Part I

The Past, Present and Future of Ground Forces

Chapter 1
An Historical Perspective of American Land Power

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After their own experience leading up to the American Revolution, the nation's founding fathers were very distrustful of a standing army. So Section 8 of Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress has the power to provide and maintain a permanent Navy, but only to "Raise and support Armies" for emergencies, with no monetary appropriations for a period longer than two years. Hence, except for the period of the American Civil War, land forces remained small until the Twentieth Century. Even the often disastrous campaigns of the War of 1812, including the burning of Washington, did not change attitudes about a large professional army. The main purpose of American land power throughout the Nineteenth Century was to conquer the continent, mostly through irregular conflict against the Indians, but also including a masterfully managed conventional campaign against Mexico. Such missions never required a very large or sophisticated army, however. Even the large levies raised to conduct the Civil War from 1861 to 1865 were quickly demobilized afterwards.

At the end of the 19th Century American expeditionary forces did respond to national imperial impulses with campaigns in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, but it was not until World War I that the United States attempted to project significant land power overseas. While the battlefield performance of the American Expeditionary Force was not up to the standards of more experienced associated powers, almost two million soldiers deployed, and their presence alone had major influence on the result of the war. But the American people became disillusioned with the result of their intervention, and again land forces wasted away in the postwar drawdown. By the eve of the next war, the U.S. Army ranked 17th in the world in size and combat power, just behind Rumania.

The United States again mobilized large land armies for World War II, along with a significant Marine Corps. They mastered airborne and amphibious operations, along with the intricacies of large scale conventional combat operations. Logistic capabilities for a multi-theater war were especially impressive, an aspect of military operations that remains a particular American strength. The results of that conflict launched a Pax Americana, where U.S. forces remained in bases around the world to enforce and expand the results of the war. But the usual postwar drawdown still produced a land force initially unprepared for the war that erupted in Korea. Divisions in Japan were not fully

manned or equipped, and only partially trained. However, after much scrambling and reinforcement the Inchon landings of September 1950 led to the disintegration of the North Korean People's Army and created a deterrent legacy that all future foes have had to consider. Eventually the Chinese intervention and fears of an even more expanded war created a stalemate and armistice on the peninsula, but the usual severe post conflict reduction of American military power did not occur. Instead the requirements of the Cold War kept large elements deployed worldwide, kept filled by a Selective Service system that had continued since 1940.

Eventually the nation was drawn into another Asian conflict to defeat communism. Almost three million soldiers and Marines served in Southeast Asia, where they developed new concepts of air mobility while relearning the old challenges of irregular warfare. Disillusionment with counterinsurgency in Vietnam, combined with the lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and perception of the Soviet land power threat, led the American Army to develop a new warfighting concept of AirLand Battle by 1982, relying on synchronized attacks throughout the depth of the battlefield. It took a while to recover from the trauma of Vietnam. The attempted Desert One rescue of American hostages in Iran in 1980 was a bloody debacle. Intervention into Lebanon ended with a disastrous attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983. That same month a successful invasion of Grenada to rescue American students endangered by a coup revealed many problems with joint operations with other services. The Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was designed to remedy them and forge a better integrated force. More successful were small footprint special operations activities for counterinsurgency in Honduras and El Salvador. The activation of Special Operations Command in 1987 also better integrated those organizations, but that reform created an unhealthy intellectual bifurcation of land forces, segregating any elements with expertise in irregular warfare. Conventional forces were free to focus solely on high intensity conventional missions while special operations forces concentrated on the small footprint counterinsurgency they were conducting in Latin America. This would have dire consequences fifteen years later in Afghanistan and Iraq.[1]

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1 For the best summary of the course of evolution of American security policies and practices, see Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, revised and expanded edition (New York: The Free Press, 1994); USSOCOM History and Research Office, *United States Special Operations Command: History* (Macdill AFB, FL: HQ USSOCOM/SOCS-HO, 1998), pp. 4-6.

The Reformed Force in Action

The culminating result of post-Vietnam reforms of land forces and their doctrine, which included a shift from the draft to all volunteers, was first evident in the invasion of Panama in 1989, which is worth examining in some detail as an example of the strengths and weaknesses of the American way of war. Operations there leading to the overthrow of the Noriega regime have been touted as the model use of quick and decisive American military force, but post-conflict activities did not go as smoothly and foreshadowed future problems in Afghanistan and Iraq. The crisis period was exceptionally long, beginning with public revelations about General Manuel Noriega's nefarious activities in June 1987 and culminating with the execution of Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989. Planning for military intervention began as early as February 1988.[2]

When Noriega annulled the election of May 1989, sent his paramilitary thugs to assault opposition candidates, and increased his harassment of Americans, the United States executed Operation NIMROD DANCER, deploying additional troops to the Canal Zone. This show of force, executed by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), was designed to show further American resolve, in the hope that it would pressure Noriega to modify his behavior. When there was no obvious modification, the President directed the execution of Operation JUST CAUSE. A textbook example of the quality of the new armed forces and doctrine developed in the United States, it encompassed the simultaneous assault of 27 targets at night. It began early on 20 December with the first bombing mission by new F-117A stealth fighter-bombers, undetectable by Panamanian radar. The air was soon saturated with transport planes carrying Rangers, vehicles for assault landings, and 82nd Airborne Division paratroopers; helicopters including new Black Hawk troop carriers; AH-64 Apache gunships; a dozen AC-130 fixed-wing gunships capable of delivering immense firepower against precise targets; and A-7 and A-37 light attack aircraft for additional close air support. The airborne assault meshed with ground attacks by elements of the 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions and the 193rd Infantry Brigade, while Navy SEALs attacked Paitilla Airport. These ground actions all happened in darkness, the first large-scale exploitation of new night-vision capabilities. After one day the hardest task remaining would be finding the elusive Panamanian leader,

