

## **Engagement or Intervention: Prospects for Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia**

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### Introduction

The international political landscape in Northeast Asia is undergoing a new period of rapid transformation as we stand at the doorstep of the new century.

First, the previously anomalous relations among the four major powers, namely, Japan, the United States, China, and Russia have recently demonstrated significant improvements. However rhetorical it may be, they are “partners” now, and not supposed to be considered adversaries any longer in their strategic perspectives. True that what they are referring to as “partnership” mainly applies to the respective bilateral relations, but these positive trends can be developed into a more structured network through additional active summit-level diplomacy. Japan has not only strengthened its ties with the US but has embarked on positive dialogues with Russia and China. Furthermore, it was clearly a most welcoming step forward that a “New Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century” was declared between Tokyo and Seoul at the time of President Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Japan in October 1998. Second, it should be pointed out that region-wide multilateral forums have expanded their scopes from primarily economic areas to security ones. The activities of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), since its establishment in 1994, have constantly grown. One feature that is common to the above two developments is the emergence of a pattern that expects an attitude of international cooperation in the security area. In short, it represents the idea of “cooperative security.”

Considering the inherently delicate nature of security, the area that is concerned about the fundamental survival of states, it would be regarded as “new thinking” to pursue “cooperative security” beyond the traditional scope of alliance, a form of security cooperation and common defense just between allies. “Cooperative security” is unique as it pursues cooperative avenues with the parties across historical animosities and potential conflicts of interests. How untraditional it is can be realized when we recall that the common practices of states have generally been based on the idea of “competition” among powers who distrust each other, whether it relies on deterrence or ultimate victory. Therefore, the idea of “cooperative security” is qualitatively different from the traditional approach of “competitive security.” Nonetheless, we are witnessing today examples of this avenue of cooperation most actively pursued at official “Track I” and unofficial “Track II” opportunities.

The present paper attempts to discuss both the prospects and challenges of problem solving by the cooperative security approach in the context of East Asia in general and Northeast Asia in particular. While it stresses the actual and potential significance of cooperative security approach, the paper does not intend to discount the continued relevance of the US military presence and the alliance relations, a la the US-Japan security arrangements, centering on Washington. In this regard, it is appropriate to foresee the growing pattern of "security pluralism" in the region as *the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* report of November 1998 observes.<sup>1</sup> "Security pluralism" represents the pattern in which the states in the region utilize all available bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral forums to respond to the host of security concerns in complementary and combined manners. Having said that, however, the question remains of how we can make these instruments with different orientations complement and consistent with each other. Moreover, cooperation cannot be achieved without engagement with other parties, and often engagement comes extremely close to intervention in one government's internal affairs. The point is particularly relevant to the many states in Asia, where the history of statehood in its modern sense is relatively short and the experience of governing state affairs. As a result, these states have gotten overly sensitive with respect to the matters of sovereignty and sovereign independence. With these points in mind, let's move on to discuss the practical link between cooperative security and alliances, especially in Northeast Asia.

#### What is Cooperative Security?

Cooperative security is an approach which generally encompasses such activities as confidence building, promotion of transparency, and preventive diplomacy<sup>2</sup>. But in order for a better understanding of cooperative security from a realistic perspective, it would be most useful to consider what cooperative security is really *not*.

First, cooperative security is *not* a type of arrangement that identifies sources of threat outside of its forum.

Second, cooperative security is *not* a type of security cooperation that is usually backed by an enforcement mechanism.

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, November 1998.

<sup>2</sup> For a schematic comparison of the four types of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region -- collective security, collective self-defense, cooperative security, and security cooperation dialogues (including "strategic cooperation") -- see Toshiya Hoshino, "Aija-Taiheiyo Chiiki ni okeru Kokusai Anzen Hoshō no Shinario: Domei no Ronri to Taiwa no Ronri (A Scenario of International Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: On the Logic of Alliance and Dialogue)," *Human Security*, No. 2 (1997), pp. 17-28. Published by Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute, Tokai University (in Japanese).

Third, cooperative security is *not* a type of activity that produces visible and immediate outcomes.

