

**Program  
Participants  
Summaries**



# PROGRAM

## Opening Session

- 9:30 – 9:35    Opening Remarks  
                  Susumu Isakai (Vice President, NIDS)
- 9:35 – 9:40    Welcoming Remarks
- 9:40 – 9:45    Chairman’s Remarks  
                  Junichiro Shoji (Director, Center for Military History [CMH], NIDS)

## Keynote Address

- 9:45 – 10:30    “LICs Revisited: From the Perspective of International Order”  
                  Akira Kato (Professor, College of Liberal Arts, Obirin University)
- 10:30 – 10:40    Break

## Session 1: Irregular Warfare – Theory and Practice

- 10:40 – 11:05    “Will Hybrid Warfare Come to Japan?”  
                  Martin Van Creveld  
                  (former Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
- 11:05 – 11:30    “Insurgency and Risk Society”  
                  Christopher Coker  
                  (Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics)
- 11:30 – 11:55    “Conceptual Definition of the ‘Irregular Warfare’”  
                  Tetsuya Endo  
                  (Professor, Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University)
- 11:55 – 12:05    Comments  
                  Eiichi Funada  
                  (former Commander in Chief, Self Defense Fleet, JMSDF)
- 12:05 – 12:25    Discussion
- 12:25 – 14:00    Lunch Time

## Special Address

- 14:00 – 14:45    “Warfare in the 21st Century”  
                  Thomas G. Mahnken  
                  (President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments)
- 14:45 – 14:50    Break

## **Session 2: History of Irregular Warfare (Part1) – Before mid-20th Century**

- 14:50 – 15:15 “Japanese Counterinsurgency Operations in Mainland China”  
Nobu Iwatani  
(Professor, Graduate School of Law, Hokkaido University)
- 15:15 – 15:40 “Algerian War: A Model of Counterinsurgency Operation”  
Kyoichi Tachikawa (Chief, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS)
- 15:40 – 15:50 Comments  
Takuya Tani (Senior Fellow, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS)
- 15:50 – 16:10 Discussion
- 16:10 – 16:25 Break

## **Session 3: History of Irregular Warfare (Part2) – From mid-20th Century to Date**

- 16:25 – 16:50 “A Trend of COIN in U.S. Army after the Gulf War: With a Central Focus on John A. Nagl in 1990s”  
Yuichi Shinpuku  
(Fellow, International Conflict Division, CMH, NIDS)
- 16:50 – 17:15 “Insurgency in Iraqi-Afghanistan and COIN”  
Carter Malkasian  
(Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
- 17:15 – 17:40 “Air Power in Asymmetric Warfare”  
Philip Sabin  
(Professor, Department of War Studies, King’s College London)
- 17:40 – 17:50 Comments  
Aihito Yamashita  
(Chief, Research Management Office, Center for Air Power Strategic Studies, JASDF)
- 17:50 – 18:10 Discussion

## **Closing Remarks**

- 18:10 – 18:15 Junichiro Shoji (Director, CMH, NIDS)

## PARTICIPANTS

### Chairman

Junichiro Shoji

Director, Center for Military History [CMH], NIDS

M.A., University of Tsukuba

*Nichibei Senryaku Shisoshi: Nichibei-kankei no Atarashii Shiten* (co-author) (Sairyusha, 2005)

*Rekishu to Wakai* (co-author) (Tokyo University Press, 2011)

*Taiheiyosenso to sono Senryaku* (co-author, 3 volumes) (Chuokoron Shinsha, 2013)

### Keynote Speaker

Akira Kato

Professor, Obirin University

M.A., Waseda University

*Terror: Gendai Bouryoku Ron* (Chukokoron Shinsha, 2002)

*Senso no Yomikata: Global Terror to Teikoku no Jidai ni* (Shumpusha Publishing, 2008)

*Nihon no Anzen Hoshu* (Chikuma Shobo, 2016)

