The Role of the Military in Peace-Building: A Japanese Perspective

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In an era of “long wars” in the twenty-first century, the roles of the military in the peace-building process stand at a critical juncture.¹ Though conflict resolutions brokered by the United Nations became the order of the day immediately after the Cold War, with the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Iraq War as a tipping point, the “war on terror” led by multinational forces has come into the spotlight. The effort to stabilize regions, also called the “fight against terrorism,” has been going on much longer than initially expected. Even after the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001, the war on terror in Afghanistan did not come to an end and we are now seeing a resurgence of the Taliban. In the Iraq War that started in 2003 as well, the state of de facto civil war has continued even after Saddam Hussein’s regime was brought down, and efforts are underway even now to restore civil order in the country. Thus, the U.S. military with its overwhelming operational capabilities, despite the victory in major combat operations at the initial stage, has not subsequently been able to “win the peace.”

This paper examines how the advent of the era of such long wars is changing the roles of the military in the peace-building process. As retired General Rupert Smith of the British Army so adeptly put it, modern conflicts are taking on the features of “war amongst the people.”² In such war, the front lines in the classical sense disappear; it thus becomes necessary to conduct counterinsurgency operations to establish the rule of law while winning the support of peoples through reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. How do these new trends of peace building and conflict resolution affect Japanese efforts? To shed light on this matter, this paper focuses its examination on the following three points.

First, the paper examines how protracted stabilization operations affect Japanese policy. After clarifying the differences between stabilization operations and traditional international peace operations it compares the approaches to stabilization

operations adopted by two major alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Second, by tracing peace building efforts in long wars, the paper attempts to analyze possible roles and missions of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in this context. It also argues that the SDF, which carries out international peace cooperation activities (IPCA) in a highly restrictive manner, has “soft power” that the militaries of other advanced countries hardly possess. Until now, the restricted activities of the SDF have been considered a symbol of Japan not being a “normal country.” In the era of long wars, however, allies and partners of the United States may take a renewed look at the unique activities of the SDF in their peace-building efforts.

Third, in an attempt to verify the above-mentioned points, the paper provides a brief introduction to the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual on counterinsurgency, revised in 2007 under the leadership by General David Petraeus, commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). It also analyzes the implications of these changes in the U.S. military for IPCA of the SDF. This manual underlines the need for restrictive use of weapons, under the heading of “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations,” which fall in with the SDF’s posture in IPCA. On the basis of these new developments within the U.S. military, the SDF may have a comparative advantage in IPCA.

1. Stabilization Operations and Alliance Management
   – Implications for Japan’s IPCA

As shown in Afghanistan, the process of post-conflict reconstruction may take longer than anticipated. This section attempts to shed light on the impact of the prolonged stabilization of international peace operations and examines the implications for Japan. On that basis, NATO and the Japan-U.S. alliance are compared in terms of differences in the alliances’ approaches to stabilization operations.

Before examining Japan’s IPCA, it may be necessary to explain the term “stabilization operation,” which is not familiar to most Japanese. A stabilization operation entails security maintenance activities conducted by the military to sustain

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order in a situation that remains unstable after organized combat ends. The U.S. divides military operations into “major combat operations” and “stabilization operations,” and moves on to stabilization operations once the end to organized combat is declared. As seen in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, greater weight had previously been given to former major combat operations, the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs”-type intervention. Following the deterioration in the security situation in Iraq, however, the Department of Defense Directive 3000-05 issued in 2005 redefined its priorities and put major combat operations on par with stabilization operations. In NATO’s case, stabilization operations are defined as peace support operations (PSO). According to the NATO Doctrine of Peace Support Operations, the alliance’s stabilization operations assume the following four stages: they are aimed to support the peace-building process including relative stability (first stage), peace-keeping and peace enforcement (second stage), post-conflict emergency response (third stage), and efforts toward sustainable peace (fourth stage). These stabilization operations are international peace activities mandated by the U.N. Security Council, but are different from U.N. peace-keeping operations (UNPKO) in nature. Moreover, stabilization operations, depending on the security situation, often involve peace enforcement under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter and the use of force may be permissible under the concept of taking “all necessary means.”

In terms of participation in these stabilization operations, Japan’s efforts can be characterized by three aspects. First, Japan does not participate directly in stabilization operations. Second, stabilization operations are never an official topic in the management of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Third, in the process post-conflict peace-building, the SDF quite often works with countries other than the United States as partners. These characteristics are explained below.

The first characteristic, the fact that Japan does not participate directly in

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5 Official terms are “Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO),” which constitute a part of “Military Operations other than War (MOOTW).”
6 NATO, *Peace Support Operations* (AJP-3.4.1) NATO Unclassified (July 2001), pp. 4-10ff.
7 In the case of Bosnia, following the Dayton peace agreement in 1995, NATO was responsible for maintaining security for about 10 years until the end of 2004 in cooperation with the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Community and others. Since the summer of 2003, NATO also took the command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and now takes charge of security sector reform including military and police reform as well as reconstruction assistance. NATO’s stabilization operations do not include counterinsurgency operations, but seek “synergy” with the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom.
stabilization operations, is widely known. Although mandated by the U.N. Security Council, stabilization operations are usually led by multinational forces and are thus different from UNPKOs. As suggested by the term stabilization operations, these activities are undertaken in a situation where social order remains fluid and the use of force is assumed to enforce peace.

