

## **Session I-1**

### Global Strategy of the United States

#### Continuity and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy

Michael E. Brown

U.S. security policy will probably exhibit much more continuity than change during the second term of the presidency of George W. Bush. First, contrary to what many have argued, President Bush is his administration's principal policymaker, and Bush—guided by a combination of personal and strategic convictions—is not disposed to change policy directions or even acknowledge policy mistakes. His security policy advisors will be more like-minded and close-knit than ever in his second term. Second, U.S. security policy will continue to be preoccupied by the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither country is likely to be fully stabilized in the first half of the Bush administration's second term. U.S. military forces will continue to be stretched, which in turn will limit U.S. capabilities to take large-scale military actions elsewhere. Finally, both President Bush and his senior advisors have a deep commitment to two strategic objectives: winning the war on terrorism and promoting democracy in the Middle East and the broader Muslim world. This will also reinforce continuity in U.S. security policy.

That said, strategic surprises could generate new policy priorities. Strategic surprises could take the form of regional developments: major setbacks in Afghanistan or Iraq, the collapse of friendly governments in countries such as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, political change in adversaries such as Iran or North Korea, instability in major powers such as Russia or China, regional conflict in South Asia, or, on a more positive note, progress in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Strategic surprises could also take the form of economic surprises, such as disruptions in international energy or financial markets. These and other unforeseen developments could obligate the Bush administration to move in new policy directions.

In the longer term, the United States needs to develop a more multi-faceted and ambitious security policy—a truly grand strategy for the promotion of national and international security. To fight the war on terrorism more effectively, the United States needs to place less emphasis on military actions and more emphasis on economic and political programs that will weaken the appeal of terrorist ideologies and organizations. To promote democracy more effectively, the United States needs to place less emphasis on rushed elections and more emphasis on the development of the strong political institutions and robust civil societies that are the foundations of durable democracies. Finally, the United

States needs to recognize that its extraordinarily powerful position in world affairs presents both dangers and opportunities. If the United States comes to be seen by others as a loose cannon—a powerful state guided by unilateralism—then other powers will be more likely to band together and balance against it. This would have adverse consequences for one and all. To advance its own national interests more effectively and to promote a more benign world order, the United States needs to make constructive engagement with other powers a top strategic priority.

## **Session I-2**

### Global Strategy of the United States

#### Challenges for the Second Term of the Bush Administration: A View from Russia

Alexander A. Pikayev

The first Bush administration has started a dramatic reconsideration of U.S. foreign and security policy—both vertically and horizontally. It has made an accent on fighting new security threats emerging in the 21<sup>st</sup> century environment. Geographically, the United States' security interests were moved from Europe and, to an extent, the Western Pacific to the Greater Middle East. At the same time, the administration has so far failed to respond adequately on three other major challenges to U.S. foreign policy: widening of the Atlantic ocean, eroding of the U.S. security umbrellas in East Asia, and finding the right balance between multilateralism, international institutions, and regimes on the one hand, and ad hoc coalitions and unilateralism on the other. Moreover, several moves of the U.S. during the last four years, like the war in Iraq, obstruction of certain important multilateral negotiations and regimes, lack of a coherent policy towards certain crises, including the North Korean issue, has led to further aggravation of these three problems.

The second Bush administration has not been formed yet, and nominations for some vacant positions have not been made. The possibility cannot be ruled out that due to the momentum of a convincing electoral victory the administration will be more homogenous compared to the first one. However, although it might have a wider field for maneuvering domestically, its international environment remains complicated. Excessive commitment to Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, without any safe and reliable exit strategy would significantly limit the tools available for attaining foreign policy goals, as well as possibly leading to insufficient attention to other pressing needs, including the North Korean nuclear issue. In the mid-term, this could further strengthen the challenges faced by the United States, especially in East Asia and vis-à-vis various international institutions and regimes.

Russia's leaders did not make a secret of their support for the Republicans prior to the 2004 U.S. elections. Primarily it was explained by their interest in continuing cooperation with Washington in a context of the War on Terror, which was not a top priority of the Democrats' election campaign. Moscow was also likely concerned by more active criticism by a future Democratic administration of Russia's policy in Chechnya, towards other democratic freedoms, and in the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, expected redeployment of U.S. forces in Europe, including closer to the Russian border, and perceived increasing

competition between Russia and the West in the post-Soviet space might lead to deteriorating U.S.-Russian relations. One of the consequences of this would be a new round of Sino-Russian rapprochement, with its impact on Asian security, including East Asia. In combination with possible erosion of the U.S.-led system of alliances in the region this could be especially worrisome.