### Special Speaker

#### **Thomas G. Mahnken**

President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University (SAIS)

*Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012)

*Strategic Studies: A Reader* (co-editor) (London: Routledge, 2014)

### Speakers

#### **Martin Van Creveld**

Former Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Ph.D., London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

*Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977)

*The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991)

*The Culture of War* (New York: Presidio Press, 2008)

### **Christopher Coker**

Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Ph.D., University of Oxford

*Barbarous philosophers: reflections on the nature of war from Heraclitus to Heisenberg* (London: Hurst & Co., 2010)

*Warrior geeks: how 21st century technology is changing the way we fight and think about war* (London: Hurst Publishing, 2013)

### **Tetsuya Endo**

Professor, Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University

LLM, University of Sussex

*Kiro ni tatsu Nihon no Anzenhosho-Kikikanri Seisaku no Jissai to Tenbo* (co-author) (Hokuseido Shoten, 2008)

“Anzenhosho ni okeru Gunji to Kesatsu no Sai,” in *Kokusai Anzenhosho*, Vol.32, No.4, 2005

“‘Hi Dentoteki Anzenhosho’ no Gainen to Shutai-Soshiki,” in *Kokusai Anzenhosho*, Vol.40, No.3, 2012

### **Nobu Iwatani**

Professor, Hokkaido University

Ph.D., Keio University

*Tairitsu to Kyozon no Rekisi Ninshiki: Nicchu kankei 150 nen* (co-author) (Tokyo University Press, 2012)

“Kahoku ni okeru Nihongun no Chiansen,” in *Senshi kenkyu nenpo*, No.19, 2016

“Japanese Intelligence and Counterinsurgency during the Sino-Japanese War: North China in the 1940s,” in *Netherlands Institute of Military History, ed., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Irregular Warfare from 1800 to the Present*, 2011.

### **Kyoichi Tachikawa**

Chief, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS

Ph.D., Sophia University

*Dainiji Sekaitaisen to France ryo Indoshina: “Nichifutsu Kyoryoku” no Kenkyu* (Sairyusha, 2000)

*British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War, 1941-1945* (co-editor) (London: Frank Cass, 2004)

*Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation’s Struggle for Identity* (co-author) (Foundations of International Thinking of Sea Power, No. 2) (Canberra: Sea Power Center—Australia, 2009)

### **Yuichi Shinpuku**

Fellow, International Conflict Division, CMH, NIDS

M.A., Sophia University

“Fukyu no Jiyuu Sakusen,” in *Rikusen Kenkyu, October-December 2013*.

### **Carter Malkasian**

Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Ph.D., University of Oxford

*Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (co-editor) (Oxford: Osprey Publishers, 2008)

*War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013)

*Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017)

### **Philip Sabin**

Professor, King's College London

Ph.D., King's College London

*Lost Battles: Reconstructing the Great Clashes of the Ancient World* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007)

*Simulating War: Studying Conflict through Simulation Games* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012)

"Why the Allies Won the Air War, 1939-1945," in Claus-Christian Szejnmann, ed., *Rethinking History, Dictatorship and War* (London: Continuum, 2009)

### **Discussants**

#### **Eiichi Funada**

Former Commander in Chief of the Self Defense Fleet

M.A., Harvard Kennedy School

*ShiiPawa: Sono Riron to Jisen* (co-author) (Fuyoshobo, 2008)

"Tenkanki no Anzenhoshō: Bunmeiron teki ni mita Teikoku Kokubo Hoshin no Suii," in *Hatoh*, Vol.156, 2001.

#### **Takuya Tani**

Senior Fellow, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS

B.A., National Defense Academy

#### **Aihito Yamashita**

Chief, Research Management Office, Center for Air Power Strategic Studies, Air Staff College

M.A., Komazawa University

*Kokka Anzenhoshō no Kohogaku* (*Shinzansha*, 2010)

"'Grey Zone Jitai' heno Taio Hoho tositeno Kikikanri: sono Yuyosei to Genkai," in *Air Power Studies*, Vol.3, 2016.

