

Peacekeeping Trends and National Responses: A Japanese Perspective

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[ABSTRACT]

This short paper aims to locate more than twenty years of the evolution of Japanese peacekeeping within broad trends and changes of global peacekeeping. It first analyzes the nature of what peacekeeping has now become with a view to identifying its implications for national peacekeeping. It does so by introducing four dimensions of change in peacekeeping – civilianization, militarization, decentralization, and strategization. The second part reviews the manner in which Japan has expanded its terms of participation into peacekeeping with a focus on the role of the MOD/ Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in this field. The Japanese efforts to diversify its roles in global peacekeeping from its traditional areas of strength (engineering and logistics) can be seen in three areas (individual participation, coordination of civilian and military activities, and capacity-building). These efforts indicate an emphasis on whole-of-government coordination and capacity-building assistance. While more focused discussions, policy initiatives as well as efforts on the ground may be needed to further articulate the Japanese way of peacekeeping, the recent efforts suggest the Japanese intention to make a unique mark on global peacekeeping.

Changing Roles of Peacekeeping in Global Security Governance

In order to better consider the implications of Japanese peacekeeping, I first introduce a brief description of what peacekeeping has become over the past two decades. These may be captured in the following four trends: *civilianization*, *militarization*, *decentralization*, and *strategization*. Each needs some

explanation that I intend to do in this section, but before doing this two general observations are in order. First, these contextual changes are all peculiar or specific to peacekeeping. Although changes in peacekeeping may be influenced by, and indeed assumed as part of, broader geopolitical, economic, or social changes in the post-Cold War period, not all these changes influence the field of peacekeeping with the same level of consistency and depth to shape the nature of peacekeeping. In other words, some trends may be fundamental, and others are, at least for now, not so.¹ By this standard, these four trends represent fundamental changes that have come to define the nature of contemporary peacekeeping. Secondly, these trends are all intertwined with each other. The first two trends, civilianization and militarization, are about the *means* of peacekeeping, whereas decentralization refers to the *frameworks* in which peacekeeping missions are organized. The changes in the means and frameworks of peacekeeping, in turn, are driven by the changing *objectives* of peacekeeping that are in this paper captured in the term strategization. Let me briefly introduce each trend in turn.


The two trends with regard to the means of peacekeeping would seem contradictory to each other (how would peacekeeping become more “civilian” and more “military” at the same time?), but these are the two aspects of the oft-mentioned multidimensionality of peacekeeping. A closer look at this phenomenon, however, reveals that the bulk of “multidimensional” peacekeeping in fact consists in the ever expanding scope of the civilian aspects of peacekeeping. Unlike traditional UN missions (typically led by a force commander and composed of military components and enablers),² contemporary missions possess a complex mix of civilian units in broad fields including electoral assistance, gender, child protection, mine action, HIV/AIDS, humanitarian assistance,

¹ One could think, for instance, of how the privatization of security has influenced peacekeeping. Though privatization certainly captures one aspect of contemporary peacekeeping, it still has not reached the same level of salience or significance as the four aforementioned changes. For discussion on this see, e.g., Åse Gilje Østensen, “In the Business of Peace: The Political Influence of Private Military and Security Companies on UN Peacekeeping,” *International Peacekeeping* 20, no.1 (February 2013), pp.33-47.

² An important exception was the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960-64), which had a Technical Assistance Board led by a Resident Representative/ Chief of the UN Civilian Operation. See Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967*, Vol. III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp.77-80.

security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), human rights, and rule of law. In addition to the force commander (FC), police commissioner (PC), and director of mission support (DMS), the mission leadership now has up to two civilian deputies to support the civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in charge of political affairs and humanitarian and development assistance respectively. The table reproduced below from the *UN Infantry Battalion Manual* (August 2012) outlining the generic organization of mission headquarters illustrates how the increasing civilianization accounts for the emergence of multidimensional peacekeeping.

Table1. UN Peacekeeping: Generic Mission Organization



Source: *United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual*, Vol.1 (August 2012), p.56.