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[2] John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 1992), p. 7.

who eventually surrendered on 3 January.[3]

Due to a focus on conducting a decisive operation and not the complete campaign, the aftermath of this smaller scale contingency (SSC) did not go as smoothly, however. Planning for the post-conflict phase, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, was far from complete when the short period of hostilities began. Missions and responsibilities were vague, and planners failed to appreciate adequately the effects of combat operations and overthrowing the regime. Though guidance from SOUTHCOM on post-hostility missions was fairly clear, tactically oriented planners at the 18th Airborne Corps (in charge of the joint task force carrying out the operation) gave post-conflict tasks short shrift. For instance, the plan assigned the lone Military Police battalion the responsibility for running a detention facility, conducting security for all of the numerous convoys, and providing security for many key facilities, as well as for being prepared to restore law and order. Though the battalion was mainly concerned with a relatively small geographic portion of the country, it was quickly overwhelmed by its responsibilities.[4]

With the elimination of the Panamanian Defense Force, the task of restoring law and order became particularly demanding, as looting and vandalism spread throughout the country. Chaos reigned as American forces scrambled to restore some semblance of order. Military policemen trained in law and order missions did not perform well in unfamiliar combat operations, and were inadequate in numbers to deal with the problems they faced in the aftermath. They also could not handle all displaced personnel and the enemy prisoners of war for which they were now responsible. Similarly, there were not enough civil affairs personnel or engineers for the rebuilding effort. Personnel deficiencies were exacerbated by slow and disorganized Reserve call-ups relying on volunteers. Political-military interagency cooperation was also poor, as many agencies were excluded from Department of Defense (DoD) planning and the embassy was severely understaffed.[5]

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[3] Malcolm McConnell, *Just Cause: The Real Story of America's High-Tech Invasion of Panama* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991). For a shorter treatment, see the CMH brochure by R. Cody Phillips, *Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1990).

[4] Fishel, pp. 29-63; U.S. Army War College, *American War Plans Special Text-2001* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 2000), pp. 233-306.

[5] LTC John Fishel and MAJ Richard Downie, "Taking Responsibility for Our Actions? Establishing Order and Stability in Panama," *Military Review*, April 1992, pp. 66, 69-75; Oral History Interview JCIT 097Z of LTG Carmen Cavezza by Dr. Larry Yates, Dr. Robert Wright, and Mr. Joe Huddleston, "Joint Task Force South in Operation Just Cause," conducted at Fort Lewis, WA, April 30, 1992, available on the U.S. Army Center of Military History website, http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/panama/jcit/JCIT97Z.htm; Fishel, pp. 38, 58-59.

Senior commanders admitted afterwards that they had done poorly in planning for post-conflict operations and hoped the Army would remedy that situation in the future. Despite these deficiencies, the U.S. Military Support Group, activated in January 1990 to support the growth of independent Panamanian institutions, was able to be deactivated just 1 year later in a much more stable country; though whether it or Panamanian leaders deserved most credit for this success was unclear to observers.[6]

A fortuitous combination of new technology, budget increases, an all-volunteer military, understood and accepted doctrine, and enlightened leadership had produced the dominant force that next decimated the Iraqi Army in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The results of that conflict seemed to herald a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) for the American armed services. Land and air forces argued about which was more dominant, but both pursued technological paths to better conduct conventional state-on-state warfare. Army programs like The Army After Next and Force XXI drove modernization programs for the Future Combat System, Crusader artillery, and Comanche helicopter, all of which were eventually cancelled. In addition, the fall of the Soviet Union freed any restraints on the deployment of American military elements, which went up 500% during the Clinton administration, mostly for peacekeeping operations of questionable utility that the military did not relish, in places like Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans.[7]

Initial operations in Afghanistan seemed to justify small land forces supported by overwhelming airpower, and that influenced the size of the army that swept Saddam Hussein out of power in Iraq. But emerging insurgencies in both theaters demonstrated American unpreparedness for such conflicts, as well as an eventual adaptability to develop and execute new doctrine for them. However, a counterinsurgency campaign that was abandoned too quickly in Iraq, and one that never really started in Afghanistan, again produced disillusionment with such operations, just as after Vietnam. The 2012 Defense Planning Guidance decreed that U.S. land power would no longer engage in major COIN or stability operations, a sentiment contributing to what President Obama admitted was his worst mistake of his administration, trying to intervene in Libya with

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[6] Cavezza Interview. LTG Cavezza expressed doubt, however, that he could have trained his unit adequately for both the Mission Essential Tasks List required for war and for the complexities of the post-conflict operations he faced; Fishel, p. 63.

[7] USAHEC Historical Services Division, *A History of the Army's Future: 1990-2018* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, 2018); Conrad C. Crane, *Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller Scale Contingencies During the 1990s* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001).

just airpower.[8]

With a new administration facing the "4 + 1" threats of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorism, U.S. land power is now developing a concept of Multi-Domain or All Domain Operations. Due to the ability of potential adversaries to deny access to the air, sea, land, cyber, and space domains, operations in each will have to be carefully choreographed and synchronized to exploit windows of opportunity. Processes will be facilitated by artificial intelligence and other technological advances. The future battlefield will be complex and multi-dimensional, and rarely will land forces be able to operate on their own.[9] Yet the requirements of contemporary "Wars Amongst the People" will continue to require the sort of close contact that only "boots on the ground" can provide.