Seeing the above three features, it is easy to recognize that this approach is qualitatively different from the traditional approaches of alliance (collective self-defense) and collective security. In other words, cooperative security is founded on important characteristics that include the principles of non-exclusionary (i.e., inclusive) membership and of “internalization” of the sources of threat. As a result, the approach is most fitted to maintaining a constant channel of communication among parties even when they are in conflict.

There are some weaknesses in this cooperative security approach. For example, this approach may not be suitable in a crisis management-type situation that requires certain quick and massive responses, including military enforcement actions, as both consensus and consent of the relevant parties are considered prerequisite for joint actions. This general requirement of prior consent restricts the activities that would imply any pretense of intervention in internal affairs, however useful they may be. It is, therefore, correct to believe that cooperative security is an approach which is inherently characterized by a lot of limitations from the very beginning. Compared with alliance, which is equipped with the combined mechanisms of deterrence in peacetime and crisis response in wartime, cooperative security is based on a menu of dialogue, confidence building and preventive diplomacy, all of which are primarily relevant in peacetime alone.

Why, then, should cooperative security matter to us? In fact, critics are numerous who question the utility of this approach. For instance, one argued that the ARF process is nothing more than a mechanism that is “built on sand” and warned that ASEAN countries have no power to mediate in the major powers’ relationships. Worse, ASEAN members have provided an opportunity for China to pressure ASEAN to turn their unity into disarray in the case of the South China Sea disputes<sup>3</sup>. One Japanese realist recently warned of the rise of what he called the ghost of “MMTGSN” – an acronym for Mutual, Multilateral, Transnational, Global, Sub-national, and Non-national – in the post-Cold War era. He is concerned about the trend towards stressing a new sense of idealism that tends to lose sight of the critical roles of states and national interests in favor of somewhat abstract conceptions of human and global interests in an interdependent world through non-state actors<sup>4</sup>.

It is true that the idea of cooperative security is more in tune with the thinking of liberal institutionalists who explore the possibility of institution building through

<sup>3</sup> Robyn Lim, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (August 1998), p.115.

<sup>4</sup> Fuji Kamiya, “Ningen Kojin no Anzen Rieki, Fukushi no Suishin, Chikyu, Jinrui yori Kokka Tan’i de (The Pursuit of Men’s Security, Interests, and Welfare at the State-level rather than the Global Level,” *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 6, 1999.

“cooperation” however anarchical the international society may be. Realists who, following Hans Morgenthau’s famous dictum, stress the “struggle of power” defined “in terms of national interest” may be more suspicious about cooperation. However, it would be far from correct for those liberal institutionalists to believe that cooperation is easily attainable once the states parties adopt a cooperative security approach. A naive sense of optimism is the last thing we can expect in the complicated strategic environment in Northeast Asia.

### Strategic Environment of Northeast Asia and Cooperative Security

Whether by divine providence or simply by coincidence, Northeast Asia is a strategic crossroads where the interests of major powers all through the geopolitical history of the region intersect. Samuel Huntington identified six civilizations in Asia<sup>5</sup>. Amongst them, four major powers represented four civilizations – Japan, Russia, China, and India –, coupled with one out-of-the region major power, the United States, have largely defined the fate of this region. Indeed, it is profoundly important to recognize that the region is characterized by the complex realities that are rooted in civilization-level differences. Furthermore, all major powers that extended their influence across Northeast Asia have pursued the path of imperialism to build their own empires. Empire is a system of political domination in which a core people dominates peripheral peoples with dissimilar cultural identities. As a result, empires have no lack of diversity in cultural and tribal background.

Looking at the civilizational, cultural, and tribal diversity, it would not take so much time to understand, unlike Europe, why the conflicts in East Asia did not simply converge into the East-West rivalry during the Cold War period. The division of the Korean Peninsula and the de facto split between Beijing and Taipei are indeed legacies of the Cold War. But the ending of the Cold War did not solve many problems in Northeast Asia.

Besides the legacies of the Cold War, three other types of issues can be identified in Northeast Asia. First are the issues that predate the Cold War. While the Western society discussed the “end of history,” people in Northeast Asia maintained “history” as a core reason of animosities, though it means “past issues” dating back to the colonial days (rather than the Marxist-Hegelian sense of history as a “broad evolution of human societies advancing toward a final goal<sup>6</sup>”). In fact, the depth of distrust and historical memories cannot be underestimated. Moreover, the settlement of World War II is the most current challenge that lies between Japan and Russia. Second are the non-traditional security challenges that cover wide-ranging issues of environment, economics, food, energy, terrorism, and drug trafficking among others.

