Guest Speech
New Roles of the Military in the 21st Century: 
The Japanese Perspective

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Introduction

I would like to start my presentation by referring to the multi-faceted role of a military in Turkey. It is a good idea not to make too much of a distinction between the traditional and non-traditional role in that country. In developing countries, a military generally plays multi-faceted and complex role, and will probably continue to do so in the future.

Last week I met with the Turkish prime minister and top military officials. All of these top officials are now retired, but they were very impressive people who are well educated and equipped with an outstanding international perspective. During our talk, I was prompted to think about the role of the military as well as the role of military force.

1) Modernization

In Turkey, the military has played an important role in modernizing the society, since it is a cohesive political entity that has also worked responsibly for modernizing the country’s politics. In many cases, such as those of China, Korea, Egypt, Indonesia, and even 19th century Japan, when developing countries were urged to modernize under pressure from European powers, the military has played a prominent role in such processes. This has happened irrespective of whether or not those countries were willing to modernize. In the case of Ottoman Turkey, modernizing a country became a serious issue after the Crimean War. When Ottoman Turkey collapsed, Kemal Ataturk narrowly succeeded in saving the country before it was reduced to becoming one of the colonies of the European powers. Since then, Turkey has not once lost a war. During the Second World War, it was one of the few countries that maintained neutrality, partly due to the extremely high level of prestige given to its military.

2) Social Stability

The military has also provided a foundation for social stability. The military organization is well established with the judiciary and the education system, and it constitutes a cornerstone for social stability. As the history of Turkey shows, the country did not move toward an extreme direction since the Turkish military kept a tacit, watchful eye on the situation. In developing countries, and this is also true in the case of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), retention of social resiliency is an important part of policies guaranteeing security. In the case of Turkey, too, the military has basically served this function.
3) Multi-ethnic society, integration

Turkey has a population of 70 million people, and the Kurds, who live mainly in the south, number as many as 12 million. The Kurdish population straddles five countries, including Turkey, and their movement for independence threatens the foundation of Turkey’s integration and unification. In a multi-ethnic society, the role of the military has been one of integrating different ethnic groups to prevent the state and its peoples from disintegration. At the same time, in some circumstances, the military has been forced to fight against terrorism by separatists and proponents of independence. These battles date back to long before the September 11 terrorist attacks.

4) Secularism

In the case of Islamic countries, the military is often a secular institution. And, as is the case with Algeria, the Turkish military is a dedicated force. We may even say that it is the stronghold of Attaturkism, which is based on the tenet of separation between politics and religion in Islamic society. Military officers who worship at mosques while on duty are expelled. In recent years, approximately 100 to 150 officers have been expelled annually for this reason. But recently, we have seen the appearance of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government, which has a strong Islamic leaning. It did not take long for tension to arise between these two institutions. One example of this strained relationship between the government and the military is the recent case of the military expelling seven officers for worshipping at a mosque, despite their favor with Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, who suggested that their “retention” would be an appropriate response. A former Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force whom I met said, “A high ranking Lieutenant Colonel has to listen to what a sergeant says. This is because the position of the sergeant is superior according to religious hierarchy. The military can’t possibly operate under this kind of belief.”

5) National interests

The former Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff, whom I referred earlier said, “the role of the military has gradually been expanding into other areas besides the role it has of fighting to defend the country. That is to say, the role of the military is to provide a means of promoting national interests. This is not new as it has been happening for some time.” We can see this example during the period of the Korean War, when Turkey sent 7,500 troops to serve for the United Nations Forces. The Turkish troops were very courageous and soon gained a good reputation. Many of the injured Turkish soldiers were sent to Japan to receive treatment. Japanese local government and communities warmly welcomed these Turkish soldiers, offered them support, and comforted them by holding various events. Most of these soldiers returned to Turkey with a strong feeling of friendship toward Japan. One reason given for the cordial
relations between Turkey and Japan is the experiences that these soldiers had while in Japan.

Why did Turkey fight so valiantly in the Korean War?