Challenges of Readiness and Modernization

The U.S. Army especially has faced the long-standing challenge of maintaining and modernizing the force as resources decline after every major conflict. Threats are usually poorly or narrowly defined, domestic economic concerns and a desire to "return to normalcy" overshadow foreign policy and security requirements, and the Army struggles to define its missions as policy makers rely more on other services. Chiefs of Staff generally find themselves with much flexibility and little direction in determining cuts and priorities, while facing a widening gulf between strategic commitments and resources. The Army has responded to this challenge in many different ways. The service has actually had few opportunities for major modernization programs, generally having to move incrementally while preparing to take advantage of those opportunities when a long war buildup or a national security policy emphasizing land forces provides more abundant funding.

The United States did not concern itself with building and sustaining the military forces of a world power until the 20th Century. Before then, the peacetime Regular Army was always very small and leaders expected the militia and volunteers to handle emergencies. While the Navy worried about keeping up with the latest technology, the Army did not. This all changed after World War I. The primary security threat to the

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8 Conrad Crane, "Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq," in Beth Bailey and Richard Immerman, eds., *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan* (New York: New York University Press, 2015), pp. 124-146; Dominic Tierney, "The Legacy of Obama's 'Worst Mistake'," *The Atlantic*, April 15, 2016; accessible at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/478461/.

9 For a concise description of Multi-Domain Battle, from which Multi-Domain Operations derived, see the Army website for "Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century," at http://www.arcic.army.mil/App_Documents/Multi_Domain_Battle.pdf.

United States was perceived as a rising Japan, with a resulting focus on the Pacific and the Navy, but the solution to this danger was pursued using naval arms limitations treaties. Meanwhile, the National Defense Act of 1920 established a base active force of 280,000 soldiers to defend the homeland and perform expeditionary duties. The legislation was heavily influenced by the Guard lobby in Congress, and depended on the Guard and an Organized Reserve to help mobilize almost 2 million draftees in 60 days for a war. The Army also made some effort to incorporate promising emerging WWI technologies such as the tank and airplane, but internal opposition to those weapons systems, the absence of imminent threats, and the reluctance of the Executive and Legislative branches to provide much funding limited military options in the "Roaring Twenties." Indeed, in some circles, the solution was to sign a treaty outlawing war, not better preparation.[10]

The Great Depression of 1929 made matters worse. Despite budgets getting tighter and the depression deepening, the Army Air Corps proved very adept at procuring money to purchase new aircraft. The rest of the force, however, was less successful at modernization, but that was partly due to internal policy. Though the Army knew it needed tanks and trucks, and mechanization overall, Chiefs of Staff almost always favored trained soldiers over new weapons when budget priorities were set. There was an assumption that the next generation of technology would be better, and that educated leaders would be able to build and adapt the Army when necessary. Consequently the service school system thrived in the 1920s and 1930s, and the best officers were assigned as students and faculty. In the meantime the service did successfully develop and field less expensive, but important, weapons like the M1 Garand rifle and a new 105 mm howitzer, and it also invested in medical innovation.[11]

The big explosion of modernization, however, occurred during the buildup for and execution of World War II, when the planning and priorities of interwar Chiefs of Staff were generally vindicated. Much of this success was due to a board system where each branch developed requirements which the Chief of Staff then prioritized. When the budget floodgates opened to prepare for war there were plenty of well-developed concepts on the table for programming. The Air and Quartermaster Corps proved especially adept at working with manufacturers to advance their technologies. Probably the greatest failure was in tank development, which was due in major part to the lack of

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[10] Millett and Maslowski, pp. 380-407.

[11] Ibid.

a distinct armor branch.[12]

The Second World War was followed by the usual drawdown and neglect of the Army. International Communism was the new threat, and the Navy and a newly independent Air Force squabbled over who should have the primary responsibility for deterrence. By 1948, General Omar Bradley declared that the Army was in a "shockingly deplorable state." The war in Korea surprised everyone; tank shortages had to be filled by pulling display models off pedestals in museums and combing Pacific islands for damaged remnants from World War II. However, instead of learning that ready land power was essential for effective deterrence, the Eisenhower Administration believed atomic threats forced the Communists into the 1953 armistice. This reinforced a nuclear focus; in fact, Ike's "New Look" policy de-emphasized conventional forces. The Army even developed the Pentomic Division concept for relevance on the nuclear battlefield. Strategic Air Command thrived, but the Army and Marine Corps lost manpower and modernization programs as the administration held fast to budget limitations. A robust Reserve Component program would again be called on to meet major conventional war contingencies and Congress, with the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, set the ceiling for such forces at 2.9 million men. By 1960 there were almost a million drill-pay reservists on the rolls. Again reliance on reserves was a hedge against a major ground war, and yet again, when that war came in Southeast Asia, draftees were used instead for most manpower needs. Korea did spark more reliance on civilian scientific advisors and the development of a new Army Combat Developments System. This system produced the M60 main battle tank, M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, and M14 rifle by the early 1960s.[13]

John F. Kennedy's national security policy of "Flexible Response" provided some impetus to reinvigorate conventional (and unconventional) ground forces and supported the Army's investment in airmobility. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's emphasis on systems analysis helped motivate the Army to set up a new Combat Developments Command in 1962, which brought into use the AR-15 rifle and new helicopters that would soon be tested in Southeast Asia. The Korean War had globalized national security strategy and Communism now also had to be contained in Vietnam, not just Europe. However, counterinsurgency against light and guerrilla forces did not provide much

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[12] Edgar. F. Raines, Jr., *The Army Requirements System, 1775-2009* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2009), pp. 34-63.