Another trend of multidimensional peacekeeping is related to its military aspects. Although peacekeeping missions have almost always contained military contingents from troop contributing countries (TCCs), the way in which these contingents are used has expanded considerably. Whereas traditional peacekeeping saw military peacekeepers deployed to monitor and patrol demilitarized zones, man observation posts, and control checkpoints in the context of ceasefire agreements, contemporary peacekeeping demands a potentially far wider range of activities in support of the implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts: assisting DDR and SSR; helping maintain law and order;

protecting key infrastructure; and protecting civilians. As this puts peacekeeping missions into difficult operational environments, they have come to be given authorizations enabling a more active or “robust” use of force. As the Capstone Doctrine (2008) explains:

The environments into which United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed are often characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population. In such situations, the Security Council has given United Nations peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order. By proactively using force in defense of their mandates, these United Nations peacekeeping operations have succeeded in improving the security situation and creating an environment conducive to longer-term peacebuilding in the countries where they are deployed.³

In Security Council resolutions, it has become standard practice for UN missions to be authorized under Chapter VII to use “all necessary means” to implement the mandated tasks, ensure the safety and freedom of movement of peacekeeping personnel in their implementation of the tasks, protect civilians under imminent danger, and/or establish security conditions for humanitarian activities.

This proactive, robust use of military force, of course, is not intended to turn peacekeepers into belligerents. Doctrinally, robust peacekeeping is still conceived within the three principles of peacekeeping (impartiality, party consent, and minimal use of force), and as such involves the use of force “at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict”.⁴ While this limitation thus differentiates robust peacekeeping from peace enforcement (which involves the use of force at the strategic level) in theory, it has certainly widened the scope of what is militarily possible in peacekeeping. However, debate over what exactly is the scope of robust peacekeeping appears to remain unsettled. Indeed, this lack of

³ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York, NY: January 2008), p.32.

⁴ Ibid.

consensus is even aggravated by the recent establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) as part of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO). In all its intentions and design, the creation of this 3,000-strong unit to combat armed rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a clear peace enforcement unit which, however, forms part of the peacekeeping mission. As MONUSCO Force Commander Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz told the Security Council in June 2013, the creation of the FIB “has generated much speculations and many interpretations. I do not see unanimous understanding about it.”⁵ The militarization trend thus presents challenges on the ground as well as for troop contributors.

A third trend of contemporary peacekeeping revolves around the increasingly multiple and diverse frameworks through which missions are organized. The term decentralization assumes the existence of some central authority which in this case is the United Nations. What we have seen for the past two decades, in contrast, is the proliferation of peacekeeping frameworks that extend beyond the global organization. This involves several elements. These frameworks are largely regionalized, with missions organized by the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), African Union (AU), and African subregional organizations (ECOWAS, ECCAS, SADC, etc.), among others.⁶ Some multinational (coalition) or national forces, such as Operations *Uphold Democracy* and *Secure Tomorrow* (US-led, 1994-95 and 2004) in Haiti, *Alba* in Albania (Italy-led, 1997), *Palliser* in Sierra Leone (UK, 2000), *Licorne* (French-led, 2002-), and *Astute* (Australia-led, 2006-12) have also engaged in activities which can at least in part be described as peacekeeping.⁷ What is interesting is that this has not led to a simple devolution of peacekeeping responsibility away from the UN. On the contrary: non-UN peacekeeping in fact has accelerated at the same time when the demand for UN peacekeeping reached and remains at a historic high; most of these missions are in fact authorized or endorsed by the UN Security Council; and many are dependent on the UN for logistics, finance, and/or longer-term follow-on presence. The decentralization of peacekeeping therefore does not mean its “de-UN-ization.” The dependence of

⁵ SCOR 6987th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6987, 26 June 2013, p.23.

⁶ ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), SADC (Southern African Development Community).

⁷ One could also include the French-led Operation *Sangaris* in the Central African Republic (December 2013-).

regional (and to a lesser degree, coalition) peacekeeping on the UN is clear from the establishment of the AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur, Sudan (UNAMID); one can also see this in the aforementioned FIB which was originally a regional initiative and then became incorporated into MONUSCO.⁸ Decentralization thus consists in the mixture of *regional*, *ad hoc* (through coalition/national forces), and *hybrid* peacekeeping.⁹ The use of peacekeeping on increasingly flexible formats enables interested states and organizations to deal with difficult post-conflict transitions on their own terms.

