Program
Participants
Summaries
PROGRAM

Opening Session
9:30 – 9:35  Opening Remarks
Noriaki Nakamura (President, NIDS)
9:35 – 9:40  Welcoming Remarks
9:40 – 9:45  Chairman’s Remarks
       Junichiro Shoji (Director, Center for Military History [CMH], NIDS)

Special Address
9:45 – 10:30  “Special Relationship? The Anglo-American Alliance During World
       War II”
       Mark A. Stoler (Professor Emeritus of History, University of Vermont)

10:30 – 10:40  Break

Session 1: Alliances before the Second World War
10:40 – 11:05  “Race, nation, and Empire: Australian attitudes to the Anglo-Japanese
       Alliance, 1902–23”
       Steven Bullard (Senior Historian, Australian War Memorial)
11:05 – 11:30  “Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy”
       Nobuo Tajima (Professor, Seijyo University)
11:30 – 11:40  Comments
       Kiyoshi Aizawa (Chief, National Security Policy Division, CMH, NIDS)
11:40 – 12:00  Discussion

12:00 – 13:30  Lunch Time

Keynote Address
13:30 – 14:30  “Japan-U.S. Alliance and Geopolitics in a New Era”
       Kazuya Sakamoto (Professor, Osaka University)

14:30 – 14:40  Break
Session 2: Japan-U.S. Alliance 1

    Allan R. Millett (Senior Military Advisor, National World War II Museum)
15:05 – 15:30  “Formation of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements”
    Shingo Nakajima (Senior Fellow, National Security Policy Division, CMH, NIDS)
15:30 – 15:40  Comments
    Ayako Kusunoki (Associate Professor, International research Center for Japanese Studies)
15:40 – 16:00  Discussion

16:00 – 16:15  Break

Session 3: Japan-U.S. Alliance 2

    Alessio Patalano (Senior Lecturer, Department of War Studies, King’s College London)
16:40 – 17:05  “Japan-U.S. Alliance and Japan’s Defense Concept”
    Yasuaki Chijiwa (Senior Fellow, National Security Policy Division, CMH, NIDS)
17:05 – 17:15  Comments
    Takuma Nakashima (Associate Professor, Ryukoku University)
17:15 – 17:35  Discussion

Chairman’s Summary and Closing Remarks

17:35 – 17:45  Junichiro Shoji (Director, CMH, NIDS)
PARTICIPANTS

Chairman
Junichiro Shoji
Director, Center for Military History [CMH], NIDS
M.A., University of Tsukuba
*Nichibei Senryaku Shisoshi: Nichibei-kankei no Atarashii Shiten,* (co-author) (Sairyusha, 2005); *Rekishi to Wakai,* (co-author) (Tokyo University Press, 2011); *Taiheiyosenso to sono Senryaku* (co-author, 3 volumes) (Chuokoron Shinsha, 2013)

Special Speaker
Mark A. Stoler
Professor Emeritus of History, University of Vermont
Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison
*Allies and Adversaries: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000); *Allies in War: Britain and America against the Axis Powers, 1940-1945* (Hodder Arnold, 2005)

Keynote Speaker
Kazuya Sakamoto
Professor, Osaka University
Ph.D., Kyoto University
*Senso Nihon Gaikoshi* (co-author) (Yuhikaku, 1999); *Nichibei Dohmei no Kizuna* (Yuhikaku, 2000); *Nichibei Dohmei no Nanmon* (PHP Institute, 2012)

Speakers
Steven C. Bullard
Senior Historian, Australian War Memorial
Ph.D., Australia National University
*From a hostile shore: Australia and Japan at war in New Guinea* (editor) (Australian War Memorial, 2004); *Blankets on the wire: the Cowra breakout and its aftermath* (Australian War Memorial, 2006); *Army Operations in the South Pacific area: Papua campaigns, 1942-1943* (translator) (Australian War Memorial, 2007)
Nobuo Tajima
Professor, Seijo University
Ph.D., Hokkaido University
*Nazism Kyokuto Senryaku – Nichidoku Bohkyo Kyotei wo Meguru Chohosen* (Kodansha, 1997); *Nichidoku Kankei-Shi* (co-author, 3 volumes) (Tokyo University Press, 2008); *Nazis Germany to Chugoku Kokumin Seifu 1933-1937* (Tokyo University Press, 2013)

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*Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku – Yoshida Rosen wo Meguru Seiji, Gaiko, Gunji* (Keio University Press, 2006); *Reisen Hen’yo-ki no Nihon Gaiko* (Minerva Shobo, 2013); *Sengo Nihon Shusho no Gaiko Shiso* (co-author) (Minerva Shobo, 2016)