There can be no other reason than its wish to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At that time, most European members of NATO were opposed to Turkey’s membership. This resembles the situation today, in which some of the European countries are privately opposed to Turkey joining the European Union (EU). However, Turkey became a member of NATO in 1953 assisted by strong support from the US. Its participation in the Korean War was motivated by this expected political gain, which was to join the NATO alliance.

Today, Turkey is an active participant in the war against terrorism and in the Afghanistan War. It has sent crack Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) units to join the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and has also sent a Turkish commander (Major General Hilmi Akin Zorlu). Behind all this lies Turkey’s desperate need for support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the support from the US to move this international organization, in order to recover from the present economic crisis. Thus, complying with the strategic requests of the US and performing such military roles was deemed necessary in terms of her national interest.

As Turkey’s example indicates, the utility of a military force is multi-dimensional and is often used in this way for a diverse range of purposes. We have seen in the past, and will see in the future, “military force used outside of war as part of a political and diplomatic strategy.” It is certainly extremely important to consider how to take on “non-traditional roles” like that of humanitarian intervention within this historical reality. However, regardless of whether the majority of countries in the world see their role as traditional or non-traditional, the fact is that these kinds of diverse roles do coexist within a range of operations their military forces are expected to conduct.

Considering Turkey’s future ascendance to EU membership, however, it is possible that the roles of Turkey’s military force and military itself will have to surmount the ultimate challenge to meet western standards. The EU will decline to accept Turkey’s membership if Islamic influence becomes too prominent within the country. On the other hand, the EU will also react negatively if the presence of its military in the country becomes too prominent. It is no doubt that Turkey’s Islamic democracy. However, with its separation between politics and religion, it provides a valuable experience and serves as a model to other Islamic states. It is true that Turkish intellectuals have started to suggest there is a problem with the military being allowed to serve as the guardian deity of this secularism. In other words, they are saying that reform of the military has become necessary. As for its response, the military sees this as taking away the authority it has obtained over the years, and there are some intellectuals who suspect that privately the military is opposed to joining the EU. This will probably come down to the core question of defining a new form of civilian control.
However, there is more to it than that. Another underlying problem is the contradiction that even though the EU’s idea of peace and war may work in the EU, it will not easily work in Turkey. The EU is already entering a post-modern era. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has said, “the core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was, and still is, a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of the individual states that emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.” This is perhaps a “luxurious” way of thinking in the sense that it can be applied only to the nations of Europe. A British diplomat, Robert Cooper, points out when speaking of Europe that “among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with states outside of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary…” He is asserting that it is necessary for Europe to get used to making this distinction, that is, to get used to this “double standard.” It is an admission of the “luxury” that the EU alone has.

In the case of Turkey, this kind of “luxury” would probably not be tolerated for long. The Balkans lies to the west, the Caucasus to the north, and the Middle East to the east and south. It is the epitome of a “modern,” that is to say, a “barbaric” world. It is here that the roles of both the military forces and the military naturally diverge. Even if it so desires, it will not be that simple for Turkey to leap into the post-modern era since it would be deemed irresponsible domestically. However, if Turkey wants to qualify to join the EU, it won’t be able to take actions like those of Russia in Chechnya. It is also possible that Turkey will become a victim of this “double standard.” One role it could assume would be one in which it is used as a suitable “buffer state,” while there would be no way it would be allowed to join. We should be careful here not to make too bold or contrastive a distinction between traditional and non-traditional, and not to over-define the role of the military.

As is seen in the case of Turkey, when considering non-traditional roles it is also important to give some consideration to traditional roles. That is because something that is called non-traditional may in fact be not that non-traditional, as it may have actually been a role that the military carried out in the past, though under a different guise.

In Japan’s case, one of the “traditional roles” for the Self Defense Forces is the preservation of the US-Japan alliance. The relationship between the traditional and non-traditional roles of the JSDF is not a zero-sum game. In other words, an increase of the non-traditional mission of the JSDF does not lead to an inversely proportional decrease to the traditional mission. Rather, the increase in non-traditional roles is instead likely to have a synergistic effect of solidifying the traditional roles. For example, Japan’s PKO participation in “nation building” activities in East Timor, the promotion of democratization and support for the Islamic political system in Indonesia where there is a separation between politics and religion, and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA), etc., have further strengthened the US-Japan alliance under a new environment, and will play a role in building a framework for multilateral security in this region.
Still, even though “stability forces,” which play a non-traditional role, have become important, it doesn’t necessarily mean that “deterrent forces,” which have formed the core of “traditional roles,” will lose their importance. For example, somewhat similar to the case of Turkey, Japan will not be allowed the “luxury” of being able to make a sudden leap into the “post-modern” era. This is apparent when looking at the case of the Korean Peninsula.