And this suggests, in turn, a fourth trend: strategization. What I mean by this term in this context is simply that peacekeeping missions increasingly come to be organized — and perhaps equally importantly, *not* organized — in ways that serve the interests and strategies of peacekeeping states and institutions. As well known, peacekeeping was established during the Cold War period as a relatively novel mode of intervention. Against this geopolitical background, a group of states such as Sweden and Canada used their neutral status to create space for mediating and thereby preventing local conflicts from affecting the systemic-level confrontation between East and West. Indeed, we still see how this process left an important mark on peacekeeping, whose principles (including, until recently, neutrality) were heavily influenced by their ideological posture. After the end of the Cold War, however, peacekeeping has morphed into something qualitatively different. Instead of serving the relatively limited goal of holding ceasefires in support of more comprehensive peace talks, peacekeeping now functions to help implement peace agreements and, as in the DRC, even (re)create conditions for peace talks. In other words, peacekeeping has evolved into a more comprehensive, direct and intrusive mode of international intervention into intrastate and regional conflicts.

This evolution is related to two broad factors that are both rooted in the end of the Cold War: the lack of clear geopolitical structure, and the proliferation of civil wars and regional conflicts. And these two phenomena, in turn, combine to present a challenge and an opportunity for states and institutions. They

⁸ The brigade was proposed at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and subsequently endorsed by the SADC and AU.

⁹ On related themes, see, e.g., Thierry Tardy, “Hybrid Peace Operations: Rationale and Challenges,” *Global Governance* 20, no.1 (January-March 2014), pp.95-118; Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, “A Global Security Vacuum Half-filled: Regional Organizations, Hybrid Groups and Security Management,” *International Peacekeeping* 21, no.1 (February 2014), pp.1-19.

present a challenge because there is no clear political rationale or angle from which to deal with these conflicts, and because dealing with them entails potentially serious financial costs and, if poorly executed, damages political capital too. They present an opportunity because all international actors find themselves more or less in this situation so that they learn and adapt themselves to cooperative solutions for conflict management that are beneficial in sharing the costs and granting themselves an aura of legitimacy. Peacekeeping is among the most prominent cooperative solutions. For organizing institutions and contributing states, therefore, contribution to this cooperative endeavor brings normative (increased legitimacy and improved or strengthened relations), financial (saved costs), and of course security (reestablished stability) benefits.

Insofar as peacekeeping is an art of conflict management that has developed through years of practice on the ground, its form reflects what members of the international community expect it to function in today's security environment. Peacekeeping mandates have been broadened and its organizing frameworks decentralized because this allows more flexibility and freedom¹⁰ for contributing states and organizing institutions. To point this out, then, leads us back to the point suggested earlier: each of these actors needs some clearer thinking and prioritized policy framework for peacekeeping engagement, i.e., strategy.

Then how does the evolution of Japanese peacekeeping look within these global changes? The latter half of this paper traces the history of Japanese peacekeeping and pins down some of its characteristics.

Diversifying Japanese Contribution to International Peacekeeping¹¹

Though Japan has been a major financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping

¹⁰ Or one could use “more selective” instead, although this implies slightly different (largely negative) implications. For the use of this terminology, see Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum, “Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945,” *Adelphi Paper* 395 (London: Routledge, 2008).

