

**Program
Participants
Summaries**

PROGRAM

MORNING

OPENING CEREMONY (9:30)

KEYNOTE SPEECH (9:40)

“Military Strategies and the Unexpected Expansion of Conflicts”

Dr. Stephen Badsey, Professor, University of Wolverhampton (U.K.)

BREAK

SESSION I: “The Expansion of Wars” (10:30)

Speakers:

Dr. Ryoichi Tobe, Professor Emeritus, National Defense Academy

“The Expansion of the Sino-Japanese War and the Japanese Army, July 1937 to October 1938”

Dr. Allan R. Millett, Professor, University of New Orleans (U.S.A.)

“The General Who Hated Surprises: Douglas MacArthur and Korea, 1950-1951”

Dr. Albert Palazzo, Director of War Studies, Australian Army Research Centre

“Meeting the Needs of War: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War”

Discussant: Dr. Tomoyuki Hanada, Senior Research Fellow, Military History Division, Center for Military History (CMH), NIDS

AFTERNOON

LUNCH BREAK (12:10 – 13:30)

SESSION II: “The Expansion of Campaigns” (13:30)

Speakers:

Dr. Phylomena Badsey, Research Administrator and Lecturer, University of Wolverhampton (U.K.)

“The Unexpected British Medical Emergency in the Gallipoli Campaign 1915-16”

Mr. Hiroyuki Shindo, Senior Research Fellow, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS

“From Opportunity to Strategic Necessity: The Japanese in the South Pacific, 1942-43”

Dr. Geoffrey P. Megargee, Senior Applied Research Scholar, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

“Rejecting Catastrophe: the German High Command and the Failure of the Offensive in the Soviet Union, Autumn 1941”

Discussant: Lt. Col. Tatsushi Saito, Research Fellow, Military Archives, CMH, NIDS

BREAK

SESSION III: Overall Discussion (15:30)

CLOSING CEREMONY (16:50)

PARTICIPANTS

Speakers

Stephen Badsey

Current Position: Professor, University of Wolverhampton

Academic Background: Ph.D., Cambridge University

Areas of Expertise: Military history since the 1850s, propaganda and military-media issues since the 1850s, military thought since the 1750s, British military history since the 1850s

Selected Publications:

The German Corpse Factory: A Study in First World War Propaganda. Helion, 2019 (forthcoming).

(co-editor with Gary Sheffield) "Chapter 14: Strategic Command," in Jay Winter, ed., *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, Volume 1. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

The British Army in Battle and Its Image 1914-1918. Continuum, 2009.

Ryoichi Tobe

Current Position: Professor Emeritus, National Defense Academy

Academic Background: Ph.D., Kyoto University

Areas of Expertise: Diplomatic History, Modern Japanese Military History

Other: Formerly Professor, National Defense Academy; Professor, Teikyo University.

Selected Publications:

Peace Feeler: Shina Jihen Wahei Kosaku no Gunzo (Peace Feeler: Peace Initiatives during the Sino-Japanese Incident). Ronsosha, 1991.

Nihon no Kindai (9) Gyakusetu no Guntai (Japan's Modern Age (9) The Paradoxical Military). Chuokoron-shinsha, 1998.

Jikai no Byori: Nihon Rikugun no Soshiki Bunseki (The Pathology of Self-Destruction: An Organizational Analysis of the Japanese Army). Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha, 2017.

Allan R. Millett

Current Position: Professor, University of New Orleans; Professor Emeritus, The Ohio State University

Academic Background: Ph.D., The Ohio State University

Areas of Expertise: Organizational history of the American armed forces; American national security policy; conflicts and the armed forces in America in the 20th century.

Other: Senior military advisor, National World War Two Museum. Formerly Professor of

History, The Ohio State University.

Selected Publications:

The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning. University Press of Kansas, 2005.

The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North. University Press of Kansas, 2010.

(with Peter Maslowski and William B. Feis) *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012* (Third Edition). Free Press, 2012.

Albert Palazzo

Current Position: Director of War Studies, Australian Army Research Centre

Academic Background: Ph.D., The Ohio State University

Area of Expertise: History of the Australian Army; contemporary character of war.

Selected Publications:

The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation, 1901-2001. Oxford University Press, 2001.

The Australian Army in Vietnam. Australian Army History Unit, 2006.

Forging Australian Land Power: A Primer (Army Research Paper). Commonwealth of Australia, 2015.

