

The Role of the Self Defense Forces in Peace Building: Changes in Policy and the Arguments that Informed Them

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Introduction: the Gulf War as a turning point

The Japanese government provided approximately \$13 billion in funding for the Gulf Crisis and Gulf War which shook the world from 1990 to 1991. This comes to almost 20% of the total financial burden of the United States and her allies making Japan the third largest financial contributor after Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.¹ However, this contribution by Japan was untimely and given out incrementally, for which it was judged as “too little too late”, and as it did not coincide with a contribution in personnel, such as troop deployments, it did not receive the approval of international society.² In March of 1991, the Kuwaiti government purchased space in major US domestic news outlets such as the Washington Post and the New York Times to express gratitude to the nations which had made an effort toward the liberation of Kuwait, but Japan was not included in the list of contributing nations. Comparing the situation to the management of a supermarket, one American friend said, “Someone who simply writes checks in the office while the rest of us are working hard in the store cannot be called a partner.” Thus, “checkbook diplomacy” was rendered ineffective.

This was the moment when the Japanese diplomats and defense planners first began to seriously consider using defense forces for international peace maintenance and peace building. Immediately following the end of the Gulf War, the Japanese government made the decision to deploy minesweepers in the Persian Gulf for post-war reconstruction. Subsequently, the Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations which stipulates participation by the Self-Defense Forces in United Nations peace keeping operations (UN PKO) was approved by the Diet in 1992, and the Act on Dispatchment of the

¹ According to a US Department of Defense report, approximately \$54 billion (88%) of the total outlay of the US during the Gulf Crisis and Gulf War of \$61 billion was covered by the international community, and Japan contributed \$11.2 billion.

² In November of 1990, the Diet failed to adopt the “Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations” submitted by Prime Minister Kaifu. This proposed law aimed to allow participation in United Nations activities for peace such as United Nations peace keeping operations (PKO) or UN-approved coalition activities.

Japan Disaster Relief Team was revised to include the participation by the Self-Defense Forces. Since then, the SDF has participated in UN PKO and international disaster relief activities in Cambodia (1992-93), Mozambique (1992-95), the Golan Heights (1996-present), Honduras (1998), and East Timor (2002-2004). Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the SDF was deployed to the Indian Ocean and Kuwait, and participated in peace building activities in Iraq and Afghanistan through legislative acts such as the so called Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.

Simply by following the trail of SDF participation in such international activities, it becomes obvious that Japan's defense policy has undergone major changes in the past several years. This paper will follow the process by which the positioning of international peace cooperation activities has changed in Japan's defense policy, and give a broad overview of Japan's policy for peace maintenance and peace building, summing up the arguments at each point during that process.

1. Initial controversy regarding SDF deployment in peace maintenance and building activities

(1) Background to the post gulf war policy changes

While Japan's defense policy underwent major changes in the years following the Gulf War, the impetus for this was that the strategic environment surrounding Japan underwent major changes as a result of the end of the Cold War. This point becomes clear in the deliberation process for "The National Defense Program Outline for FY1996 and Beyond" (hereinafter "NDPO1995") which was drawn up in November of 1995 (Heisei 7). With the preparation of the NDPO1995 in mind, Prime Minister Hosokawa established a commission comprised of important persons from academia, finance and the bureaucracy in February 1994, and requested a statement on security policy optimized for the post-Cold War strategic environment. The report prepared by the defense issues commission in August 1994, entitled "The Modality of Security and Defense Capability of Japan" (hereinafter referred to as the Higuchi Report) evaluated the role served by Japan's defensive power during the Cold War in the following way.

"The defense capability of Japan in the Cold War period was built up and maintained for the primary purpose of preparing for the attacks on Japanese territory by hostile forces," and "Japan's mission was to defend the country

based strictly on the right of self defense. In light of its geographic position, however, Japan naturally played an important role in the anti-Soviet strategy of the Western bloc.”³

Whereas NATO formed a European front against the massive land forces of the Eastern powers, Japan was face to face with the far-eastern military district of the Soviet army across a border formed by the sea. Because the Soviet Pacific fleet had to pass through the Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits to reach the East China Sea or the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Japan from its base in Vladivostok, the protection of the Japanese mainland, which controlled these important straits, was an important contribution to the western alliance. However, following the end of the Cold War, Japan’s contribution to the western administrations through its defense posture became decisively unimportant. This is because the geographical importance of Japan dropped significantly due to the elimination of the need for an anti-Soviet strategy. If that is the case, then it is necessary for Japan, as a nation which boasts one of the largest economies in the world and enjoys the many benefits of international peace and prosperity, to search for a new path through which to contribute to the international community.