At present, it is not assumed that the SDF will directly participate in stabilization operations. In order to clarify the implications of this policy, it is necessary to compare the modalities of SDF’s participation in UNPKOs and multinational forces. First, if Japan participates in UNPKOs in accordance with the International Peace Cooperation Law, such participation must follow the traditional peace-keeping principles such as the consent of parties in a conflict, impartiality, and the minimum use of weapons.\(^8\) In recent years, however, UNPKOs have turned into large-scale, multi-dimensional operations, and accordingly, the need to review traditional principles has emerged.\(^9\) Amid the changing tide, the capstone doctrine for UNPKOs, prepared and approved by the U.N. Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO), took a step forward from the traditional approach of the minimum use of weapons, and authorized the use of weapons for the defense of the mandates.\(^10\) Though UNPKOs do not assume any peace enforcement or use the expression “stabilization operations” \textit{per se}, post-conflict stability is essential for the peace-building process. For this reason, UNPKOs require “robust” responses at the tactical level. Amid the transformation of UNPKOs as described above, the scope of activities of the SDF under the existing framework of the International Peace Cooperation Law has become more restricted.\(^11\)

Next, Japan’s participation in stabilization operations led by multinational forces, not UNPKOs, is considered likely to be \textit{ittaika} (inseparable from the use

\(^8\) In traditional U.N. peace-keeping operations, the police-like use of military force in “crowd control” to maintain order was one of the most important issues. Trevor Findley, \textit{The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations} (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2002), p. 32.

\(^9\) For example, while the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) consisted of 1,233 members, the size of the MONUC (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo) expanded to 22,174 members, and cover diverse tasks including the people’s livelihood, DDR and the rule of war. The Cabinet Office, “Concerning Activities under the International Peace Cooperation Law”, p. 2 <www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei2/dai5/siryou3.pdf>.


of force).\textsuperscript{12} Focusing on geographical elements, the SDF units can be deployed only in “non-combat zones.” Additionally, their activities will also be restricted to such fields as supplies, transportation, repairs, maintenance, medical services and communications. This interpretation has not changed even after IPCA were upgraded to a primary mission of the SDF in 2007.\textsuperscript{13}

As an attempt to examine the implications of Japan’s restrictive policy, a comparison is made with the Dutch troops deployed in Samawah in the province of Muthanna, Iraq, as was the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF).\textsuperscript{14} The Dutch government decided to participate in the Iraq Stabilization Force (SFIR) (the so-called multinational force) at the request of Britain and the United States in April 2003. On the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 adopted on May 22, Dutch troops started operations on July 10.\textsuperscript{15} The tasks of the Dutch troops were to “restore and maintain security and stability” in the “relatively quiet” province of Muthanna and “assist humanitarian initiatives and help with reconstruction” (to be described in detail later). While the 1,100-strong Dutch troops were part of the multinational force, they were supposed to get support from the South-East Multi National Division under the command of British troops in the event of armed attacks, just as were the SDF units.\textsuperscript{16}

In contrast, the GSDF troops deployed in Samawah took the unique approach

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\item[12] Cited as matters to be considered in judging the possibility of the SDF’s IPCA being \textit{ittaika} (inseparable from the use of force) are: “(1) the geographical proximity between a location where combat operations are taking place, or about to take place, and a location where the SDF units are to conduct their operations; (2) specific operations of the SDF units; (3) closeness of the relationship with foreign countries’ parties that take on the task of using force; and (4) the current status of activities of parties with which the SDF units are supposed to cooperate (tentative translation by the author)” For legal interpretations, see reference materials submitted by the Panel for Rebuilding the Legal Foundation in terms of Security. “The So-Called ‘Logistical Support’ in International Peace Activities, p. 1 <www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhousyou/dai5/siryou1.pdf>.
\item[13] For example, the report of the Panel for Rebuilding the Legal Foundation in terms of Security, chaired by Shunji Yanai, points out the ambiguity of the concept of \textit{ittaika} (inseparable from the use of force) by stating that “this concept is extremely difficult to apply to the sites of activities where the situation changes from moment to moment, including under what circumstances the logistical support operations are regarded being inseparable with the use of force by other countries and what demarcates ‘combat zones’ and ‘non-combat zones’ (tentative translation by the author)” (June 24, 2008). <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhousyou/houkokusho.pdf>.
\item[14] For more information on the cooperation between Japan and the Netherlands in Samawah, see “International Peace Cooperation: the Complementarity between Defense, Diplomacy and Development” (June 12, 2008, Keio University Mita Campus).
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of liaising and coordinating with the multinational force, but not going under its command.\textsuperscript{17} At the Japan-U.S. summit meeting in May 2003, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated Japan wishes to make “a contribution commensurate with its national power and standing,”\textsuperscript{18} “proactively and on its own initiative,”\textsuperscript{19} and also explored how the reconstruction of Iraq as designated by the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 should proceed. While the Dutch troops had “restoring and maintaining security and stability” and “assisting humanitarian initiatives and helping with reconstruction” as the two pillars of their operation, Japan’s basic plan for the SDF, approved in December 2003, called for “response measures centering on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.”\textsuperscript{20} Thus, the SDF’s activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance were defined as medical services, water supply, rehabilitation and maintenance of public facilities (including schools), and transportation of humanitarian and reconstruction-related goods among others. However, the basic plan also incorporates “support activities for ensuring security” and provides for operations to “support the UN member states’ activities to restore security and stability in Iraq.” As for the security of the SDF conducting reconstruction assistance activities in Iraq, the basic plan called on the SDF to take \textit{its own} security measures by considering the overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security. In the case of Iraq, the emphasis was often placed on the liaison between the SDF and the multinational force, but as described above, Japan did not participate directly in stabilization operations.