Phylomena Badsey

Current Position: Research Administrator and Lecturer, Wolverhampton University

Academic Background: Ph.D., Kingston University

Areas of Expertise: War sociology, history of political thought.

Selected Publications:

(co-authored) *War, Journalism and History: War Correspondents in the Two World Wars.* Peter Lang, 2012.

“Care-giving and the Naval Nursing Service,” in Rhys Crawley & Michael Locicero, eds., *Gallipoli: New Perspectives on the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force 1915-16.* Helion, 2018.

“Vera Brittain: War Reporter 1939-1945,” in Yvonne McEwen & Fiona Fiskens, eds., *War, Journalism and History - War Correspondents in the Two World Wars.* Peter Lang, 2012.

Hiroyuki Shindo

Current Position: Senior Research Fellow, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS

Academic Background: LL.M., Kobe University

Areas of Expertise: Modern Japanese military history.

Selected Publications:

“The Japanese Army’s ‘Unplanned’ South Pacific Campaign,” Peter Dean, ed., *Australia*

1942: In the Shadow of War. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

“The Japanese Army’s Search for a New South Pacific Strategy, 1943,” Peter Dean, ed., *Australia 1943: The Liberation of New Guinea*. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

“Holding on the Finish: The Japanese Army in the South and Southwest Pacific, 1944-45,” Peter Dean, ed., *Australia 1944-45: Victory in the Pacific*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Geoffrey P. Megargee

Current Position: Senior Applied Research Scholar, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

Academic Background: Ph.D., The Ohio State University

Area of Expertise: Modern European history; military history; history of the Holocaust.

Selected Publications:

Inside Hitler’s High Command. University Press of Kansas, 2000.

War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941. Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.

Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945. Indiana University Press, 2009 to present (Editor-in-Chief; seven-part series (ongoing)).

DICUSSANTS

Tomoyuki Hanada

Current Position: Senior Research Fellow, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS

Academic Background: Ph.D., Hokkaido University

Areas of Expertise: Russian political history; Russian military history.

Selected Publications:

“The Russian Empire’s Colonial Administration and Decolonization Wars in the Caucasus during the first half of the Nineteenth Century.” *Senshi Kenkyu Nenpo*, No. 15, 2012.

“The Nomonhan Incident and the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact.” *Fifteen Lectures on Showa Japan: Road to the Pacific War in Recent Historiography*, Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, 2016.

“The Soviet Military Offensive in Manchuria and the Collapse of Japanese Empire in August 1945.” *Senshi Kenkyu Nenpo*, No. 22, 2019.

Lt. Col. Tatsushi Saito

Current Position: Research Fellow, Military Archives, CMH, NIDS

Academic Background: M.A., Waseda University

Area of Expertise: Modern Japanese military history.

Selected Publications:

“An Ideal for Military History Research: A Perspective.” *Rikusen Kenkyu*, Vol. 443 (February 2018).

“A Study of the Japanese Armed Forces’ Amphibious Operations: An Investigation of Revisions of Army and Navy Manuals.” *Rikusen Kenkyu*, Vol. 442.

“The Creation and Growing Pains of Japan’s Command Organs: The Satsuma Rebellion.” *Gunji Shigaku*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (December 2016).

CHAIRS

Tomoyuki Ishizu

Current Position: Director, CMH, NIDS

Academic Background: M.A., Kings College London

Area of Expertise: Philosophy of war and peace; war studies; the First World War.

Selected Publications:

“The Japanese Airpower,” in John A. Olsen, ed., *Routledge Handbook of Air Power*. Routledge, 2018.

(co-editor with Williamson Murray) *Conflicting Currents: Japan and the United States in the Pacific*. Praeger, 2009.

“The Rising Sun Strikes,” in Daniel Marston, ed., *The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima*. Osprey, 2005.

Kyoichi Tachikawa

Current Position: Chief of the Military History Division, CMH, NIDS

Academic Background: Ph.D., Sophia University

Area of Expertise: International relations history.

Selected Publications:

Dainiji Sekaitaisen to Furansuryo Indochina: “Nichifutsu Kyoryoku” no Kenkyu [The Franco-Japanese Collaboration in French Indochina during the Second World War. Sairyusha, 2000.

(co-editor with Brian Bond) of *British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War, 1941-1945*. Frank Cass, 2004.

(co-authored with Naoko Sajima) *Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation’s Struggle for Identity*. Sea Power Center - Australia, 2009.