# SUMMARIES

## Keynote Address

### **LICs Revisited: From the Perspective of International Order**

Akira Kato

The purpose of this address is to revise LIC (Low Intensity Conflict) from the perspective of international politics on the formation and destruction of Western international order (Westphalian sovereignty).

LIC can be roughly classified into two types. The first is a battle as tactics against terrorism and guerrillas, prosecuted by state actors such as military forces and intelligence agencies in interstate conflicts. The second is terrorism and guerrilla warfare as a strategy, prosecuted by non-state actors such as IS and Al-Qaeda in non-interstate conflicts. This address focuses mainly on the latter LIC by non-state actors.

The history of LIC after World War II can be roughly divided into two stages: During the Cold War and Post-Cold War.

The LICs during the Cold War are characterized by the formation of Western international order. In the concrete it involves first the construction of modern sovereign states through colonial liberation, national unification, nation-building and takeover of power, etc., second the proxy wars of the hegemonic struggle between U.S. and Soviet Union, third the modern Western ideological struggle between liberalism and communism. For example, the Vietnam War, the civil wars in Central and South America such as Nicaragua, El Salvador and Colombia, and PLO's Palestinian liberation struggle, all of which aimed at the construction of modern sovereign states, were proxy wars supported by the hegemonic power U.S. or challenger power Soviet Union. At the same time, they were also ideological struggles for Western international order between liberalism and communism.

On the other hand, the LICs after the Cold War are characterized by the destruction of the Western international order. Specifically, it involves first the destruction of the modern sovereign state, which is followed by the clash of Western and non-Western civilizations (Islamic, Hua-Yi order, etc.), and the denial of the ideologies adhering to the Western international order such as liberalism and communism. In addition to these characteristics, along with the dramatic development of ICT, the LICs space after the Cold War has become global and cyber as seen in Al-Qaeda and IS.

These post-Cold War LICs, or so-called Global/Cyber-LICs, have been destroying modern sovereign states and Western international order as described below.

In particular, the destruction of modern sovereign states has occurred in the following three areas:

Firstly, it is an objection to the concept of sovereignty. Rebuttal to the idea of modern sovereignty raised by Islamic groups, including Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria and

Libya has led to a decline or loss of the governance capacity of governments, thus resulting in the weakening and collapse of the states.

Secondly, it is a hollowing out of the sovereignty. In the concrete with an increase of terrorism and guerilla warfare by IS, Al-Qaeda and other actors who are indifferent to borders, LIC activities organized by intelligence agencies and special task forces, under the name of the war against terrorism, have mainly targeted at non-state actors, as typified by the assassination of Usama Bin Laden and IS leaders. Thus, such anti-terrorist activities (counter-insurgency) and cyber terrorism ignoring sovereignty have turned the sovereignty into a mere formality.

Thirdly, it is the weakening of the liberal democracy institutions based on freedom and equality that forms the basis of modern sovereign states. Specifically, as seen in the rebels of alienated minorities such as immigrants, refugees and poor people in Western countries, and in the populism and Post-Truth politics resulting from the intensification of religious and/or ethnic conflicts motivated by anti-Islam or anti-immigrant/refugee sentiments, the foundation of liberal democracy institution has been shaking in the Western world.

Next, the destruction of Western international order due to LIC has brought about the following phenomena:

Firstly, it brought a shake of Western international order principles, such as the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs and of no use of military force. Specifically, the principle of no use of military force has become a mere formality by the possible use of military force in LIC as seen in reviewing the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs by introducing the concept of “responsibility to protect,” and in high-profile assassination by means of U.S. drones.

Secondly, it brought the resurgence of the idea of non-Western order building against liberal democracy in the Western international order. In particular, Islamic despotism has reemerged as seen in Caliphate that revived in association with the emergence of IS, and the restoration of the Chinese Hua-Yi order as seen in MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War) in the South China Sea.

