

The Algerian War: A Model for Counterinsurgency Operations

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Introduction

The Algerian War is an armed conflict that began with the uprising of the National Liberation Front (FLN: *Front de libération nationale*) on November 1, 1954, and ended with the ceasefire following the conclusion of the Evian Accords on March 18, 1962. In general, it is recognized as the war for Algerian independence from France. However, there were special circumstances, in that Algeria, although a French colony, was administratively part of Metropolitan France. For this reason, the French government did not officially acknowledge this conflict as a war and responded to it as a “state of emergency (*événements*),” calling its actions in Algeria “operations to maintain order (*opérations de maintien de l’ordre*).” Only after Act No. 99-882 (*Loi n° 99-882*) of October 18, 1999 was enacted was this conflict officially referred to in France as a “war.”

In December 2006, during the Iraq War, the US Army revised the counterinsurgency doctrine and developed Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964), authored by David Galula, a French Army officer who engaged in counterinsurgency operations during the Algerian War, is believed to have had a major influence on this revision process.¹

Around the same time, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-6*,² written by British historian Alistair Horne and originally published in 1977, was reprinted for the first time in ten

¹ United States Department of the Army, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). The entire *Manual* attempts to extract lessons from the Algerian War, with more than 40 citations of France and Algeria (Geoff Demarest, “Let’s Take the French Experience in Algeria Out of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” *Military Review* [July-August 2010], p. 19, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536515.pdf>, accessed on January 31, 2017). There are four books related to the Algerian War in the bibliography (in addition to Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, there are *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, the English translation of *La guerre moderne*, written by Roger Tranquier, like Galula a French officer who served in the Algerian War, and published in 1961; *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-62* by British historian Alistair Horne to be hereinafter described; and *The Centurions*, the English translation of *Les Centurions* published by French novelist Jean Lartéguy in 1965. Within the US Army, even before this revision of its doctrine and creation of the *Manual*, the movie *La battaglia di Algeri* (released in theaters in 1966), the subject of which was the Algerian War, was played in the Department of Defense in 2003, after the Iraq War had already begun. The Algerian War appears to have been recognized as “one such conflict which offers valuable lessons” from an early stage (Robert M. Riggs, “Counter-insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War,” a paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College [February 2, 2004], p. ii, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a422755.pdf>, accessed on March 27, 2017). In the Marine Corps, Christopher Harmon, who was teaching at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at the time, gave lectures on the Algerian model to U.S. Marines serving in Iraq (Jill Carroll, “How to Fight Insurgents? Lessons from the French,” *The Christian Science Monitor* [June 29, 2007], p. 1, <https://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0629/p01s02-wome.html>, accessed on March 27, 2017).

² Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-62*, the 2006 edition (New York: New York Review Books, 2006, originally published in 1977).

years. It is regarded as the classic work on the history of the Algerian War, and is also known for the anecdote that Dr. Henry Kissinger recommended the book to then President George W. Bush.

Indeed, as a result of the war, Algeria gained independence from France; therefore, Algeria is generally seen as the winner and France the loser. That said, some regard France as the military victor, for they had all but destroyed the National Liberation Army (ALN: *Armée de libération nationale*), the military arm of the FLN in Algeria, by 1960. That is why the Algerian War is regarded as a successful example of counterinsurgency operations.

This study is mainly about the measures that France took to expel the rebels from Algeria. It also refers to the collaboration between the French Army and non-FLN Algerians. Let me add here that many of those measures were not planned before the war; instead, they evolved into a system through trial and error during the actual warfare while drawing on the experience of the First Indochina War (1946-54). In other words, the French military did not have a counterinsurgency doctrine when the Algerian War began.³

Grid Operation (*quadrillage*)

For a while after the conflict began, the French military used conventional means of combat for the eradication (*rattissage*) of the relatively small number of FLN insurgents active mainly in the Aurès and Kabylie regions. On land, heavily equipped with tanks, heavy artillery and the like, it pushed into the regions where the insurgents were active and conducted operations there. Occasionally, aircraft and surface vessels were used to conduct bombardment. These attacks did inflict damage on the insurgents, but were not able to destroy the FLN as an organization. As the French ground forces completed their mop-up operations and left pacified areas, the remainder of the insurgents who had been hiding out in the mountains would return in a cycle that would be repeated again and again. Moreover, the returning insurgents would kill and otherwise take revenge on local Muslim residents who had cooperated with the French. This led the other residents, who had not necessarily been supporters of the FLN, to provide food, shelter, and funds to the insurgents. They also became sources from which men would join the insurgents in the fighting.

The “grid operation (*quadrillage*)” was started at the end of 1954 by the French military in order to put a stop to this vicious circle. The operation took the following form. It divided Algeria into many sectors (*secteurs*).⁴ French ground forces would enter the key municipalities in a sector and occupy them, then station a garrison of 60 to 100 soldiers entitled “sector

³ Simon Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars: A Century of Counterinsurgency* (Strout, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2016), p. 128. The official doctrine had to wait for the “Instructions for the Pacification of Algeria (*Instruction pour la pacification d’Algérie*)” issued on December 10, 1959.