SUMMARIES

Keynote Address

Military Strategies and the Unexpected Expansion of Conflicts

Stephen Badsey

This paper analyses the military strategies that have been employed as a consequence of the unexpected expansion of conflicts. It does so both from the perspective of grand strategy, and an unexpected expansion on a national scale in the course of a war, and from the perspective of the operational level, and an unexpected expansion affecting the course of a specific campaign. Its perspective is chiefly that of military staffs in their planning, either in their responses to an unexpected enemy expansion of the conflict, or in their dealing with the unexpected consequences of their own decision to choose expansion. Most of the examples chosen are from the last 100 years: the era of industrialised states and organised armed forces including air power. The analysis is informed by the substantial body of existing military theory, including the related concepts of surprise, escalation, and the political-military interface. The course of both the First and Second World Wars (as the two large and protracted industrialised wars of the first half of the 20th Century) shows several examples of unexpected expansion and response, largely due to additional countries joining in the conflicts. The subsequent era of nuclear weapons shows far fewer cases of overt intervention, and many successful attempts to prevent escalation, but cases of unexpected expansion have still taken place.

At the grand strategic level there has been considerable discussion about technological responses to unexpected expansions or escalations, linked to the idea of a victory over a substantially stronger enemy through a new 'super weapon'. But although variants on this have been tried, there has not yet been a convincingly successful case.

In protracted wars, by far the most common issue in responding to unexpected expansion has been force generation by the responding power, including the expansion, training and equipping of ground forces, and sometimes of navies and air forces. The largest single factor has been the time needed to respond; the greatest problem has been finding strategies to cope with often heavy defeat in the interval, followed by the later consequences at the operational and tactical level of a substantial and hasty expansion. The same factors have also applied to some protracted campaigns, notably counterinsurgency wars in the later 20th and early 21st Centuries. Only at the operational level has the need for rapid changes in equipment or in combat doctrine ranked as equal in importance to the need for additional combat-ready forces.

Session 1

The Expansion of the Sino-Japanese War and the Japanese Army, July 1937 to October 1938

Ryoichi Tobe

The Sino-Japanese War (China Incident) can be roughly divided into five stages, based on the Japanese Army's policy or stance towards it: 1) from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to the deployment of forces to Shanghai (July to August 1937), 2) the escalation to all-out war and the adoption of a policy to resist expanding the area of the war, i.e. increasing the frontage of battle (September 1937 to March 1938), 3) the search for a military solution (April to October 1938), 4) an extended attritional war (November 1938 to November 1941), and 5) the Pacific War period (December 1941 to August 1945). Among these, this report covers the period during which the war escalated, in other words, the first through third stages.

The Japanese Army's basic policy towards the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was to seek a local settlement and to keep the incident from expanding. Nevertheless, the Army decided to send reinforcements from Manchuria, Korea and mainland Japan to North China, in order to prepare for any threat the Chinese Central Army might present. However, opinions were divided over the sending of reinforcements from mainland Japan, and it was not until three weeks after the Incident that the Army finally decided upon an all-out military commitment.

At this stage, the Army's objective was to seize control of Beijing, Tianjin, and the surrounding areas, and this objective was achieved quickly. In August, however, an armed clash occurred in Shanghai, and the Japanese Navy asked the Army to send forces to protect Japanese nationals living in Shanghai. The Army was reluctant to send its forces to Shanghai, but could not reject the Navy's request.

War spread from North China to Shanghai, and assumed the characteristics of an all-out war. China decided to fight an all-out war of resistance. The Japanese government also abandoned the non-escalation policy. Yet, neither side formally declared war. The Japanese Army historically had never conceptualized an all-out war against China, and continued to pursue their policy of avoiding as much as possible an expansion in the area or frontage of battle. That was because they had to prepare for the Soviet threat from the north. Thus, the Army tried to force China into submission by seeking decisive victories in North China and around Shanghai. A decisive battle was not realized in North China, however, because the Chinese forces retreated, while in Shanghai, the Japanese were forced into an increasingly difficult battle because of unexpectedly stiff Chinese resistance.

After the amphibious operation in Hangzhou Bay in November led to the crumbling of Chinese resistance around Shanghai, the Japanese forces on the spot increasingly pressed for the capture of Nanjing, the capital. The Army high command had no plans to capture Nanjing, but they could not reject those requests from the local forces. Thus, the area of battle expanded despite the Army's policy to avoid increasing the geographical area of the war. Furthermore,

the Army was not able to link the victory in Nanjing to peace negotiations with the Chinese.