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<sup>5</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

<sup>6</sup> See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

The sudden wave of the Asian financial crisis was a stark reminder that the globalization of market economy, unless properly managed, can quickly undermine the fundamental stability of national governments and regional political order. And third are the immediate military security issues that would constitute the “clear and present dangers.” The possibility of military confrontations between two Koreans and across the Taiwan Strait cannot be ruled out. The nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan has challenged the very core of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The unannounced firing of a multiple-stage “missile” over the territorial air space of Japan from North Korea together with the series of recent news reports regarding the actual deployment of Nodong missiles by the Stalinist regime of Pyongyang were indeed wake-up calls for Japan to engage in a more realistic debate on national defense. Both the infiltration of midget submarines into South Korean territorial waters and the nuclear suspicion surrounding the underground facilities reminded us of the stark reality of military stand-off across the demilitarized zone. While the level of trilateral Japan-US-ROK cooperation is stronger than ever, it is worrisome to witness the escalation of propaganda and rhetoric by the North Korean government against these three rivals.

As long as the military threats remain in Northeast Asia, we are not able to abrogate alliance relationships like the US-Japan security ties and the credible US military presence that supports the alliances without a workable alternative. But having been exposed to the multiplex sources of instability in this region where civilization, culture, and history complicate international relations, it is also correct to recognize that measures of deterrence and response *alone* cannot ensure regional stability and state security. It is for this reason that the cooperative security approach is considered useful as an additional avenue for enhancing security in the region.

### Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia

As discussed earlier, cooperative security is primarily a set of peacetime means based on the voluntary efforts of confidence building and preventive diplomacy. They are cooperative measures whose effectiveness realists would dispute. The reality is, however, more encouraging than the realists’ expectations. Here, five levels of activities are easily ascertained.

First, ARF has made substantial progress since its inception of 1994 both at the ministerial meetings and other inter-sessional meetings on such specific areas like confidence-building, peace keeping operations, non-proliferation, and search and rescue. China’s willingness to actively participate in this forum is noteworthy. Of course, we can interpret China’s motives in terms of their tactic of stressing “multilateralism” to criticize the “outdated” role of bilateral alliances, such as the US-Japan ties, that can have a direct impact

on China's national interests. But participation entails obligation and responsibility. In this regard, it is significant that China volunteered to chair the inter-sessional meeting on confidence building and then released its own defense policy paper. These are some of the developments that would not have taken place if not for the idea of cooperative security and for the framework of ARF. Additionally, we can point out a practical usefulness of multilateral forums as they provide opportunities for bilateral meetings. For example, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen had a tete-a-tete meeting on the occasion of the ARF meeting in Jakarta in 1996 which served as a valuable opportunity for dialogue in the wake of the Taiwan Strait crisis of March of that year.

Second, the activities of unofficial Track II meetings also provide useful forums for cooperative security. One such example is the activities of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Formally established in 1994 mainly to support the ARF, the CSCAP organized one working group on security cooperation in the North Pacific which now constitutes the only single whose membership includes the representatives from all relevant parties in Northeast Asia, including the US, Japan, China, Russia, North and South Korea, Canada, and Mongolia, along with security experts from Southeast Asia, the South Pacific and Taiwan. The workshop was particularly useful as it counterbalanced the activities of ARF, which tend to focus on security concerns in Southeast Asia. CSCAP was successful in discussing peace and security issues, including the situation on the Korean Peninsula. And it was possible only because CSCAP successfully involved both North Korea and Mongolia, who have not yet participated in an official level regional multilateral security dialogue of the ARF. CSCAP is also engaged in other issues such as the elaboration of guidelines related to maritime security cooperation and an initiative to develop a regional framework for peaceful use of nuclear energy and non-proliferation (known as a PACATOM initiative).