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Discussants

Kiyoshi Aizawa
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Ph.D., Sophia University
*Nichi Ei Koryu-Shi* (co-author 3 Volume) (Tokyo University Press, 2001); *Kaigun no Sentaku* (Chuokoron Shinsha, 2002); *Higashi Asia Kingendai Tsuushi* (co-author) (Iwanami Shoten, 2010)

Ayako Kusunoki
Associate Professor, International research Center for Japanese Studies
Ph.D., Kobe University
*Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen Hosyo Seisakushi no Keisei* (Minerva Shobo 2009); *Gendai Nihon Seiji-Shi 1 – Senryo kara Dokuritsu he* (Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2013)

Takuma Nakashima
Associate Professor, Ryukyu University
Ph.D., Kyusyu University
In his award-winning six-volume memoir, Winston Churchill labeled the Anglo-American World War II Alliance the “special relationship” — a judgment with which much of the world concurred at the time and still concurs today. Indeed, many view this alliance and special relationship, which still continues, to have been a natural one based on common language as well as common interests, values and cultures. Over the last three-four decades, however, numerous historians have challenged Churchill’s description and such beliefs, and have instead emphasized the numerous Anglo-American conflicts that took place during as well as prior to the Second World War. Prewar conflicts included the bloody and lengthy American War for Independence, a second war from 1812-1815, and clashes throughout the rest of the nineteenth century that almost led to a third war on numerous occasions. The two nations also continued to consider each other rivals and potential enemies in the first four decades of the twentieth century, and were brought together in 1941 primarily if not solely by fear of common enemies. Furthermore, their wartime alliance was marked by serious disputes over proper military strategy against the Axis powers and personality conflicts as well as disagreements on numerous postwar issues, most notably trade, colonialism, and relations with other nations. This lecture will analyze those conflicts, disputes and disagreements as well as the unprecedented cooperation that did characterize their World War II relationship in an effort to figure out if it was truly “special” as Churchill and others have claimed. In the process, it will illustrate the problems all alliances face, and thus the reasons so many of them fail as well as why some of them succeed.
Session 1

Race, nation, and Empire: Australian attitudes to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-23

Steven Bullard

The story of Australia’s attitudes to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance from 1902 to 1923 is one filled with uncertainties and contradictions. On the one hand, the alliance provided a guarantee of security for the new nation, as demonstrated, for instance, in the actions of the Japanese Navy as an alliance partner during the First World War. But for much of the period in question, many in the Australian government, the military, and the broader public considered their alliance partner to be the main threat to the future peace and freedom of the country. Compounding the tension inherent in these issues was the unflinching efforts of the Australian Government to ensure the dominance of the British race in this far-flung corner of the Empire, as evidenced in restrictive immigration practices – the so-called White Australia Policy.

This paper examines the history of Australia’s attitudes to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance through the lens of the interconnected issues of race, nation and empire. Australia in the early decades of the Twentieth Century was a country uncertain of its place in the world. Federation in 1901 had provided the isolated British colonies the framework of nationhood, but the central identity of the new nation and its citizens was subsumed by connections to Empire. Debates and policies concerning defence and security were subsequently framed in terms of a contest between wider imperial and narrower local issues. This was nowhere more evident than the decision by the Australian Government from 1907 to develop an independent defence capability, while remaining under the broad protection of British naval power. This desire was directly motivated by fears of growing Japanese influence in the Pacific, despite the guarantees provided by the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Though the alliance was initially imposed on Australia, it was broadly accepted as the only viable guarantee of Australian security. Nevertheless, attitudes towards the alliance reflected the interplay of race, nation and empire that characterised how Australia viewed its place in the world over the period the alliance was in effect. This argument is presented in three main sections. The first examines the period from the formation of the alliance in 1902 through its renewal in 1905 and 1911. These events will be viewed in the light of changing attitudes in Australia to the country’s defence and the perceived threat from Japan. The second section looks at the alliance in action, with an investigation of Australian attitudes towards Japanese involvement in the First World War, particularly attitudes to Japan’s occupation of the former German territories in the Pacific. The last section traces Australia’s conflicted attitudes towards the future of the alliance in the context of the post-war peace settlement and debates on disarmament.
In Articles 1 and 2 of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy concluded on September 27, 1940, the three Contracting Powers reciprocally recognized the “establishment of a New Order” and “leadership” of Germany and Italy in Europe, and “establishment of a New Order” and “leadership” of Japan in the “Greater East Asia.”

Article 3 provides that if one of the three Contracting Powers gets attacked by “a Power at present not involved in the European War or the Japanese-Chinese conflict,” they shall assist one another. This provision apparently implied both U.S. and Soviet, however, Article 5 confirmed the continuation of the status quo relation with Soviet, including the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact; thus the Tripartite Pact revealed their commonly imagined enemy—the United States—.

