

Part I

Nuclear Policies of the United States and Russia

The Obama Administration's Nuclear Policy and Implications for East Asian Security

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The Context for Obama Administration's Nuclear Policy

The threat of global nuclear war between the United States and Russia has decreased dramatically during the last twenty years. Unfortunately, mitigating the nuclear dangers of the Twenty-First century is no less challenging, and perhaps more difficult, than it was during the Cold War. More nations have acquired or are seeking nuclear weapons. North Korea tested a nuclear device in 2006 and again this past May, and many fear that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons capability. Several years ago, the international community discovered that A.Q. Kahn had orchestrated a sprawling black market trade in nuclear secrets and materials. His operation is no longer active, but the nuclear black market likely still exists. And the necessary technology for building a bomb is available. Finally, fanatical terrorists are determined to buy, build, or steal nuclear weapons. For these reasons, many policymakers and analysts look back at the Cold War as a simple conflict. Such nostalgia is misplaced but understandable. For all the perils of the Cold War, the threat of a nuclear attack or accident may be greater now than it was during the second half of the twentieth century.

Upon coming into office, President Obama pledged to place nuclear and non-proliferation issues at the top of his agenda. During a visit to Prague in April, the president laid out his administration's broad approach to nuclear policy:

- The United States “is committed to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” although “[t]his goal will not be reached quickly —perhaps not in my lifetime.”
- The United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and urging others to do the same.

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- But as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to allies.
- To reduce warheads and stockpiles, the United States will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with the Russians this year. Hopefully, the START follow-on treaty will set the stage for further cuts and create a framework that will eventually include all nuclear weapons states.
- The United States will pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons.
- The United States will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by providing more resources and authority to international inspections. It will also work to enforce the NPT and impose real and immediate consequences for countries that violate their treaty obligations. Additionally, the Obama administration will build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank
- The United States will ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon because nuclear-armed terrorists are the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. As part of this effort, the United States will lead a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, build on efforts to break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. To sustain a global alliance committed to preventing nuclear terrorism, the United States will turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institution and convene a Global Summit on Nuclear Security within the next year.

The remainder of this paper will discuss the current Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. goals for the Strategic Arms Reduction Follow-on Treaty, U.S. extended deterrence and assurance policies, and the future of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure.

Transitions in the United States and Japan

We understand that the newly elected Democratic Party of Japan is in midst of

a thorough examination of Japan's foreign and defense policies. The Obama administration is still in its first year in office and is also conducting a number of strategic reviews. A vibrant dialogue is the lifeblood of a healthy alliance. Therefore, as both countries assess their strategies, policies, and objectives, it is important that they continue share their concerns, aspirations, and ideas with each other. To this end, I would like to briefly describe the comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that is currently underway in the United States.

Secretary of Defense Gates signed the Terms of Reference for the NPR on May 13, and it will be completed between January and February. The NPR is tasked with establishing U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy, and force posture for the next 5 to 10 years and providing the basis for the negotiation of a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

This is the third NPR; the previous two were conducted in 1994 and 2001. The NPR will also satisfy the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2008, Sec. 1070 (Public Law 110–181), which calls for the NPR to assess:

- The role of nuclear forces in United States military strategy, planning, and programming.
- Policy requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence posture.
- The relationships among United States nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms control objectives.
- The role that missile defense capabilities and conventional strike forces play in determining the role and size of nuclear forces.
- The levels and composition of the nuclear delivery systems that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans for replacing or modifying existing systems.
- The nuclear weapons complex required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans to modernize or modify the complex.
- The active and inactive nuclear weapons stockpile required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans for replacing or modifying warheads.

The United States chose to conduct the NPR along a two track process. The first

track addressed time urgent issues, such as the July summit (July 6–8 in Moscow), the START follow-on negotiations, and nuclear issues that impact the Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget. Other issues not tied to START or FY2011 budget decisions (e.g., extended nuclear deterrence, infrastructure (physical and human), declaratory policy) are currently under review as part of the second track.

Though the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for conducting the NPR, the NPR Directors are embracing a “whole of government” approach which entails interagency collaborations and consultations with other U.S. Government departments and agencies (e.g., Department of State, Department of Energy) and appropriate Congressional committees, as well as allies. Additionally, the DOD is conducting the NPR concurrently with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) review, the Space Policy Review (SPR), various other interagency reviews, the START-follow on negotiations, and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 2010 Review Conference preparations. Government officials have likely circulated many reports, memoranda, and drafts during this interagency process. But contrary to the claim published in the *Guardian* in September, the DOD has not yet submitted a draft of the NPR to the president.