I Changes in the role of military force

Let us recognize the new problems and challenges that humanitarian aid and “human security” bring.

When looking at non-traditional roles of a military, it is necessary to keep in mind the diverse traditional roles that even so do not change, which are not only the roles of advanced western nations, but also those of an overwhelming majority of non-western nations in the world. I believe that these roles will not change very much in the future.

In this context it is necessary to acknowledge the following:
1) The character of threats and risks has changed since the end of the Cold War. This change has been accompanied by changes in the role of military forces from being merely “deterrent forces” to acting as “stability forces” as well.
2) The huge wave of globalization has weakened the national sovereignty of every country and formed a vacuum. This vacuum no longer has to be filled by the United Nations or the world’s superpowers.
3) In connection with globalization, dramatic advances in science and technology have brought about a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), resulting in a gap between the capabilities of the United States and its allies, in consequence of which a division in roles has been created between combat duties and reconstruction duties.

New emerging threats from states that have failed to maintain their domestic governance, the imminent collapse of states, religious and ethnic disputes, civil wars, terrorism and drug trafficking have increased. In dealing with these new threats, the international community, and in some cases multilateral forces, have intervened politically as well as militarily to provide humanitarian aid and restore stability. In Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, military intervention was attempted to provide humanitarian aid. However, in places like Rwanda, such efforts have been abandoned. As these examples indicate, military forces have recently become progressively involved in humanitarian aid, PKO, the establishment of peace and nation building. These cases indicate that they have come to take on “non-traditional roles.”

The capabilities gap within NATO, especially that between the United States and the other member countries, is raising the need of fundamental redefinition of the way in which alliances work. This gap that has become structural has amplified the unilateralist trend of the United
States. This has been accompanied by the emergence of a trend in the relationship between the United States and its allies in which the United States is specializing in combat duties, while its allies are specializing in reconstruction duties.

The September 11 terrorist attacks not only caused an acceleration in the trends outlined in 1), 2) and 3) above, but they also issued a new challenge. In a commencement speech given at West Point, President Bush said, “the greatest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology.” The events of September 11 have instilled in us a sense of fear about the future map of this “grave new world.” The combination of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will undoubtedly pose a huge threat to the international community in the long term. However, this battle will be different from the battles of the past in that it will be a complex challenge.

We can win the battle against terrorism. However, it will not be easy to win the battle against terrorism, because we must also win the peace, not just the war. Broadly speaking, there are three issues that we must consider from the perspective of the roles of military force:

* Efforts to solve the root cause of terrorism

The only way we can beat terrorism is to resolve its root causes. However, resolving the root causes will require us to devote a lasting commitment and large resources, and it is questionable whether military force is best suited for this resolution. Resolution of these root causes will also require economic development of the countries of concern. It will also be necessary to protect the fundamental human rights of the people in those countries. In some cases, the international community now uses military force to intervene directly in domestic affairs for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid in order to establish fundamental human rights - or in the words of Kofi Annan, the comprehensive rights of “political rights,” “food as a human right,” and the “right to security.” We have begun to hear calls from the international society to make the objective of security engagements by the international community the ensuring of “human security” at a civilian level. There is the fact that military force is crucial for “nation building.” The important roles of military force in this area are the stabilization of regions and the prevention of disputes. This type of role for military force will often incorporate the traditional roles of military forces.

* The pitfall of humanitarian intervention and human security

There is a pitfall to be found with both humanitarian intervention and “human security.” It is the tendency to see these concepts in terms that are too categorical, ethical or moral. The development of a global media is promoting the tendency that preserving the humanity is thought to be a prime objective of the security. It is no denying that the North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals should in no way be condoned. We must look at a marked tendency in the way that this has been received domestically in Japan to characterize this incident in terms of the
absolute standards of good and evil. This tendency makes it increasingly difficult to come up with a “gray resolution” for problems of national security that must take geopolitics into account.