[13] MAJ Garry L. Thompson, *Army Downsizing Following World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and a Comparison to Recent Army Downsizing* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2002), pp. 28-37; Arthur W. Connor, Jr., "The Armor Debacle in Korea, 1950," *Parameters*, Summer 1992, pp. 66-76; Millett and Maslowski, pp. 544-552; Raines, pp. 73-82.

justification for force modernization.[14]

In the aftermath of Vietnam the Army suffered severely, again, ending up with the "Hollow Force" of the late 1970s. Army leaders realized they needed to modernize the force, especially after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, but defense budgets were shrinking. By 1979, six of ten divisions based on the continental United States were rated "not combat ready," as was one of four in Europe. The Congressional Budget Office's explanation for the readiness issues of the Seventies echoes eerily even today: "Yet the underlying problem may have been an imbalance between defense resources and national security commitments that made it impossible for DoD to buy both readiness and modernization."[15]

The Army's last great opportunity for modernization occurred with the Reagan defense buildup in the early and mid-1980s. After an unsatisfactory period where doctrine writers were given primary responsibility to determine Army needs, the 1973 War jolted the Army into a new approach. The newly created Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) reinvigorated combat developments. Once again, farsighted leaders operating in tough budget and policy environments laid the groundwork to exploit opportunities. The result was the development and fielding of the "Big Five" between 1971 and 1990 – Abrams Tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Apache and Blackhawk Helicopters, and Patriot Missile System. These systems still provide the backbone of the force today. All the services thrived during this period, but the Army benefited from a national security strategy reemphasizing strong conventional forces to further deter the Soviet Union. Reagan's defense policies really envisioned a fusion of New Look and Flexible Response.[16]

Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 revealed the impressive results of Army modernization and other programs – it also initiated another period of ground force drawdown and neglect. Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan realized the risks the service faced in trying to maintain its preeminence. He set four goals to guide change - Maintain the Edge, Integrate and Strengthen the Force, Resource the Force, and Re-Shape the Force. He followed this with specific guidance to all key subordinates about managing risk. He also set up the Louisiana Maneuvers and battle labs to further define requirements, and his successors continued to refine the system under increasing budget

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[14] Raines, pp. 82-92.

[15] Andrew Feickert and Stephen Daggett, *A Historical Perspective on "Hollow Forces"* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), pp. 2-9.

[16] Raines, pp. 93-105; Millett and Maslowski, pp. 614-616.

pressures. His concerns are very recognizable today. In fact, despite obvious differences in the comparison, the Army is facing similar circumstances today: recent demonstration of the Nation's need for a ready, well-equipped, highly trained ground force; unclear or "shifting" threat; reducing budgets; manpower reductions; and reassessment of policy as we deal with a "new world."[17]

It has been common for land forces to do poorly in force modernization efforts, especially when pursuing them alone (without the benefit of a 1980s defense build-up). Generally the Army especially has not fared well in getting its share of modernization funding since the era of Joint Requirements began in 1986. The fate of the Comanche, Crusader, and Future Combat Systems clearly demonstrate the vulnerability of major Army modernization programs in periods of vague threats and tight budgets. Also, as during the 1920s-1930s, Chiefs of Staffs have tended to emphasize trained and ready personnel over weapons procurement.[18]

By the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review declining budgets had again put considerable strain on land forces to balance readiness, modernization, and manpower. The events of 9/11 momentarily solved that dilemma. However, like counterinsurgency in Vietnam, the long war against terrorism and insurgency that has been the focus of the military for almost two decades has not been conducive to nurturing Congressional support for ground force modernization. Air-centric operations in Kosovo and Libya reinvigorated questions that never go away about the necessity of, roles for, and requirements generated by land power. Recent discussions of Air-Sea Battle concepts and the Pacific Pivot left the Army once again standing in the shallow end of the resource pool, despite numerous historical examples that justify a ready land force.

Predicting the Future

One of the great challenges for land forces trying to modernize is to predict exactly what future war will be like. Ironically, for the United States the clearest visions for modernization have come during periods of the tightest budgets, a version of the quote attributed to Winston Churchill, "Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we will have to think." In the period leading up to World War II, American airmen developed new ideas for strategic bombing, Marines created the doctrine for amphibious operations, and soldiers laid the groundwork for modern combined arms warfare. All

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17 Papers of Gordon Sullivan, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA; Feickert and Daggett, pp. 13-19.

18 Raines, pp. 105-123; USAHEC Historical Services Division, *A History of the Army's Future: 1990-2018*.

still influence the force today. Similar clear visions appeared in the aftermath of Vietnam, when military budgets and force readiness again took a nosedive. In January 1974 Colonel Donn Starry got to wander the battlefields of the recent Yom Kippur War. His papers at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center include a copy of the report he compiled from that visit. The three main conclusions of his report were that it was possible to fight outnumbered and win, that the lethality of modern weaponry had vastly increased, and that the tank was the dominant land weapon system. Observations from that Arab-Israeli conflict drove a complete revision in the way the U.S. Army would fight that eventually culminated in AirLand Battle, and contributed to the development of the "Big 5" weapons systems that still serve in the Army today – the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, Blackhawk and Apache helicopters, and Patriot missile. These really comprised a "system of systems" that made AirLand Battle possible.[19]

Overseeing these intellectual and technological changes was the newly established Training and Doctrine Command of General William E. DePuy. It must be noted that initially the Army got the warfighting concept wrong: the doctrine which appeared in 1976, abandoned the traditional focus on forms of maneuver and concentrated on "winning the first battle" with new defensive weaponry like TOW missiles.[20] I came into the Army under that doctrine, and remember practicing it fighting a Dunn-Kempf wargame at my officer advanced course in the late 1970s. I commanded a combined arms battalion task force that successfully decimated a Soviet motorized rifle regiment. However, we took heavy casualties, and when the second echelon force approached, our only option was to call in a strike with nuclear weapons.