Since the loss of the capital did not make the Chinese surrender, the Japanese Army had little choice but to prepare for an extended war. Still, they tried to maintain their non-expansion policy, because they could not mobilize any further forces. Once again, however, the non-expansion policy was abandoned because of demands made by the forces at the front. The Japanese deployed in North China made those demands because they had run headlong into additional Chinese forces of considerable size while pursuing the Chinese forces retreating southwards. The Japanese Army fought and won the ensuing Xuzhou Campaign in May 1938, but failed to annihilate the enemy. In October, both Canton and Hankou were captured, but once more, the Army could not connect these military victories to success in peace negotiations. The Army determined that it had reached the limits of its military capability, and thereafter decided to stop expanding the geographical area of the war, and to shift its focus to maintaining security in the occupied territories.

This report shall look in more detail at this process through which the Sino-Japanese War expanded, and explore the reasons why the war expanded unexpectedly, even though the Japanese Army had decided upon a basic policy of keeping the conflict localized and avoiding an escalation, i.e. increase in the area or frontage of the war.

Session 1

The General Who Hated Surprises: Douglas MacArthur and Korea, 1950-1951

Allan R. Millett

For a theater commander who prided himself on strategic intuition and bold decisions, Douglas MacArthur spent considerable time in supreme command recovering from strategic and operational surprise. Certainly, the Philippine campaign, 1941-1942, produced a litany of miscalculations that cannot all be excused by the weaknesses of the American-Filipino defense forces. The first year of the Korean War was no different. MacArthur again endured strategic surprises, one mounted by the North Koreans in June and the other, by the Chinese in October-November, 1950. The third surprise came in April, 1951, when President Harry S. Truman relieved MacArthur of all three of his theater commands and sent him into permanent retirement. In all of these surprises, MacArthur provided an example of a general behaving badly, blaming anyone in his wide impact area for his surprises. Only the troops' dogged combat performance and inspired generalship prevented strategic disaster.

Session 1

Meeting the Needs of War: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War

Albert Palazzo

When Australia decided to commit forces to Vietnam in support of the United States and the Republic of South Vietnam War with North Vietnam, its Army was fundamentally unprepared. The Army was under strength and under equipped, and it was a struggle to form the battalion-size task force that the Government had agreed to commit. Australia was only able to meet this trivial requirement by reassigning individual soldiers from across the field force and combing out the training establishments. At the war's highpoint, the Australian task force had grown to brigade size strength, which included three infantry battalions and an array of supporting arms that it used to control the province for which it had responsibility – Phuoc Tuy. In addition, Australia had built its own support base at Vung Tau to provide for the needs of the task force base at Nui Dat, a requirement that necessitated additional growth in the force.

In addressing the several-fold increase in Australia's commitment, this paper will examine the two main factors that drove the expansion. These factors can be termed the military imperative and the political imperative. Both imperatives played a part in determining the size of Australia's contribution to Vietnam, sometimes working together and at other times working independently or even against each other. This paper will explore how these factors worked to increase the size of the force and then drove its reduction in the war's second half. It will demonstrate that of the two, the political imperative was the more important and that military needs took second position to those of the Government.

Session 2

The Unexpected British Medical Emergency in the Gallipoli Campaign 1915-16

Phylomena Badsey

This paper analyses the medical strategies that were improvised by British staff officers throughout the Gallipoli or Dardanelles Campaign of February 1915 to January 1916. The British expected and planned for a short campaign, the object of which was to pass British warships through the Dardanelles Straits to threaten the Ottoman Empire's capital of Constantinople. But from the start they met unexpectedly heavy opposition. The first unsuccessful attacks on the Gallipoli positions consisted entirely of ship-to-shore bombardments. This was followed by an improvised amphibious landing by British and Empire troops in April, which produced only stalemate, together with heavy losses from fighting and illnesses. A second amphibious landing in August, meant to rejuvenate the campaign, produced only further stalemate and losses. From the start of the land campaign, General Sir Ian Hamilton, the British commander at Gallipoli, saw casualty evacuation and treatment as one of his most important priorities. Of the estimated 213,000 British casualties, 145,000 came from illness, while veterans recalled the terrible problems with intense heat, swarms of flies, body lice, and severe lack of water. Over several months, senior medical and staff officers created an effective chain of casualty evacuation, which ran from the front line trenches down to the beaches, then by small boats to hospital ships (and 'black ships' which were used unofficially to transport casualties), and on to field hospitals either on nearby Lemnos, or as far away as Malta, and Alexandria in Egypt. This evacuation chain eventually functioned so well that in planning and executing the successful and relatively bloodless final evacuation of troops from Gallipoli in January 1916, the Royal Navy and Army planning staffs drew heavily on the methods and experience of the medical staffs to evacuate the remaining troops.