There are growing calls to upgrade the military commitment in implementing humanitarian aid from the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that have provided humanitarian aid on the ground in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda, and have seen human disaster at first hand. This appeal for the military’s involvement in humanitarian aid has been helped along in part by the fact that many of the NGO logisticians are former military personnel. As a result, there are also those who say that NGOs providing humanitarian aid are in virtual “existentialist danger.” (For an example, see David Reiff, “Humanitarianism in Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, Nov. 2002-Dec. 2002)

* Differences in the concept of the military roles

Attitudes concerning the role of the military can be divided broadly into two camps: the Huntington concept (the role of the military is victory in war), and the Janovitz concept (the role of the military is to build stable international relations). The US military and the constabulary role-focused French military are representative examples of these two concepts, respectfully. The roles of military forces are also created according to these differences in concept of the military. Since September 11, in the process of deciding how to respond to the threat of terrorism, most countries around the world have become involved in a debate over which approach to the concept of the military is advisable, and have wrestled with the issue of a structure for “homeland security.”

II  The situation in Japan

Instead of referring to the 1990’s as the “lost decade,” we can call it the “decade of slow progress,” in terms of security commitments. In other words, it is the “decade in which Japan finally took steps toward becoming an ordinary country.”

Let us take a look at what kind of situation Japan has found itself in against the backdrop of this larger situation.

1) National Defense Outline

In Japan’s case, a response to the redefinition of the roles for military force began in 1995 when the National Defense Program Outline stated explicitly that the country should “respond to various kinds of situations like large-scale disasters” and “contribute to building a more stable security environment.” The report also noted the importance of policies to counter terrorism. The background to this plan included the dispatch of Japanese military units to the Arabian Gulf to
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clear the sea of mines and the dispatch of PKO units to Cambodia, the Great Hanshin Earthquake, which occurred in January 1995 (6,433 fatalities), the Sarin Gas Attack that March (12 fatalities, 5,500 injured), and heightened interest among the Japanese people and a steady growth in support for the “non-combat functions” and “non-military activities” of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in those situations.

Although Japan sent minesweeping troops to the Arabian Sea after the Gulf War, Japan was criticized of being too late and branded as having engaged in “checkbook diplomacy.” This caused “trauma” in Japanese society. To put it succinctly, this trauma was the one that Japan experienced with regard to not being able to use its military and not knowing how and for what purpose it should use it. Japan made a great effort to recover from this trauma. The change first appeared around 1992 when Japan sent its first PKO unit to Cambodia. The awareness of the Japanese people concerning PKO changed greatly after this mission, and today more than 80% of the Japanese population support PKO. In 2002, approximately 700 PKO troops were sent to East Timor. This also marked the first time that female troops had been dispatched.

We have become accustomed to referring to the 1990s as Japan’s “lost decade.” However, when speaking of security from the perspective of the sequence of events, it was more the “decade in which Japan finally took steps toward becoming an ordinary country.”

2) September 11

The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing war against terrorism in Afghanistan reminded Japanese political leaders of the “Gulf War Trauma,” so that Japan quickly responded to support the policy of the United States.

However, the war against terrorism was an extremely complicated arrangement, and it was difficult to discern the roles and mission of every law enforcing authority, including the JSDF and the National Police Agency. The existing division of labor between those authorities was totally inadequate for responding to an asymmetrical threat like that posed by terrorism. It can be said that a viable concept of the military remains uncertain and unclear, and that the Who, What, When, Where, Why and How of using military force have yet to be established.

More to the point, the question of how to deal with the changes in the international environment following September 11 has been a huge challenge for Japan. This stems from two elements: First, a transformation of the security environment was taking place in Asia, followed by a transformation that was taking place in the US. Since the Second World War, Japan’s focus has been on the Asia Pacific region of Asia. This has been consistent from economic cooperation to ASEAN to promotion of APEC. September 11 has changed all that. The Asia that Japan has to deal with now has become more complex as it consists of Eurasian Asia, Islam Asia, and Chinese Asia. Diversity within Asia has not been addressed sufficiently by Japan’s previous policies towards Asia.