The second characteristic of Japan’s efforts in the analysis from the standpoint of stabilization efforts and the alliances is that the Japan-U.S. alliance does not directly regard stabilization operations as a common task. In this respect, the Japan-U.S. alliance contrasts strongly with NATO that is directly involved in the command

\textsuperscript{17} The cabinet decision of June 18, 2004, set out the course for the SDF troops to be placed “under the unified command of the multinational force” but conduct liaison and coordination with it.
\textsuperscript{19} This expression was used in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) adopted in December 2004 in such passages as “…making proactive efforts on its own initiative to help improve the international security environment is positioned as a major role of defense” to indicate Japan’s stand on international peace cooperation activities.
\textsuperscript{20} “Basic Plan regarding Response Measures based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq” (December 8, 2003).
of stabilization operations. Needless to say, in responding to conflicts surrounding Japan, the Japan-U.S. alliance is supposed to ensure deterrence and defense through close cooperation. The report by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, submitted in August 2009, also called for responses to ballistic missiles and terrorism as well as information gathering, early warning, surveillance/reconnaissance, and anti-overflight measures in order to achieve the goal of deterrence and effective responses to situations within and around Japan’s territory, thereby proposing “deterrence by operations (dynamic deterrence).” On the other hand, the Council report positions international peace cooperation activities in areas beyond Northeast Asia as “improvement of the global security environment,” calling for Japan’s efforts as a “peace-fostering nation” toward support for reconstruction of failed states and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.21 Japan-U.S. cooperation in this field appears somewhat indirect, as compared with cases of bilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia. In the discussions on the transformation of the Japan-U.S. alliance, such fields as humanitarian assistance activities, reconstruction support, peace-keeping operations and support for the capacity-building of other countries are identified as areas for bilateral cooperation and positioned as future tasks for the two countries.22

NATO took the command of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo as well as the ISAF in Afghanistan. NATO is a collective defense mechanism with a clause for collective defense of member states, and undertakes crisis response operations outside the “North Atlantic area” as a task of the alliance. While its “out-of-area operations” in Afghanistan do not involve any collective defense responsibility, all NATO member states are obligated to participate in conflict resolution in some form. Thus, NATO members have decided to move in the direction of reorganizing their forces as expeditionary ones and declared their intention to make it possible to immediately deploy 8% of their ground troops.23

Technically, it is not assumed that Japan and the United States together will take operational command for out-of-area conflicts. This issue has usually been discussed in the context of the “collective right of self-defense” for Japan, but

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21 The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report, p. 34.
more importantly, it has more to do with the differences in the nature of alliance management. For NATO, the Afghanistan issue puts the commitments of the member states to a test, while for Japan, Afghanistan is not an issue for the alliance stemming directly from the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.\(^{24}\) NATO’s relationship with Japan is regarded as an exchange with a “contact country” for regular strategic dialogue and defense exchanges; it does not represent any direct cooperation in conflict resolution, unlike the cooperation conducted under the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Instead, mutual cooperation in Afghanistan is understood as Japan’s commitment within the framework of the Group of Eight (G8) reconstruction assistance (the Bonn Process).

Japan’s support for provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Afghanistan gives little impression of its direct cooperation with the ISAF. In January 2009, Japan decided to dispatch its personnel to the Lithuanian-led PRT in Chaghcharan in Ghor province, but the team was comprised of civilians only, including two diplomats, as the dispatch of SDF was not decided. It was explained that the decision to send civilians to the Chaghcharan PRT was made in response to the request from Lithuania, the PRT’s lead country, with no reference at all to NATO or the ISAF. The decision to dispatch the civilians was explained as “part of our efforts to reinforce Japan’s development assistance activities in rural areas of Afghanistan.”\(^{25}\) In fact, “ISAF Placemat,” a list of the troop-contributing countries of ISAF, does not include Japan. When Japan provides financial assistance to PRT-led reconstruction support projects as well, Japan makes decisions on its own initiative. In sum, compared with NATO, Japan’s cooperation with the ISAF is not an issue that stems directly from the Japan-U.S. alliance but is discussed in the context of the overall picture of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

The third feature of Japan’s efforts in terms of stabilization efforts and the alliances is that Japan’s partners in its IPCA tend to be countries other than the United States. This phenomena, somewhat paradoxically, stems from the difference in the characteristics of the Japanese and U.S. militaries. The U.S. forces are structured and trained toward expeditionary operations. The area of operations of the

\(^{24}\) In January 2007, then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a speech before the North Atlantic Council as the first Japanese prime minister to do so, but Japanese media features his explanations about North Korea’s nuclear development program to the NATO member states.

\(^{25}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dispatch of Japan’s Civilian Assistance Team to the Chaghcharan PRT in Afghanistan” (April 17, 2009). <http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/press/release/21/4/1190655_1096.html>. According to the website, some 140 Japanese, including about 30 Japan International Cooperation Agency experts, were engaged in various activities in Afghanistan as of the end of 2008,
U.S. forces is global, and the U.S. forces mainly shoulder high-intensity operations. In contrast, the SDF’s primary task is still “territorial defense,” and the focus of Japan’s security policy is the stability of Northeast Asia, including North Korea’s nuclear development and missile issues. Security issues directly linked to Japan’s territorial defense assume high-intensity operations, including missile defense, but international activities on a global scale do not involve such an approach.

Given the above-described differences in the characteristics of the two militaries, Japan-U.S. cooperation in international peace cooperation activities in the field are naturally limited.26 In many cases of the GSDF’s overseas operations, local partners are European countries, Canada, Australia and others besides the U.S. For example, the key was cooperation with Australia in Cambodia and East Timor, and cooperation with Britain, the Netherlands and Australia in Iraq. As a consequence, Japan came to gradually expand strategic dialogues and security cooperation with Britain and Australia.

2. IPCA of the SDF – Characteristics of Japan as the “Soft Power”

Throughout the Cold War period, Japan’s defensive defense posture created a “strategic culture.”27 In the new post-Cold War environment, some parts of that posture have changed and other parts have not. On the one hand, the need for defense capabilities in preparation for possible contingencies involving Japan has come to be widely recognized in the changing situation in Northeast Asia, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, and the rise of China. The anti-militarism that had characterized post-war Japan is gradually losing influence amid the evolving environment in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, in the case of a global conflict, the public opinion still tends to favor non-military solutions such

26 The notable exception is refueling support operations by the MSDF in the Indian Ocean. But these operations broadly cover the troops contributing countries and are not being conducted in the context of cooperation with the United States. “The Issuance of the Defense Minister’s Order for the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law” (January 16, 2008, tentative translation by MOD).

as diplomatic negotiations via the United Nations and conflict prevention through development assistance. Furthermore, IPCA of the SDF mainly comprise activities in such forms as UNPKOs, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support, anti-terrorism and/or anti-piracy measures. Examples include provision of medical support and maintenance of public facilities by the GSDF, refueling operations and anti-piracy measures by the MSDF, and air transportation and surveillance activities by the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). Activities of the SDF in these areas can be described as the utilization of the SDF’s military assets and capabilities in non-combat tasks.

