup> His reasoning was that the deployment of combat forces would not contribute to improving the situation on the ground, and that the responsibility of maintaining order should be borne by police units. Furthermore, he also pointed out that the PLA was “busy with the task of national defense.” Peng concluded that it would go “beyond the scope of PLA’s abilities” to send combat forces to UN peacekeeping missions.

Moving into the 2010s, the Chinese authorities started to announce the possibility of sending combat forces more clearly. In May 2012, the “Regulations on the PLA’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations” (trial) took effect. These regulations did not mention specific types of forces to be sent to UN missions. However, as for the possibility of sending combat forces, an official of the Peacekeeping Affairs Office explained that, “We leave open the possibility of expanding missions which our military forces will carry out [in the future].”<sup>18</sup> In other words, Chinese military authority recognized the possibility of deploying combat forces on UN peacekeeping missions.

In December 2013, Beijing sent a large detachment of personnel, including combat forces for the first time, along with engineers and medical personnel to support UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission

in Mali (MINUSMA). Chinese “guard” (force protection) force was responsible for the security of the MINUSMA headquarters and cantonment sites. In January 2015, China’s armed forces dispatched the first infantry battalion of 700 troops to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Chinese peacekeepers provided protection to civilians, UN personnel, and UN facilities there.

When China’s Ministry of National Defense announced the deployment of “combat forces” (作战部队) to Mali, it provided a cautious explanation. Spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense Colonel Yang Yujun gave the following statement on the dispatch of a “security force” (安全部队) to the MINUSMA.<sup>19</sup> “There is no such thing as so-called combat forces in UN peacekeeping forces. The main purpose of the UN peacekeeping forces is to help relevant countries to restore and maintain peace, prevent wars and monitor ceasefires; peacekeeping personnel should not get directly involved in military conflicts in host countries.”

On the other hand, in the face of the recent situation in which the civilian population frequently becomes the target of attacks, the international community increasingly permits the use of “any means necessary” to protect civilian populations with the clause in Security Council resolutions. Consequently, there are many examples of peacekeepers becoming targets of parties involved in conflicts. Although the spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense stated that “peacekeeping personnel should not get directly involved in military conflict,” experts within the military pointed out that peacekeepers face increasing danger.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, the PLA has also set out concrete responses to danger. In May 2011, in light of the dangers in areas in which missions take place, the main peacekeeping standby forces from across the army carried out their first intensive training with the aim of “improving emergency response capabilities for peacekeeping missions.”<sup>21</sup>

Beijing took the bold course of dispatching “combat forces.” The main reason is the following: Chinese leadership perceived troop deployment to UN peacekeeping operations to be a positive demonstration of China’s international responsibilities. Saying this, if China wanted to uphold its aim of strengthening the role of the UN and maintaining its basic principles of peacekeeping operations, it would have been fine to limit its dispatched troops to logistic forces. However, China was not able to respond adequately to the increased danger just by strengthening the capabilities of logistic forces, which led to it sending “combat forces.”<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore, there was an expectation that dispatching “combat forces” would contribute to enhancing China’s position and role in UN peacekeeping.<sup>23</sup> Although Chinese authorities and experts emphasized that China had dispatched the largest number of peacekeepers among the permanent members of the Security Council, they argued that China lags behind in ability to lead UN peacekeeping when compared to other permanent members.<sup>24</sup> They believed that sending “combat forces” was one way of improving this situation. Major General Du Nongyi, vice president of the PLA University of International Relations pointed out that, “compared to other types of military personnel, combat forces have a major impact, and this could lead to an improved position for China and the PLA in UN peacekeeping operations.”<sup>25</sup>

### **Manpower, Materials, Money, and Experience: Securing Leadership Role**

In September 2015, in his address to the UN General Assembly's annual gathering and Peacekeeping Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China's new contribution to support the "improvement and reinforcement of peacekeeping operations."<sup>26</sup> (1) China would join the new standby arrangements system, and establish an 8,000 troop stand-by peacekeeping force. (2) The nation would proactively consider sending more personnel for engineering, transportation and medical treatment to participate in peacekeeping operations (3) China would provide training for 2,000 peacekeeping personnel from different countries over five years. (4) China would provide military aid worthy of 100 million dollars in total to the African Union (AU), so as to support the establishment of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). (5) China would deploy the first helicopter unit for the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. (6) China would also establish a one billion dollar, 10-year "China-UN peace and development fund."