¹¹ Information on Japan's peacekeeping can be found in the Japanese Ministry of Defense (<http://www.mod.go.jp/>), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/>), and the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office (<http://www.pko.go.jp/index.html>). Except for a few updates where appropriate the following paragraphs are based on available sources in October 2014.

budget,¹² Japan's participation in peacekeeping missions only started in September 1992 when it deployed around 600 SDF engineers to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) for one year. Since then, Japan has so far joined a total of ten UN missions in eight situations, including the ongoing contribution to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The following is a summary of the SDF participation into UN peacekeeping: UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ, May 1993-January 1995, movement control unit); UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF, February 1996-January 2013, transport unit); UN Transitional Administration/ Mission of Support in East Timor (UNTAET/ UNMISSET, February 2002-June 2004, engineer unit); UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS, October 2008-July 2011, headquarters staff); UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT, September 2010-September 2012, military liaison), UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, February 2010- March 2013, engineer and transport units), and UNMISS (November 2011-, engineer unit). In addition, the SDF has engaged in a range of reconstruction assistance activities (medical services, water supply, infrastructure repair, transport of relief supplies, etc.) and logistic support (air transport and medical services) to the multinational forces in Iraq through units from all the services (December 2003-December 2008). In January 2007, some fifteen years after the first mission in Cambodia, peacekeeping was recognized as one of the "primary missions" of the SDF under the Self-Defense Forces Law (Article 3).¹³

While, as this brief summary shows, the SDF contribution has mostly consisted in engineering and logistics,¹⁴ there have been incremental yet conscious efforts to diversify the types of the contribution, both within the participating missions as well as through national programs. One can detect

¹² Under the latest scale of assessment, Japan provides 10.833% of the UN peacekeeping budget for 2014-15. The US remains the top contributor with 28.3626% in the same period, followed by France (7.2105%), Germany (7.141%), UK (6.6768%), China (6.6368%), Italy (4.448%) and Russia (3.1431). See Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, UN Doc. A/67/224/Add.1, 27 December 2012, Annex.

¹³ The revised SDF law similarly recognized other "international peace cooperation" activities including humanitarian and disaster relief as well as the SDF operations in Iraq and in the Indian Ocean (both now terminated).

¹⁴ To reflect this strength, Japan has been chairing the UN working group to develop an engineer unit manual for UN peacekeeping. Work on the new manual is scheduled to be complete in 2015.

three specific types or patterns that appear to be emerging: individual participation, closer civil-military cooperation, and capacity-building assistance.¹⁵

With regard to *individual participation*, UNMIS was the first such mission (2008) for which the SDF contribution took the form of two officers (logistics and information management) serving the mission headquarters. Prior to this, Japan had sent six military observers to the political mission in Nepal (UNMIN, between March 2007 and January 2011). Between 2010 and 2012 two military liaison officers also joined UNMIT. While these cases did not involve or lead to unit-level participation, UNMISS has seen the combination of an engineer unit of around 330 personnel (increased to 400 from October 2013) and three headquarters staff. The idea that individual participation matters and can be one source of consistent Japanese contribution (especially at the senior officer level) appears to take hold, as can be witnessed by the start of training programs by the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPTRC). Established in 2010 as part of the Joint Staff College, JPTRC has run two four week-long training programs for potential contingent commanders and staff officers (Colonel/Lieutenant Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel/ Major levels, respectively). Since 2009 a biannual senior mission leaders' training program has also been organized in cooperation with the US government (as part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative: GPOI), inviting participants from a total of thirteen countries in the previous three occasions (2009, 2011, 2013).

Another emerging aspect of the diversifying effort is increasing emphasis placed on better *coordination of civilian and military aspects of Japanese peacekeeping*. A broader background to this is a combination of the external and internal factors. The global or external background is the aforementioned civilianization of peacekeeping which created pressures and opportunities for national contributors. The domestic or internal factor is that Japan's contributions, including those by the SDF, traditionally have an emphasis on civilian rather than military areas. Apart from in-mission service such as logistics and headquarters, the SDF's substantive contribution has mainly consisted in infrastructure reconstruction (bridges, schools, roads, etc.). For instance, SDF engineers working as UN peacekeepers in Timor-Leste between

¹⁵ See in particular "Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Summit on 'Strengthening International Peace Operations'," 26 September 2014, available from <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000053990.pdf>>, accessed 14 October 2014.