Since the president instructed the NPR to balance U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy, and force posture with U.S. non-proliferation objectives, critics from both the right and the left of the American political spectrum will probably criticize it. Such a debate is necessary and healthy, but we must ensure that the wellspring of voices analyzing, praising, and critiquing U.S. nuclear policies do not distort the NPR's actual conclusions and recommendations. In his May 30 speech in Singapore, Secretary Gates noted that the QDR and NPR will at times be “a messy process,” but “it will be an open and transparent exercise — so that no one will get the wrong idea about our intentions... We will consult with key allies and partners. And we will articulate our strategy clearly. It is our hope that this effort can be an example of the power of openness and its ability to reduce miscommunication.” Consistent with this goal, the United States will produce an unclassified document explaining the conclusions of the NPR — unlike the previous two NPRs.

START Follow-on

The U.S.–Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expires on December 5, 2009. President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev reached a preliminary

agreement 6 July to cut the American and Russian nuclear arsenals by as much as a third while exploring options for cooperation on missile defense. The agreement instructs negotiators to draft a new accord that maintains START's critical verification mechanisms and reduces the number of deployed nuclear warheads in each country to between 1500 and 1675, down from the previous ceiling of 2200. The two leaders were unable to resolve a dispute over reductions in missile launchers and bombers, agreeing only that they should lower the START limit of 1600 such delivery vehicles for each country to between 1100 and 500.

The two presidents also signed a joint statement on nuclear cooperation, confirming their "commitment to strengthening their cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and stop acts of nuclear terrorism." In particular, the statement included the goal of improving security at nuclear facilities around the world and support for additional efforts to research and develop nuclear energy systems and services. Additionally, presidents Obama and Medvedev made some progress in the long-standing dispute over U.S. missile defense plans, agreeing to work together to assess threats posed by countries such as Iran and North Korea. They also agreed to explore cooperation in missile defense and intensify talks on establishing a joint center for early detection of hostile launches. (President Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center during a 1998 summit in Moscow)

Both countries are cautiously optimistic that they can reach a START Follow on agreement by the December expiration. To be successful, though, Russia must agree to temporarily set aside its concerns about U.S. conventional long-range strike, missile defense capabilities, and upload capacity until after the START Follow-on negotiations, and the United States must do same for Russia's deployed "non-strategic" nuclear forces.

Extended Deterrence and Assurance

U.S. security guarantees to allies —including extended deterrence broadly and extended nuclear deterrence specifically— are an important focus of the QDR, NPR, and BMD review. As discussed earlier, these reviews are still underway, but we already know that extended deterrence will figure prominently in the Obama administration's decisions about the U.S. nuclear and strategic posture. That extended nuclear deterrence is back in the spotlight after several decades in the shadows is

not surprising. North Korea conducted its second nuclear test in May, as well as a series of missile tests in April, May and July this year. Many in the international community believe that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Plus China's military modernization program continues, and Russia's war with Georgia and recent exercise have exacerbated the security concerns of NATO member states in Eastern Europe.

The May 6 report of Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission made several important observations about extended deterrence that probably frame how the NPR is examining the subject:

- "...developments in major power nuclear relations and proliferation affect allies and friends at least as much as they affect the United States. Their particular views of the requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in an evolving security environment must be understood and addressed by the United States."
- "...As part of an effort to understand assurance requirements, steps to increase allied consultations should be expanded."
- "...All allies depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella should be assured that any changes in its forces do not imply a weakening of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees."

Before moving forward, it is necessary to briefly review several basic aspects of contemporary deterrence. In order to extend deterrence, the United States must first be able to deter. Though there are a variety of opinions about deterrence within the U.S. strategic community, there is a widely-held recognition of the need to adjust deterrence to each of a wide range of potential opponents, actions, and situations. Similarly, the 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept frames deterrence as a function of our ability to influence three variables in a potential adversary's decision-making calculus: "in order to prevent hostile actions against US vital interests...An adversary's deterrence decision calculus focuses on their perception of three primary elements": the benefits of a course of action; the costs of a course of action; and the consequences of restraint (i.e., costs and benefits of not taking the course of action we seek to deter).

In my experience, examining U.S. allies' capabilities and communications is a good way to tackle the challenges of tailoring extended deterrence (broadly defined — not just nuclear deterrence).