However, there is one factor that cannot be ignored when considering Japan’s national security, and that is that Japan has a fundamental weakness. Because the Japanese economy achieved considerable growth from the 1950s to the 1980s, urbanization was intensified and the population and the industrial base grew dense. Because the domestic transportation infrastructure is not only highly concentrated but extremely complex, the social infrastructure of Japan is extremely vulnerable to natural or human-induced disaster. This can also be expressed from an international perspective. It is widely known that Japan is highly dependent on imported energy. As Japan’s economic activity has spread widely throughout the world, Japan has come to depend highly on product markets, nations that provide natural resources including energy and regional security. International peace and stability has become a seriously important factor for Japan. On the other hand, simply strengthening the Self-Defense Forces is not a contribution to the efforts of the international

³ Though the defense issues commission was convened by Prime Minister Hosokawa on February 28, 1994, it continued its deliberations after Prime Minister Hosokawa stepped down, and the commission delivered its report, “The Modality of Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century”, to Prime Minister Murayama on August 12th of the same year.

community. Professor Akihiko Tanaka of the University of Tokyo has said that, “while it is a bit paradoxical, there was no need for Japan to become aggressively involved in the world’s international conflicts during the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War has served to place the world at a distance, and this has become an issue for Japan’s security.”⁴

(2) Self restraint with regard to SDF participation in PKOs and other missions

The international peace cooperation activities were begun against this background, but the actual SDF deployments have been carried out with considerable restraint and prudence. For instance, the so-called primary tasks of the so-called international peace keeping force (oversight of disarmament, encampment and patrol activities) stipulated by the Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations of 1992 were put on hold for the time being. This hold was only lifted in December of 2001 as a result of the domestic and international understanding gained from the performance and experience built up during six overseas deployments over the previous nine years.

With regard to this prudent stance, the *Defense of Japan 1992* (annual white paper) organizes the discussions surrounding the establishment of the Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations and carefully explains its background. First, it was necessary to guarantee that, in the participation in the UN peace keeping operations, the SDF activities “were not the execution of armed force prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution or the deployment of troops overseas whose goal was the execution of armed force, or in other words, the equivalent of so-called overseas military troop deployments.”⁵ For this reason, meeting the so-called five PKO principles including a ceasefire agreement among the combatants and agreement of the parties involved in the conflict became a prerequisite for Japan’s participation.

Secondly, it was necessary to consider the sense of concern held by neighboring countries based on their experiences in World War II with regard to the deployment of the SDF and to gain their understanding. This came from the understanding that “high expectations have repeatedly been expressed by Cambodia, where

⁴ Akihiko Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō: Sengo 50nen no Mosaku [Security: Examining the 50 Years After the War]* (Tokyo: The Yomiuri Shinbun, 1997).

⁵ Japan Defense Agency, *Nihon no Boei [Defense of Japan 1992]* (National Printing Bureau, 1992) p. 159-160.

deployment is possible for the time being, regarding the cooperation of the SDF with UNTAC. However, some countries have shown a reaction such that they desire prudence in the overseas deployment of the SDF while at the same time expressing their understanding of our country's international contribution.”⁶ Further, it was necessary to ensure that it was possible for Japan to choose to cease activities or end the deployment whenever the SDF was placed under the command of the UN if, for example, the five PKO principles were no longer being met.⁷ That is to say that it was determined that prudent handling was required for the SDF to participate in UN peace keeping operations within the scope of the Constitution and with the understanding of neighboring countries.

2. Development of policy regarding international peace cooperation activities: The debate in the mid-1990s

(1) The position of international peace cooperation in the NDPO1995

With regard to the stance Japan should take for participation in international peace cooperation activities, the aforementioned Higuchi Report stated that “[Japan] should escape from the passive security role it has held until now and behave as an active creator of order.” For this reason, “it is essential that proactive participation in the various multilateral cooperation efforts carried out within the framework of the UN for international security should, to the extent possible, be seen as an important mission of the SDF,” and this “carries the meaning of providing international public resources for peace.”⁸ This understanding is also reflected in the NDOG1995. Alongside 1) the defense of our nation and 2) responding to various situations in major disasters and other contingencies the NDPO1995 recommended 3) the clear statement of contribution to the development of a more stable security environment as roles that should be played by the SDF. From that standpoint, the NDPO1995 further recommended the promotion of international peace cooperation activities, security dialog, and defense exchange, and proceeding with cooperation with the various activities related to the areas of arms control and arms reduction.⁹ The National

⁶ Ibid. p. 161.

⁷ Ibid. pp. 160-161.

⁸ Defense Issues Commission, *Nihon no Anzen Hoshō to Boeiryoku no Arikata* [*The Modality of Security and Defense Capability of Japan*], (August 1994, hereinafter referred to as the “Higuchi Report”) <<http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19940812.OIJ.html>>

⁹ “The National Defense Program Outline for FY1996 and beyond”.