As mentioned above, in stark contrast to LIC that played a role of forming the Western international order during the Cold War age, Global/Cyber-LIC after the Cold War has been destroying the Western international order.

## Session 1

### **Will Hybrid Warfare Come to Japan?**

Martin Van Creveld

1. The American dream factory causes new and unprecedented kinds of war being invented all the time. Brushfire war. Low intensity war. Fourth-generation war. Asymmetric War. Infowar. Cyberwar. And enough other forms of war to make one's head spin. The goal is always the same: To make Congress pay. With great success, as the budget of the Pentagon, so clearly shows.
2. In reality, there are only two kinds of war: trinitarian and nontrinitarian. The former is waged by states against each other and based on a clear division of labor between government, armed forces, and people. The latter is waged by or against other kinds of organization and is not. The former relies, ultimately, on making force counter force; the latter, primarily on stealth and dispersion.
3. Starting on 1945, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hands of states has caused trinitarian war to go into steep decline. On the other hand, technological developments have put unprecedented firepower into the hands of non-state organizations. Look at Hezbollah, Hamas, and ISIS. All have their own GPS-guided missiles, drones, and cyberwar capabilities. States can now fight like non-state actors and vice versa. ISIS, for example, can fight in ways similar to a state (as seen in Mossul) and Russia can employ asymmetric tactics normally used by non-state actors.
4. Also starting in 1945, states' attempts to use their armed forces in order deal with nontrinitarian warfare have, on the whole, been an abysmal failure. Starting with the British in Palestine in 1947-48 and ending, for the time being, with the failure, after three years of fighting, to subdue ISIS.
5. Publications on hybrid warfare only rarely mention Japan. Two main reasons for this. First, Japan has a very strong government which does not look as if it is about to give up its near monopoly over violence. Second, it is an island. Given the capital-intensiveness of naval war, serious hybrid war at sea is hard to imagine. At best non-state organizations can try to deny their opponents command of the sea; but they cannot obtain it.
6. Nevertheless, Japanese history has had its share of non-trinitarian war before it was brought to an end by Tokugawa Ieyasu at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. Also, between 1937 and 1945, in China where it fought not only the government of Chang Kaishek but any number of militias, big and small. Currently, though, Japan is one of the richest, most secure, and, above all, most homogeneous countries on earth. So how might it become involved in such a war?
7. Answer: Japan's extreme dependence on foreign trade—probably no great power in history has been more so. Attempts to interfere with that trade may make Japanese military intervention necessary, in which case the war will almost certainly be a hybrid one.

Including, besides cyberwar, mining of the waters through which trade passes, shore to ship cruise missiles, and the like. All launched not by governments but by other organizations with or without government support.

8. Owing to political and technological developments, hybrid war is now the dominant one on earth. While Japan has been able to avoid it so far, there is a fair chance that it will no longer be able to do so in the future. Air, naval and ground forces (Marines) will all be involved. It is also very likely that Japan will wage its war not on its own but with the support of allies.
9. As I have pointed out, since 1945 the record of states' attempts to deal with this kind of war has been very bad indeed. Yet whereas almost all those attempts have taken place on land, the challenge to Japan appears to be primarily a maritime one. So the decisive question is, can Japan devise new kinds of waging nontrinitarian war so as to avoid the fate of its predecessors?

## Session 1

### **Insurgency and Risk Society**

Christopher Coker

War seems to have escaped the narrow parameters that it was given in the course of the twentieth century – deterrence and defence. Its principal theme is now security in its various, often mutually exclusive, forms. And what we are securing ourselves against is a kaleidoscope of risks, defined or ill-defined, real or imaginary, external or internalised, all of which makes us more anxious than ever. The Washington Post columnist Robert Samuelson captured the essence of this change in a piece entitled ‘Rediscovering Risk’. The events of the post-9/11 world, including terrorism, were all ‘metaphors for the defining characteristic of a new era – risk’.