Though the concept he developed was fatally flawed, DePuy had fostered an intellectual process that replaced Active Defense with AirLand Battle by 1982. The merging of the new warfighting concept with new training programs and the new technology produced the powerful force that overwhelmed the perfect enemy, an inept Soviet clone, in DESERT STORM in 1991. The whole world took notice, and discussions in defense circles pondered whether we had witnessed a true Revolution in Military Affairs or just a Military Technological Revolution.

In hindsight this was the time for a course correction, but instead the Army

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[19] Papers of Donn Starry, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA; Desert Storm Study Project, *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), Chapter 1.

[20] Major Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988).

continued on its vector of expecting great results from conventional high technology. After DESERT STORM and the end of the Cold War the Army abandoned AirLand battle to pursue the RMA with programs such as Force XXI and the Army After Next, and mostly theoretical weapons like the Future Combat System. The new vision was based upon a force with "near-perfect, near-real-time intelligence systems" and massed lethal effects with extremely deadly precision strike systems. Even the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency got alarmed about some future projections, and briefings in the files at USAHEC highlight dangerous "tales from technology dreamland" and "tales from systems dreamland." That same year I received a chart from Central Command entitled "Modern Warfare System Flow," that illustrated the war they were preparing to fight. The diagrams' many boxes showed how modern technology would reduce our own vulnerabilities, immobilize our enemies, and require very low ammunition expenditures because of precision systems. In short, the chart depicted a quick and decisive war with few friendly casualties and total destruction of the enemy, almost without firing a shot.[21] The shortcomings of such a view would not become clear until a decade later in Iraq. Just as George Patton would have been very comfortable with what he would have seen during DESERT STORM, Donn Starry would with modern battlefields. The realities of combat have not changed very much, nor have technologies leaped ahead into the realm of science fiction.

Performing Nontraditional Missions

But what has changed is an expansion of the missions that land forces must perform beyond just the normal requirements of combat, especially since the United States began to deploy major forces overseas. Experiences with postwar occupations and stability operations have stretched the flexibility and capacity of American land power. I often tell students at the Army War College that the U.S. government can be depicted as a fiddler crab, with one very large claw labeled "Department of Defense" and the small claw labeled "the rest of the interagency." Every Foreign Service Officer in the State Department could barely outfit one aircraft carrier. They are also outnumbered by the total number of musicians in DoD. Hence it is not surprising that military forces, especially soldiers and Marines, often have to pick up missions that might be better performed by civilian agencies, particularly in situations with questionable security. Military doctrine

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[21] USAHEC Historical Services Division, *A History of the Army's Future: 1990-2018*; Chart of Modern Warfare System Flow, by Earl Rubright, U.S. Central Command, 1993, in possession of author.

recognizes that all campaigns involve a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks, varying by the type and phase of the operation. Despite the continued focus on major conventional war, especially by the Army, American land power has almost always been called upon to perform in a different role, and even large scale combat operations usually require a long period of stability tasks to cement the results.

At the conclusion of World War I, 200,000 American troops moved to positions around Coblenz, preparing for the possibility that the Germans would not sign the peace treaty. When they agreed to the Versailles Treaty in the summer of 1919, the occupation force rapidly diminished, numbering only 16,000 a year later. By the end of 1922 that figure was down to 1200, and all left the next year. Though the bulk of responsibility for the details of the occupation and regime change fell on other Allied governments, occupying American troops did find themselves in charge of a million civilians. The U.S. Army and government had not really accepted the administration of civil government in occupied enemy territory as a legitimate military function after the Mexican War, Civil War, or Spanish-American War, and the officer in charge of civil affairs for the U.S. military government in the Rhineland after World War I lamented that the American army of occupation "lacked both training and organization" to perform its duties.[22]

As World War II approached, Army War College committees went back to the World War I reports and developed formal doctrine for military government. In the spring of 1942, a School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia, and thinking began there about postwar reconstructions of Germany, Japan, and Italy. By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed Allied planning for the occupation of that nation had been ongoing for 2 years. All staff sections at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces and Army Group headquarters invested considerable resources in developing what became Operation ECLIPSE. The plan correctly predicted most of the tasks required of the units occupying the defeated country. Within 3 months, those formations had disarmed and demobilized German armed forces, cared for and repatriated four million POWs and refugees, restored basic services to many devastated cities, discovered and quashed a potential revolt, created working local governments, and reestablished police and the courts.[23]

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[22] Edward M. Coffman, *The War To End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), pp. 359-360; Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975), p. 3.

[23] MAJ Kenneth O. McCreedy, *Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1995).