Defense Program Outline laid out in 1976 during the Cold War (NDPO1976) focused exclusively on preventive measures against the invasion of Japan and reaction to invasion. Compared with this, the NDPO1995, which newly stipulated participation in international peace cooperation activities as a new role for defensive power, carries great importance. However, the NDPO1995 did not go so far as to approach the aggressive and proactive exercise of the role of being an “active creator of order” directly as a statement of policy.

(2) The Japan-US Alliance and international peace cooperation activities:
discussions for the reaffirmation of the alliance.

In the work carried out in the mid 1990s for the reaffirmation of the Japan-US alliance, which took place in parallel to the discussions surrounding the NDPO1995, the international cooperation activities carried out by the SDF and the US military became points of focus. In April 1994, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton announced the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century in Tokyo. The joint declaration holds three important meanings. First is the fact that the top leaders of both Japan and the US officially declared to both insiders and the general public that “the cooperation between Japan and the US in the area of security continues to be extremely important in the post-Cold War environment.” Secondly, Japan-US cooperation was organized into three areas including 1) cooperation between the two countries based on the Japan-US security relationship, 2) cooperation on the regional level, and 3) cooperation at a level extending across all regions, thus expanding Japan-US cooperation to have a wider focus. During the Cold War, the scope defined by the alliance relationship was narrow and the focus was exclusively on the contexts of the two countries, such as the US commitment to defend Japan and Japan’s cooperation in the stationing of US forces in Japan. Both leaders clarified that Japan and the US would further cooperate in both regional and global problems. Particularly, in addition to arms control and arms reduction activities, the international peace keeping activities covered in this paper, and humanitarian aid activities, were presented as areas for Japan-US cooperation with regard to global problems. Third, both leaders ordered their respective diplomatic and defense ministries to begin revision of The Guidelines for Japan - US Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”).

As a result, work to revise the Guidelines began in August 1996. The first Guidelines was the result of discussions that began under an agreement between

Minister of Defense Sakata and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and was approved by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in 1978.¹⁰ This document aimed for the smoother and more effective operations under the Japan-US security arrangements, and played a major role particularly in strengthening the conditions of cooperation in operational terms from the 1970s through the 1980s. However, it was undeniably designed to deal with the strategic environment of the Cold War, and revision of the 1978 Guidelines was a necessity in proceeding with adjustment of the post-Cold War strategy to handle the vastly altered strategic environment of both Japan and the US.¹¹ The new Guidelines was announced by the SCC in September 1997 after several case studies.

The new Guidelines seamlessly integrated the issues surrounding Japan-US defense cooperation in each level of the three primary sections which were 1) peacetime cooperation, 2) measures in the event of an attack on Japan, and 3) cooperation in case of regional contingencies. Particularly, regarding the international peace keeping and peace building activities that are the theme of this paper, cooperation and coordination between Japan and the US in the areas of peace keeping operations, humanitarian aid activities, and security negotiations were covered in Section 1) on peacetime cooperation.

3. International peace cooperation activities and the war on terrors

(1) Expansion of international peace cooperation activities after 9/11: Response based on the Special Measures Law.

The role of the SDF with regard to international missions further increased after the terrorist attacks which occurred in the US on September 11, 2001. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law proposed by the government on October 5th passed the Diet on the 29th and was promulgated on November 2nd. At the same time, a proposed revision to the SDF Law was also passed to allow protection of the areas surrounding US military installations in Japan under conditions where an order is not given for public security operations. The following is the purpose of the Anti-

¹⁰ The Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) was established in 1960. The members of the SCC at the time were the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense on the Japan side, and the Ambassador to Japan and the Commander of the United States Pacific Command on the US side. However, in 1990, the US membership was raised to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State.

¹¹ Akihiko Tanaka, *ibid.* pp. 382-384.

Terrorism Special Measures Law.

“Recalling that UN Security Council Resolution 1368 regards the September 11 terrorist attacks that took place in the US as a threat to international peace and security, and also noting that UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1269, 1333 and other relevant resolutions condemn acts of international terrorism, and calls on all member states to take appropriate measures for the prevention of such acts, the purpose of the Law is to specify the following measures in order to enable Japan to contribute actively and on its own initiative to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism, thereby ensuring the peace and security of the international community including Japan.