⁴ There were 75 sectors according to Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger (Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, “France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy,” Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy* [London: Routledge, 2002], p. 15).

troops (*troupes de secteur*)” nearby to secure the area.⁵ In this manner, the French military was not only able to sustain the stability of specific areas but also to prevent insurgents from appearing in places where many Muslims in the general population lived and contact them or hide themselves in their midst. The French military is believed to have deployed more than 300,000 troop members in this grid operation. However, 90% were used for the static garrison sector troops and only 10% consisted of the task forces/intervention forces (simply “task forces” hereafter) entitled “general reserves (*réserves générales*).”⁶

This grid operation was originally implemented in rural areas. However, it came to be applied to operations in urban areas as well when the FLN expanded its operations there. One prominent example of this is the Battle of Algiers (*la bataille d’Alger*), which took place from January to October in 1957. Then, the French military divided the city of Algiers into four sectors.⁷ The regiments of the 10th Paratroops Division launched operations to “restore security and public order” in each of the sectors, ultimately annihilating the FNL organization in Algiers, the main city of Algeria.⁸

In 1957, under the initiative of Raoul Salan, the Supreme Inter-military Commander for Algeria (10th Military Region) (*commandant supérieur interarmées de l’Algérie [la 10e région militaire]*), the French military limited the areas subject to mop-up operations while establishing three types of zones throughout Algeria, “operation zones (*zones d’opérations*),” “pacification zones (*zones de pacification*),” and “interdicted zones (*zones interdites*),” in order to accelerate operations by completely isolating the insurgents from the general population. The operation zones (*zones d’opérations*) were zones where the French task forces actively engaged in mop-up operations. There, the French military could use any means to restore order. The pacification zones (*zones de pacification*) were fertile zones where garrisons were posted and people could live safely. There, the French military engaged in civil affair operations and psychological actions aimed at winning hearts and minds and also sought cooperation between the French military and local residents, while Muslim residents were all registered and monitored. They were required to carry identification documents at all times

⁵ The “sector troops” consisted mainly of active soldiers and reserves called up from mainland France, as well as soldiers from Africa, including Algeria. Their main missions were to protect the farms managed by residents of European descent and the villages of Muslim residents, develop and protect roads, railways, pipelines, and other infrastructure, and collect information. Although they conducted patrols, they rarely encountered insurgents (Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* [New York: Preager, 1964], p. 35; Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* [Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1972], p. 190).

⁶ Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (London: Longman, 1994), pp. 121, 125-126. The “general reserves” were a crack force consisting mainly of campaign-tested veteran soldiers from airborne troops, the Foreign Legion, amphibious forces, mechanized infantry units, and so on (Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 35).

⁷ A sector was further subdivided into districts, blocks, etc.

⁸ For example, see David N. Santos, “Counterterrorism v. Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Algeria and Afghanistan,” *Small Wars Journal* (March 14, 2011), pp. 28-30, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/706-santos.pdf>, accessed on March 27, 2017; John Talbott, *The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York: Knopf, 1980), pp. 83-89; Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization*, pp. 127-135.

and their actions were controlled. The interdicted zones (*zones interdites*) were relatively sparsely populated areas from which the few residents were evicted to make them no-man's land.⁹ They were free-fire zones, where the French soldiers were permitted to shoot at anything that moved, human or animal.¹⁰

Regrouping (*regroupement*)

In fact, the French military had been forcing residents to evacuate before the interdicted zones (*zones interdites*) had been fully implemented for operational purposes.¹¹ In the beginning, the residents who were forced to evacuate found safe places nearby on their own to which they would relocate.¹² Later, the French military took measures to specify areas to which the residents would be relocated, establish housing, schools, medical services, and other facilities necessary to live there, and made the residents live collectively there. This was called "regrouping (*regroupement*)," and the facilities called "grouping centers (*centres de regroupement*)."¹³

One study estimates that the number of "regrouped" Muslim residents had reached 2,350,000 by 1961. This accounts for 26.1% of the total Muslim population in Algeria at the time. There were 3,740 "regrouping centers" according to a survey conducted in February 1962.¹⁴ (However, questions have been raised about this number, specifically the possibility that some "regrouping centers" may have been counted multiple times due to changes in their names.)

"Regrouping" was conceived of from a military perspective. Specifically, the measure was aimed not only at protecting the safety of ordinary residents but also at more thoroughly

⁹ It is estimated that up to 3,525,000 residents were forced to relocate up to the time of the truce, the equivalent of approximately half of the Muslim population in the provincial areas of Algeria. (Michel Cornaton, *Les regroupements de la décolonisation en Algérie* –[Paris: Edition ouvrières, 1967], p. 123).

¹⁰ Samia Henni, "On the Spaces of Guerre Moderne: The French Army in Northern Algeria (1954–1962)," *FOOTPRINT: Spaces of Conflict, Delft Architecture Theory Journal*, No. 19 (Autumn/Winter 2016), p. 42, <http://footprint.tvdelft.nl/index.php/footprint/article/download/1157/1709>, accessed on April 4, 2017; Hugues H. Canuel, "French Counterinsurgency in Algeria: Forgotten Lessons from a Misunderstood Conflict," *Small Wars Journal* (March 14, 2010), p. 6, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/389-canuel.pdf>, accessed on March 27, 2017; Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization*, p. 121.

¹¹ It is believed that the call on residents in the Aurès region on November 21, 1954 to relocate to "safe zones (*zones de sécurité*)" that had been created was the first of its kind. It is reported that only about 2,000 residents responded (Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, p. 78).

¹² Residents who lost their original land, homes, and livelihoods turned against the French, creating room for the insurgents to infiltrate (Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 45).

¹³ The first "regrouping" took place in the Aurès region as a local, temporary measure in November 1954. Later, as large-scale "regrouping centers" became necessary as the result of the full implementation of interdicted zones, it was established as official policy as a general measure by 1957. (Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 214, 222; Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 43).