But such thorough preparation for post-conflict demands has not been typical for American land power. In contrast to the World War II example, LTG John Yeosock, commander of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, could get no useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, prisoners, and refugees, complaining later that he was handed a "dripping bag of manure" that no one else wanted to deal with. Neither the Army nor DoD had an adequate plan for postwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even more unprepared. The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers and civil affairs personnel, and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government.[24]

Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning for DESERT STORM can be attributed to the fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War. Post-conflict planning historically has been a function of headquarters at echelons above corps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly attributable to the generally small scale of American interventions. Difficulties also result from the fact that for at least the latter half of the 20th century, U.S. military leaders and planners focused predominantly on winning battles, not on the peacekeeping or nation-building that comes afterwards. But national objectives can often be accomplished only after the fighting has ceased; a war tactically and operationally "won" can still lead to strategic "loss" if post-conflict operations are poorly planned or executed. These problems had surfaced in Panama, and would appear again, with much more serious consequences, in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Smaller Scale Contingencies of the 1990s

This was surprising, considering the extensive experience with smaller scale contingencies and stability operations of American land forces after the end of the Cold War. Prior to World War II, the majority of instances where American armed forces were used abroad involved Marine or Navy actions to protect U.S. citizens or promote national interests. The use of American military means (especially the Army) expanded considerably with the advent of the Cold War and America's ascension to superpower status. After the end of the Cold War, there was another significant increase in the use of military forces (with

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[24] John J. Yeosock, remarks in "What We Should Have Done Differently," Part II of *In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm* (Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000), pp. 25, 29; Janet A. McDonnell, *After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999).

special emphasis again on the Army) by American political leaders to achieve policy objectives. While this overall increase in military operations began in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, it stabilized at a high level during the first full year of the Clinton administration. From 1993-2000, the American military engaged in 170 separate deployments. Except for the major theater war of Operation DESERT STORM, they fell under the broad heading of smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs), ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping, averaging between 20 and 30 a month.[25] Some examples are worth examining in detail to get a sense of the set of land power missions required for such operations.

In Somalia, Operation PROVIDE RELIEF from August to December 1992 consisted primarily of airlifts of supplies, but the deteriorating security situation caused the United Nations to expand its mandate to include restoring order. The nucleus for the Joint Task Force in Operation RESTORE HOPE that resulted was a Marine Expeditionary Force, reinforced by much of the 10th Mountain Division. After 5 months the first peacekeeping operation directed by the U.N. under the auspices of Chapter VII of its charter replaced the initial force. While the actual combat power of the new force was reduced, its mission was actually expanded to include disarming Somali clans. Most of the 4,500 Americans serving in the U.N. operation were Army logistics support personnel, but the 10th Mountain Division provided over a thousand combat soldiers for a Quick Reaction Force. The Marines also kept a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) offshore. The Army eventually reinforced its contingent with Task Force Ranger as well. There was a poor transition from one force to another, and a lack of appreciation for the increasing security problems and capabilities of the armed threats in the country. One problem with short rotations is the loss of institutional knowledge that results. The failure to properly coordinate humanitarian, military, and diplomatic requirements, and the jumble of nation-building tasks added by the newest U.N. mandate, meant that determinants of mission success were vague at best. Campaign planning is very difficult without a clear end state. There were critical shortfalls in communications units in a complex multinational environment, intelligence personnel and procedures, and liaison between military and civilian agencies.[26]

Institutional resistance to nation-building contributed to "mission creep" as those

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[25] Center for Army Analysis, "Stochastic Analysis of Resources for Deployments and Excursions: A Historical Perspective," December 2000; *Landpower and Crises*, pp. 1-2.

[26] Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 14-85.

tasks were forced upon unprepared American units or fell to them by default. Forces were not structured or resourced to accomplish all their required missions, and this culminated in the debacle in Mogadishu in October 1993. President Clinton withdrew all American forces 5 months later, and, without a U.S. ground presence, the relief effort in Somalia foundered. The country reverted into "a madhouse of violence and corruption" with a wretched population.[27]

Like Panama, intervention in Haiti was a response to a long-festering crisis. It began with the military overthrow of President Jean-Bertrande Aristide by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras in September 1991. The JCS sent the first alert order to the commander of U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) to begin planning for contingency operations in Haiti on April 1, 1993. Tens of thousands of Haitian refugees fleeing their impoverished island taxed humanitarian relief agencies and facilities throughout the Caribbean. Planning for active intervention intensified in October after armed protesters in Port Au Prince turned away a ship loaded with U.N. peacekeepers. During the next year, international pressure on the military leaders of Haiti increased, and was intensified even further by obvious American preparations for an invasion. The decision of the Haitian government in September 1994 to return President Aristide to power was to a large extent because they knew Army helicopters and 10th Mountain Division soldiers aboard the USS Eisenhower, along with elements of the 82nd Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg, were heading for Haiti. In fact, General Cedras did not begin to negotiate seriously with the American diplomatic delegation until he had confirmed that the 82nd Airborne detachment was in the air. The overwhelming force deployed in the initial occupation and that force's professional and disciplined conduct and appearance in continuing operations did much to deter and control the actions of potential troublemakers.[28]

The long lead-time between the beginning of the crisis and actual military intervention combined with lessons learned from operations like those in Panama and Somalia greatly facilitated planning for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. USACOM prepared plans for both forced and unopposed entry, while DoD conducted extensive interagency coordination. Its Haiti Planning Group, with the assistance of other government agencies, prepared a detailed "Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services." The lead agency for all major functional areas was the U.S. Agency

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[27] Richard C. Hottelot, "A New Somalia?" *Christian Science Monitor*, August 23, 2000, p. 8.