- (1) The measures Japan implements in support of the activities of the Armed Forces of the US... thereby contributing to the achievement of the purposes of the UN Charter.
- (2) The measures Japan implements with the humanitarian spirit based on relevant resolutions or requests made by the UN and others.¹²

Based on this law, the following were stipulated as activities to be carried out by Japan: 1) cooperation and support activities by the SDF including the provision of supplies; 2) search and rescue activities for personnel in distress; and 3) victim relief activities including the transportation of daily necessities, and medical and other humanitarian aid activities. The majority of these items are identical to the activity items for regional conditions stipulated in the aforementioned new Guidelines and are also the activities stipulated by the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan instituted in 1999 to secure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines. While the region of activity in the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was expanded to include the open seas and the territory of foreign nations (when the respective nation gave its permission), the preconditions regarding those regions were the same as in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. In other words, these regions met the conditions that combat

¹² The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law as cited in *Defense of Japan 2002*, p. 112.

engagements were not currently being carried out and that it was acknowledged that armed engagement would not be carried out during the period of the activities. Further, a limit was set such that the activities must not be equivalent to the threat of armed force or the execution of armed force. Based on this law, warships of the Maritime Self-Defense Force were deployed to Southwest Asia to begin operations with the goal of providing support to the military forces of other nations that were tasked with fighting terrorism and providing humanitarian aid.

The preconditions for SDF deployment and the specific activities expressed by the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law were thoroughly discussed during the processes of preparing the new Guidelines and the establishment of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. In other words, questions regarding interpretation of the Constitution and problems regarding alignment with existing policy had already been taken care of. It was thus also due in part to these conditions that the period of time from the presentation of the proposed law to its passage and establishment was shorter than previously seen. In the case of the Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations, it required approximately two years from the repeal of the previous United Nations Peace Cooperation Law in November 1990 to the enactment of the new law in August 1992. Further, the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan took approximately one year from its proposal in April 1998 to its enactment in May 1999, and approximately two years were required for the passage and establishment in November 2000 of the Ship Inspection Operation Law that was split off from it. In comparison, in the case of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the proposed law was presented on October 5th, 2001 and enacted shortly after on November 2nd. This point can also be made regarding the preparation process for the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq for the continuing reconstruction aid following the Iraq war. In fact, the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq was passed in July 2003, two months after the end of major military operations in Iraq was declared.¹³ It could be said that the template that was formed from the establishment process for the International Peace Cooperation Law, the Law on Situations in Surrounding

¹³ International News Center/Japan, "Diet Institutes Iraq Reconstruction Law; SDF to Deploy for Support", July, 29, 2003

Areas, and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was used in the establishment process of the Iraq Special Measures Law. Limits were set such that the activities must not consist of the threat of armed force or the execution of armed force, and the goals were set to be humanitarian reconstruction activities and support for the military forces of other nations involved in reconstruction or peace keeping and peace building, thus adhering to prior examples. On December 9, 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi announced a basic plan which, based on the law, stipulated the deployment of the SDF to the southern region of Iraq to carry out medical, water supply, facility reconstruction and repair missions.¹⁴

(2) Iraq humanitarian and reconstruction aid activities and the NDPG2004:
transformation to a “proactive” and “independent” policy.

The creation of policy for the SDF deployment to Iraq is clearly distinguished from that related to the UN PKO decision making that had taken place previously. The keywords in this case are “proactive” and “independent.” At the Japan-US top level meeting held at President George Bush’s home in Crawford, Texas on May 23, 2003, shortly after the cessation of major conflict in Iraq, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated, “We will make a proactive contribution. I want to consider the possibility of Japan doing something independently. I want to contribute in a way that is appropriate for Japan.”¹⁵ For the Prime Minister to express Japan’s independence here was a major breakthrough. In the international peace cooperation activities until then, it was typical for Japan to take a more passive stance in deciding to participate in response to strong demands from the international community representing the United Nations. As stated in the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report (chairman: Hiroshi Araki, advisor to Tokyo Electric Power Company, hereinafter referred to as the “Araki Report”) made public in October 2004, regarding this type of participation in peace building, “rather than a mission directly related to the security of Japan, it was common for it to be discussed as an ‘international contribution’, stated in terms that had a somewhat third person nuance.”

In the preparation of policy for humanitarian reconstruction aid to Iraq, a more

¹⁴ Announcement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the basic plan for the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance In Iraq. http://www.lkanteil/foreign/policy/2003/031209danwa_e/html.

¹⁵ Yomiuri Shinbun Shijibu, *Gaiko o kenka ni shita otoko: Koizumi gaiko2000-nichi no shinjitsu* [The Man Who Made a Fight Out of Diplomacy: the Reality of Koizumi’s Diplomacy] (Shinchosha, 2006), p. 168.

independent approach was required that differed from the previous UN peace keeping operations. In Cambodia and the Golan Heights, the UN created a solid framework and requested Japan to handle a portion of that function. Japan's participation was decided on the basis of complying with the request. In the case of Iraq, it was necessary for Japan to define all of the elements related to the SDF activities including the content, region, period and methods. In other words, a response was required precisely in line with Prime Minister Koizumi's statement to Bush, "I want to consider the possibility of Japan doing something independently."