2002 and 2004 not only (re)built roads, bridges, water supply points, schoolyards, and garbage disposal facilities but also trained local government personnel to use road construction equipment such as bulldozers (which were also donated). In addition, though not as part of peacekeeping, the SDF has several experiences of providing humanitarian assistance (as in eastern Zaire/ DRC in September-December 1994) and logistic assistance to international and local relief actors (Timor-Leste, November 1999-February 2000; Pakistan/ Afghanistan, October 2001; Iraq/ Jordan, March-August 2003). Moreover, the SDF has ample experiences of post-disaster relief in both domestic and international settings over many years, including the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake (March 11, 2011) which involved complex coordination with foreign militaries and disaster relief teams, local authorities, NGOs and civil society groups.¹⁶ While this “civilian” role by the SDF is grounded in the legal frameworks which strictly limit the scope of military tasks by the SDF, it also reflects the sense of what comparative advantages the SDF may have in comparison with other national militaries and, more broadly, an idea of how Japan wants itself to be perceived globally as a provider of global security goods.

While the civilianization of peacekeeping thus likely creates more opportunities for Japan, there is a question of how Japan should contribute to what are in actuality quite a broad range of fields. Indeed, Japan has long been one of the largest and most active donors of development assistance over many years, and its assistance has come to include areas such as DDR, mine action, refugee assistance, and governance all of which are now regular tasks for peacekeeping missions. The current Official Development Aid (ODA) Charter, a revised (in 2003) version of the original 1992 text, counts “peace-building” among its four priority areas:

In order to prevent conflicts from arising in developing regions, it is important to comprehensively address various factors that cause conflicts... In addition to assistance for preventing conflicts and

¹⁶ In another example, in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013, the SDF provided air transport for JICA’s disaster relief teams heading to the Philippines. The SDF also dispatched a combined unit of 1,170 personnel to conduct medical and transport activities. 中村明「フィリピン台風「ハイヤン」被災地への緊急援助隊派遣を振り返って」<http://www.jica.go.jp/topics/scene/20140214_01.html>, accessed 11 August 2014.

emergency humanitarian assistance in conflict situations, Japan will extend bilateral and multilateral assistance flexibly and continuously for peace-building in accordance with the changing situation, ranging from assistance to expedite the ending of conflicts to assistance for the consolidation of peace and nation-building in post-conflict situations.

For example, ODA will be used for: assistance to facilitate the peace processes; humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, such as assistance for displaced persons and for the restoration of basic infrastructure; assistance for assuring domestic stability and security, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), and the collection and disposal of weapons, including demining; and assistance for reconstruction, including social and economic development and the enhancement of the administrative capabilities of governments.¹⁷

This awareness of closer linkage between development and stability is set to continue. In a speech in April 2014, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida emphasized that “ODA efforts must be strengthened for ensuring the security of the international community. ODA for creating a peaceful and stable society which will serve as the bedrock of the economy and of the active participation of individuals, or ODA for peace, stability, and security – I believe this is also one of the directions that ODA should be moving towards.”¹⁸ The advisory panel on the review of the ODA Charter, set up in March 2014 by the Foreign Minister and consisting of academics, policy experts and NGO representatives, acknowledges increasing coordination between ODA and “the parts of peacekeeping that are engaged in civilian-purpose activities.”¹⁹ While clearly ruling out the use of ODA for direct military purposes,²⁰ the report thus acknowledges the military’s role in

¹⁷ “Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter,” 29 August 2003, Section I.3(4), unofficial translation. The other three priority areas are poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and addressing global issues.

¹⁸ “An Evolving ODA: For the World’s Future and Japan’s Future,” 4 April 2014, available from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/ic/ap_m/page3e_000169.html>, accessed 11 August 2014.

¹⁹ 「ODA 大綱見直しに関する有識者懇談会報告書」（平成 26 年 6 月 26 日）（3）ア（イ），translation by the author.