First, extended deterrence and assurance requires tailoring a strategy for each

ally. U.S. defense officials must attempt to answer the following questions:

- Which actors are U.S. allies worried about?
- What actions are allies worried about these actors taking?
- How do allies think about deterrence? What do they think is the proper division of labor with the United States?
- How are their views of deterrence evolving?
- How are they influenced by domestic constituencies, politics, and history?
- What are their perceptions of the United States?

This information will help the United States craft a strategy to achieve the following goals:

- To extend deterrence, the United States must be able to deter its allies' adversaries.
- And assurance requires that allies believe that the United States can and will do so. [Note the difference between extended deterrence and assurance: the former focuses on influencing adversaries' calculations; the latter focuses on the calculations of U.S. allies. The concepts are related but distinct.]

Secondly, extended deterrence and assurance requires tailoring the mix of capabilities relevant to extended deterrence, based on the specific allies and the specific threats they face. The basket of capabilities necessary to assure and deter is dynamic. U.S. views on deterrence evolve, and so will those of U.S. allies — including the role of offenses and defenses, and the role of U.S. capabilities versus their own capabilities to underpin deterrence.

Extended deterrence is certainly more than just extended nuclear deterrence. Individuals in the United States and throughout the world often overlook or downplay the non-nuclear capabilities that support U.S. extended deterrence commitments. If I was permitted only one statement at this symposium, it would be this: *U.S. security commitments are not limited to a single weapon system or capability. The United States conceptualizes extended deterrence as an architecture encompassing all the tools—nuclear, conventional, political, diplomatic, legal, and economic—that we can leverage to assure allies and deter potential adversaries. And when we extend deterrence to Japan, we are committing this deep and diverse repertoire of tools to Japan's defense. The mechanisms through which the United States exercises extended deterrence may change, and should change to reflect an evolving security*

environment, but our commitment to our allies is constant.

U.S. conventional capabilities play an important — and increasing — role in extended deterrence. Japan has considered improving its own conventional strike capabilities. In 2003, for instance, the Diet debated whether Japan should pursue a conventional Tomahawk capability, and Japan requested the F-22. These capabilities enhance deterrence.

Defenses, particularly missile defenses, have gained acceptance, even enthusiasm, among some allies as a complementary part of extended deterrence. Japan has invested in the SM-3 and Patriot BMD systems to enhance its security, and we are committed to working with Japan to develop effective and credible interoperable missile defense systems. And these capabilities enhance deterrence.

As we are discussing missile defense, I should address the recent U.S. decision to reallocate resources from a fixed long-range missile defense installation in Eastern Europe to a deployable Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) system to counter Iran's short and medium range missiles. President Obama and his national security team have clearly and forcefully explained the reasoning underlying their decision. In Secretary Gates' own words: "The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the Shahab-3, is developing more rapidly than previously projected," and "the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities has been slower to develop than was estimated in 2006."² The United States altered its acquisition and deployment strategy in response to the intelligence community's assessment of the threat, which is what we must do in order to exercise extended deterrence continuously in dynamic environment. The United States is currently planning to deploy a Patriot missile battery in Poland, and it is consulting with Poland and Czech Republic about hosting components of the land based SM-3 that will be introduced in Phase II of the new missile defense deployment strategy. These actions are consistent with the Obama administration's insistence that Russia was not a factor in its decision.

A Forward military presence and force projection capability are a third conventional element of extended deterrence. An overseas presence is a visible manifestation of the United States' commitment to its allies, and this enhances deterrence.

Beyond military capabilities, extended deterrence broadly understood rests on

² Cole Harvey, "Obama Shifts Gears on Missile Defense," *Arms Control Today*, vol. 39, no. 10 (October 2009), <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/missiledefense>.

the overall health of the alliance relationship, including shared interests, dialogue and consultation, exercises, and coordinated defense planning. Additionally, trends in US behavior in the international arena shape the United States' reputation as a security guarantor.

However, focusing specifically on **extended nuclear deterrence**, what characteristics do U.S. nuclear forces need in order to assure allies? Do U.S. nuclear weapons need to be deployed or deployable to the region in question in order to reassure allies? And how visible do they need to be?

At present, the only U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on allied territory are the remaining air-delivered bombs in several NATO countries that could be delivered by dual-capable U.S. or allied aircraft. While the United States at one time deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea, they were removed decades ago, and the extension of nuclear deterrence to allies in the Asia–Pacific region has since then been by offshore nuclear forces. The ability to deploy nuclear weapons to a region to deter or assure has declined over the years.