Given these conditions, time and effort were required until the deployment could be decided to take into account the news from the region, the ability of the SDF, and the political and legal restrictions.¹⁶ In fact, many investigative missions were deployed to Iraq since the three secretaries-general Hiraku Yamasaki of the Liberal Democratic Party, Tetsuzou Fuyushiba of the New Komeito Party, and Toshihiro Nikai of the (then) New Conservative Party visited Umm Qasr in southern Iraq in May 2003 immediately after the cessation of combat. It may be suggested that the US military, which received the deployments of the repeated investigative teams, without any decision having been made about the deployment of the SDF, questioned whether "Japan is serious or not". The government investigative team which was headed by (then) Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kouhei Masuda was deployed from September to October. As a result of visiting Baghdad, Balad, Basra, Nassiriya, Samawah, and Mosul, viewing the security, communications and health conditions of each area, and hearing of the conditions from military and government representatives, they arrived at the conclusion that "the only area which is relatively secure and where the other armies are not engaged in reconstruction is Samawah."¹⁷ Following that and the further deployment of an SDF specialist investigative team in mid-November, the basic plan regarding humanitarian and reconstruction aid for Iraq was approved on December 9th, and the Defense Agency prepared a request for execution on December 18th. The personnel of the advance team for the Air Self-Defense Force unit left for Kuwait on December 26th, five months after the passing of the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction

¹⁶ It is said that part of the reason that some time was required for the decision making regarding the SDF deployment to Iraq was that there was the factor of the political timing of the election for the president of the Liberal Democratic Party in September of that year. For a full account see the previously mentioned Yomiuri Shinbun Shijibu, *The Man Who Made a Fight Out of Diplomacy*.

¹⁷ Yomiuri Shinbun Shijibu, *Gaiko o kenka ni shita otoko: Koizumi gaiko2000-nichi no shinjitsu [The Man Who Made a Fight Out of Diplomacy: the Reality of Koizumi's Diplomacy]* (Shinchosha, 2006), p. 174.

Assistance in Iraq on July 26th. Subsequently, the deployed units of the Ground Self-Defense Force carried out medical, water provision, and public facility reconstruction and maintenance operations; transportation of materials related to humanitarian aid and reconstruction; and support for the security activities of the other foreign nations in Iraq and Kuwait.¹⁸

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (NDPG2004) prepared in December 2004 reflected this experience and learning. NDPG2004 followed the direction of the declaration of the aforementioned Araki Report and defined international peace cooperation activities as activities which would be “carried out independently and proactively as a part of diplomacy.” This point is also clearly reflected in the review regarding the role of defensive power. Specifically, as the third role following 1) effective response to new threats and diverse situations and 2) preparation for full blown invasion, it presented 3) independent and proactive efforts for the improvement of the international security environment. Further, it stated the following, and clarified that Japan would actively get involved in establishing order in regions which were important to it.

In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan. Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges.¹⁹

Thus, following the experience from participation in international peace cooperation activities amassed since the 1990’s and the involvement in the international peace cooperation activities in Afghanistan and Iraq following the terrorist attacks in the US, the independent and proactive involvement in such activities finally became a central element of Japan’s security policy.

¹⁸ Japan Defense Agency, *Nihon no Boei [Defense of Japan 2004]*, (Gyosei, 2004) p. 190.

¹⁹ Japan Defense Agency, *The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and beyond*.

4. Peace building capability as the public property of the international community

(1) The SDF as public property held by Japan for the international community.

As made apparent by the conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, international cooperation in peace keeping and peace building activities is more important than ever. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the US Department of Defense in February 2006 stated that “the United States will not win the war on terrorism or achieve other crucial national security objectives discussed in this Report by military means alone” and further clarified that the cooperation of partners, beginning with the coalition member states, was essential. Particularly regarding the coalition states, it declares that “the United States, with concert with allies, will promote the aim of tailoring national military contributions to best employ the unique capabilities and characteristics of each ally.”²⁰ From the position of Japan, which is a coalition state, the question becomes what capabilities and characteristics should be used in that cooperation. A capability which is acknowledged as being individual and that should be put to use by the US, the only superpower, is most likely to be useful to other nations as well. Specifically, this refers to the useful public property of the international community.