¹⁴ Cornaton, *Les regroupements de la décolonisation en Algérie*, pp. 121-123. One estimate puts the number of people subjected to "regrouping" at 2,500,000. It is also estimated that 1,175,000 others were forcibly relocated though not subjected to "regrouping." The latter moved to towns and villages nearby or urban areas. When the areas near the borders with Tunisia to the east and Morocco to the west were declared interdicted zones, many of the residents there crossed the borders to become international refugees (*Ibid.*, p. 123; Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 213-216, 225).

isolating the insurgents from the residents. At the same time, the French military intended to win hearts and minds within the “regrouping centers” using civil affair operations and psychological actions, and to guide the residents in a direction that made self-rule and self-defense possible, mainly through collaborators recruited from among the residents, in order to reduce the burden of protecting the residents.¹⁵ However, although “regrouping” had a measure of success, it did not match expectations on the whole and also led to criticism both domestically and abroad, and is viewed as having been a relative failure.¹⁶

The reasons for the failure are more or less the following. First, military operations were prioritized when “regrouping” was conducted, with the result that the facilities and operations for the “regrouping centers” were not prepared in time.¹⁷ Indeed, the “regrouping centers” were overcrowded and unsanitary and were plagued by famine, leaving many children to suffer from hunger and disease.¹⁸ Second, in order to prevent intrusion by the insurgents, the centers were surrounded by barbed wire and watchtowers and guardhouses were established where soldiers were permanently posted. This gave them the appearance of concentration camps.¹⁹

Discontent among the residents over these poor conditions increased and ill feeling towards France grew, as “regrouping” and the “regrouping centers” became prime targets for anti-France propaganda by the FLN. In April 1959, the French authorities in Algeria established a new policy entitled “Modernization by the Construction of 1,000 New Villages (*plan des Mille villages*)” and undertook the improvement of the environment in the “regrouping centers” with food and medical support from the Red Cross among others. However, it was too late, nor was a balance between these efforts and military operations forthcoming.²⁰

¹⁵ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, pp. 44-45; Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 184, 213. The French military trained and armed residents and organized “self-defense groups (GAD; *groupes d’auto-défense*). When a village or town was attacked by the ALN, GAD was expected to ward off the attack until the nearest French military defense troops arrived. (Canuel, “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria,” p. 4). It is reported that GAD was organized in 1,840 villages, but their effectiveness is unknown (Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 45).

¹⁶ Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars*, p. 134; Canuel, “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria,” p. 6.

¹⁷ Ironically, the construction and management of the “regrouping centers” and efforts to win hearts and minds there were left up to the French military, particularly the “Specialized administration sections (*Sections administratives spécialisées*)” that are discussed later (Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 184, 222).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 222, 224; Henni, “On the Spaces of Guerre Moderne,” pp. 46-47. See the following for the details: Charles-Robert Ageron, “Une dimension de la guerre d’Algérie: les <<regroupements>> de populations,” Jean-Charles Jauffret et Maurice Vaïsse, dir., *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d’Alérie* (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 2001), pp. 327-362.

¹⁹ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 44; Henni, “On the Spaces of Guerre Moderne,” p. 52.

²⁰ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 45; Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars*, p. 134; Henni, “On the Spaces of Guerre Moderne,” p. 52; Brian Liebelt, “French-Algerian Insurgency Lessons and Iraq’s Insurgency,” *Social Sciences Journal*, Vol. 7, Issue 1 (February 9, 2011), p. 81, <http://repository.wcsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=ssj>, accessed on March 27, 2017.

The Battle of the Frontiers (*la bataille des frontières*)

The French military not only tried to isolate the insurgents from the Muslim population in general; it also isolated the insurgents from their foreign supporters in “the Battle of the Frontiers (*la bataille des frontières*).”

Egypt was a source of weapons for the FLN, albeit not to the extent that the FLN had hoped for, since the beginning of the conflict. After gaining independence in March 1956, Tunisia to the east and Morocco to the west provided venues for ALN, the military arm of the FLN, for training, stockpiling weapons, treating wounded soldiers and the like. In other words, the insurgents had set up a system in which they sent young men that they had recruited in Algeria and wounded soldiers to Tunisia or Morocco, which had turned into sanctuaries beyond French authority. There, new recruits were given training and wounded soldiers were given treatment, after which they were sent back with weapons to Algeria to take part in the anti-French activities there.²¹

In 1957, to deter members of the insurgency and its sympathizers from going back and forth across the borders with neighboring countries, the French military initially installed multiple layers of obstacles along the borders covering a distance of 20 km (sometimes more) from these borders.²² 2.5 m (8 feet)-high, 5,000-volt, electrified steel barbed-wire fences were erected in the middle, while the 45 m (90 yd) space on both sides of the fences was seeded with landmines. Encampments and pillboxes were established every 2-3 km along the outer edges of the minefields and were connected with roads on which armored vehicles ran back and forth incessantly on reconnaissance missions dubbed “tractoring” and “cleaning floors.”²³ In addition, aircraft conducted monitoring from the air by day while searchlights flooded the area by night. Radars and sensors were also deployed. Action was taken immediately to capture intruders as they were discovered or otherwise detected. Troops were readied two- and threefold to be prepared for the unlikely case where intruders were able to get through.²⁴

The line along the border with Tunisia was called the “Morice Line (*ligne Morice*)” after André Morice, then Minister of National Defense and the Armed Forces (*ministre de la Défense nationale et des Forces armées*). Initially, it stretched approximately 320 km (200 miles) in its entirety from the Mediterranean Sea to the Sahara Desert. The Line was later partially moved to be closer to the border, until it was a distance of 4 km from the border and extended to approximately 460 km. The line along the border with Morocco was called the “Pédron Line (*ligne Pédron*),” with a total extension of approximately 145 km (90 miles). The areas between

²¹ The Tunisian and Moroccan Governments denied the existence of “sanctuaries” against French accusations (Gregory D. Peterson, “The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962: Blueprint for U.S. Operations in Iraq,” a monograph for U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies [May 26, 2003], p. 19, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a429272.pdf>, accessed on May 24, 2017).