- In 1991 and 1992, President George H.W. Bush's Presidential Nuclear Initiatives eliminated most so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons³.
- In 1994, the United States announced its decision to permanently give up the capability to deploy nuclear weapons on aircraft carriers or other surface ships.
- While the decision in 1994 was to retain the capability to redeploy TLAM-N on attack submarines, there has been a budget battle nearly every year since over whether to retain TLAM-N. The TLAM-N is a system that has not been updated with all the modern improvements made to the conventional version, and may atrophy soon.
- However, it is important to note that all the U.S. nuclear weapons are committed to extended nuclear deterrence. U.S. SLBMs, ICBMs, and nuclear capable bombers are just as much a part of extended nuclear deterrence as the TLAM-N or Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) and nuclear bombs in Europe. Extended nuclear deterrence does not ipso facto depend on the specific systems, characteristics, composition, or size of the US nuclear arsenal.

³ The term "tactical" or "non-strategic" nuclear weapons is oxymoronic: all nuclear weapons would be strategic in their effect; "tactical" or "non-strategic" nuclear weapons are really just differently-deployed. This is leftover terminology, meaning nuclear weapons not covered by START, SORT or other arms control agreements

Third, the clarity and credibility of U.S. messages (words and deeds) in the minds of the allies it is attempting to assure is critical. On this point, it is important to acknowledge a few fundamental points:

- Assurance (like deterrence) is in the eye of the beholder.
- The United States should have regular discussions with allies—in track 1, 1.5, track 2— about whom they are worried about, what allies are worried about their doing, and how to deal with it—as well as the nature of deterrence, dissuasion, assurance.
- As officials in NPR think about numbers and characteristics of nuclear forces, they will need to consciously address the issue of how to reassure allies that the extended nuclear pledge is still viable.
- But those may impact allies' views of the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence.
- Institutionalizing U.S.-Allied exchanges on issues related to nuclear deterrence would help the United States identify and mitigate misperceptions that undermine extended nuclear deterrence and assurance. Such discussions could also include non-nuclear capabilities that contribute to deterrence.

Nuclear Infrastructure

Activists and analysts within both the arms control and defense policy circles often portray the trade-offs between non-proliferation and nuclear infrastructure refurbishment in absolute terms. Proponents of disarmament frequently argue that building new nuclear warheads will demonstrate to the world that the United States is not serious about its Article VI obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), thus undermining U.S. non-proliferation policies. Alternatively, supporters of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program assert that failing to modernize the U.S. stockpile will corrode U.S. extended deterrence commitments and spur U.S. allies to pursue their own nuclear weapons capabilities.

Such hyperbolic claims do not provide a useful starting point for a discussion of the relationship between the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, deterrence and extended deterrence, and U.S. non-proliferation objectives. Instead, we should look to core U.S. national security objectives to frame our discussion. For this, the dual objectives President Obama articulated in his Prague speech are illuminating: the United States must reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy while

also strengthening deterrence and extended deterrence. What is the role of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure in achieving these objectives?

In my opinion, there is actually much more overlap between the requirements of deterrence and extended deterrence and non-proliferation and disarmament than most people realize. We know that the United States will need to maintain a safe, effective, credible, and reliable nuclear deterrent to protect itself and its allies for the immediate future. To do so, the United States needs to ensure that its warheads and strategic delivery vehicles function, that it can continuously evaluate the operability of its warheads and strategic delivery vehicles, and that it has the technology and the people to meet these requirements. In other words, the United States needs a vibrant nuclear infrastructure.

However, maintaining a vibrant infrastructure will be critical to enabling deep nuclear arms reductions and achieving U.S. non-proliferation objectives. For instance, as the number of warheads and delivery vehicles that the United States deploys decreases, the effectiveness and reliability of each remaining unit becomes more important, as does the ability to quickly replace systems that are damaged or malfunction. And the ability to reconstitute warhead and delivery vehicle production to respond to an international crisis or a rising nuclear challenger is of paramount importance. If one day the conditions that enable nuclear disarmament exist throughout the international environment, a responsive infrastructure capable of reconstituting our nuclear weapons programs will be our hedge against uncertainty. In the more immediate future, the technologies and workforce we develop will sharpen our non-proliferation capabilities, such as verification and compliance tools, nuclear forensics and attribution techniques (which will help deter state sponsors of WMD terrorism), and the myriad other technical difficulties that we must overcome to move to world without nuclear weapons.