As an example of the capability of the SDF, the search, warning and information capabilities of the AEGIS escort vessels used by the Maritime Self-Defense Force are useful at any time, and as such vessels are only possessed by a few nations including the US and Spain, they can be called important public property of the international community. This is clearly demonstrated by their performance in the Indian Ocean. The P-3 patrol squadron of the Maritime Self-Defense Force is of a scale not seen anywhere else in the world. The high expectations regarding these capabilities are clearly expressed in the fact that the contribution of Japan is strongly requested in the ongoing anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.

Further, Japan possesses helicopter capabilities not seen in other nation. For instance, there are approximately 800 heavy-lift CH-47 transport helicopters in the world. Subtracting the approximately 500 held by the US military, 60 of the remaining 300 are in the possession of the Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces. Thus Japan is effectively the second major heavy-lift helicopter nation in the world. Approximately 100 helicopters deployed from around the world were involved in

²⁰ US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: US DoD, 2006), pp. 92, 88.

the emergency transportation of patients and medical supplies in the mountainous areas of Pakistan as part of the emergency relief activities there for the earthquake of the fall of 2006. Six UH-1H utility helicopters were transported by air on Air Self-Defense Force C-130s from Japan and good use was made of their small size in providing detailed support. However, the only nations to deploy heavy-lift helicopters in the CH-47 class were the US, the UK, and Germany.²¹ It would be beneficial to utilize these large-sized helicopters that are not found in other countries in such situations in the future. There are other related areas in which the SDF has a relative advantage internationally. The medical support capability provided by outdoor medical equipment held by the Ground Self-Defense Force, and the search and rescue capabilities of the Air Self-Defense Force are just two examples.

(2) Situations in which the public property of the international community is needed. What sorts of capabilities can or should be, utilized as the public property of the international community in what sorts of situations must be considered. With regard to this question, suggestions may be found in the discussions revolving around the transformation of the Japan-US Alliance. The SCC clarified the mission, roles and capabilities that should be held by Japan and the US on October 29, 2005 in the bilateral document entitled the “US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” (hereinafter the “ATARA Report”).²² The ATARA Report was a bilateral document that laid out the important areas for future Japan-US cooperation into two categories which were “the defense of Japan (including responding to new threats and diverse situations) and responding to regional situations,” and “efforts for the improvement of the international security environment beginning with participation in international peace cooperation activities.” Further, the following fifteen items were presented as activities for which cooperation should be strengthened in those situations:

- 1) Air defense,
- 2) Ballistic missile defense,
- 3) Counter-proliferation operations such as PSI (a security framework regarding proliferation).

²¹ Masatoshi Muranishi, “Pakisutan Kokusai Kinkyu Koku Enjyotai ni Sankashite [Regarding Participation in the Pakistan International Emergency Aerial Rescue Squadron],” *Likujo Koku [Ground and Air]*, No. 209, p. 25-34. (Ground and Air Committee, April 2006).

²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Agency, *Nichibei Domei: Mirai no tame no Henkaku to Saihen [US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future]* (October 29, 2005).

- 4) Counter-terrorism.
- 5) Maritime activities including minesweeping and maritime interdiction.
- 6) Search and rescue operations.
- 7) Intelligence, surveillance and warning.
- 8) Humanitarian relief operations.
- 9) Reconstruction assistance operations.
- 10) PKO and support for the development of the PKO capability of other nations.
- 11) Protection of infrastructure including US military facilities,
- 12) Disposal and decontamination of weapons of mass destruction.
- 13) Mutual logistical support activities including supply and transportation.
- 14) Provision of facilities, and
- 15) Cooperation in the rescue of non-combatants.

The fifteen areas of cooperation for these situations are the result of discussions between Japan and the US regarding missions, roles and capabilities. From the standpoint of activities possible under Japan's policy, such areas of cooperation are desirable, and further can be seen as areas in which Japan's capabilities supplement the US. Further, it has already been noted that if these capabilities are useful to the US with its own immense capabilities, then they are also useful for international society. Among the fifteen items, those underlined are classified under humanitarian aid, paramilitary or non-military cooperation in anti-terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These are the areas emphasized by NDPG2004 as "independent and proactive efforts for the improvement of the international security environment." To put it another way, they are also connected to the realm of peace building, the topic of this paper.

(3) A framework to utilize the SDF as international public goods.