²² For details, see Jacques Vernet, “Les barrages pendant la guerre d’Algérie,” Jauffret et Vaïsse, dir., *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d’Alérie*, pp. 253-268. See also Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization*, pp. 135-136.

²³ Jules Roy, *Arujeria senso: Watashi wa shogen suru*, trans. by Michihiko Suzuki (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten 1961), p. 114, originally published in French under the title of *La Guerre d’Algérie* by Julliard in 1960.

²⁴ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 34.

the two lines and the respective borders were designated interdicted zones (*zones interdites*). According to records, approximately 80,000 troops were posted to defend the two lines.²⁵

The FLN tried many times to breach the two lines with intrusions and supplies, but success was hard to come by. After more than 6,000 casualties by one estimate, it gave up the attempt. The Morice and Pédron Lines were a great tactical success.²⁶

Efforts by the French military to isolate insurgents from their foreign supporters took place by sea and in the air as well. On the seas, French Navy vessels kept their eyes on ships destined for Algeria. They would capture ships on the high seas that were transporting arms according to reliable information, seize the arms and ammunition, and detain and bring in the crew. It is estimated that the total volume of arms and ammunition seized amounted to 1,350 tons. The first major haul was the capture of the cargo ship *Athos* on October 16, 1956. The ship had been carrying 70 to 80 tons of weapons and ammunition for the ALN from Egypt. The greatest success came in 1959 with the capture of the cargo ship *Lidice*, which was carrying 581 tons of arms and ammunition.²⁷

The main role of the Air Force was the unglamorous work of reconnaissance from the air, but that is not to say that there were not times when it came under the public spotlight. For example, on October 22, 1956, Air Force aircraft scrambled against a Moroccan aircraft flying from Rabat, the capital of Morocco, to Tunis, the capital of Tunisia, which was carrying five FLN leaders that were active overseas including Mohamed Ahmed Ben Bella, and forced it to land in Algiers. This was a success for the French Air Force, but at the same time was a setback. While institutional damage was indeed inflicted on the FLN by apprehending five of its leaders in one fell swoop, the incident harmed France's international standing whereas the FLN attracted sympathy.²⁸

The French Air Force also bombed Sakiet Sidi Youssef, a village in Tunisia. France bombed this village near the Algerian border, accusing it of hosting a training camp for the ALN. However, Tunisia, denying the existence of "sanctuaries," brought the incident, in which many villagers were killed or wounded by the air raid, to the attention of the United Nations. The bombing of Sakiet was likely the greatest mistake that the French Air Force committed during the Algerian War. Ultimately, for France, the bombing "resulted in little military gain, while costing a great deal in diplomatic complications and unfavorable public opinion."²⁹

By the end of 1958, the "Battle of the Frontiers" had cut off insurgents on Algerian territory from the outside world, making it impossible for the ALN to conduct large-scale insurgency operations. Subsequent action had to be limited to small-scale, opportunistic

²⁵ Alexander and Keiger, "France and the Algerian War," p. 15; Peterson, "The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962," pp. 20-21.

²⁶ Peterson, "The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962," p. 23.

²⁷ Bernard Estival, "The French Navy and the Algerian War," Alexander and Keiger, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62*, p. 84; Patrick Boureille, "La Marine et la guerre d'Algérie," Jauffret et Vaisse, dir., *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d'Alérie*, p. 100.

²⁸ Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, p. 159. Ben Bella would later go on to become the first president of the newly independent Algeria.

²⁹ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 34.

terrorist acts, sabotage, attacks on French military facilities, and the like.³⁰ In that sense, the “Battle of the Frontiers” was a victory for the French. But many ALN members remained in Tunisia and Morocco, albeit at a loss as to where to go.³¹ The FLN were able to continue to gain international recognition as a result.³²

The Challe plan (*le plan Challe*)

In February 1959, Maurice Challe, who succeeded Salan as the supreme commander of the French military stationed in Algeria (the 10th Military District), launched a large-scale mop-up operation with the eponymous name of the “Challe Plan (*plan Challe*)” in order to eradicate the remainder of the ALN in hiding, mainly in the mountainous regions of Algeria.³³

Challe reorganized the troops in implementing the plan. Critical of the fact that much of the fighting force was being diverted to the static and defensive “sector troops,” he dismantled and downsized them into small units comparable in size to those of the insurgents to give them more mobility. The general reserves, which had until then operated at the squadron and battalion levels, started operating at the regiment and division levels, while heliborne air assaults were also tested with the aim of operating them systematically as a fighting force playing a core role in large-scale attacks. Furthermore, mixed special forces entitled “pursuit commandos (*commandos de chasse*)” consisting of 60 to 80 French and local Muslim soldiers were established (splitting into small units of four or so members as necessary). The pursuit commandos are said to have normally moved on foot at night. Needless to say, soldiers recruited from the local population who spoke the vernacular, knew the terrain in detail, and were well versed in the daily habits of the insurgents collected information, based on which the locations at which the remainder of the ALN was hiding were identified and subjected to ambushes. They were highly effective in executing operations. Challe appointed as commanders of these troops’ officers who had received training in psychological warfare at the Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerilla Warfare (CIPDG; *Centre d’instruction et de préparation à la contre-guérilla*). Moreover, Challe demanded that the troops spare no effort to respect the local culture and also sought to have them allow any ALN remnants to live and be of use instead of killing them. It is said that many of the Muslim soldiers among the pursuit commandos, called *para bleu*, were former ALN members.³⁴

In this manner, many Muslim locals served in the French military as regular soldiers or

³⁰ Charles R. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), p. 228.