President Xi's 2015 pledge has been fulfilled. In June 2017, China registered a standby force of 8,000 troops to the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS). This force has 28 units in 10 categories: infantry, engineering, transport, medical, force protection, rapid response, helicopter, transport aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and surface vessels.<sup>27</sup> In 2018, 13 of these units were elevated to PCRS Level 2. In 2019 and 2020, six units were upgraded to Level 3 from Level 2. In August 2017, China sent a helicopter contingent equipped with four Mi-171 medium multi-purpose helicopters to the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Chinese helicopter contingent took responsibility for transporting personnel, injured people, and materials, plus battlefield reconnaissance.<sup>28</sup> China also implemented capacity-building assistance. The PLA provided 20 training programs on civilian protection, etc., for more than 1,500 peacekeeping personnel from over 60 countries over five years, and the Ministry of Public Security also carried out training for more than 1,000 police personnel from different countries.

In May 2016, a China-UN peace and development fund was established under the name "UN Peace and Development Trust Fund" (UNPDF), to which the Chinese government would contribute 200 million dollars over 10 years.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, from 2016 onwards, China greatly increased the proportion of the UN peacekeeping budget, coming second to the United States.<sup>30</sup> There was also an increasing number of cases in which Chinese military personnel took up leadership posts such as the Force Commander. In November 2016, Major General Yang Chaoying was appointed to the Acting Force Commander of UNMISS, and in December Major General Wang Xiaojun, who was the Defense Attaché to India, became the Force Commander of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).<sup>31</sup> As of 2020, the Deputy Force Commander of UNMISS (Major General Zhang Yijun), the Sector West Commander of

UNMISS (Senior Colonel Wang Chuanjin), and the MINUSMA Sector East Commander (Senior Colonel Zhu Jinsong) are members of the Chinese military. It could be said that China has striven to ensure leadership in UN peacekeeping by actively providing manpower, materials, money, and experience.

Notably, China’s 8,000-troop peacekeeping standby force had a major international impact. Both peacekeeping experts and UN officials appraised it as a “great gift.”<sup>32</sup> However, some PLA officers and officials argue that the organization and structure of China’s standby force is not adequately adapted to the diversifying environments of peacekeeping missions. They also point out there is a large gap among units according to their PCRS Level, in terms of the operational structure and mechanisms.<sup>33</sup> In fact, after China registered with PCRS, the scale of its troop deployment has not increased.<sup>34</sup>

**Table: Number of troops dispatched by China for UN Peacekeeping Operations: 2012—2020**

2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
1,800	1,865	1,973	2,839	2,448	2,419	2,419	2,437	2,436

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, “Troop and Police Contributors.”

Note: As of December 31 each year.

**Initiatives to Improve the Safety and Security of Peacekeepers: the Increasing Gap**

In recent years, China has repeatedly emphasized enhancing the role of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs) in UN peacekeeping. Ambassador Wu Haitao of the Permanent Mission to the UN pointed out that TCCs and PCCs are the main actors in implementing UN peacekeeping operations, and TCCs and PCCs must be acknowledged and respected.<sup>35</sup> In this regard, he insisted that, “We should strengthen the triangular communication between the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the TCCs.” According to Wu, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations should play its full role as a policy review body and give TCCs more say on peacekeeping issues.

China, seeking to enhance the role of TCCs and PCCs, has proactively worked on improving the safety and security of peacekeepers. In 2016, after China suffered three fatalities in Mali and South Sudan, the Chinese government confronted a more vocal public at home who sometimes questioned the rationale and risks of China’s participation in peacekeeping missions.<sup>36</sup> Accordingly, Beijing strengthened efforts to improve the safety and security of peacekeepers. The China-led UNPDF has provided resources to 95 projects to help advance international peace and security and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.<sup>37</sup> The UNPDF views peacekeeping capacity-building as an important task, through which it aims to assist the United Nations

in enhancing the safety and security of peacekeepers and supporting developing countries in building their peacekeeping capacities.<sup>38</sup>