[28] CINCUSACOM CD-ROM, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: U.S. Forces in Haiti, 1997*, executive level AAR pamphlet, pp. 1-13 and Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) entries 10451-37950 and 10754-92362.

for International Development (USAID), with DoD support, mostly from Army units, in reestablishing public administration, conducting elections, restoring information services, assisting the Department of Justice with setting up and training a police force, disaster preparedness and response, running airports, and caring for refugees. Military units did have primary responsibility for security measures such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), protecting foreign residents, and demobilizing paramilitary groups.[29]

These plans and their execution were obviously affected by the desire of military leaders to avoid getting involved with "nation-building" missions such as those that had led to so much grief in Somalia. Army lawyers wrestled with interpreting humanitarian requests for reconstruction to classify them as mission related and allowed versus nation-building and prohibited. Medical units were told to focus on supporting the JTF and not humanitarian assistance, as they were cautioned not to replace the medical facilities of the host nation. This stand-off approach had its most regrettable result on September 20, 1994, when American forces stood by and watched Haitian police kill two demonstrators. The next day American officials expanded the rules of engagement to allow more military involvement in restoring and maintaining law and order.[30]

Similar expansion of land force roles and missions happened in most other areas of the restoration efforts. The attorneys eventually rationalized that any action that made Americans look good would lessen security risks, and approved more projects. Other governmental agencies were slow to arrive or build up resources, so the military picked up the slack. Generally, the other departments had not done the detailed planning that DoD had, and often wanted more support than DoD expected to provide. A typical example was when the Ambassador to Haiti asked for military advisers to help new government ministries get established until efforts from USAID and the State Department could be established. The result was a ministerial advisor team from the 358th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade, "the first large scale implementation of a civil administration effort since World War II." The scope and pace of CA missions increased so rapidly that they threatened to get out of control, and raised fears that such actions would only heighten Haitian

[29] David Bentley and Robert Oakley, "Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti," National Defense University Strategic Forum No. 30, May 1995; AAR, 2-9, USACOM CD-ROM; Haiti Planning Group, "Draft Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services," furnished to author by COL Mike Fitzgerald, CENTCOM J-5.

[30] Interview of LTC Karl Warner by COL Dennis Mroczkowski, JTF-190 Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY AAR, pp. 266-267; Interview of COL Gerald Palmer by MAJ Christopher Clark, JTF-190 Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY AAR, p. 269; Chronology, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, USACOM CD-ROM.

expectations that U.S. forces could fix all the nation's problems, and thus set the people up for great disappointment later.[31]

These expanded missions caused many other problems. Engineer planning, equipment, and personnel were inadequate for their required civil affairs and reconstruction projects. Soldiers had to develop new policies and procedures to help set up internal security forces and expend funds. This often required "working around" legal restrictions. Soldiers assumed expanded roles in maintaining law and order, including manning and operating detention facilities and developing new crowd control techniques. Items like latrines and police uniforms were in short supply. Doctrine and personnel were not available to establish proper liaison with the myriad civilian organizations working in the country. As in previous SSCs, intelligence assets were severely taxed, and the force in Haiti had to rely heavily on theater and national intelligence assets to make up for deficiencies.[32]

However, the military in general, and the Army in particular, received much praise for its performance in Haiti. Nonetheless, once the last American troops left the island in April 1996, the situation there quickly deteriorated to conditions approaching those early in the 1990s. Without long-term military involvement, most U.S. policy goals were frustrated. The civilian agencies that replaced military forces did not have the same resources available, and persistent flaws in the Haitian economy, judicial system, and political leadership obstructed reform.[33]

Combat actions in the Balkans reflected the trend in the 1990s to rely more on aircraft and cruise missiles for hostilities, though the threat of the Croat Army had important influence on the negotiations that led to the Dayton Accords for Bosnia, just as the growing potential for a NATO ground campaign helped resolve the situation in Kosovo. The deployment of a relatively small ground contingent, including 350

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[31] This expansion of missions is evident from the Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Logistics Support Operations briefing from the USACOM CD-ROM; Warner Interview, p. 267 and JULLS entry 10829-67459, and Memorandum from 358th Civil Affairs Brigade to CG, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, SUBJECT: After Action Report, USACOM Operation Uphold/Maintain Democracy, May 26, 1995, and JULLS entry 11566-55234, USACOM CD-ROM.

[32] JULLS entries 00676-58398, 00969-70100, 01040-06216,02656-20553, 10355-63106, 10447-74360, 10758-27517, 11558-362234, 11640-05029, 11640-61460, 50257-20594, 50258-39326, 92638-89373, USACOM CD-ROM.

[33] U.S. General Accounting Office, *Foreign Assistance: Any Further Aid to Haitian Justice System Should be Linked to Performance-Related Conditions*, GAO-01-24, October 2000; "Haiti is Nightmare for U.S.," *Charleston Post and Courier*, October 5, 2000; "Haiti's Disappearing Democracy," *New York Times*, November 28, 2000; Ben Barber, "U.S. Officials See Failed Haiti Policy," *Washington Times*, November 29, 2000.