These tendencies can be confirmed in Public Opinion Survey on the Japan Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issue, conducted by the Cabinet Office every three years. In the 2006 survey conducted during the period when the GSDF troops were undertaking humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support activities in Iraq, a high percentage, 66.7% of those polled, supported the SDF’s activities. Of over 80% of the respondents supporting IPCA, 53.5% said the “current level of efforts should be maintained,” surpassing the 31.0% who replied Japan “should get involved more actively than before.” Summing up these results, Japanese public opinion appears to expect the SDF to undertake activities centering on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support. In the same opinion survey conducted in January 2009, in response to the question asking the purposes for the existence of the SDF, 43.6% cited “efforts in international peace cooperation activities,” a low figure indicating that such activities by the SDF have yet to be fully appreciated relative to “disaster relief operations” (78.4%) and “national security” (70.0%).

The restrictive posture of the SDF may be regarded as part of the “soft power” Japan can exercise in the international community. The SDF, established after the end of World War II, has been proactively conducting domestic disaster relief

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28 Katzenstein, Ibid. Public opinion in Japan was skeptical about the air raids in Kosovo and the Iraq War that failed to obtain clear U.N. Security Council mandates authorizing the use of force. On the other hand, it gives high marks to the idea of “human security” and civilian activities in peace-building efforts.


31 According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr., as against “hard power” such as the military power and economic might that impose upon other countries, “soft power” means “intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions.” Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), pp. 32-33, 267.
operations, and also has extensive dialogues with local communities over military bases issues. It may be argued that since its establishment, the SDF has stuck with the stance of “winning the hearts and minds” of the Japanese people as a “force for good.” In fact, regarding humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support in Iraq, then Defense Agency Director-General Yoshinori Ohno described the SDF’s activities as “soft power in the form of cordiality” and explained them as efforts toward nation-building in Iraq.

Paradoxically, the SDF can exercise this soft power only by imposing substantial limitations on its own operations. In other words, soft power can be obtained as compensation for Japan not exercising hard power in its international peace cooperation activities. The restrictive nature of the SDF’s operations has hitherto been criticized by those who argue for Japan becoming a “normal country” and/or possessing a “normal military.”

As a consequence of the military taking on civilian activities in the long wars, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support operations have come to be reevaluated in terms of winning support of local residents, however. Amid this evolution, the international assessment of the SDF’s operations has also undergone change. It may also be argued that the impact of soft power has come to be appreciated further. In order to examine this point, the SDF’s restrictive attitude in IPCA is

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32 This expression is mostly used to describe peace-buildings efforts and an expansion of the scope of member states in the European Union. In the term, the “force” does not necessary connote military implications. For example, see President Prodi’s Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, January 11, 2002 <http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_1022_fr.htm>.

33 In Yoshinori Ohno, “Using Soft Power in the Form of Cordiality – Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction Support in Iraq,” the direction of peace-building efforts by the SDF is shown. Ohno said, “We hope that Iraq will regain stability as early as possible and the Iraqi people will be able to get on with nation-building efforts on their own and civilians from Japan can support them. At present, however, we still have to ask the SDF to do its utmost by relying on its ability with withstand the severe environment. (tentative translation by the author)” <http://www.mmmz.kantei.go.jp/k/mw/192/jy/honne.html>.

34 For developments regarding a “normal country” debate in Japan, see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence As a Normal Military Power (Adelphi Papers: AP 368-9), pp. 49ff.

35 Hughes argues that Japan has come to possess an ordinary military by adopting a hedging strategy in the wake of the changes following the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (London: Routledge, 2009). Oros also believes that Japan already possesses a normal military in terms of the comparison of defense budgets, equipment and organizations, but argues that the change in Japan’s unique “security identify” is hard to come by. Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

36 For the position of this author on the matter, see the following: Tomonori Yoshizaki, “NATO no Mingun Kyoryoku (CIMIC) [Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) by NATO,]” Yuji Uesugi and Chiyuki Aoi, eds., Kokka Kensetsu niokeru Mingun Kankei [Civil Military Relationship in State Building] (Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin , 2008), pp. 205-226.
analyzed below from the three aspects of (1) the purpose of SDF operations, (2) the timing of SDF dispatches, and (3) the duration of SDF operations. Needless to say, the limitations on the purpose of SDF operations are related to the other two matters.

(1) Purpose of SDF Operations
As already noted, of UNPKOs, the SDF has covered traditional peace-keeping operations and stayed away from multi-dimensional peace-keeping operations in the wake of civil war, peace enforcement under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, or stabilization operations by multinational forces. Thus, IPCA of the SDF have chiefly covered such activities as repairs and engineering works including repairing local roads and bridges, water supply, refueling, food provision, medical services, lodging facilities, and transportation and storage of support materials. Even in operations under the Special Measures Law, the SDF is required to avoid its operations becoming ittaika (inseparable from the use of force) with other countries.

In general, international peace operations can be categorized as follows: (1) monitoring ceasefires, (2) logistical support, (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) guard activities, (5) maintenance of security, and (6) maritime inspections. Among these operations, the following activities and operations are not stipulated in Japan’s current laws and regulations: First, in civilian-led activities, de-mining activities for humanitarian purposes, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants are not included. Second, in military-led operations, the development and reconstruction of security-related organizations, or the so-called security sector reform (SSR); guard activities (guarding of personnel, facilities and goods); activities to secure public safety (securing safety through stationing and patrolling, checking of passers-by, defense against destructive acts, arrest/detention, collection and storage of weapons, etc.); maritime inspections (for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions and prevention of movements of terrorists).