In 2017, the Chinese government supported a UN research project on the safety and security of peacekeepers via the UNPDF.<sup>39</sup> This research project was carried out at the request of UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and a report was released in December.<sup>40</sup> The lead author was Brazilian Lieutenant General (Retired) Santos Cruz who served as the Force Commander of MINUSTAH and MONUSCO. The Cruz Report comprehensively discussed measures to reduce military casualties and injuries. Many experts within China focused on the arguments that the report advocated for “changing mindsets” regarding the security risks of peacekeeping activities. The report stated that peacekeepers must be “empowered to take the initiative to deter, prevent, and respond to attacks,” and when there is a clear risk such as an ambush, terrorist attack, or open combat, “the United Nations must employ overwhelming force.”<sup>41</sup>

Associate Professor He Yin of the China Peacekeeping Police Training Center, China People’s Police University criticized the Cruz Report, saying, “It underscores the validity of the devolution of UN peacekeeping.”<sup>42</sup> He argues that since 2010, due to the changes in conflict forms, the influence of interventionism, the recklessness of the Security Council mandate and the manipulation of major powers, the practice of UN peacekeeping has devolved from the “maintaining peace—building peace” model to the “building peace—keeping peace” model. Accordingly, “peace” is frequently created by non-peaceful means—peace enforcement. He asserted that China “should actively promote the return of UN peacekeeping to a path of evolution.” Furthermore, in another monograph, Professor He pointed out that the report concentrated too much on responses in terms of technology, equipment and actions, and thus, he emphasized, “We should search for the causes on strategic and political levels.”<sup>43</sup>

The Chinese government might have felt a sense of urgency in responding to the Cruz Report. Through the UNPDF, Beijing had strengthened its contributions to practical issues such as supporting capacity-building efforts and improving the safety and security of peacekeepers. Moreover, the PRC Permanent Mission to the UN, took the opportunity presented by the Cruz Report to continue bringing up the theme of improving the safety and security of personnel while moving on to international consensus-building regarding how UN peacekeeping should be.<sup>44</sup> In February 2020, Ambassador Zhang Jun, Permanent Representative to the UN said that China would hold an open debate on “United Nations peacekeeping operations: Better capacity building, more safety and security” during its presidency of the Security Council in March, to which all TCCs are invited.<sup>45</sup> The debate was cancelled due to the escalating COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>46</sup> Despite the cancellation, China decided to proceed with a resolution that members were in the process of negotiating as the anticipated outcome of the signature event. On March 30, 2020, the Security Council adopted resolution 2518 on capacity-building and the safety and security of peacekeepers, which had been co-sponsored by 43 nations.<sup>47</sup>

Resolution 2518 affirms that “lasting peace is not achieved or sustained by military and technical engagements alone, but through political solutions.” Resolution 2518 comprehensively covers issues concerning the improvement of the safety and security of peacekeepers, and many of the points overlap with those raised in the Cruz Report.<sup>48</sup> Nevertheless, China moved towards adopting the resolution to maintain a balanced discussion by focusing on the basic principles of peacekeeping. Ambassador Zhang Jun believed that the resolution would be *of great significance for improving peacekeeping operations* as well as effectively ensuring the safety of peacekeepers (emphasis added by author). He clearly expressed that the resolution would contribute to “forging a consensus,” and peacekeeping operations could be improved and a great role could be played in resolving hotspot issues by political means.<sup>49</sup> China emphasized the “primacy of politics” to conflict resolution.<sup>50</sup>

## Conclusion

China deems dispatching troops to UN peacekeeping operation is a diplomatic means of influencing the course of the UN peacekeeping. China began a large-scale dispatch of troops in earnest at the beginning of the 2000s due to a sense of crisis at the deteriorating authority and role of the UN. China aimed to both strengthen its contributions to UN peacekeeping operations and uphold basic principles of peacekeeping by limiting its troop dispatches to logistic forces. In light of the changing environment of peacekeeping operations, in the 2010s, Beijing decided to send “combat forces.” This also involved an expectation of a improved capability to lead UN peacekeeping, including policy discussions. Moreover, Xi Jinping declared that China would proactively and regularly provide manpower, materials, money, and experience to UN peacekeeping, so as to ensure China had a more active leadership role.