We find ourselves living in risk societies, a term popularised by, among others, the German sociologist Ulrich Beck. And ‘risk’ in English conveys a similar penumbra of invented meanings. Economists are obsessed with Risk Capital; our societies are obsessed with children at risk; sociologists analyse ‘high-risk behaviour’. Beck’s thesis is that we have witnessed a radical change in social politics and cultural experience. The risk society perspective is a heuristic device that allows us to observe and probe the peculiarities of our own world, and to ask why it is pervaded by an extraordinary degree of anxiety about the future.

The risk society, argues Beck, was first conceived in the 1970s when environmental fears first came to the fore, and we were particularly anxious about the toxicity of modernity – think nuclear power stations and chemical plants (Bhopal/Seveso). We are worried about the side effects and the consequences of progress. Beck defines a risk society as one for which modernity is problematic because it involves consequences. ‘Blowback’, the CIA calls it, when you fight the monster you have created. It involves reaping what one sows, a suitable biblical metaphor for paying for the sins of the fathers, or the previous generation’s mistakes.

The risk society was given a boost by 9/11. Ten years ago only four US universities offered courses devoted to disaster management. Today over 200 are available and a further 100 are under consideration. And the way the US and its allies have chosen to fight the ‘war against terror’ have merely served to emphasise how risk averse we have become. ISAF operations in Afghanistan were bedevilled from the start by national caveats (120 in all, at least 70 with operational consequences). A British training team in Iraq was prevented from leaving its base in 2016 for fear of the risks it would incur which much diminished its ability to achieve its ‘advise and assist’ mission. Western politicians are probably the most risk-averse generation in history, whether it is confronting Russia, Iran, or until very recently, dealing with ISIS. Unfortunately, we are condemned to live in the risk age for some time yet, fascinated and appalled at the same time by the governments, regimes and movements that are prepared to take some of the risks that we too were once prepared to incur. As an American writer adds, what amazes us most is our own inability to be dangerous.

## Session 1

### **Conceptual Definition of “Irregular Warfare”**

Tetsuya Endo

Although a vocabulary “irregular warfare” existed already during the Cold War, it is difficult to say that this concept has been well established and embedded in Japanese military and conflict studies, as seen in its parallel use with “non-regular warfare.”

For definition of term and linguistic work in academic studies is itself the major part of academic consideration and has important meaning, my presentation would be thought out the principle of conceptual definition as follows. 1) Conceptual definition shall be led proactively by academy without granting any dominant position to those used or produced by public agencies and the press etc. based on their own backgrounds or viewpoints. 2) It should be considered neutral and as geographically universal as possible. 3) While taking into account the “inconsistency” of the term meaning by the times, consideration should be given so that the definition of term may have the best possible meaning diachronically, precluding easygoing redefinition or change of definition. A new term should be devoted to any situation or event completely different from conventional definition. 4) Syntactically logical contradiction should be avoided. 5) Consideration should be given to the consistency with superordinate concepts, and if there is discrepancy, it is necessary to consider whether the object concept of definition is “metaphor” or “rhetoric.” 6) Difference, subsumption and synonymous relationship with adjacent synonyms should be considered. 7) Definition should be a meaningful both socially and academically. 8) There is no guarantee that a clear line can be drawn between the institutional/normative significance and the significance as a social phenomenon/human behavior, but the difference must always be considered.

In my presentation I regard “irregular warfare” as synonymous with “non-regular warfare” for the time being. “Unconventional warfare” is assumed to be a term incidentally derived from the concept of “nuclear warfare,” and it should be in a different context from this discussion. “Irregular warfare” in English is assumed to be the most approximate to the Japanese term. The words “warfare” and “(armed) conflict” are viewed here as having no difference in actual content. “Irregular battle” is regarded as a different related vocabulary because it conveys a stronger sense of language that may be more suitably used to refer to smaller-scale hostilities. In addition, dare I say that “warfare” is an uncountable noun focusing on the aspect and form of conflict and not completely synonymous with “war” that can be used as proper noun.