## **Session II-1**

### U.S. Policy toward East Asia

#### U.S. Policy toward Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea

In-Taek Hyun

U.S.-ROK relations have been undergoing a profound change during the last several years, facing major challenges including the North Korean nuclear issue, U.S. post-9/11 strategic priorities and the realignment of U.S. forces in Korea, as well as new domestic political situation in South Korea and changing North-South relations. The inauguration of President Bush in his second term would open a new era for American foreign policy, entailing serious political, military, and economic implications for the Northeast Asian region in general, and the Korean peninsula in particular.

In this presentation, I will first talk about the current situation of the North Korean nuclear issue. In doing this, I will examine very briefly both the U.S. and ROK policies toward North Korea, focusing on their differences and similarities for the last four years. I will also describe North Korea's dilemma for the next Six-Party Talks. In this part, I will also focus on some specific questions on the issue that both the United States and South Korea have to deal with carefully.

Second, regarding the changing U.S.-ROK alliance, South Korea's domestic development and its implications for U.S.-ROK relations will be examined. The terrorist attack of September 11 became the major turning point for the fundamental reassessment of U.S. strategic priorities since the advent of the post-Cold War era. The strategic transformation can not be defined merely as a conceptual change of military strategy. It is more comprehensive, including transforming the U.S. global defense posture review (GPR). The U.S.-ROK alliance has been one of the major targets of changing strategic priorities of the United States. I will explain the rearrangement of the U.S.-ROK alliance. I will also carefully examine the asymmetrical transformation of alliance between the U.S.-ROK and the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Third, regional dynamics, in particular how China factors in terms of the North Korean nuclear issue and the U.S. policy toward it, will be analyzed. In terms of relative power, whether China is a rising challenger or not in the post-Cold War international system is an issue of heated debate among international relations theorists. China has two different faces: as a peace-maker and as a peace-breaker. China has played a crucial role as an honest broker on the North Korean nuclear issue. However, at the same time, it has an image as a bully on

the China-Taiwan crisis. Even on the North Korean nuclear issue, questions are raised on China's role, which I will discuss.

Finally, I will examine what should and will be South Korea's strategic choices from the short and long-term perspectives. In doing this, I will talk about South Korea's "Neo-Bismarckian Strategy," the desirability of its nuclear-free state, and the future role played by South Korea for the U.S.-ROK alliance.

## Session II-2

### U.S. Policy toward East Asia

#### Japan-U.S. Security Relations under the Koizumi Administration: Implications for Bush's Second Term

Heigo Sato

The Japan-U.S. security relationship has widened its scope and depth after 9/11. The dispatch of the SDF for the OEF (Afghan operation) and Iraqi humanitarian reconstruction missions has symbolically marked an end to Japan's passive security policy. It paved the way for a more proactive security strategy from Japan. For the first time after World War II, Japan sent the SDF abroad under its own discretion, which was unprecedented under the "peace constitution." Changes in the security environment, the rise of a new generation, and proactive politicians like Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi have made this new arrangement possible.

The 9/11 incident and the war on terror changed the Japan-U.S. alliance to a truly global partnership. As Tokyo and Washington were reaffirmed as "unshakable partner," in September 2001, just days before the 11<sup>th</sup>, the war on terror provided a chance to prove the common will of the policy leaders. Prime Minister Koizumi stood firm with the United States and called for active contributions to the global effort led by the United States. Prime Minister Koizumi repeatedly emphasized the need to promote a spirit of international cooperation outlined in the preface to the constitution and the need to conduct a proactive and subjective contribution to the welfare of the international community. Indeed, the management was made possible when the following conditions were met: the U.S. security commitment to Japan, the shared interest on international security issues and common policy measures in dealing with them, Japan's decision to activate the SDF for global security issues, and U.S. support. The Bush administration understands these conditions needed for Japan's proactive security commitments.

Given the fact that the second Bush administration's continuation of the "coalition of the willing" approach, Japan and the U.S. need to reaffirm its validity in light of global norms. Therefore, the next step for bilateral security relations would be to enhance the institutionalization of the security cooperation mechanism.

## **Session III-1**

### The United States and the War against Terrorism

#### The United States, Asia, and the War against Maritime-related Terrorism

Michael Richardson

Al-Qaeda's use of hijacked civilian airlines as cruise missiles to strike New York and Washington in September 2001 fundamentally changed the way security is approached in the transport sector. It exposed a whole new degree of vulnerability in the global transport system.