However, the main factor that drove Beijing to secure its leadership was the widening of the gap between the basic principle and reality of the environment surrounding peacekeeping operations. Although Beijing had a strong preference for traditional UN peacekeeping operations, the reality was that diverse peacekeeping missions were increasingly required, including civilian protection and long-term peace-building, and “any means necessary” including the use of military force partly in order to protect civilian population. It was difficult for China to affect the reality of policy development merely by limiting its dispatched troops to logistic forces to maintain its principled position on peacekeeping, which lead the country to take the course of sending “combat forces.”

On the other hand, in recent years UN peacekeepers have been increasingly attacked by violent extremist groups. China suffered three fatalities in 2016 including one in Mali in May and two in South Sudan in July of the same year. The Chinese government confronted a more vocal public at home who sometimes questioned

the rationale and risks of China's participation in peacekeeping missions. Accordingly, China strengthened its international initiatives concerning the improvement of the safety and security of peacekeepers. However, the 2017 Cruz Report, which was supported by the Chinese government, suggested that when there was a clear risk, the UN must employ overwhelming force, including the use of military force. This meant the report was taken as contradicting the basic position of China, which advocates for the "primacy of politics." Consequently, China drafted a Security Council resolution and moved to drum up support from TCCs and PCCs. On March 30, 2020, the Security Council adopted resolution 2518, which affirmed the "primacy of politics." In other words, in recent years, China's peacekeeping policies and its search to ensure its leadership can be understood as a response to the widening gap between China's principled position and actual policy development of UN peacekeeping.

After resolution 2518 was adopted, China emphasized the necessity of implementing the resolution and moved to establish a new mechanism.<sup>51</sup> In April 2021, the Group of Friends on the Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers was launched under the joint initiative of China and major TCCs/PCCs—Brazil, Indonesia, and Rwanda. According to Ambassador Zhang Jun, this group "provides a platform to strengthen information sharing, policy coordination, and capacity building." He expressed the hope the group would contribute to "translating the consensus of member states into concrete action on the ground."<sup>52</sup>

It remains uncertain whether China's search to ensure leadership has functioned to lessen the gap between principles and reality. If, on the premise of maintaining the safety and security of peacekeepers, China wants to see "improvements" of peacekeeping operations, it cannot avoid involvement in discussions about the fundamental issue of what values, principles, standards and norms will be set out in the creation of peacekeeping mandates.

---

#### NOTES

\*The author is grateful for the useful comments from the researchers of Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center, Joint Staff College. The author appreciates the insightful comments and suggestions from Professor YAMASHITA Hikaru.

<sup>1</sup> Wang Yi, "A New Journey Ahead after Fifty Extraordinary Years," *China Daily*, June 28, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> "New Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations: Written at the Time of Kicking off the 'Shared Destiny-2021' International Peacekeeping Field Training Exercise" [为联合国维和行动作出新贡献: 写在'共同命运-2021'国际维和实兵演习开始之际], *PLA Daily* [解放军报], September 7, 2021.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, "Troop and Police Contributors," as of August 31, 2021.

<sup>4</sup> "Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236: Report of the Secretary General," A/73/350/Add.1, December 24, 2019.

<sup>5</sup> Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee [中共中央宣传部], "The Historical Mission, Action and Values of the CPC" [中国共产党的历史使命与行动价值], *People's Daily* [人民日报], August 27,

2021.