³¹ One estimate places the number at 20,000 on the Tunisian side alone (Canuel, “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria,” p. 7).

³² Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 35.

³³ Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars*, p. 137.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 136-138; Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, pp. 37-38; Peterson, “The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962,” p. 26; Canuel, “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria,” p. 9; Riggs, “Counter-insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War,” pp. 5, 14-15. The number of Muslim soldiers in the pursuit commandos reached a peak of 15,000.

members of auxiliary forces. Their number is said to have been more than 180,000, more in terms of sheer number than the locals who joined the FLN. The regular soldiers, called *harkis*, in particular handled the protection of residents and the gathering of information among the sector troops, and fulfilled the role of scouts in operations among the general reserves and pursuit commandos.³⁵

Operations under the Challe Plan were as follows. First, ground forces would secure the key town(s) and/or village(s) in the sector as in the grid operation. At the same time, the pursuit commandos would chase down insurgents hiding out in the area, hunting and attacking them day and night over a period of several days or weeks. At this point, the pursuit commandos would hand over the operation to the general reserves and relocate elsewhere, where they switched to hunting and attacking other insurgents. The insurgents that the pursuit commandos had chased down would be eradicated by the general reserves that had taken over the operations. As the operation came to an end, the sector troops would be deployed to replace the general reserves to upgrade infrastructure, give training to the locals for self-defense and so on. The procedures for implementing the operations under the Challe Plan were as follows. Operations began in the military districts (*wilaya*) to the west, where ALN forces were relatively weak. As operations wound down in one military district, they were gradually shifted to the central, then eastern military districts, where the ALN gradually became stronger, where they were repeated in a kind of process. The number of pacification zones (*zones de pacification*) increased accordingly.³⁶ The Challe Plan adopted a so-called “oil stain (*tache d’huile*)” strategy.³⁷

The preexisting establishment of interdicted zones (*zones interdites*) and the regrouping and the “Battle of the Frontiers” were reinforced and maintained under the Challe Plan. Their success aside, it is notable in particular that the plan emphasized civil affair operations in the pacification zones (*zones de pacification*) and regrouping centers. In this manner, Challe utilized and adapted preexisting means to conduct large-scale operations as a whole, but at the same time gave substance to what were fresh ideas at the time, such as the reorganization of

³⁵ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 40; Peterson, “The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962,” p. 33; Grant A. Vaughan, “Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned from the French-Algerian War (1954-1962) Applied to the Afghanistan War,” a master dissertation submitted to U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University (April 30, 2010), p. 19, <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA600522>, accessed on March 27, 2017. One report sets the number of *harkis* at 20,000 in 1957 and 61,500 in June 1960 (Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 40). Muslim locals were being accepted partly to offset the smaller number of draftees from mainland France as the result of the lower birth rates during World War II (Guy Pervillé, *Arujeria senso: Furansu shokuminchi shihai to minzoku no kaiho*, trans. by Shoko Watanabe [Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 2012], p. 100, originally published in French under the title of *La guerre d’Algérie* by Presses Universitaires de France in 2007 and 2012).

³⁶ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 38; Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars*, pp. 137-138; Peterson, “The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962,” p. 26; Canuel, “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria,” pp. 9-10.

³⁷ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 104.

the troops to sizes appropriate for the operations at hand, massive utilization of helicopters,³⁸ and the reliance on officers who had received training in psychological warfare.³⁹

It is reported that, under the Challe Plan, more than 26,000 ALN troops were killed and 11,000 more captured. The ALN lost many members and its caches of weapons and food, and, isolated from ordinary residents, it became difficult for it to secure supplies and recruit new members. It was all but destroyed as an organization. Isolated, the remaining members had to go into hiding, desperate for their personal survival. While it continued its terrorist operations, the FLN came to realize that it was impossible to achieve Algerian independence through military might. In this manner, the Challe Plan fulfilled its role by delivering an overwhelming military success. At the same time, however, the circumstances of the 1,000,000 Muslim residents who had been newly “regrouped” drew criticism both domestically and from abroad.⁴⁰

Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS: *Sections administratives spécialisées*) and Urban Administrative Sections (SAU: *Sections administratives urbaines*)

In addition to mop-up operations, the French military made efforts to win hearts and minds through civil affair operations and psychological actions, as we have already seen. “Specialized administrative sections (SAS; *sections administratives spécialisées*)” were mainly responsible for such efforts particularly in the regrouping centers.

The activities of the SAS were first tested in the Aurès region starting in September 1955. Aurès had been left without civilian administrators since the conflict began, which paralyzed public administration. The FLN took the opportunity to intercede with the “Political and Administrative Organization (OPA; *organisation politique et administrative*),” its own administrative organization,⁴¹ an action that was seen elsewhere as well. The French tested SAS operations as a counter to the OPA and also as a bridge until the time when Muslim residents could take over the administration on their own. The SAS was recognized as a useful means for economic, political, and administrative reconstruction in the local municipalities within the pacification activities, given official recognition by cabinet order in September 1956, and dispatched throughout the theater of operations.⁴²

The first mission of the SAS was to reestablish contacts between the administrative

³⁸ As the title of Charles R. Shrader’s book *The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962* shows, the Algerian War was the first war in which a large number of helicopters were operated, albeit mainly for transporting troops and supplies. Helicopters made it possible to overcome constraints imposed by terrain, resulting a dramatic improvement in aerial mobility (Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, p. 184; Riggs, “Counter-insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War,” p. 4). The first major outcome of an operation using helicopters was the first large-scale heliborne operation conducted in October 1956, which killed 126 insurgents (Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization*, p. 128).