Third, we can recognize the Four Party Meeting as a form of cooperative security specifically designed to promote dialogue among the parties to the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War to replace it with a lasting peace regime. The forum is founded on the originated in an idea to create a channel of dialogue between North and South Korea with the United States and China participate as intermediaries. The actual process of consultation is far from smooth over the delicate issues of a withdrawal of the US forces in South Korea and the dissolution of the United Nations Command. Nonetheless, the forum has an invaluable function to encouraging direct communications between the two direct parties to the conflict on the Korean Peninsula that would not otherwise be possible.

Fourth, if we single out the essence of cooperative security in its objective of enhancing security environment through dialogue and communication among parties with different political and economic systems and among those with deep historical animosities,

recent active summit level diplomacy among major powers in Northeast Asia should be seen as good examples. The declaration of a “mature and strategic partnership” between the US and Russia in January 1994 is one of the first such examples, as is that of the “constructive strategic partnership” of September that year between China and Russia. The “partnership” relations have since been developed between the US and China, Japan and China, and Japan and Russia. The scope of security dialogue and exchanges among military officers as well as defense officers has made a substantive expansion.

When the ideal type of cooperative security is supposed to be more multilateral in form and inclusive in substance, these sets of bilateral “partnership” relationships may not necessarily fall in this category. But given the “indivisible” nature of the values of “international peace and security” and the fact that stability among the major powers has a much broader impact on the interests of other states, it is essentially the same as multilateralism in its qualitative sense<sup>7</sup>. This is the same logic that is applied when we say that the US-Japan alliance is a multilateral “public good” in its substance in spite of the inherently “exclusionary” form of bilateral security mechanism. The idea is derived from the fact that the alliance, though it was originally conceived of as a mechanism to counter the threat posed by the former Soviet Union as well as to defend Japan, is also expected to play a major role to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region by means of the effective US forward military presence. There are some arguments, like those by the Chinese, that question the utility of the US-Japan alliance in the new post-Cold War world by stressing its Cold War origin. Supposing, however, that the utility of credible deterrence and the crisis response role of the US presence have not been diminished in this region of uncertainty and instability, it is legitimate to assert that both the United States and Japan are providing the benefit of stability and security to the region as a whole, non-exclusionarily, by defraying all the major costs associated with fulfilling this role. Contrary to the common characterization of alliance, the US-Japan security arrangements are not supposed to be targeted against any particular adversarial power. Given that, it is logically possible to expect both the originally collective self-defense mechanism of the US-Japan alliance and more inclusive cooperative security frameworks work without necessarily contradicting to each other<sup>8</sup>. Also to be noted is that collective self-defense mechanisms with wider roles and cooperative security frameworks do not contradict each other as long as both of them pursue the same orientation of conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of potential disputes. China’s preoccupation with US-Japan involvement in a potential Taiwan conflict would be a non-issue if all the

<sup>7</sup> For a qualitative definition of multilateralism, see John Gerald Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in John Gerald Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), ch. 1.

<sup>8</sup> The continued relevance of the US-Japan alliance can also be explained from the reverse effect of creating uncertainty and the power vacuum that would be caused by its abrogation.

relevant parties show restraint and commit to a resolution of the problems by peaceful means.

Finally, it is important to recognize the efforts individual countries make unilaterally to generate an atmosphere that is conducive to cooperative security. These include the current efforts of the National Institute of Defense Studies to organize annual seminars and other programs for regional confidence building as well as those organized by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies based in Honolulu, for example. Many governments in the region are becoming more active in hosting and cooperating in these activities with a faith in the confidence building to avoid misunderstandings through direct exposure and direct human networking.

#### Dilemmas of Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia

The previous section has outlined some of the major manifestations of the cooperative security activities in Northeast Asia at unilateral, bilateral, sub-regional, and regional levels. While all of these are generally positive developments in the right direction, there are some remaining challenges for cooperative security in Northeast Asia. Here, the following three points will be highlighted.

First and foremost, one of the most urgent and important challenges is engagement with North Korea, probably the most isolated and thus the least transparent state in the world, so as to bring Pyongyang into the network of dialogue. It is a daunting challenge because the Pyongyang government's *juche* (self-reliance) ideology is far different from the very notions of mutual communication and dialogue that are fundamental to the process of confidence building. For them, power defined in terms of military strength may be the only common language for understanding. The reason that the North Korean government put the greater priority on consultations with the United States than with Japan and South Korea rests on this thinking. The Four Party Talks forum that Washington and Seoul proposed jointly was a measure designed exactly to overcome this absence of communication between North and South Korea, the most fundamental requisite for the future settlement of the division of the peninsula. Having said that, however, it is not correct to bargain with Pyongyang if they solicit dialogue with the rest of the international community only through a series of activities which are suspected to violate international norms, the development of weapons of mass destruction and suspicious activities at underground facilities among others.