The use of the term “regular warfare,” which is supposed to lead to the meaning of “non-regular warfare,” is rare. And it is not a legal term. In the past, the term “irregular warfare” has been mainly used for guerrilla war, of which one of the parties is not a regular state army. Coupled with usage such as referring to a special unit that performs anti-guerrilla campaign as “irregular war” unit, it can be said that the word sense image of “irregular war” has been

formed accordingly.

Defining that a “non-regular warfare” is not a “regular warfare” has little significance. In fact, what is regarded as a problem is the definition of “war” as its superordinate concept; problem developed coupled with a drastic reduction of “regular war.” The meaning of word “war” must be considered in the context of the human behavior/phenomena historically recognized as “war”, while paying attention to the change and addition of the contemporary situation, not ignoring the normative viewpoint today in particular.

In considering the basic definition of warfare, it should be borne in mind that the acts and phenomena of war were the nucleus that historically formed the social field of today’s military affairs. I would like to tentatively define the core meaning of warfare as a human behavior or a social phenomenon aiming at realization of will by achieving complete destruction or submission/compromise of opponents by means of the direct use of the physical power of killing and destruction (paralysis) among human community, class interest groups, etc. In warfare, it can be said that there is the essence of aiming at achieving the goal by expanding the spatial control from the relatively safe sanctuary for organization, supply and rest. The basic subject of warfare was the existence of a state or sub-state with a dominant territory, and as long as these are the subjects, judgment as to whether it is a war or not seems to be made almost based on conflict intensity.

In terms of the definition of “war”, a question of how we view a long-term conflict with ambiguous “subdomain subjects” as regards the territory of war and the subject of war, as seen in the Northern Ireland conflict in which urban guerrilla activities were carried out based on areas with high collecting population of people who share a certain identity.

Besides the examination of the “irregular warfare” itself, I would like to suggest here the consideration of its position in the recent international security environment. As the societal ‘mode’ which loosely regulates the world is gradually changing into “civil” dimension, it has become difficult for regular states to wage regular warfare. There seems increasing use of those means other than war in order to attain national interest which can be portrayed by the words “stealth”, “dual”, and “niche”. This could be related to the frequent appearance of the discourse of “irregular warfare” and “hybrid warfare”.

## Special Address

### **Warfare in the 21st Century**

Thomas G. Mahnken

My talk will examine the uses of history for examining contemporary and future wars. It will examine the character and conduct of war in the 21st century, to include both continuities and potential discontinuities. It will conclude by discussing the re-emergence of great-power competition and conflict as a driver of military planning.

## Session 2

### **Japanese Counterinsurgency Operations in Mainland China**

Nobu Iwatani

This presentation examines the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Japanese Army against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Mainland China during the Sino-Japanese War, referring to the survival strategy and specific tactics of its opponent.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident which occurred on July 7, 1937, developed into a full-scale war between Japan and China by the battle of Shanghai started on August 13. The Japanese Army reached almost limit of ability to mobilize after taking over Wuhan and Guangzhou; meanwhile the Kuomintang (KMT) Army led by Chiang Kai-shek moved their base to Chongqing and carried on the war against Japan. Consequently, the Japanese Army tried to resolve the war by a political means or conspiracy rather than military means. Then, the war fell into a stalemate. Since China theatre became second front in the Pacific War after the outbreak of the war between Japan and U.S. in December 1941, the Japanese Army focused on maintaining or restoring the security in the occupied area, while suppressing the KMT Army's counterblow. To the Japanese Army that commenced full-fledged efforts on security measures, the cause of trouble was not the KMT but the CCP.