The environment necessary to independently and proactively engage in international peace cooperation activities is close to being realized. In July 2007, previously secondary importance international missions became primary missions with the change from the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense. The framework to allow the SDF forces to respond to international missions more swiftly and effectively has also been prepared. For instance, in March 2007, the Ground Self-Defense Force established the new Central Readiness Force for central management of units with

quick response capabilities such as helicopter squadrons and airborne units. With the Central Readiness Force Regiment assigned to the force, its mission is to provide first response to international missions and to command all Ground Self-Defense Force units deployed abroad. The International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit is also assigned to the force with the mission to carry out training and education in peacetime for personnel who must serve as the cadres for international peace cooperation activities; to support training carried out by each unit; and to research and compile the experience gained from international peace cooperation activities, and put it to use in training and education.²³

Framework transformation to enable more organic management of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces has also proceeded. On March 27, 2006, the Joint Staff Office was re-organized to reinforce the old Joint Staff Office as a secretariat of the Joint Staff Council, and the post of Chief of Joint Staff, was established to replace the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council. Previously, orders from the Defense Minister regarding the operation of each Self-Defense Force were passed through their respective service Chiefs. Under the new structure, the Chief of Joint Staff plans a unified operational framework for the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, directions from the Minister regarding operation of the SDF are passed through the Joint Chief of Staff, and the Chief gives the orders regarding the operation of the SDF. Behind this change was the understanding that “as activities outside the country for the SDF are on the increase, as in international peace cooperation operations, anti terrorism support activities, etc., operations are required that meet the specific needs of the situation based on a flexible combination of the capabilities of each Self Defense Force.”²⁴

Under NDPG2004, equipment improvements are also being made. The report stipulates the “preparation of equipment required for international peace cooperation activities such as transport aircraft, helicopters and light armored vehicles,” and further to “establish a new airborne refueling and transport unit, and to procure the next generation transport aircraft (C-X) with transport and flight capabilities which exceed the existing transport aircraft (C-1) in order to appropriately engage in international peace cooperation activities.”²⁵

²³ Japan Defense Agency, *Nihon no Boei [Defense of Japan 2005]* (Gyosei, 2005) p. 101.

²⁴ Joint Staff Council, *Togo Unyo ni Kansuru Kento Seika Hokokusho [Report on the Study of Joint Operations]* (Defense Agency, December 19, 2002), p. 3. <<http://www.jda.go.jp/join/folder/seikahoukoku/cyou-houkoku.pdf>>

²⁵ Japan Defense Agency, *Nihon no Boei [Defense of Japan 2005]* (Gyosei, 2005) p. 104, 113.

In this way, the framework for the SDF to engage in international peace cooperation activities is steadily being prepared. However, the international peace cooperation activities carried out by the SDF and the associated capabilities for those activities are only one part of the means to the greater end. Effectiveness is only achieved when the government and non-governmental bodies in Japan, the militaries of each nation beginning with those of the US, and the governments and non-governmental bodies of other nations function together organically. Wide-ranging discussions are taking place regarding cooperation that dissolves borders between the various ministries, the public and private sector, and the world's states. Further, the point of what Japan wishes to achieve through these measures depends on the intent of the nation and of the citizens. There needs to be a national discussion amongst the citizens on a vision of how Japan should engage in the area of peace building.

In closing, “the chain reaction of safety and reconstruction (security and affluence)” is the key to peace building. The actions being carried out now in Iraq and Afghanistan by the international community are perfect examples of post-conflict peace building, and they are stabilization operations, as stated in terms of military operations categories. It is a fight against asymmetric opponents including insurgents, terrorists and guerrilla forces. Such operations are influenced by many factors not found in operations in which the opponent is a conventional military force. Of course, the goal of the operations carried out by the SDF in Iraq was humanitarian reconstruction aid and not direct conflict with terrorists. However, the operations for the recovery and maintenance of peace carried out by the forces of many nations beginning with the US and the operations which had humanitarian reconstruction aid as their goal both affect each other and the characteristics are such that the results should be accumulated. If safety is achieved through the recovery of peace then reconstruction projects become easier and reconstruction is fostered. If the reconstruction of Iraq proceeds and employment is created, then the desire for stability among Iraqi citizens who regain affluence as a result of such actions will increase. Thus a framework will develop where the terrorists who jeopardize stability will be eradicated by the Iraqi citizens themselves. Reconstruction work on a greater scale will be possible in a peaceful society born in this way creating a positive spiral chain reaction between safety and affluence.

In expanding the positive spiral between safety and affluence, it is extremely important for the various organizations related to the military, government and citizenry to cooperate while fulfilling their respective roles. In Afghanistan, the

various nations comprised primarily of the nations of NATO have compiled these functions into the PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) where the military handles security, and government and non-governmental bodies handle infrastructure maintenance and industrial reconstruction to work toward peace building in each region. In comparison, the activities carried out by Japan in Samawah can be called a template for the PRT. The Samawah office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established in the SDF camp in Samawah, and diplomats in charge of ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) participated in reconstruction aid work together with SDF personnel. The ODA and SDF activities can be called the “two wheels of the cart.” For instance, after medical equipment was provided to hospitals in four locations in the Al Muthanna Governorate through ODA, SDF personnel were assigned to these hospitals to provide training and advice on the use of the provided equipment as well as on diagnosis and treatment. Further, there is a case where water tanker trucks provided to the waterworks department of the Al Muthanna Governorate through ODA distributed water obtained and purified by the SDF from canals.²⁶ However, if reconstruction work proceeds and more stable conditions are achieved, larger scale ODA activities and private sector activities can be started, and the role of the SDF will become relatively smaller. Colonel Bansho, commander of the first Reconstruction Assistance Group, made the following comment regarding this point at the symposium held by the Center for Global Partnership, Japan Foundation, in July 2005.