²⁰ 「ODA 大綱見直しに関する有識者懇談会報告書」（1）イ（ア）。See also “Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida,” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000086.html>, accessed 11 August 2014.

peacekeeping, disaster relief, and other non-traditional security contexts²¹ and the need for closer coordination with these activities as part of Japan's overall contribution to international peace and stability. Given that this line of thinking also finds a voice in the National Security Strategy (see below),²² it looks likely to be reflected in a new ODA Charter (expected to be finalized sometime during 2015).²³

As the advisory panel reports hinted, there is already some work in this direction in the field. In South Sudan, the SDF and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) coordinated their activities to make effective use of their respective resources. In one instance, JICA provided non-grant funding for the repair of community roads in a district in Juba to the local government which in turn purchased and provided construction materials to the UNMISS' SDF engineers for their repair works.²⁴ In another instance, the SDF unit demolished old facilities in preparation for the improvement of the water supply system in the capital through the construction of a JICA-funded additional water treatment plant.²⁵ In a related development, the South Sudan case also saw the

²¹ The advisory panel report calls for an expansion of the scope of ODA to include assistance in the fields of law enforcement capacity-building, counterterrorism, countering organized crime, and strengthening cyber security. 「ODA 大綱見直しに関する有識者懇談会報告書」(2)ア(イ)。

²² See also MOFA's backgrounder for the advisory panel (外務省国際協力局「政府開発援助(ODA)大綱の見直しについて」(平成26年3月) <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/about/kaikaku/taikou_minaoshi/files/minaoshi_1403.pdf>, accessed 11 August 2014) .

²³ The new charter was subsequently adopted on 10 February 2015. For the text, see <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000138.html>, accessed 17 February 2015.

²⁴ "JSDF Collaboration with ODA," *Japan Defense Focus* 45 (October 2013), p.8. The SDF unit also worked with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to build a way station for returning refugees and displaced persons, and with the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) in its project to create a "zebra" crossing for a local primary school. Indra Garner, "Way Station Handing-over Ceremony," <http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/liaison/liaison19.html> and David Stanley, "The Friendship into the Future," <http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/liaison/liaison21.html>, accessed 19 August 2014.

²⁵ JICA 「オールジャパンでの取り組み(自衛隊、NGOとの連携)」 <http://www.jica.go.jp/south_sudan/office/activities/all_japan.html>, accessed 11 August 2014. JICA has also funded transmission pipelines, public water stands, and eight water tanker filling stations. The project cost around USD 47.7 million in total. "JICA to Improve Safe Water Supply in South Sudan's Capital," 18 November 2013, <http://www.jica.go.jp/south_sudan/english/office/topics/131118>

establishment for the first time of a joint coordination center to strengthen coordination with UNMISS as well as representatives of the host government, other donors and international agencies. These are still rather isolated cases of coordination between the SDF and civilian peacekeeping actors on the field level. With the growing awareness of possible synergy between these actors, however, the whole-of-government approach is likely to be gradually adapted to Japanese peacekeeping at all levels.

A final aspect of the diversifying effort is *a focus on peacekeeping capacity-building*. This can be seen in three recent programs. One is financial and training assistance to peacekeeping training centers. In Africa, starting in 2008, Japan has provided a total of USD 36.6 million to thirteen African peacekeeping centers (Benin, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia: two centers, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Togo) and sent a total of 31 instructors to centers in Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, and South Africa. Initially training assistance took the form of these lecturers (SDF officers and civilian experts) conducting one-off lectures as part of the centers' curricula, but it has been gradually made more flexible with the sending of an SDF officer as program advisor for a new conflict prevention and management course at the Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre and another officer who, while serving the UNMISS, offered a lecture on the protection of civilians in South Sudan in a course organized in that country by Kenya's International Peace Support Training Centre – both in 2014.²⁶ Japan has also announced its support for the new US program to assist the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC).²⁷ For the Malaysian Peacekeeping Center, Japan provided in 2011 a USD one million fund to prepare and conduct multidimensional peacekeeping courses, and sent five civilian lecturers from the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters in the Cabinet Office between 2011

.html>, accessed 11 August 2014.

²⁶ 「ケニア国際平和支援訓練センターにおける自衛官による講義実施」(2014年8月12日) <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_001145.html>, accessed 13 August 2014; 「ケニア国際平和維持訓練センター及びエチオピア国際平和維持訓練センターへの自衛官の派遣」(2014年9月26日) <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_001277.html>, accessed 30 September 2014.