The stability of Northeast Asia is a common interest of the four major powers of Japan, the United States, China, and Russia. Nothing in this regard is more important than their cooperation and coordination among them. In this connection, it is also worth noting that the idea has been floated to organize a six party forum to discuss matters of common



concern by adding Japan and Russia to the original members of the Four Party Talks<sup>9</sup>. The idea would prove to be premature and even counterproductive if intended to replace the current four party mechanism as opposition from China and North Korea is highly likely. Nonetheless, it would be not just workable but useful for engagement purposes when agendas were set to include broader transboundary challenges in the sub-region such as environment and energy issues. In Northeast Asia, there are precedents of more functional and issue oriented cooperation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) sponsored Tumen River Development project. Both of them would have a long-term effect in promoting the opening up and reforming of North Korean society but both require broad-based international support, which is not easy when the Pyongyang government repeatedly demonstrates uncompromising behaviors.

The second challenge is related to the question of how we should guide the predominantly bilateral major power “partnership” relations in complementary directions. Trilateral relations among major powers can be unstable, but at the same time, it is important to find out whether the three sets of bilateral “partnership” relations – Japan-US, US-China, and Japan-China – will choose to move down the path of “concerted bilateralism” or that of “competitive bilateralism.” The alliance relationship between Japan and the US is naturally different qualitatively from US-China and Japan-China relations. On the one hand, China is extremely cautious about the development of bilateral Japan-US defense cooperation particularly with regard to the interpretation of their actions in situations “in the areas surrounding Japan.” On the other hand, there are some views that any improvement of the relationship between Washington and Beijing will be made at the expense of US-Japan relations. Indeed there are some indications that President Clinton pointedly made a plan to visit China without stopping in Japan, another episode of “Japan passing.” It is not easy to guide these three sets of bilateral relations among these three powerful countries toward a more cooperative direction, but certain attempts have already been made to promote the stability of trilateral Japan-US-China relations mainly at Track II level, the development of which will have an enduring effect in the region.

Third is the challenge of separating engagement from intervention. This is related to situations in which one hopes to assist reform and problem solving through various engagement measures while the same activities can be considered a serious intervention in domestic affairs. Among the trilateral Japan-US-China relations, anything related to Taiwan would face this dilemma. For the ASEAN countries, in this period of economic crisis and interdependence as well as the expansion of new membership, it has become more realistic to

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<sup>9</sup> For Japan, Prime Minister Obuchi first mentioned the idea at the occasion of his summit meeting with U.S. President Clinton in Washington, D.C. in 1998.

take up some matters that would have been considered “domestic affairs” in the past. Some members adamantly oppose the idea but others, most notably Thailand and the Philippines, have proposed an idea of “flexible engagement” to substitute for the non-intervention principle. The dilemma is hard to overcome as long as cooperative security presupposes consensus and consent from the parties directly concerned, but the candid dialogue will necessarily touch the core and sensitive area of one’s domestic concerns. In this sense, a review of the boundary between engagement and intervention by respecting the spirit of “cooperative” aspect of security dialogue would be inevitable.

#### Conclusion: Realism of Cooperative Security

Most theorists in international politics will look at cooperative security through the prism of a liberal institutionalist perspective. But as we have seen in this paper, the purpose of cooperative security is as real as realist thinkers would expect from the normal interaction among states<sup>10</sup>. This is, however, nothing surprising because the “cooperation” side of the equation in the cooperative security approach is as much a goal as a means to achieve it. If the goal serves their strategic interests, governments will choose the “cooperative” path rather than the “competitive” one. Positive but primarily bilateral efforts to enhance “partnership” among the four major powers in Northeast Asia – Japan, the United States, China and Russia – are in line with this sense of realism backed by the “strategic” consideration of power balancing. So is the general demand for confidence building and transparency from the pragmatic calculation of reducing the likelihood of unwanted confrontation. In this manner, the new thinking of the cooperative approach to security has gained momentum towards constituting an additional building block of a regional security order in Northeast Asia. The relevance of the traditional alliance mechanisms of deterrence and crisis response will certainly play an enduring role in the twenty-first century, and the demand for the new approach of cooperative security will prove to be an indispensable value added even from the realist perspective.