The CCP reached Northwest China in 1936, after two years of escape (so called "the Long March"), as the result of the encirclement operations by the KMT. The CCP Army had not developed their guerrilla warfare tactics before that time, but rather preferred to engage reckless trench warfare. It was after outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War that the CCP started to develop guerrilla warfare tactics, which was closely related to their survival strategy.

When the CCP reached Northwest China, they were left with 10,000 soldiers which once were over 300,000 and had to rebuild the base on its wasteland. Furthermore, even after the Long March, as the KMT continued to pursue, the CCP was still in the critical situation. However, with the Xi'an Incident, the CCP has legitimized; thus, they could expand its own territory and rapidly increased power after outbreak of the war against Japan.

In the early phase of the war, many of the CCP leaders thought that they would fight with Japanese on the front line like KMT. Nevertheless, they finally accepted Mao Zedong's idea to increase own forces with fighting guerrilla warfare and establishing base in the mountainous area of North China. While Japanese and the KMT locked in the battle, the CCP could develop without any pressures from both-sides. They succeeded in gaining people's support and extended power through political maneuvering while getting the sources of supply for food and manpower. Against such military forces, Mopping-up operations against bandits or armed groups as usual was ineffective.

The Japanese Army studied the CCP's doctrine and political warfare to set up new units called the Special Guard. The Special Guard was the units specialized for anti-communist activities which combined military police with infantry equipped with mobility and

communication. It succeeded at the beginning, but as the war situation worsened and the CCP took countermeasures, the Special Guard could not respond adequately and failed to obtain expected result.

## Session 2

### **Algerian War: A Model of Counterinsurgency Operation**

Kyoichi Tachikawa

The Algerian War is an armed conflict that began with the uprising of the National Liberation Front (FLN: *Front de Libération Nationale*) on November 1, 1954, and ceased after the conclusion of the Evian agreement on March 18, 1962. In general, it is recognized as the war for Algerian independence from France. However, there were special circumstances that made it uneasy to regard the war as such, for Algeria was administratively part of Metropolitan France, actually being a French colony though. For this reason, the French government did not acknowledge this conflict publicly as war, and responded as “state of emergency (*événements*),” calling its action in Algeria “order maintenance operation (*opérations de maintien de l’ordre*).” Only after the Law No. 99-882 (*Loi n° 99-882*) was enforced on October 18, 1999, this conflict was officially referred to as “war” in France.

In December 2006, during the war in Iraq, the US Army revised the counterinsurgency doctrine, and developed “Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.” On this revision process, David Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964) is believed to have had a major influence. Galula was a French Army officer who had experienced conducting counterinsurgency during the Algerian War.

During the same period, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-62* by Alistair Horne, a British historian, originally published in 1977 was reprinted for the first time in ten years. It is regarded as the classic on the history of the Algerian War and is also known for an episode that Dr. Henry Kissinger recommended the reading to President George W. Bush.

Indeed, as a result of the war, Algeria gained independence from France; therefore, it is common to see Algeria as the winner and France as the loser. Meanwhile, some say that France won military victory, for they had almost destroyed the military organization of FLN called the National Liberation Army (ALN: *Armée de Libération Nationale*) in Algeria by 1960. That is why the Algerian War is regarded as a successful example of counterinsurgency operation.

This presentation is mainly about the measures France took to expel the rebels from Algeria such as “grid operation (*quadrillage*),” “forbidden zone (*zone interdite*),” “regrouping (*regroupement*),” “Morice line (*ligne Morice*),” “Challe plan (*plan Challe*),” “specialized administrative sections (SAS: *Sections administratives spécialisées*),” “urban administrative sections (SAU: *Sections administratives urbaines*),” “Center for Instruction and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare (CIPCG: *Centre d’instruction et de préparation à la contre-guérilla*)” among others. It also refers to the collaboration between the French Army and non-FLN Algerians.