- <sup>6</sup> Masayuki Masuda, “China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy and Troop Dispatch: A New Avenue for Engagement with the International Community,” *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security* 12 (December 2011): 3–25.
- <sup>7</sup> During this period, China also strengthened support for UN peacekeeping missions through its contribution of military observers and staff officers. Before 2003, an average of around 40 military observers and staff officers combined a year were dispatched; in 2004 this went up to just under 70 people. Xiong Guangkai [熊光楷], *International Situation and Security Strategy* [国际形势与安全战略] (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press [清华大学出版社], 2006), 130–131.
- <sup>8</sup> Peacekeeping Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defense of People’s Republic of China (PRC) [中华人民共和国国防部维和事务办公室], *Mission for Peace: Commemorative Album of PLA’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations* [和平使命: 中国人民解放军参加联合国维持和平行动纪念画册] (December 2011), 22, 55.
- <sup>9</sup> When Beijing made a decision to send the first troop to UNMIL, it was announced that 550 personnel would be dispatched, but a total of 558 personnel were actually sent, as the number of military personnel dispatched included an additional eight medical officers. “First Chinese Peacekeepers Leave for Mission in Liberia” [中国赴利比里亚维和部队首批官兵出发], *People’s Daily*, December 10, 2003; Ding Yan et al., “Protecting and Nursing AIDS by Chinese medical Officer in Liberia” [中国驻利比里亚维和医务人员对艾滋病的防护及护理], *Chinese Journal of Practical Nursing* [中国实用护理杂志] 22, no. 6 (2006): 72.
- <sup>10</sup> Wang Zhenchuan [王振川] ed., *Yearbook of New Age of Reform and Opening up 1997* [中国改革开放新时期年鉴 1997] (Beijing: China Democracy and Legal Publishing House [中国民主法制出版社], 2014), 518.
- <sup>11</sup> “China Gradually Scale up its Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations” [中国逐步加大参与联合国维和行动的力度和规模], *Xinhua* [新华社], December 9, 2003.
- <sup>12</sup> During the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from 1992 to 1993, China sent engineer units: two battalions of 400 troops totaling 800. Still, the PLA continued to send military observers, liaison officers, and staff officers to UN peacekeeping operations other than UNTAC. See, Information Office of State Council [国务院新闻办公室], “China’s National Defense in 2002” [2002 年中国的国防] (December 9, 2002), *Xinhua Monthly* [新华月报] ed., *Selection of Important Literature of the Party and State since the 16th National Congress of the CPC* [十六大以来党和国家重要文献选编] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House [人民出版社], 2005), 836.
- <sup>13</sup> “First-ever All-Army Peacekeeping Work Conference Begins” [我军首次维和工作会议开幕], *PLA Daily*, June 19, 2007. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Public Security also took part in the conference.
- <sup>14</sup> “PLA Peacekeeping Work Conference Held in Beijing” [全军维和工作会议在京召开], *PLA Daily*, June 26, 2009.
- <sup>15</sup> “Will China Send Peacekeeping Combat Force?” [中国今后可能外派维和作战部队], *Henan Business Daily* [河南商报], November 23, 2009.
- <sup>16</sup> “Will China Send Combat Force to Peacekeeping Missions?” [中国将派战斗部队参与维和?], *Time Weekly Online* [时代在线网], November 26, 2009.
- <sup>17</sup> “Experts Interpret China’s Peacekeeping Operations” [专家做客中国日报网解读中国海外维和行动], *China Daily Online* [中国日报网], January 20, 2010.
- <sup>18</sup> “Ministry of National Defense Answers Questions on ‘Peacekeeping Regulation,’ Consider Comprehensively on Dispatch of Combat Force” [国防部就〈维和条例〉答问 统筹考虑作战部队派遣], *China Internet Information Center* [中国网], May 17, 2012; “New Detachment Asserts China’s Role as Peacekeeping Heavyweight,” *Xinhua*, April 8, 2015.
- <sup>19</sup> “Ministry of National Defense: China to Send First Security Force for Peacekeeping Mission in Mali” [国防部: 中国军队首次派出安全部队参与马里维和], *Xinhua Online* [新华网], June 27, 2013.