Eurasian Asian issues involve the question of how to build stability in central Asia, how to

proceed with nation building in this area, and the dangers that destabilization in India, Pakistan, Russia (particularly the hollowing out of eastern Siberia and Far Eastern Russia and the resulting destabilization) and North Korea pose to Japan’s safety and peace.

Next there was the rise of Islamic Asia. Issues in this region involve warding off the rise of political Islam in Pakistan and Indonesia, and also in post-Mahathir Malaysia, and the question of how to develop a moderate and secular Islamic form of democratic government. This is likely to have a huge impact on the economic development of Asia and the future of regionalism.

Lastly, there is Chinese Asia. Whether or not China, which is on the verge of becoming an economic superpower, will become involved in liberalized trade and an economic order on both a global level and regional level without having formed a special relationship with Asia, the Southeast Asian zone in particular, is a question that will greatly influence Japan’s future. The single biggest diplomatic and security issue facing Japan in the 21st century is whether or not it will be able to coexist with, and build a cooperative relationship with, a China that follows universal and global standards.

The second change comes from the United States.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has justified its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region on the basis of “regional security.” It has shifted from the single guiding principle of a “deterrent force” on the basis of “forward deployment” that had prevailed in the past, and has begun to push to the fore “stability forces” that seek to maintain regional security while doing its best not to incite the other side. Non-combat objectives such as the security of straits, the execution of economic sanctions, PKO, intercepting drug trafficking, continual surveillance and handling of environmental conservation, such as ocean pollution, international emergency aid activities, and aid for national construction now fall within the duties and roles of US forces.

Although, in March 1996, the US sent an aircraft carrier to the vicinity of Taiwan in response to China’s threat of a missile strike on Taiwan, this was not the same as a “deterrent” action as in the days of the Cold War, but was an action undertaken with the intention of “dispute prevention.” It seems that in the future, the “regional security” that was effectively maintained as a result of the presence of the US military that practiced core roles of “deterrence” and “response” in the past, will be brought about by positive action, not just presence, and will bring with it “protection” and “stabilization.” Whereas “deterrence” and “response” fall within the realm of a traditional alliance, in order to proceed positively with “protection” and “stabilization,” a separation is in the process of being created in which there is a desire to utilize a “coalition of the willing.”

This is evident in the way that the US came up with a “coalition of the willing,” with Russia, India and China, while it was strengthening a stance that placed a heavy emphasis on Eurasia after the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, this, and the way in which the US adjusted its relationships with its traditional allies, caused a sense of unease among some of its allies, and
concern exists among some US allies that this is devaluing the traditional alliances.

III Diplomacy of “Nation building”

It is Japan’s interest to promote “nation building” diplomacy, through which to establish its image as a power is that of a “global civilian power.”

Since September 11, and amid the recent issues surrounding Iraq, Japan might have effectively found a new role and duty for itself, without any strategizing. This is “nation building” diplomacy.

Whether it is maintaining peace or establishing peace, the politics and diplomacy that bring the war-torn country into the world community is of critical importance for world security and peace. As they recall their own war experiences, many Japanese people see the value of these people getting back on their feet and righting themselves, and feel a sense of duty and concern that even Japan can probably do something to help. It seems that they think that Japan should not engage in “nation building” diplomacy as an “avocation,” but that it should make it a new “vocation.”

One example of this sort of concern can be found in a report recently released by the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace, a group that advises Prime Minister Koizumi. The head of the Advisory Group is former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Yasushi Akashi, who has led peacekeeping activities in Cambodia and Yugoslavia. The report points out that civil wars that cross national boundaries and terrorism have become new threats, and recognizing that traditional PKO on their own are insufficient. It recommends Japan to engage in the multi-faceted peace building ranging from the prevention of disputes to the “establishment of peace” and “nation building.”