Session 2

From Opportunity to Strategic Necessity: The Japanese in the South Pacific, 1942-43

Hiroyuki Shindo

At the opening of the Pacific War, the “Southern Operation” was the primary operation for both the Japanese Army and Navy. In the South Pacific, the only strategic objective was the capture of Rabaul. The Army only committed the brigade-sized South Seas Detachment to operations in the Pacific Ocean area proper, including the assault on Rabaul, because the Army as well as the Navy understood that the Pacific Ocean was the Navy’s area of operational responsibility. Soon after the start of the war, the Navy planned further offensives to capture Lae, Tulagi, and other points in eastern New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The Navy also proposed operations to cut the line of communications between the U.S.A. and Australia, and the Army acquiesced. This concept became Operation FS, and called for the capture of such distant areas as the Fiji and Samoa Islands. The Army’s commitment to FS was minimal, and was determined to require only approximately ten battalions.

When these offensives into the South Pacific were being planned, neither the Navy nor the Army imagined that the South Pacific would become one of the major battle areas of the Pacific War. In reality, however, the Navy ultimately lost many ships and aircraft in the battles for the Solomon Islands. The Army, too, ultimately had to commit approximately ten divisions to the South Pacific, and suffered over 200,000 dead from all causes on New Guinea alone. The losses suffered by both services in the South Pacific also reduced their effectiveness, in particular the Navy’s, to fight in the campaigns which followed in the Central Pacific, the Philippines, and other areas.

This report shall address the following questions. First, what was the Japanese expectation regarding the scale or scope of the South Pacific campaign when they first planned their expansion into the area? Next, how did the Japanese respond when the South Pacific campaign started to expand with the start of the Guadalcanal campaign and the intensification of the fighting for eastern New Guinea? The Japanese Army and Navy’s experience in the South Pacific is an example of a campaign that expanded beyond expectation, and the focus shall be on how effectively the Army and Navy handled that change in the military situation.

Session 2

Rejecting Catastrophe: the German High Command and the Failure of the Offensive in the Soviet Union, Autumn 1941

Geoffrey P. Megargee

On June 22, 1941, the German armed forces—the Wehrmacht—launched their invasion of the Soviet Union. The Germans' confidence ran high. The year before, they had defeated the French army, which was supposedly the most powerful on the European continent, in a matter of weeks. Moreover, the Red Army appeared unable to conduct modern operations. Its troops were untrained, and Stalin's purges had gutted the officer corps. One good blow, the Germans thought, and the entire edifice would collapse. The campaign would be over in a few weeks. Indeed, the Germans made fantastic gains that summer, and killed or captured hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops. Germany's military leaders were sure they were on the brink of victory.

By the beginning of autumn, however, the Germans' situation was beginning to deteriorate. Losses were mounting. The logistical system was not keeping up with demand. The weather was turning bad. Most important, the Soviets were showing no signs of collapsing.

In October, the Wehrmacht launched Operation Typhoon, a last lunge at Moscow that the Germans were sure would chew through the Soviets' last reserves and win the war. The initial results were encouraging, but the onset of the autumn rains, followed by winter, and continuing Soviet resistance brought the offensive to a final halt by the beginning of December. Soon the Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive, and the Germans found themselves in desperate straits.

As their offensive stalled, the German generals displayed an attitude that mixed denial, discouragement, and long-term optimism. They only gradually gave up on their most ambitious goals, including an autumn advance through the Caucasus into Iran to threaten the British in the Middle East. Until very late, they refused to believe that the Soviets could have any reserves left. As a result, they threw their armies into impossible offensives, and forfeited any chance to prepare for winter operations. Moreover, even after Hitler declared war on the United States, his generals saw the strategic situation in rosy terms: 1942 would bring victory over the Soviets, after which Germany could concentrate on defeating the Americans. Through the whole experience, the fundamental attitudes that had shaped the planning for Barbarossa continued to govern the Germans' behavior.