²⁷ “Speech by H.E. Shinzo Abe”. The new US program is called the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). In the same speech he also expressed the plan to provide engineering equipment to African countries through the UN, and conduct training for its use.

and 2012.²⁸ One recent development in this regard is the November 2013 agreement with Cambodia on peacekeeping training and education, which will lead to capacity-building assistance programs in the future (see below). A second capacity-building initiative can be located in the aforementioned JPTRC. As already mentioned, the bilateral GPOI program has been multinational from its inception. While the other two programs (UN Staff Officers' Course: UNSOC and Peacekeeping Operations Contingent Commanders' Course: POCCC) were run for Japanese officers and policy officials in the first two years, they too became open to foreign participants in 2014, beginning with the POCCC held in July. Two officers from Thailand and Germany joined 10 SDF officers and 3 civilians in the course.²⁹

A third initiative does not have an exclusive focus on peacekeeping. Termed straightforwardly, the MOD's "capacity-building assistance" (CBA or *nouryoku-kouchiku-shien* in Japanese) project is a new framework that was initiated in 2011 (when a CBA Office was created within the MOD's International Policy Division) with the broad aim of "help[ing] other country improve its own capacity by utilizing Japan's capacity".³⁰ The CBA project addresses the capacity needs of foreign military and security-related organizations in fields such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), maritime security, military medicine, mine action, and peacekeeping through training sessions and seminars in the host country or in Japan. Through these collaborations the project is expected to stabilize the international and regional security environment that in turn produces security benefits for Japan. The Defense White Paper of Japan (2014 edition) is fairly eloquent in spelling out its multiple significance, arguing that CBA can have the positive effects of "(1) improving the capacity in the security and defense-related fields of the countries receiving such support and enabling them to contribute to improve the global security environment; (2) strengthening bilateral relationships by satisfying each country's requests for support; (3) strengthening relationships with other supporting countries such as

²⁸ 「マレーシア PKO 訓練センターへの講師派遣」 (2012 年 3 月 9 日) <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/24/3/0309_09.html>, accessed 9 March 2012.

²⁹ 国際平和協力センター「第 3 期国際平和協力上級課程から教育対象者を拡大」(n.d.) <<http://www.mod.go.jp/js/jsc/jpc/education/course.html>>, accessed 13 August 2014.

³⁰ MOD, "Capacity Building Assistance," available from <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/exc/cap_build.html>, accessed 14 August 2014.

the U.S. and Australia; and (4) promoting an awareness among the Japanese people and the countries receiving support of Japan's stance of working proactively and independently to promote regional peace and stability, thereby increasing trust in the MOD and the SDF, as well as Japan as a whole. In addition, these initiatives also facilitate improving the capabilities of the SDF itself."³¹

Peacekeeping is a priority area within the CBA project. By October 2014, this project has offered 23 programs offering assistance to Mongolia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia and Timor-Leste in HA/DR, peacekeeping, military medicine, aviation safety, underwater medicine, and oceanography. In peacekeeping, a team of Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) officers, MOD officials, and members of the Japanese NGO JMAS conducted training in civil engineering (road construction, etc.) at Cambodia's National Center for Peacekeeping, Mine and ERW Clearance in two occasions (January-March 2013 and December 2013-March 2014). Fifteen and nineteen Cambodian personnel received training, respectively. In March 2013, six officers from the Vietnamese Army were invited to visit the GSDF Central Readiness Force, MOD headquarters, and JPTRC to learn about the SDF's peacekeeping posture. With the Mongolian Armed Forces the SDF/ MOD team made two visits between June and July 2013 to the Mongolian Defense Ministry, Tavan Tolgoi Peace Operations Support Training Centre, Defense University Military Engineering School, and several engineer units to identify training needs in the field of engineering.³²

Japanese peacekeeping in the evolving world of global peacekeeping

Finally, let me get back to the question I posed at the beginning. How can one locate the evolution of Japanese peacekeeping within the trends of global peacekeeping? It is clearly the civilian aspects of peacekeeping to which Japan has responded most, ranging from the SDF and JICA activities in the field to the policies such as the ODA Charter. Calls for a cross-sectoral, whole-of-government approach appear to have gained wide consensus among policy makers and practitioners. Capacity-building assistance is an indirect form of contribution that helps develop the civilian and military peacekeeping capabilities on the global scale. Direct military activities by SDF

³¹ See MOD, *Defense of Japan 2014*, Ch.3, Sec.1.3.