(2) Timing of SDF Dispatches
Generally, an international force is assigned to ensure security, albeit temporarily, in local areas in order to avoid the creation of a post-conflict power vacuum. Colonel Garland Williams of the U.S. Army, based on the experiences in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, argues that the initial 12 to 18 months after the conflict are the most
critical period.\textsuperscript{37} In the case of the Iraq War, an early and smooth shift from combat operations to stabilization operations was definitely needed. In reality, however, after combat in the city of Baghdad came to an end in April 2003, looting occurred at national museums and government office buildings; the forces stationed, without any stabilization mandate, did not take on a policing mission to restrain looting.\textsuperscript{38}

While it is important to fill such a post-conflict gap and make a switch in reconstruction support to stabilization, can Japan make any contribution in this area? Former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in his policy address (on January 18, 2008) stated, “With the Japan-U.S. security alliance and international cooperation as the basis, Japan will actively address these global challenges, and play a responsible role in the international community as a ‘peace-fostering nation’,” and “we will proceed with consideration of a so-called ‘general law’ for the purpose of implementing expeditiously and effectively international peace cooperation activities,”\textsuperscript{39} putting Japan’s peace operations on the government’s policy agenda.

Then, how soon can Japan send the SDF troops overseas?

For the sake of convenience, the timing of the dispatch is considered for two stages: the stage prior to the outbreak of conflict and the stage during which efforts launched after the outbreak of conflict are under way toward stabilization.\textsuperscript{40} While some argue that the pre-conflict preventive deployment, or the dispatch of forces before acts of combat occur, is possible under the so-called five principles of PKO participation.\textsuperscript{41} Under the International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992, there has been no track record of such deployment as yet. In the past, Japan considered the “dispatching of the SDF troops as an idea worth examining” in reference to Macedonia in the former Yugoslavia, where the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) was stationed from 1993, but the preventive deployment of the SDF

\textsuperscript{38} For the background, see Thomas E. Ricks, FIASCO: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 150-152.
\textsuperscript{39} “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda to the 169th Session of the Diet” (January 18, 2008)
\textsuperscript{40} The categorization of the stages is in accordance with “The So-Called ‘Rear-Area Support’ in International Peace Activities,” p. 4.
\textsuperscript{41} Yasushi Akashi, then-the UN Secretary-General’s special representative to former Yugoslavia, as well as Shunji Yanai suggested the “preventive deployment” of the SDF forces in Macedonia, but the idea never materialized. Yasushi Akashi ed., Oraru Hisutori Nihon to Kokuren no 50nen [Oral History - the 50 Years for Japan and the U.N.] (Tokyo: Minerva Shobo, 2008), p. 35.
forces never materialized. Next, it is generally considered difficult to dispatch the SDF to UNPKOs under current law immediately after the outbreak of conflict, when stabilization efforts are still under way. This is because we must wait until warring parties agree to a ceasefire and wait for a deployment of international peacekeepers, which are essential parts of the preconditions for the dispatch of SDF troops.

On the other hand, in the dispatch of SDF troops under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law enforced after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the way was cleared for “cooperation and support activities,” and “relief and rescue operations” as long as troops are sent to “non-combat zones.” In addition, in activities under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, it became theoretically possible for SDF troops to undertake “maintenance of safety (anzen kakuho)” in “non-combat zones” after an end to major combat operations in Iraq was declared. Nevertheless, the deployment of SDF troops still assumes a series of procedures covering from the preparation of a special measures law after the outbreak of conflict and approval of a basic plan for the dispatch at a cabinet meeting after the Diet enacts the law.

The following is the procedure for the dispatch of SDF troops, with a comparison of general trends in “stabilization and reconstruction” in Samawah, Muthanna Province, Iraq. Following the start of the Iraq War in March 2003, the U.S. Marine Corps were deployed in Samawah, and subsequently President George Bush declared an end to “major combat operations” on May 1. Two months later, in July, Dutch troops were deployed there for the maintenance of security and civil-military cooperation operations. Japan, after a cabinet decision in December, dispatched SDF troops in January 2004. Even in the case of Iraq where the dispatch of SDF troops was realized relatively smoothly at the initiative of Prime Minister Koizumi, there was a time lag of about six months after the deployment of the Dutch troops. It is difficult for SDF forces to directly fill the stabilization and reconstruction gap (S&R gap) under the current legal system.

(3) Duration of SDF Operation
S&R operations after combat operations tend to become prolonged. A report by the Defense Science Board of the U.S. Department of Defense put forth the view that these operations would continue for “five to eight years.”

combat operation,” cooperation between the U.S. and coalition members holds the key; in a longer “stabilization operation,” cooperation among allies and friends has become essential.

Is the SDF capable of continuing IPCA for five to eight years? In the case of participation in UNPKOs, the duration of the dispatch of the SDF troops is often limited to a period of one to two years. The duration of the SDF operations was comparatively short, limited to about a year in Cambodia (ceasefire monitoring and the dispatch of the engineering battalion), to one year and nine months in Mozambique, and to about two years and a half in East Timor. 43 The exceptionally long participation is seen for the dispatch of the SDF troops to the U.N. Disengagement Observer Forces on the Golan Heights (UNDOF), where they have been deployed from 1996 until now. However, the missions of the SDF troops as UNDOF are limited to supplies and logistical support tasks, along with a handful of officers at the Headquarters. On the other hand, the dispatch of the GSDF troops to Samawah under the Iraq Special Measures Law lasted for some two and a half years. After the end of the GSDF missions, air transportation operation by C-130s from Kuwait to Iraq continued until December 2008. Refueling operations in the Indian Ocean continued from December 2001 through the time of writing (July 2009), though there was a brief suspension of operations. In summation, it can be said that the duration of the dispatch of the SDF forces under the special measures laws tends to become longer than the participation in UNPKOs.

3. Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Building – The Case of Iraq

In considering the role of the military in the peace-building process, one of the focal points is what sort of relationship should be built with civilian organizations that participate in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support as well as development projects. Depending on the local situation, the civil-military relationship can take various forms. 44 The closest form of the civilian-military relationship is “cooperation,” followed by “coordination” and then the “coexistence” that does not

43 The dispatch of the engineering battalion to East Timor continued for a relatively long period of time, from February 2002 to June 2004.
even involve any mutual adjustment of their operations. The military tends to regard civilian organizations as “force-multipliers” in achieving the operational goals and to proactively facilitate civil military cooperation/coordination (CIMIC). In contrast, humanitarian organizations regard coordination with the military as the “last resort” to protect the independence, neutrality and impartiality of their activities. In other words, the civil-military relationship tends to be laden with tensions by nature; cooperation between the two may be rather an exceptional phenomenon that reflects the spirit of the times of the “war on terror.”

The GSDF dispatch to Iraq shed light on CIMIC in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities of the SDF. Since the first UNPKOs in Cambodia, emphasis has been placed on the aspect of support for people’s livelihood in IPCA by the SDF. Hence it was not that the SDF’s relationship with civilian organizations emerged abruptly in Iraq. In fact, many of the SDF operations, including repairs of roads and bridges by the GSDF engineering units, provision of food, drinking water and other relief items and support for election personnel are consistent with a template for civil-military cooperation/coordination used globally. Nevertheless, coordination between the SDF troops operating in East Timor and the United Nations and other international institutions, the local government and private-sector NGOs were regarded as civil military affairs (CMA); it was never called CIMIC.

However, the Dutch troops of the Iraq Stabilization Force (SFIR) already deployed in Samawah had the CIMIC unit, and the term CIMIC grabbed headlines as the SDF troops conducted liaison and coordination with the Dutch unit regularly. In Samawah, the GSDF deployed the Iraqi Reconstruction Support Group comprising 500 members (in three-month rotations) and the Iraqi Reconstruction Operations Support Unit consisting of 100 members (in six-month rotations). The former was responsible for the implementation of reconstruction support operations, maintenance and management, and guarding of the Samawah camp; the latter took charge of the planning of reconstruction support operations, information and public relations, accounting, and legal affairs. It also dealt with support activities in Kuwait, including coordination with other troop-contributing countries, and communications with the Ground Staff Office in Tokyo. The latter was responsible for CIMIC-like activities.

45 Yukie Osa, “NGO no Shiten kara Mita Mingun Kankei no Kadai [Issues in the Civil-Military Relationship from the Perspective of NGOs], Uesugi and Aoi eds., Kokka Kensetsu niokeru Mingun Kankei [Civil Military Relationship in State Building], p. 181.
Operations of the SDF have been described as medical services, water supply activities, operations to restore and maintain public facilities and creation of local employment. In general, it is difficult to assess how humanitarian assistance activities have enhanced local governance in conflict areas. It is principally because comparable and reliable data in the area is hard to obtain. The same difficulty is most likely to apply to humanitarian assistance and reconstruction operations by the SDF as well. It probably requires some time to assess the extent to which “humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support operations” such as medical technique support and repair work have contributed to enhance local governance in Muthanna Province. For example, the decline to about one-third in the mortality of newborn babies at the Samawah Maternity and Children’s Hospital is cited as one of the achievements. But the significance of such a change in this indicator needs to be weighed comprehensively in combination with other local factors involved.

It was the “external coordination team” within the Iraqi Reconstruction Operations Support Unit that supported the SDF’s activities toward civil-military coordination. The team was acting as the so-called CIMIC unit. According to Masahisa Sato, the commander of its first contingent, the team was divided into sections for overall coordination; policy; medical support; water supply; roads and bridges; schools; medical clinics; electricity, agriculture and sewerage; youth and sports; donations; public information; and logistical support. It comprised a total of 47 members: 15 self-defense officials, 20 local staff members and 12 local engineers. Such an organizational setup is similar to a CIMIC unit in NATO. The SDF’s activities placed an emphasis on local ownership, aiming at “capacity building” of local staff members. The SDF’s activities took the forms of medical technique support in medical services, water purification guidance in water supply, and designing and guidance in the maintenance of public facilities, putting curbs on direct local activities by self-defense officials. This approach was in contrast to the one adopted in Cambodia, where the SDF troops directly undertook water supply

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47 According to the FY2008 version of the Defense White Paper, medical technique support was provided a total of 277 times, water was supplied to a total of about 11.89 million people, repair work was completed at 36 schools, groundwork and pavement of roads were completed at 31 locations, and repair work was completed for 66 other facilities. Furthermore, up to 1,100 jobs were created per day for a total of 490,000 people (Reference 47 at the end of the White Paper).

operations and distributed goods.\textsuperscript{49}

It is also noteworthy that an attempt was made at the “All-Japan” approach. It was made through the coordination of official development assistance (ODA) by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support operations by the GSDF as two wheels of one cart. The GSDF troops were withdrawn in July 2006 after some two and a half years of operations in Iraq, but only after the start of construction work (in March 2006) for a large-scale power station in Samawah. This highlighted the completion of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support operations by the military and the transition to full-fledged development financed by ODA. The power station, completed in December 2008 with Japan’s emergency grant aid, is expected to double the power supply in Muthanna Province, hopefully enhancing local governance.\textsuperscript{50}

Moreover, the fact that the SDF forces undertook operations in coordination with international organizations should provide lessons for their future activities. The experiences of working with the U.N. Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) in school repair work (at 65 schools at the time); and with the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) in projects to clean up roads and hospitals, and in water pipe repair projects should help the building of a network the next time around.\textsuperscript{51} This networking with international organizations and NGOs is likely to be passed on to the International Peacekeeping Cooperation Center (tentative).

Having said all that, operations of the GSDF were not without problems. While the strengthening of coordination was sought between ODA and the SDF’s operations, some problems did emerge such as that “the speed with which the SDF troops repaired a medical clinic did not coincide with the supply of ODA-financed goods.”\textsuperscript{52} In conducting IPCA in a systematic manner in the future, the SDF needs to identify the contents of its support in line with specific local needs before sending

\textsuperscript{49} According to Sato, “the GSDF initially considered a Cambodian approach in Iraq, in which its troops prepare drinking water and distribute it on their own.” However, at the suggestion of Katsuhiko Oku, the plan was modified for the SDF troops to provide support for the local waterworks department. Masahisa Sato, \textit{Iraku Jietai ‘Sentouki’} [‘Combat Record’ of the SDF in Iraq] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2007), p. 18.