Currently, though the SDF is active in Iraq for numerous reasons, I believe that at a certain stage, the time will come sooner rather than later when we will pass our activities on to the personnel centered around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, those involved with ODA, personnel of NGOs and NPOs, people in the public sector, and of course government and other organizations. We will do our best until that time, until we are given orders, and fulfill the mission to the best of our abilities.²⁷

What must be considered here is that the growth of industry is essential for the expansion of the positive spiral between safety and affluence. Japan announced that it

²⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's Assistance for the Reconstruction of IRAQ*, (Foreign Ministry Pamphlet, November 2004). <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/pr/pub/pamph/iraq_fs.html>

²⁷ *Report*, The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, p. 19.

plans to provide a total of \$5 billion in aid to Iraq. From that amount, all \$1.5 billion of grant aid has been approved and aid has been provided in the areas of electricity, water and medicine, peace and security, and education. The aim of this aid is to rebuild the social infrastructure of the Iraqi people, and improve peace and security conditions. While the aid aims to provide basic services to the Iraqi people, it leads directly to the reconstruction of industry which is essential for further development. Further, regarding the issue of the creation of employment, this has been limited to employment for so-called public works related to infrastructure maintenance. The initial humanitarian and reconstruction aid activities, including those by the SDF, simply provided the impetus for a positive spiral between safety and abundance, and it is thus important that they are expanded. The Japanese government has already reached agreement on this point regarding specific projects in excess of \$2 billion from a total in yen loans of \$3.5 billion after continued adjustment with the Iraqi government for the areas of transportation, energy, and industrial plants. It is extremely important to ensure that the positive spiral between safety and affluence is more definite by ensuring that such economic cooperation is really effective; in other words, to make sure that it will yield benefits for the Iraqi people.

This point is even clearer in peace construction in Afghanistan. That is to say, in order to make Afghanistan a stable nation and prevent it from becoming a hotbed for terrorism, an alternative to the cultivation of opium poppies in the south and west where the Taliban's influence is strong must be found. This is because the sale of narcotics is the source of funding for terrorist organizations. Further, even if it is unrelated to thought and creed, it is preferable for groups selling narcotics that social order be in disarray. The tribal leaders who control the countryside also do not wish for the social order to be controlled by the military or police in order to prevent the strengthening of the influence of the central government. Thus groups with different motivations are operating with a desire for unrest in the security and legal orders.

A system to develop an alternative to opium poppy cultivation that is highly profitable, such as the cultivation and processing of agricultural products, is essential in order to overcome these conditions. Previously in Myanmar, marijuana production was replaced with buckwheat, and today buckwheat *shochu* is produced as a secondary product. Several possibilities have also been suggested for Afghanistan. For instance, it has been reported that, based on the fact that Afghanistan is one of the main production areas in the world for pomegranates, business to sell soap using the essential oil of the pomegranate has been successful. Other candidates

include alpine flora such as lavender and saffron. What is important here is that it is meaningless to simply come up with an alternative crop. It is necessary to adopt not only the agricultural technology required for cultivation but also the processing technology required to produce highly profitable products. For this reason, plant construction is also required. Further transportation routes must be secured domestically in Afghanistan and to the export destinations such as Europe, Asia and America, and distribution networks must be developed in these areas at the same time. Of course the creation of a security situation in which such business can be carried out is a prerequisite for these goals, but security must not be the only goal. A grand design is required to set off a chain reaction from safety to reconstruction and then to prosperity.

This can be examined from the standpoint of military power. There are many things which cannot be done in peace building without military power. This includes post-conflict restoration of security and initial reconstruction work such as the construction of roads in areas where infrastructure is inadequate. However, with the success of activities based on military power, the military's role becomes smaller. In other words, activities based on military power can be considered successful when the military is no longer required. Further, such conditions cannot be created with military power alone. At this point, as the SDF experienced in Iraq, the positive spiral between security and reconstruction is already essential. Additionally, the activities of public and private sector organizations become more important as the role of military power diminishes. This is because a positive spiral must be put into place between safety and prosperity. A road map which enables such a chain reaction must be drawn up when making a decision regarding the participation of the military in peace building activities.