³² In March 2014, five members of the Mongolian Army Staff were also invited for a round of visits to the MOD, GSDF Engineer School and other related facilities.

peacekeepers remain strictly limited under domestic law to the protection of “the lives of others or prevent bodily harm to themselves, other personnel of the Japan Coast Guard or [International Peace Cooperation] Corps Personnel who are with them on the scene, or individuals who have come under their control during the performance of duties,”³³ but the recent cabinet decision on 1 July 2014 shows the government’s intention to develop legislation that permits a wider “use of arms” for purposes including, potentially, the implementation of mission mandates and the protection of civilians.³⁴ With regard to the decentralization trend, Japan is somewhat in a different situation from European, North American or African peacekeeping nations because of the lack of viable regional peacekeeping framework, leaving the UN as the only standardized window of participation for Japan.³⁵ However, partly with the help from Japan through its financial and capacity-building assistance, many countries in the region such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Mongolia and Timor-Leste are becoming, or preparing to become, new contributors to global peacekeeping. Along with active peacekeeping engagement by countries like India, China, South Korea, and Malaysia, there is an emergent context characterized by a shared interest in peacekeeping that may suggest a potential for region-wide cooperation in this field. Finally, with regard to the increased need for strategic thinking towards peacekeeping engagement, the National Security Strategy of Japan (December 2013) — the first policy document of its kind in Japan — makes the case for a policy of “proactive contribution to peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.³⁶ The Strategy argues that “Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II” including through contribution to UN peacekeeping but that “surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its

³³ Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (Act No. 79 of June 19, 1992 with revisions up to Act No. 118 of 2006), art.24(2), provisional translation.

³⁴ Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People, 1 July 2014, para.2.(2)C, provisional translation. With regard to the latter, the scenario especially under consideration is concerned with the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” or “coming to the aid of geographically distant unit or personnel under attack”. Ibid., para.2.(2)A.

³⁵ Japan’s participation into coalition forces, such as the one in Iraq, is outside the aforementioned Act and requires new legislation.

³⁶ National Security Strategy of Japan, 17 December 2013, sect.I, provisional translation.

own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities.”³⁷ Based on this recognition, the Strategy sets out three national security objectives: strengthening deterrence necessary for the country’s survival, peace and security; improving the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region; and improving “global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions.”³⁸ Each of these three entails “strategic approaches” in respective fields, and peacekeeping constitutes a major pillar of the country’s proactive posture for supporting international efforts to promote peace and stability in the world. The Strategy says:

Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities with its determination to contribute even more proactively to peace based on the principle of international cooperation, taking into account the appreciation and expectation Japan receives from the international community. In addition, when participating in PKO, Japan will endeavor to ensure effective implementation of its operations, through coordination with other activities, including ODA projects.

Moreover, in order to implement seamless assistance in security-related areas, including through further strategic utilization of ODA and capacity building assistance, as well as coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Japan will develop a system that enables assistance to potential recipient organizations that cannot receive Japan’s assistance under the current schemes.

Furthermore, Japan as a whole will proactively engage in training for peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries. When engaging in such efforts, Japan will consult closely with countries or organizations that have experience in the same fields, including the U.S., Australia and European countries.³⁹

This is largely in line with what we have described above. One could call this posture

³⁷ Ibid, sect.II(1).

³⁸ Ibid., sect.II(2).

³⁹ Ibid., sect.4(4).

a Japanese approach to cooperative security management, characterized by an emphasis on whole-of-government coordination and capacity-building assistance. There is admittedly a need to articulate such approach through more discussions as well as actions on the ground. However, recent policies and new initiatives suggest that there is indeed a will to proceed further, in order to make Japan a “proactive contributor to peace”.