### Session 3

#### **A Trend of COIN in U.S. Army after the Gulf War: With a Central Focus on John A. Nagl in 1990s**

Yuichi Shinpuku

This presentation focuses on John A. Nagl of the U.S. Army, a pioneer of counter-insurgency (COIN) studies, looked through his backdrops that he started COIN studies in order to clarify a degree of the U.S. Army's interest to an asymmetric warfare in 1990s.

It is said that the U.S. Army was not interested in COIN until they came to face security deterioration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Later, the U.S. Army conducted COIN operations with the initiative of David H. Petraeus, and then Nagl played a leading role in drawing up the COIN manual for the operations.

Though the Nagl's COIN studies were spotlighted since 2002, it is not well known when and why he took interest in COIN. In the 1990s, the U.S. Army developed a new concept of "Military Operations Other Than War: MOOTW or OOTW" in order to respond to military changes after the Cold War, and COIN was involved as one of them. But Nagl had already doubted the negative attitude of the top brass from this time. In this context, the 1990s is worth noting as a preparatory stage of full-fledged COIN studies within the U.S. Army which started in 2000.

In this presentation, by examining Nagl's works, memoirs, etc., I would like to consider how his COIN studies in the 1990s had been ahead in the U.S. Army. First, I shed light on the reasons and backgrounds why he became interested in COIN studies. Second, in order to clarify the difference of viewpoints between Nagl and the top brass of the U.S. Army, I analyze some reasons why it arose by comparing the possible threats and countermeasures that U.S. might face in the future.

### Session 3

#### **Insurgency in Iraqi-Afghanistan and COIN**

Carter Malkasian

The United States invested incredible effort to defeat insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2004 and 2011. The effort brought some success. Yet that form of counterinsurgency proved too costly to be sustainable and the United States drastically reduced its commitments.

Over the following years, security deteriorated in both countries. The reasons for the deterioration lie in political, cultural, and social factors internal to Iraq and Afghanistan that are difficult to change.

Forced to return to war in both countries, the United States adopted a lighter, more indirect, form of counterinsurgency. The significance is an evolution in thought on counterinsurgency, as democracies try to balance the risk of terrorism against the cost of counterinsurgency.

It also informs strategy more broadly, particularly the value of managing instability in war-torn countries versus fixing it.

### Session 3

#### **Air Power in Asymmetric Warfare**

Philip Sabin

- Air Power (AP) evolved in symmetrical conflicts, but recent AP employment has been increasingly in asymmetric conflicts.
- There is considerable debate about AP effectiveness in these asymmetric conflicts.
- AP losses have declined precipitously, and UAVs reduce even further the risk to air personnel.
- There is hence a temptation to employ AP instead of putting ground forces at risk.
- The down side of this trend is that AP appears less 'heroic', and is often perceived as 'unfair' and illegitimate.
- This increases sensitivity to collateral damage, although some AP users are less sensitive than others.
- ISTAR is vital to identify legitimate targets and to underpin the concomitant media campaign.
- The vaunted 'flexibility' of AP does not extend to flexibility of interaction and engagement with a tangled ground environment.
- AP hence works best against clearly distinguishable adversaries, and is less effective in tangled factional fighting.
- Despite its tactical rapidity, AP usually takes a long time to achieve visible results in asymmetric conflicts.
- A key factor is whether AP can demonstrably ameliorate the threat of counter-action such as rocket or terrorist strikes.
- Ground forces have their own grave limitations in asymmetric conflicts, and depend fundamentally on AP dominance.
- AP is increasingly costly, and there are serious affordability problems in maintaining AP which can cope both with symmetrical and asymmetric conflicts.
- Provision of air defence assistance is a key means of limiting the effectiveness of enemy AP in asymmetric conflicts, but one which has considerable potential to backfire.
- Overall, AP use in asymmetric conflicts is becoming more widespread, despite the many problems and challenges involved.
- As difficult as it often is for AP to succeed in asymmetric conflicts, it is at least as difficult for opponents to counter the asymmetric AP advantage by a coherent strategy of their own.