\textsuperscript{50} “State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Seiko Hashimoto’s Attendance at a Ceremony to Deliver a Large-Scale Power Station in Samawah” (December 22, 2008), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website <http://www.mofa.go.jp/MOFAJ/press/release/h20/12/1185659_922.html>.

\textsuperscript{51} Sato, “Goran Kogen kara Iraku he [From the Golan Heights to Iraq],” p. 319.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 312.
its troops on support missions.\textsuperscript{53} Under provisions of the Iraq Special Measures Law, the SDF was unable to provide desks, chairs and textbooks, or goods not related to its repair services. Some SDF members recall that while people at Iraqi schools expected to receive high-tech equipment like personal computers and cell phones as assistance from Japan, an economic power, what the SDF troops brought with them were pencils and notebooks for schools in developing countries. If Japan is to seek a comparative advantage in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support activities, it may become necessary to consider the so-called regional strategies tailored for respective regions concerned.

4. Reappraisal of Japan’s Soft Power – Implications of Restrictive Military Operations in Long Wars

Whether the restrictive activities of the SDF in its IPCA would function as soft power depends on how other countries evaluate Japanese activities. In this paper, one that addresses the linkage between the alliances and stabilization operations, the important question is whether the United States, an ally, appreciates the SDF’s restrictive military operations.

A new trend is emerging in an era of long wars with prolonged stabilization operations: the military has to adopt an even more restrictive posture. In the transformation of U.S. forces after 9/11, “network-centric warfare,” to destroy enemies in decisive battles, was emphasized. The SDF’s IPCA are not expected at all to display these offensive capabilities and this will unlikely change in the future. However, the prolongation of stabilization operations is putting efforts to win the hearts and minds of peoples through reconstruction support in the spotlight, and in this respect, the SDF’s soft power is showing relative improvement.

What provides the clue to the examination of this point is the latest Counterinsurgency Field Manual \textsuperscript{54} of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, as revised in

\textsuperscript{53} For the dispatch of its troops to Iraq, the SDF invited a former defense attaché in Iraq and other lecturers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Middle East Institute of Japan and the Nippon Foundation for the preliminary education of its troops on cultures and religions in the Middle East and also prepared the handbook for similar purposes. Major General Koichi Isobe, “Kokusai Ninmu to Jietai – Koremade no Rebyu to Kongo no Kadai [Self-Defense Forces and Overseas Missions: Review of the Past Operations and Future Challenges],” Journal of International Security, June 2008, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 28.

2006. The Field Manual that incorporates the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan introduces a number of examples of the “paradoxes of counterinsurgency.” The scrutiny of these paradoxes is likely to lead to the reappraisal of the SDF’s activities in its peace operations. General David Petraeus of the U.S. Army led the work to revise the Field Manual. General Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) overseeing the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, was responsible for SSR in Iraq, and later made himself the architect of the “surge” strategy both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The common thread through the paradoxes of counterinsurgency is the advocacy of the restrictive use of military power. This section summarizes five of the paradoxes cited in the Field Manual and considers their implications for Japan. The first and most shocking paradox of all is that “Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents [the U.S.] do not shoot.” This indicates a 180-degree about-face in the U.S. approach to counterinsurgency considering that the United States sought decisive battles to overthrow the enemy regimes both in Afghanistan and Iraq. The second is that “money is ammunition.” Once security is restored, “dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets.” In other words, coordination between reconstruction and restoration of security determines the success and failure of an operation. The third is that “Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.” Support from the people is indispensable for the suppression of insurgents. “If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people,” reinforcing fears on the part of the people with the end result of insurgents snatching the initiative away from stabilization forces. The fourth is that “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.” The use of force in a major way could provide insurgents with a good opportunity for their propaganda. Lastly, the fifth paradox is that “Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.” Terrorist acts and guerrilla operations by insurgents are often aimed at provoking excessive responses from counterinsurgents. Opening fire on a crowd and executing a clearing operation on the part of counterinsurgents may create more enemies.

The five paradoxes described above are common in advocating restraint in the use of weapons. The reason behind the call for restrained responses is that the success and failure of counterinsurgency operations depend on whether the hearts and minds of the people can be won to the side of counterinsurgency. A local government,

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aware of the blurred line between insurgents and the ordinary people, tends to withhold clearing operations. In other words, the use of weapons must be restrictive in order to “win the hearts and minds of the people” as well. Instead, operations of the military must be “protected by the bodyguard of information.” It goes without saying that the support from local residents is essential for the successful gathering of this information.

The paradoxes presented in this Counterinsurgency Field Manual exactly describe the very restrictive stance of the SDF in its IPCA. It is possible to construe that the SDF’s stance of not firing a shot and causing not a single casualty is performing a certain “function” in the form of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support operations. According to Colonel Masahisa Sato, the commander of the first Iraqi contingent, the SDF provided the troops “‘escalation control’ training so as not to create a situation where gunshots are fired as much as possible.”\(^5^6\) This will indicate that the SDF troops were under self-discipline so that the existence of the SDF in Iraq should not lead to any deterioration in the country’s security situation. As Yuji Uesugi points out, the process of working out “techniques not to shoot and not to be shot” and creating a “sea of confidence and safety” can be said to present useful lessons for other countries as well.\(^5^7\)

5. Limitations on Japan’s Soft Power

This paper has mainly looked at Japan’s growing soft power in the “long wars,” but on the other hand, Japan’s soft power has its own structural limits. In this section, this issue will be examined from three aspects: the perception of ordinary Americans, Japan’s reliance on stabilization operations of other countries, and the lack of Japanese initiatives in SSR.