- <sup>20</sup> Lu Jianxin, Wang Tao, Zhou Hui [陆建新, 王涛, 周辉], *International Peacekeeping* [国际维和学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2015), 187–197; Du Nongyi, Zhou Hui, Yang Kai [杜农一, 周辉, 杨凯], *Military Diplomacy of New China and International Peacekeeping* [新中国军事外交与国际维和研究] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2015), 118–122.
- <sup>21</sup> “First Backbone Intensive Training for Peacekeeping Stand-by Forces Begins in Xi’an” [首次维和待命部队骨干集训在西安举办], *Xinhua Online*, May 27, 2011; “First Backbone Intensive Training for All-Army Peacekeeping Stand-by Forces Concluded” [全军首期维和待命部队骨干集训结束], *PLA Daily*, June 4, 2011.
- <sup>22</sup> Admiral Sun Jianguo, a deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department stated that, “The scale and type of China’s peacekeeping forces have continuously widened; this is a tangible embodiment of China’s firm support for UN peacekeeping operations.” “Sun Jianguo: China is the Largest Troop-Contributing Countries among Permanent Members of the Security Council” [孙建国: 中国是安理会常任理事国维和派兵最多国家], *China News* [中国新闻社], March 27, 2015.
- <sup>23</sup> “Protecting Peace: Summary of Chinese Armed Forces’ 25 Years of Participation in UN Peacekeeping” [守望和平永不变: 中国军队参加联合国维和行动 25 周年综述], *Xinhua*, April 19, 2015.
- <sup>24</sup> Du Nongyi et al., *Military Diplomacy of New China and International Peacekeeping*, 199.
- <sup>25</sup> Du Nongyi et al., *Military Diplomacy of New China and International Peacekeeping*, 203. International criticism of China’s responses to the Darfur conflict in the middle of the 2000s grew as the UN Security Council discussed how to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Darfur. With the increase in critical international opinion, Beijing worked on summit diplomacy and established the Special Representative on African Affairs in 2007 to persuade the Sudanese government to accept the dispatching of blue helmets to Darfur. In the face of this international environment, Chinese strategists cranked up internal discussions on how to increase China’s discourse power and define international responsibility. Thus, how to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations also became a topic of discussion.
- <sup>26</sup> “Xi Jinping Attends and Addresses UN Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping” [习近平出席联合国维和峰会并发表讲话], *People’s Daily*, September 30, 2015.
- <sup>27</sup> Information Office of the PRC State Council [中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室], “China’s Armed Forces: 30 Years of UN Peacekeeping Operations” [中国军队参加联合国维和行动 30 年], *People’s Daily*, September 19, 2020.
- <sup>28</sup> “China’s Helicopter Unit Joins Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur,” *Xinhua*, June 11, 2017; “China’s First Helicopter Unit Completes Mission in Darfur and Returns Home” [中国首支赴达尔富尔维和直升机分队完成任务分批回国], *Xinhua*, August 24, 2018.
- <sup>29</sup> “China and the United Nations Signed Agreement to Establish China-UN Peace and Development Fund” [中国与联合国签署设立中国—联合国和平与发展基金协议], *Xinhua*, May 6, 2016.
- <sup>30</sup> “China to Become 2nd Largest Contributor to UN Peacekeeping Budget,” *China Daily Online*, May 30, 2016; “China Makes Great Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations,” *Xinhua*, July 27, 2016.
- <sup>31</sup> “Chinese Replaces Kenyan Commander in Juba,” *The East African*, November 3, 2016; “UN Chief Appoints Chinese General as Force Commander of UN Mission in Western Sahara,” *Xinhua*, December 9, 2016.
- <sup>32</sup> Interview with Canadian officials (Ottawa, December 2017); Interview with UN officials (New York, May 2018).
- <sup>33</sup> Su Xisheng, Zhao Chuang [苏喜生, 赵闯] “Analysis on How to Strengthen the Capacity Building of the Army’s Peacekeeping Standby Forces” [如何加强陆军维和待命部队能力建设], *National Defense Science & Technology* [国防科技] 41, no.2 (April 2020): 122–125.
- <sup>34</sup> The peak of Chinese military personnel deployment in UN peacekeeping missions was in July 2015; at the end of the month, 2,887 military personnel had dispatched on six missions.