³⁹ Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars*, p. 138; Canuel, “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria,” pp. 9-10.

⁴⁰ Peterson, “The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962,” p. 27; Canuel, “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria,” pp. 9-10; Vaughan, “Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned from the French-Algerian War (1954-1962) Applied to the Afghanistan War,” p. 17.

⁴¹ The OPA, the name used by the French, was known as the shadow government in the provinces. The FLN deployed six-man units to collect funds, distribute goods, conduct trials, collect information, engage in propaganda, and so on (Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars*, p. 132).

⁴² Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 147-148, 191.

authorities and the residents and reconstruct the local municipalities socially, politically, and economically. They were also tasked with identifying reliable leaders from among the locals who could take on the administrative tasks in cooperation with France. For this purpose, the SAS members lived among the residents. The second mission was to collect information concerning insurgents hiding nearby. The most valuable information often came from the residents.⁴³ The third mission was to provide medical and educational services where circumstances allowed. The SAS also protected residents, conducted night patrols, developed infrastructure, gave agricultural advice, arranged jobs, engaged in propaganda, and so on. The SAS members would act as administrative officials, doctors and nurses, teachers, and engineers.⁴⁴

An SAS was a small unit, with only four core members, the leader, the adjutant/intendance officer, an interpreter, and a signal soldier. They were called *képis bleus* for the blue kepi caps that they wore. The SAS leaders were French Army officers (1/3rd active and 2/3rds called up reserves),⁴⁵ captain or first lieutenant in rank, and essentially trained at the CIPCG.⁴⁶ Some adjutants/intendance officers were officers while others were noncommissioned officers or civilians under contract. Radiotelephone operators were borrowed from other units. In addition to these core members, a unit consisted of a few European settlers (*colons*) who could speak the local language and a small number of locals retired from the French military as noncommissioned officers or common soldiers or educated at French schools. Some units included experts in public health, agriculture, education and the like.⁴⁷

The SAS required guards because they were often targeted in attacks⁴⁸ due to the disruption their work caused to the insurgents. The French military organized a unit of 30 to 50 locals to guard an SAS unit. The guards, called *maghzens* (also transliterated as *makzans*),

⁴³ Riggs, "Counter-insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War," p. 9.

⁴⁴ Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 147, 197; Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, pp. 47-48. See Noara Omouri, "Les sections administratives spécialisées et les sciences sociales," Jauffret et Vaïsse, dir., *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d'Alérie*, pp. 386-387 for details. The objective of the propaganda was to convince the Algerians of the virtues of being governed by the French and to keep them on the side of France. Sites where locals gathered were particularly useful for this. There, explanations of the state of affairs as well as rebuttals to the anti-French propaganda from the FLN were conducted, sometimes using visual and sound effects. Teams of psychological experts were formed and were active throughout Algeria in conducting such efforts (Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, p. 198).

⁴⁵ Omouri, "Les sections administratives spécialisées et les sciences sociales," Jauffret et Vaïsse, dir., *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d'Alérie*, p. 385.

⁴⁶ SAS leaders were given special education beyond the training at the CIPGC (*Ibid.*, pp. 389-394). It was said that the success or failure of "regrouping" depended on the SAS leaders (Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, p. 184). The SAS leaders were also expected to be able to speak the local language (Henni, "On the Spaces of Guerre Moderne," p. 45). The authority to disburse funds sent to Algerians in the "regrouping centers" from their relatives living in mainland France was vested in the SAS leaders. This was meant to prevent money from flowing to the insurgents. SAS leaders used this authority to distribute funds only to the Algerians who responded to their demands. The leaders could also determine the amount of money to be distributed (Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, p. 184).

⁴⁷ Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 184, 195; Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 47.

⁴⁸ The SAS was actually looked down upon by some of the settlers and even the French military (Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars*, p. 135).

also acted as orderlies and messengers in addition to performing guard duty. In addition, they protected residents and provided information in their possession concerning insurgents.⁴⁹

As already mentioned, the usefulness of the SAS was recognized. The SAS also made a favorable impression on international public opinion.⁵⁰ However, they had to fulfill their mission under the demanding conditions of high capability requirements, dangerous surroundings, and low pay. Particularly challenging was the lack of manpower and funds.⁵¹ As an example of the lack of manpower, the Kabylie region had a population of more than 900,000 at the time, while the number of SAS units dispatched there was 73. This meant that one SAS unit had to cover more than 12,000 residents, the equivalent of the population of two to three villages.⁵² Doubt has also been cast on whether the actual activities had long-lasting effects.⁵³ There also was a tendency to prioritize French social and cultural values over local ones.⁵⁴

The SAS did its work in provincial areas. It was the “Urban administrative section (SAU; *section administrative urbaine*)” that performed a similar function in urban areas.⁵⁵ SAUs filled the administrative vacuum in the urban areas. Placed at the junction of civilian administrators and military personnel, they intermediated between the French military and the urban residents. In addition, they found jobs and housing for Muslim residents and attempted to improve social services for them to keep them on the French side and to obtain information concerning terrorist activities from them.⁵⁶ They were also responsible for monitoring and controlling the residents and cutting off the supply of personnel from urban areas to the insurgency by conducting resident surveys, providing identification, issuing IDs, and conducting searches and inspections.⁵⁷

⁴⁹ Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 195-196; Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 40. The number of *maghzens*, at 3,400 at the beginning of 1957, reached 12,200 as of the end of the year and 19,000 during June 1959, where it stayed. (Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 40). The *maghzens* were not necessarily trusted, for many of their relatives had joined the insurgency. Indeed, some of their ranks escaped, individually or in groups, with the weapons given to them by the French to join the resistance. In some cases, they killed the French officers before escaping. Thus, there were those who were wary of them as potential ALN members (Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 195-196).