Following the attacks, the United States closed its air space for four days and its ports for two days. Some U.S. officials fear that the next big attack on America could come by sea, not by air. Many officials in Asia, Australia, and Europe share this concern about maritime-related terrorism. Al-Qaeda has said a number of times that it wants to shut key sea-lanes to strike a mortal blow at the political economy of the West.

So far, terrorists have mainly used trucks and other motor vehicles packed with explosives or fuel-laden aircraft as their most destructive weapons. Now, one of the biggest concerns of authorities is that terrorists may strike using another vital form of transportation—ships and cargo containers. The fear is that these workhorses of world commerce will be used to conceal a nuclear explosive device or, more likely, a radiological or “dirty” bomb that uses conventional explosives to disperse deadly radioactive material, causing mass panic as well as significant casualties.

Bombing attacks against individual vessels have been the only method planned and carried out so far. But the frequency of pirate attacks, particularly in Southeast Asian waters, has shown that ships can be boarded and seized by armed raiders potentially, including terrorists who might want to use them as weapons.

Officials and counter-terrorism experts in the United States and Asia have warned that the next step up in mass casualty terrorism may be an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. A ship or container is regarded as one of the most likely delivery devices for a nuclear or radiological bomb. Those who worry about such an attack believe that weapons of mass destruction and terrorism have become interlocking threats—and could, if more effective safeguards are not put in place quickly, fuse in an extremely dangerous challenge to global security and stability.

Shipping is the heart of global trade. Most international trade—about 80% of the total by volume—is carried by sea. About half the world's trade by value, and 90% of the general

cargo, is transported in containers.

Sea borne trade is vulnerable to a well-planned terrorist attack on two fronts. First, the port-city hubs that form an interdependent global trading web and increasingly dominate container shipping. There are over 30 such mega port-cities spread across Asia, North America, and Europe. Many of these giant port-cities are also the locations of the top 20 container terminals. Second, the handful of international straits and canals through which 75% of world maritime trade passes. For example, about one third of the world's trade and half its oil go through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. These and other key international waterways—which are vital to Japan and other East Asian trading nations and energy importers—are relatively narrow and could be closed, at least temporarily, to shipping in an accident or terrorist strike.

The paper will look at the multilateral and U.S.-led security measures, the extent of Asian participation, and their effectiveness in guarding against maritime-related terrorist threats. These measures include the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, the Container Security Initiative, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

## **Session III-2**

### The United States and the War against Terrorism

#### The United States and the War on Terrorism: A European Perspective

Jolyon Howorth

### **1. The General Question of Transatlantic Relations under Bush-2**

There are three distinct aspects to the transatlantic relationship, which the paper will address. The first is the systemic interplay of great power politics. At this level, there is nothing automatic about transatlantic harmony. The second dimension has to do with the end of the Cold War. It is normal that Europeans and Americans should have squabbled in recent years in that the type of cozy relationship they shared during the Cold War was a historical aberration. What we have seen since 1989 is a new chapter in a centuries-old process of geo-strategic adjustment. A third factor is the style and the substance of U.S. policy under the Bush administration. This has rendered what would have been a difficult post-Cold War adjustment in any event all the more problematic.

### **2. Transatlantic Relations concerning Counter-terrorism Strategy & Measures**

The paper notes that there is no “single” European view, but a spectrum of opinion. At the official level, the discourse insists that the EU and the U.S. are united in the struggle, that the EU itself is united and fully committed, and that much more needs to be done to coordinate the campaign. However, critics highlight the differences between the Bush administration’s black-and-white crusading rhetoric (“with us or with the terrorists”) and the EU’s propensity to address the problem in terms of varying shades of grey. The paper will consider the difference between the EU’s decades-long experience of fighting various (limited) forms of terrorism and the U.S. approach to combating “super-terrorism.” Differences in threat assessment will be analyzed. The paper will explore the difference between a strategy focusing on root causes and one focusing on immediate responses. It will consider the lessons to be learned from a comparison of U.S. responses to 9/11 and European responses to the Madrid bombings.

The paper will assess the degree of cooperation that has been achieved, both internally in the EU, and between the EU and the United States, highlighting measures such as intelligence sharing, approaches to money-laundering, coercive military strategies, preventive

diplomacy, and law enforcement. It will compare the two sides' success in striking an acceptable balance between repression of terrorism and respect for human rights. It will also assess the different attitudes in the two regions towards evaluating the links between non-state actors and "rogue regimes" where terrorism is concerned. Finally, it will draw up a balance sheet of what remains to be achieved.