American soldiers, in the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia had significant impact both for peacekeeping there and as a show of force to deter potentially aggressive neighbors, preventing any "conflict spillover." The U.S. Army picked up its usual predominant load of stabilization phase tasks requiring more than 10,000 troops in Bosnia and Kosovo.[34]

Deployed Army task forces generally became lighter with every rotation, and moved from immediate security concerns towards enhancing long-term stability. By late 1997 it became apparent to stabilization forces (SFOR) in Bosnia that a large disparity existed between the ability of military forces to achieve their initially assigned tasks of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and that of their less-capable civilian counterparts to meet their own implementation requirements. SFOR realized it could not disengage with such a large "GFAP Gap" remaining, and expanded its mission to "assist international organizations to set the conditions for civilian implementation of the GFAP in order to transition the area of operations to a stable environment." U.S. military leaders on the scene recognized they were moving into the area of nation-building, but saw no alternative if SFOR was ever going to be able to withdraw or significantly reduce its commitment without risking the peace.[35]

As the nature of the stability operations and support operations in Bosnia evolved, so did the requirements of the peacekeeping force. It needed fewer combat troops and more engineers, military police, and civil affairs personnel. Intelligence requirements changed and expanded. After-action reports highlighted many shortfalls in force structure and peacekeeping policies, many of them common to previous SSCs. Army lawyers again proved adept at "thinking outside traditional fiscal rules and applications" to support operational requirements. The roles of military policemen expanded to include performing as maneuver battalion task forces and working with international law enforcement agencies. Difficulties with tactical MPs trying to perform law and order missions reappeared.[36]

There were problems with shortages and recall procedures for RC engineer, military intelligence, and civil affairs augmentation. The massive engineering requirements for

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34 Steven R. Bowman, *Bosnia & Macedonia: U.S. Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 1995), p. 12; Julie Kim, *Macedonia: Conflict Spillover Prevention* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 1998).

35 Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, *After Action Report: Operation Joint Guard*, November 1998, pp. 3-2, 3-21 to 3-23.

36 Ibid., pp. 9-26, 9-36; Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, *Operation Joint Endeavor: After Action Report*, May 1997, p. 235.

Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD especially highlighted branch deficiencies with command and control, construction unit allocations, and bridging. A split-based logistics system trying to meet requirements in the Balkans and back in the Central Region of Europe required considerable augmentation and still strained combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) assets considerably. Liaison officers were in great demand, not just as Joint Commission Observers with the Entity Armed Forces, but also to coordinate with the myriad non-governmental organizations and other agencies. There were shortages of linguists throughout the theater, which especially exacerbated problems with intelligence. Military intelligence (MI) doctrine was completely inadequate for supporting peace operations, and understaffed intelligence units had to adapt as best they could for the complex "multi-service, multi-agency, and multi-national" situation further complicated by a host of treaty requirements.[37]

Contemporary Legacies

Despite all this experience, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq repeated the pattern of inadequate preparation for post-conflict and non-kinetic operations. It is a bit ironic that so much criticism is directed at inadequate "Phase IV" (post-conflict) plans for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, while the fact that there was no such campaign planning for Afghanistan at all gets ignored. CENTCOM planners viewed operations there as a "strategic movement to contact" setting the stages for later operations; no one expected the Taliban to fall so quickly to a combination of Northern Alliance militia and American special forces and airpower. Diplomats were then quick to set lofty goals for rehabilitating that country, but in the ensuing four year lull in significant strife there little progress was made, allowing the Taliban to regroup and regenerate. Instead American and international attention turned to Iraq.[38]

The continuing turmoil in Iraq eventually prompted the appointment of a new commander in 2007, General David Petraeus, who also brought a new counterinsurgency approach he and USMC General James Mattis had fostered with an Army/Marine writing team, spelled out in a new counterinsurgency manual, Field Manual 3-24. That

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[37] Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, *After Action Report: Operation Joint Guard*, pp. 4-5, 5-18; COL David A. Kingston, *Towards a More Relevant Engineer Command* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000); Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, *Operation Joint Endeavor*, pp. 78-94, 130-131, 206, 210; Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Joint Military Commissions: Lessons Learned From Operation Joint Endeavor*, May 1996; LTC Melissa E. Patrick, *Intelligence in Support Operations: The Story of Task Force Eagle and Operation Joint Endeavor* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000).

[38] Crane, "Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq," pp. 127-129.

new doctrine emphasized a campaign design process to identify a complex problem set, and recognized non-kinetic activities along political, economic, social, and informational lines of effort as being just as important to a final solution as combat actions. FM 3-24 emphasized that stability operations would be the most important to ensure long term success, and also noted "By default, U.S. and multinational military forces often possess the only readily available capacity to meet many of the local populace's fundamental needs." Also, "Soldiers and marines should prepare to execute many non-military missions to support COIN efforts. Everyone has a role in nation-building, not just Department of State and civil affairs personnel."[39]

General Petraeus and his new approach did create a window of opportunity for political reconciliation in Iraq, but when failure to achieve a Status of Forces Agreement resulted in a withdrawal of American military forces in 2011, along with a massive reduction in contributions from other U.S. agencies as well, that country returned to a state of civil turmoil, riven by tribal and religious strife that was exploited by the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Eventually American ground troops returned to assist in removing that threat. Likewise such forces remain in Afghanistan. A small surge in forces there in 2011, again led by General Petraeus, did achieve some limited gains, but there has never been the commitment of resources there as there was in Iraq. Arguably a true integrated and fully resourced COIN campaign has never really been applied there.[40]

But the current ground force presence in Iraq and Afghanistan does reinforce one important principal concerning the use of American land power: in order to achieve national objectives in any kind of military intervention, a long term commitment afterwards is almost always required. American soldiers and Marines remain on station in Germany, Japan, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, and many other locations. Politicians who promise short campaigns with a quick "Mission Accomplished" and return of the troops are almost always proven wrong. So the grim reality for American leaders who want to use military force to achieve their goals is that it will probably require long term U.S. land power presence to fully accomplish them.

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[39] On creating FM 3-24, see Conrad C. Crane, *Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016); U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Dept. of the Army, 2006), paras. 1-153, 2-41.

[40] Crane, "Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq," pp. 137-142.