⁵⁰ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 51.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 50; Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars*, p. 135.

⁵² Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 191, 194. There were approximately 660 units in the SAS as of the end of 1959, to which 1,287 officers, 661 NCOs, and 2,921 civilian experts were assigned (Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 50).

⁵³ Ultimately, in the face of the harsh circumstances confronting the regrouping centers, the mission that the SAS painstakingly fulfilled over such a long period of time turned out to be in vain (Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars*, p. 135).

⁵⁴ For example, in the history classes in the schools in the regrouping centers, the students were being taught about French heroes, not Algerian ones (Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 51).

⁵⁵ One report says that 20 SAU units were formed as of the end of 1960. SAU members lived in the Kasbah in Algiers, for example (Henni, “On the Spaces of Guerre Moderne,” p. 45).

⁵⁶ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 49. “As a solution for slums, housing complex projects were built one after another in the cities. However, slums kept cropping up and would never go away” (Pervillé, *Arujeria senso*, p. 142).

⁵⁷ Vaughan, “Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned from the French-Algerian War (1954-1962) Applied to the Afghanistan War,” p. 21.

From January 1955 to December 1957, 125,000 Algerian refugees entered Algiers in part because of the establishment of the aforementioned interdicted zones (*zones interdites*), creating slums there. When the FLN gained control over them, the French military assigned to the SAU the mission of ousting the FLN and protecting the residents. Specifically, the SAU was ordered to identify the residents of the slums, seek out and detain senior FLN members, reestablish safety and resume support for residents, and create jobs for 200 people within two to three weeks. As a result of SAU activities, FLN tax collectors were expelled, and it became possible for the public subsidies to the residents (for example, 2,400 francs annually per child), which they had been prevented from receiving, to be resumed and school to be reopened with virtually all 1,800 students immediately returning. In addition, a vocational school was opened for teenagers and SAU members served as judges to conduct trials.⁵⁸

The usefulness of SAU, like SAS, was recognized, yet, also like SAS, had to fulfill their mission under the demanding conditions of high capability requirements, dangerous surroundings, and low pay. They also shared the same difficulties of the lack of manpower and funds.⁵⁹

Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare (CIPCG: *Centre d'instruction et de préparation à la contre-guérilla*)

Conceived as an institution for educating and training officers and NCOs being assigned to Algeria on the characteristics of the region and the special nature of the war there, the Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare (CIPCG: *Centre d'instruction et de préparation à la contre-guérilla*) was officially established on June 16, 1956 near Arzew, a seaside town in western Algeria. In the first year of its existence, education and training was conducted on subjects such as “Muslim psychology and society,” “the political bases of the rebellion,” “fundamentals of pacification activities,” and “counter-guerrilla methods.” Education and training concerning psychological warfare were also conducted, but the emphasis was on tactics.⁶⁰ There was a two-week course for senior officers and a five-week course for junior officers, cadets, and NCOs. However, subsequent pressure to shorten the curriculum reduced the latter to three weeks, with education and training in psychological warfare being cut. The reasons given for this was that producing commanders for reserves being pressed into duty to protect transport and to fight insurgents was being prioritized and that psychological warfare was unpopular with the trainees.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 208-209.

⁵⁹ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, p. 50; Innes-Robbins, *Dirty Wars*, p. 135.

⁶⁰ For example, in the five-week course for junior officers, cadets, and NCOs, classes related to psychological warfare took up 29 hours, or 14%, of the total 207 hour in classes (Frédéric Guelton, “The French Army ‘Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ [CIPCG] at Arzew,” Alexander and Keiger, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62*, p. 38). The first operation in which the tools of psychological warfare were used was the aerial distribution of propaganda flyers in the Aurès region on November 15, 1954 stating “Soon a terrible calamity will befall the rebels. Then French peace will again reign” (Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, p. 78).

⁶¹ Guelton, “The French Army ‘Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ (CIPCG) at Arzew,” pp. 37-39.

In early 1957, the CIPCG trainees began to take up their posts. By August, 245 senior officers, 2,030 junior officers, and 900 NCOs had completed their education and training there. In July, in line with the intentions of Salan, the supreme commander of the French military stationed in Algeria (the 10th Military District), the responsibility within district headquarters was transferred from the 3rd Bureau, in charge of operations, to the 5th Bureau, in charge of psychological actions.⁶² This freed the CIPCG from downsizing pressures. In October, the curriculum was reviewed under the understanding that the ultimate objective of the pacification activities was to keep public sentiment among the residents on the French side. As a result, in the new curriculum, education and training concerning psychological warfare was increased while education and training concerning tactics disappeared almost completely. In addition, it was decided that all officers of colonel rank or below being assigned to Algeria should in principle receive education and training at the CIPGC. The center became the “antechamber of Algeria” for officers.⁶³

The main focus of the education and training was on “Muslim sociology,” “Revolutionary warfare,” “the adversary and his ways,” and “the tactical and psychological struggle against the rebellion.”⁶⁴ Three courses were established: Course A for sector troop commander candidates (colonels and lieutenant colonels, one month in duration with 10 to 20 taking the course simultaneously), Course B for district- and sub-district-level commanders (majors, captains, and first lieutenants, for a duration of one month, with 150 taking the course simultaneously), and Course C for second lieutenants and cadets (of indefinite duration with educating and training for 200 in two months). In the two years between the fall of 1957 and summer of 1959, during which it was a full-fledged education and training institution for psychological warfare, the CIPGC provided education and training for 7,172 members (39 colonels, 136 lieutenant colonels, 616 majors, 1,614 captains, 1,158 first lieutenants, 1,434 second lieutenants, and 2,095 cadets). The effect was to bring relative uniformity to the active officer corps of the French military and to increase the number of second lieutenants and cadets beyond plans. On the other hand, in an ironic twist, it forced the reduction of the duration of the courses to