- <sup>35</sup> S/PV.8064, Security Council Meeting of 5 October 2017; “Chinese Representative: UN Peacekeeping Operations Must Attach A Great Importance to Role of Troop Contributors” [中国代表: 联合国维和行动应重视出兵国作用], *Xinhua*, October 7, 2017.
- <sup>36</sup> Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Evolving Role as a UN Peacekeeper in Mali,” United States Institute of Peace, September 2018: 6.
- <sup>37</sup> “Workshop on the Fifth Anniversary of Establishment of China-UN Peace and Development Fund Was Held” [中国—联合国和平与发展基金设立五周年“成就与展望”研讨会举行], *Xinhua*, December 8, 2020.
- <sup>38</sup> S/PV.8218, Security Council Meeting of 28 March 2018; “Ma Zhaoxu: Promote Reform of UN Peacekeeping Operations, Achieve Greater Effectiveness” [马朝旭: 推动联合国维和行动取得更大实效], *China News Online* [中国新闻网], March 29, 2019.
- <sup>39</sup> “Ministry of Foreign Affairs: China Has Always Supported UN Peacekeeping Operations with Concrete Actions” [中国始终以实际行动支持联合国维和行动], *Xinhua*, January 24, 2018.
- <sup>40</sup> Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, William R. Phillips and Salvator Cusimano, “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business,” United Nations Peacekeeping, December 19, 2017.
- <sup>41</sup> Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz et al., “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers,” 10-13.
- <sup>42</sup> He Yin [何银], “Devolution and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping” [联合国维和的退化与出路], *International Studies* [国际问题研究], no. 1 (2020): 136.
- <sup>43</sup> He Yin [何银], “Rethinking Safety and Security Management in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” [反思联合国维和行动中的安全风险及应对], *World Economics and Politics* [世界经济与政治], no. 5 (2018): 74.
- <sup>44</sup> According to Richard Gowan, UN Director of the International Crisis Group, Beijing has since worked with the UN secretariat on safety issues and intelligence after the Cruz Report was released. See, Richard Gowan, “China’s Pragmatic Approach to UN Peacekeeping,” Brookings Institution, September 14, 2020.
- <sup>45</sup> “Statement by Ambassador Zhang Jun at the Side Event on Peacekeeping Capacity Building” [常驻联合国代表张军大使在维和能力建设主题边会上的发言], PRC Permanent Mission to the United Nations, February 20, 2020.
- <sup>46</sup> “May 2021 Monthly Forecast,” Security Council Report, May 2021, 5.
- <sup>47</sup> S/RES/2518 (2020). Of the permanent members of the Security Council, only Russia cosponsored the resolution. “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution on the Safety and Security of Peacekeepers” [安理会一致通过维和人员安全问题决议], PRC Permanent Mission to the United Nations, March 30, 2020.
- <sup>48</sup> As for a positive understanding of the Cruz Report, see, for example, Ding Sheng [丁盛], “New Logic of Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers” [联合国维和部队安全“新逻辑”], *Huanqiu* [环球], no. 4 (2018): 42–43. Colonel Ding, Professor at Political College of PLA National Defense University, served as a military observer in MINURSO in 2013 and head of Sector East’s training unit of MINUSMA in 2016.
- <sup>49</sup> “Explanatory Statement by Ambassador Zhang Jun When Security Council Adopted Resolution on the Safety and Security of Peacekeepers” [张军大使在安理会表决维和人员安全问题决议时的解释性发言], PRC Permanent Mission to the United Nations, March 30, 2020.
- <sup>50</sup> At the High-Level Event on Action for Peacekeeping (A4P), held in the UN Headquarters in September 2018, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the primacy of politics must be reflected in every aspect of peacekeeping operations. “Wang Yi’s Remarks at the High-Level Event on Action for Peacekeeping” [王毅在“为维和而行动”倡议高级别会议上

的发言], *Xinhua*, September 25, 2018.

<sup>51</sup> “May 2021 Monthly Forecast,” 6.

<sup>52</sup> “Statement by Ambassador Zhang Jun at the Launching Event of Group of Friends on the Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers” [张军大使在联合国维和人员安全之友小组启动仪式上的讲话], PRC Permanent Mission to the United Nations, April 27, 2021; “China’s Leadership in Establishing Group of Friends on the Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers” [中国推动成立联合国维和人员安全小组], *People’s Daily*, April 29, 2021. In May 2021, China, which held the presidency of the Security Council, gave a presidential statement and reaffirmed the traditional principles of UN peacekeeping operations based on resolution 2518, as well as asserting the necessity of comprehensive initiatives, including equipment, intelligence, new technologies, training, and medical. See, “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” S/PRST/2021/11, May 24, 2021.

The views expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not represent the official views of NIDS.

We do not permit any unauthorized reproduction or unauthorized copying of the article. Please contact us at the following regarding any questions, comments or requests you may have.

Contact NIDS at plc-ws1[]nids.go.jp (replace the brackets [] with the @ symbol and email your message)

Website: <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/>