It also recommends that Japan should:

1) Participate in the UN Standby Arrangements System, whose objective is the expeditious deployment of UN PKO;
2) Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law to establish international peace cooperation as a regular duty of the SDF, and prepare units within the SDF with a high level of readiness;
3) Position civilian police that are engaged in PKO on clear legal foundations, and establish a special police unit in the National Police Agency;
4) Have the government use Overseas Development Assistance actively, enhance the partnership between NGOs and the government, and abolish the vertical structure of government ministries and agencies.

The Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS), which is headed by Tetsuya Nishimoto, a former Joint Chief of Staff, is a Japanese NGO that has been built mainly by experts formerly employed in the SDF, and is engaged in the disposal of unexploded mines in Cambodia. It will finally
commence its task of removing land mines this July. Not long ago, this kind of activity was inconceivable. If I may use my words, Japan is in the process of maturing into a “global civilian power.”

This kind of non-traditional role primarily involves multi-faceted activities, and in many cases these activities are performed in partnership with NGOs. This requires a multi-faceted framework of peace and stability in Asia, and multi-faceted collaboration that includes Japan, and when this happens, dialogue between one military and another and collaboration become important. The Shangri La Process that was held in May 2002 in Singapore also provided an opportunity for multi-faceted dialogue between defense authorities in Asia.

Admittedly, in Asia, especially northeast Asia, there is the threat posed by North Korea. This requires the strengthening of structures to contain any new threats by North Korea, such as an examination of the option of a missile defense, strengthening the Security Consultative Structure between Japan, the US and South Korea, and the reorganization of the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization). However, North Korea’s nuclear threat points to a new possibility for building a multi-faceted framework among Japan, the US, China, Russia and North and South Korea for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula. With this in mind, Japan should promote dynamic and creative diplomacy.

Conclusion

Indeed, the habits and customs left over from the Cold War will not disappear easily.

When looking at the placement of the divisions of Japan’s land-based SDF, one gets the impression that there is still a threat to the north (the Soviet Union). There is a strong belief among some in the SDF and former members of the force that non-traditional duties should, if at all possible, be seen as an “avocation.” The fundamental philosophy behind this is the belief that “the military should have only a little involvement in society.” I, myself, have even heard the opinion that if Japan becomes involved in this kind of avocation, then “Japan’s SDF will become like those of Canada.”

Those who are critical of the existence and roles of the SDF think that if the SDF is made to perform those kinds of duties, the roles of the SDF will expand unchecked, and Japan will become a military superpower. They express concern about whether the SDF was all along meant to be a defense-only defense force in the first place, thus raising questions in relation to the Japanese constitution. This also represents concerns that the SDF is getting too close to society.

To venture in a slightly different direction, this resembles the idea that “the military should not be used for such a purpose.” During the Cold War, because the deterrent force, being the allied deterrent force, took care of the military force, it was never necessary to mobilize or
deploy the military. But that is now changing. There is no doubt that behind this lies a desire to use the SDF as a powerful means of diplomacy in light of the weakness of Japan’s economic power and the decrease in ODA. There is nothing wrong at all in wanting to use the SDF to promote national interests. However, Japan has not established a clear concept of its military for this new era. Irrespective of this, I wonder whether wanting to use the SDF isn’t getting a bit ahead of ourselves.

I have serious qualms about this. There needs to be intense debate about the non-traditional roles of the military and new duties for the SDF, in conjunction with developments concerning the situations in Iraq and North Korea, and especially in relation to “nation building.” At the same time, the greater these roles become, and the stronger the support of the Japanese people in response, the greater the need becomes for both the establishment of a collective self-defense, and the simultaneous establishment of civilian control.

Now is the time to debate this issue head on and openly. And, regardless of whether one likes it or not, this debate is not likely to be limited to the SDF and the Defense Agency, but will develop into a rebuilding of Japan’s public administration, which is the most vital foundation for protecting peace and safety.

At the present time, Japan’s vertically divided administration, inadequate leadership by politicians, and emotional public opinion, are thwarting the creation of a solid public administration system in Japan. Without a spirited and strong public administration that serves the state by seeing beyond the interests of individual organizations, it will not be possible to protect the country or to protect peace. Neither will it be possible to build nations or to build peace. Japan’s journey to becoming an “ordinary country” has just begun. This journey will most likely be completed by the rebuilding of its public administration system.