⁶² The 5th Bureau attempted to win hearts and minds by influencing the political and ideological beliefs of the Algerian residents and keeping them on the French side through psychological actions (Elie Tenenbaum, “French Exception or Western Variation? A Historical Look at the French Irregular Way of War,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 4 [June 2017], p. 562). See Marie-Catherine et Paul Villatoux, “Le 5e Bureau en Algérie,” Jauffret et Vaïsse, dir., *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d’Alérie*, pp. 399-419 on the 5th Bureau.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-43, 49; Denis Leroux, “Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d’Algérie: le Centre d’instruction pacification et contre-guérilla d’Arzew (1957-1959),” *Vingtième Siècle*, n°120 (avril 2013), pp. 102, 104-105, https://www.cairn.info/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=3L8PTNqBe47Xw-WQ6mpOQBkwdjsu0M18bwDcBg_A8HA, accessed on September 11, 2017. Officers from other countries such as Belgium and Portugal also received education and training at the CIPGC (Leroux, “Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d’Algérie,” p. 110).

⁶⁴ Guelton, “The French Army ‘Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ (CIPCG) at Arzew,” p. 43. See also Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, pp. 177-178 for the contents of education and training.

an average of 13 days because of the increased number of officers and cadets taking them.⁶⁵

However, these glory days did not last very long. At the beginning of May 1960, Pierre Messmer, Minister of the Armed Forces (*ministre des armées*), visited and observed the CIPGC. After the visit, Messmer made the decision to conduct a fundamental reform of the education and training, abolishing the course for senior officers and holding that only education of use to actual combat should be given. As a result, tactical education and training was once again prioritized. At the same time, education and training for psychological warfare would be provided as an applied course to be conducted four times a year (for two weeks for 90 members) for the officers who were being assigned to the zones, districts, and blocks, and the content was narrowed down to matters concerning “personal issues” that Algerians faced.⁶⁶ The French Government had already begun to change tack towards resolving the conflict by giving independence to Algeria, so little need remained for education and training to keep Algerians on the French side.⁶⁷

The CIPCG provided education and training to approximately 10,000 officers and NCOs assigned to Algeria during the five years of its existence. Many experts in psychological warfare were created through the education and training aimed at winning the Algerian War by engaging the hearts and minds of the residents, but this ultimately failed to achieve its objective.⁶⁸

Conclusion

Using the abovementioned measures, the French military had all but destroyed the ALN, the military arm of the FLN, in Algeria by 1960. This was clearly a military victory. It was achieved by isolating the insurgents from ordinary residents by establishing pacification zones (*zones de pacification*), etc. and by “regrouping” or isolating the insurgents from their foreign supporters using obstacles installed along the borders such as the Morice Line, monitoring from the air and by sea, etc., information obtained from ordinary residents as well as former FLN members, and mop-up operations that emphasized mobility such as the Challe Plan.

However, France was not able to build on this military victory to achieve victory in the war itself. Needless to say, it could not resist the global shift towards “decolonization.” But the role of diplomacy cannot be ignored either. The FLN succeeded in shaping not only international opinion but public opinion within France towards support for independence by

⁶⁵ Guelton, “The French Army ‘Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ (CIPCG) at Arzew,” pp. 43-44; Leroux, “Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d’Algérie,” p. 105. Course A was subsumed into Course B because of the small number of people taking the course (Leroux, “Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d’Algérie,” p. 105).

⁶⁶ Guelton, “The French Army ‘Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ (CIPCG) at Arzew,” pp. 47-48. The newly established applied course taught “organizing the population” because it was considered necessary in order to develop “self-defense groups (GAD; groupes d’auto-défense)” (Leroux, “Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d’Algérie,” p. 111).

⁶⁷ Leroux, “Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d’Algérie,” p. 110. The 5th Bureau, which oversaw psychological actions and had jurisdiction over the CIPGC, was disbanded in February 1960, and the CIPGC returned under the fold of the 3rd Bureau (*Ibid.*, p. 11).

⁶⁸ Guelton, “The French Army ‘Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ (CIPCG) at Arzew,” p. 49.

using the harsh conditions of the “regrouping centers,” the actions in violation of international law by the French Air Force, the inhumane methods used to extract information, etc. to conduct anti-French propaganda in the United Nations and elsewhere. It is also certain that continued terrorist activities in Algeria and mainland France, albeit diminished in number, also increased the antiwar sentiments of the French people as well as their anxiety towards the mounting cost of the countermeasures towards an uncertain future.⁶⁹

At the same time, turning our attention to the French military, although it secured military victory by 1960, it had taken six years since the insurgency began, and four years just for the Challe Plan to be launched. Since the counterinsurgency doctrine had not been determined at the beginning of the conflict, effective response was not forthcoming at the onset. As a result, not only did the French military fail to eliminate the FLN at the earliest stages but even allowed the FLN to expand its powers. In addition, it prioritized military operations that centered on combat and was late to recognize the importance of key factors in counterinsurgency operations such as HUMINT, psychological warfare, civil affair operations, and winning hearts and minds. This can also be identified as a reason why military victory took so long and why the military victory did not lead to victory in the war itself.

⁶⁹ The radical actions of French conservatives, most notably the Secret Army Organization (OAS; *Organisation de l'armée secrete*), who opposed independence for Algeria, were also a factor that led French public opinion towards accepting independence.