If, then, the cooperative approach to security has become not just desirable but workable, how can we better seize the moment to keep the momentum going? In my view, one key to moving forward in this direction can be found in deepening the mutual consciousness of “community” in Asia in general and in Northeast Asia in particular as we embark on the voyage through the twenty-first century. Contrary to the common concern

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<sup>10</sup> David Dickens, analyzing the role of the ARF, also concludes “(T)he idea of the ARF draws on liberal traditions yet its primary goals were realist.” David Dickens, “Lessening the Desire for War: The ASEAN Regional Forum and Making of Asia Pacific Security,” *CSS Working Paper 11/98*, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, November 1998.

about the regionalist approach, which would be highly relevant if we were to fall into the trap of exclusionary regional bloc building, an open and constructive regional community has more to contribute to the overall stability of the international order<sup>11</sup>.

Moreover, this positive “community” consciousness would be greatly enhanced if it were backed by certain guiding principles. One of them should be the participation of *all* the relevant parities. This idea of inclusiveness will constitute the fundamental ground for security cooperation. In this connection, the conspicuous absence of North Korea in many of the region-wide forums, including the ARF, is one such challenge to overcome. CSCAP has partially succeeded in engaging Pyongyang officials, but additional avenues should be sought. While early accession of North Korea to the ARF will be a short-term goal, Japan can take an engagement approach, if not at the official level, in view of the missile launch and the other irregular activities of the Pyongyang government, then through credible unofficial channels.

The second is related to a set of codes of conduct. In a nutshell, they should expect the members of this regional community to adhere to a commitment to peaceful settlement of conflict, arms control and disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preventive diplomacy. Japan’s basic commitment to “exclusively defensive defense” can be more internationalized as a useful attitude that does not intend to threaten others. The definitional question of “non-intervention” may remain as the demarcating line between “intervention” and “flexible engagement” becomes more obscure. Practically speaking, however, “intervention” and “non-intervention” should not always be treated dichotomically if all the members of the community are expected to respect the above commitments to codes of conduct in the event of conflict. This is because that intervention of outside forces becomes unnecessary if the parties to the conflict show restraint and demonstrate an attitude of resolving the differences solely by peaceful means. On the other hand, those who resist any intervention from outside should recognize the responsibility, as well as their right of non-intervention, that in this period of globalization and interdependence, their domestic affairs easily bear international repercussions.

Cooperation is indeed difficult as both realists and liberal institutionalists would agree. It is particularly so in this highly sensitive field of security. But just like many things in

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<sup>11</sup> On the relationship between regional order and global order, see Akio Watanabe and Toshiya Hoshino, “Kokuren to Ajia-Taiheiyo no Anzen Hoshō: Shudan-teki Anzen Hoshō to Shudan-teki Jiei no Aida (The United Nations and the Security of Asia Pacific Region: Between Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense),” *Kokusai Seiji (International Relations)*, Vol. 114 (March 1997), pp. 57-71 (in Japanese). Charles Kupchan prescribes “the emergence of regional unipolarity in each of the world’s three areas of industrial and military power – North America, Europe, and East Asia” after “the inevitable decline” of Pax Americana, noting that “securing peace within regions is an essential first step toward securing peace globally.” See, Charles Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), p.42.

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life, difficulty alone does not discourage people to try and achieve their goals. Any optimism is allowed. Time, however, is not against the tide. A sea change is taking place. Past legacies and historical animosities have gradually been balanced with more future-oriented visions. The traditional conception of security that stresses a competitive struggle of power and interests has been diversified to incorporate a cooperative side to the equation. The past practices of deterrence and containment are no longer the only story in international relations. And a sense of community is developing. This is, in essence, a "community of values," based on a consciousness that cooperation is not necessarily an exception but a desirable rule. In this way, the realists' view of power play on this Northeast Asian chessboard will converge with the cooperative security approach.