One of the limitations of Japan’s soft power is that Americans have rated Japan’s military strength very low from the beginning. According to the results of an opinion poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in the autumn of 2008, factors Americans view as “very important” in “Japan’s influence” in the world

\(^5^6\) Sato, *Iraku Jietai ‘Sentouki’* ['Combat Record’ of the SDF in Iraq] p. 216

today are technology and innovation (65%); economic power (49%); leadership in Asia (39%); a democratic system (36%); economic assistance to other countries (31%); and military strength (17%).

The poll of American views of Japan produced rather ironic results in that Americans want to see more *hard* power from Japan’s military strength. In replying to the poll’s question asking them whether they “favor or oppose Japan being able to do the following military activities under a *changed* Japanese Constitution (emphasis by the author),” the support is quite high at 84% for “participate in international peace-keeping missions” (with 13% not in favor). The support is also high for both “undertake independent combat missions consistent with international law, just like any other country” with 69% (28% not in favor) and for “participate in international combat missions in places like Iraq” with 67% (30% not in favor). In sum, the poll shows the ironic results that while Americans regard the influence of Japan’s military strength at present as minor, they have high expectations for Japan’s participation in combat missions under a changed Constitution.

The second limitation on Japan’s soft power lies in that Japan’s activities depend heavily on stabilization operations and peace-building endeavors by other countries. Since the SDF can deploy its troops only in low-intensity non-combat zones, Japan’s peace operations are premised on securing safety in areas surrounding the area of its operations. On the other hand, since the SDF troops are not charged with the task of protecting the troops of other countries, they find themselves in a situation where they depend on other countries for their safety but cannot provide the safety for the troops of other countries. As Colonel Sato recalls in his memoirs, the SDF troops are put in a situation where “for example, suppose both the Dutch troops and the SDF troops are attacked by unidentified adversaries while operating in nearby areas. The SDF troops naturally fight back to protect themselves. However, when the adversaries target only the Dutch troops in their attack, the SDF troops cannot use their weapons and can only standby idly doing nothing.”

As the third limitation on Japan’s soft power, Japan’s activities face constraints in SSR, including military and police reform, which is an important component of

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the peace-building process. In facilitating the peace-building process, there is no question as to the need for reform of the security sector, including a country’s army and police. Here, the comparison is made again between the Dutch troops and the SDF troops, both deployed in Samawah. The Dutch troops, after taking over the task of maintaining security in Samawah, conducted small quick-impact projects such as water pipe repairs, then took on medium-scale projects involving infrastructure development, and after the withdrawal of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in June 2004, increased reconstruction support projects conducive to the development of security institutions. The starkest contrast with Japan is the Dutch effort in the area of SSR. In 2004 alone, instructors from the Dutch troops trained some 2,800 people as the necessary personnel for Iraqi security institutions. Subsequently, in March 2005, Iraq took over the task of maintaining security in their respective areas and support for the multinational forces, allowing the Dutch troops to withdraw from Muthanna Province in March 2005. The Dutch government continued its support for SSR in Iraq by sending instructors to NATO’s Training Mission – Iraq.61

In contrast, the SDF is not allowed to take charge of SSR under the current law. Thus, Japan’s contribution is geared toward civilian assistance in SSR as well. At a meeting of the SSR Working Group for Afghanistan, Japan became a leading nation, together with the United Nations, in “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants,” but the actual work was coordinated by civilians in the DDR unit of the Japanese embassy in Kabul.62 In the case of Iraq, the GSDF, when it withdrew from Samawah, delivered a note on the handover of its Samawah camp to the 10th division of the Iraqi Army, but this hardly represents SSR. The 10th GSDF Contingent left behind only tents, housing units, bulletproof containers, television sets, refrigerators, beds, blankets and other fixtures as well as cafeteria facilities, air conditioners, generators and commercial off-the-shelf water supply systems; the GSDF could not leave behind “anything that could pose security issues such as weapons, communication equipment and vehicles, under Japan’s three principles for arms exports.”63

62 For details, see Kenji Isezaki, Buso Kaijyo: Hunsoya gamita Sekai [Disarmament: the World Seen by a Dispute Mediator] (Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, 2004.)
As described above, the Dutch troops and the SDF troops undertook humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support operations in Samawah, where the security situation was relatively favorable. The primary missions of the Dutch troops were the maintenance of security and SSR in Samawah, and after security was restored in the province of Muthanna, the Dutch troops took on SSR for the whole of Iraq together with other NATO members. From the perspective of peace-building, a lesson may be drawn from the Dutch posture on SSR while also undertaking humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support operations.

Conclusions

Amid the prolongation of stabilization operations by multinational forces, Japan has come to be expected to take more proactive roles in the peace-building process. Japan has adopted an approach in which it contributes to humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support operations in rather unique ways, while not participating directly in stabilization operations. The SDF’s activities in Iraq under the Iraq Special Measures Law were limited to “non-combat zones” in order to avoid the possibility of their activities of ittai[1](inseparable from the use of force) by the multinational force. Thus, the restrictive activities of the SDF in IPCA can be said to have come to constitute a form of Japan’s soft power.

The advent of an era of “long wars” may turn this unique approach by the SDF into the strength of Japan, as the military has come under greater pressure for more restricted operations amid the prolongation of stabilization operations. This paradox of military operations is reflected already in the US Army and Marine Corps’ Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The lesson cited by the Manual that “Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot” precisely characterizes the posture of the SDF in conducting its international peace operations. The U.S. forces’ review of stabilization operations may lead to a reappraisal of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support operations by the SDF. The approach to “civilian surge,” presented in a recent report of the U.S. National Defense University, suggests that possibility.

Japan’s exercise of its soft power, however, heavily depends upon stabilization operations and peace-building efforts conducted by other countries. Japan’s

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international peace operations are premised on securing safety in areas surrounding the area of its operations. In addition, the Japanese approach to SSR, an essential component of the peace-building process, is rather restrictive and, up to now, has been handled by civilians. In summary, purely military solutions to conflicts are no longer feasible; however, the military will remain the sine qua non in peace-building.