Furthermore, the Appendix to the Pact defined that Germany would “promote amicable understanding” between Japan and Soviet and “act as go-between,” all of which are purposed to prompt alliances between the three and Soviet.

In the wake of these provisions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan immediately drafted a document on October 3, entitled “Japanese-Soviet Diplomatic Relations Adjustment Outline.” Article 7 is of particular importance, which envisaged the division of activity spheres as follows.

a. Soviet recognizes Japan’s traditional interest in Inner Mongolia and the three Provinces in Northern China, whereas Japan recognizes Soviet’s traditional interest in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang.

b. Soviet allows Japan’s future entry into French Indochina and Dutch East Indies, whereas Japan allows Soviet’s future entry into Afghanistan and Persia (including India depending on situations).

c. Japan, Germany and Italy shall have Soviet cooperate in establishing a New World Order, not excluding the possibility of Soviet’s joining in the alliance to develop a Quadripartite Pact on the same basis between the four nations.

On Germany’s part, ten days later, October 13, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop sent a letter to Stalin saying: “Our Führer’s view is that the historical mission of Soviet, Italy, Japan and Germany is to coordinate the four nations’ foreign policies from a long-term perspective and confirm their profits based on realistic standards so as to lead the future development of all four peoples in the right direction.” In other words, Ribbentrop also proposed the shape of the quadripartite alliance based on defined activity spheres.

Hitler himself took extra steps. In his talk with Molotov in mid-November 1940, based on the premise that “it is the duty of Russia and Germany to give consideration to the coordination of Japan-China relations,” he said “China is also in a position to participate in the
activity spheres of awake countries” depending on circumstances; thus suggesting that even the Republic of China led by Chang Kai-shek could join in the above quadripartite alliance.

As seen above, when it comes to considering the political and diplomatic aspects of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, we need to focus on the movement on the political fronts led by Stalin/Soviet and Chang Kai-shek/Republic of China, even more than the three parties’ political intents and the corresponding diplomatic responses from U.S. and U.K.

From these aspects, this presentation addresses the historical significance of the Tripartite Pact, centering on the vicissitude of four-way relations between Japan, Germany, Italy and Soviet and the response of Chang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government.
Keynote Address

Japan-U.S. Alliance and Geopolitics in a New Era

Kazuya Sakamoto

Last year, the 70th year after the end of World War II, the introduction of the new Guidelines for Japan U.S. Defense Cooperation and the enactment of the new Legislation for Peace and Security brought a landmark development to the Japan-U.S. alliance in furtherance of the reciprocity to “guard each other for each other.” We can say that the alliance entered a new era, as the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said “this opened a new page” in the history of the bilateral alliance. In this address, I would like to consider the purpose (mission) of the Japan-U.S. alliance in a new era especially in the light of geopolitics, after looking back on the alliance history in view of the development of reciprocity and confirming the significance of approved exercise of the right of collective self-defense in the context of the new Guidelines and the new Legislation for Peace and Security.

• Introduction
• (1) Development of reciprocity in the Japan-U.S. Alliance
• (2) New Guidelines/Legislation for Peace and Security and the right of collective self-defense
• (3) Geopolitics of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
• Afterword: Significance of Article II in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
When the U.S. and its allies in the Asia-Pacific War signed a peace treaty with Japan in 1951, the companion bilateral security agreement between the U.S. and Japan, also signed on 8 September, started a process of strategic realignment that did not end its first phase until 1960. The mutual security pact of 1951 addressed only one immediate problem, the continued, exclusive use of military bases established by the US armed forces in 1945-1950 and then expanded and reorganized during the Korean War, 1950-1953. In addition to ceding base rights only to the United States, Japan agreed that it would not make any defense agreements with any other nation without the consent of the United States. In addition, as a price for its strategic partnership with Japan, the United States signed mutual defense agreements with Australia, the Philippines, and New Zealand in order to end the state of war with Japan.

The US-Japan defense treaty of 1951, however, required more comprehensive elaboration, so negotiations continued until the first treaty was replaced in 1960 by the more definitive Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (May, 1960). This treaty, still in force, put the two nations into an alliance that made any external military threat to either of the partners actionable by the other partner. In other words, if the Soviet Union attacked the forces or bases of either partner, both nations were obligated to take appropriate military action.

The U.S. concept of insular strategic defense in the Asia-Pacific world evolved in the late 1940s with Soviet bellicosity in Europe, the success of Soviet nuclear tests and long-range bomber adoption, the triumph of the Chinese Revolution, and the success of anti-imperialism in Asia. The concept of nuclear deterrence and retaliation received official endorsement in Joint Emergency War Plan 1 or Plan Halfmoon, the first general war plan produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and used for planning and budgeting for the armed forces for FY 1949. The plan had a Eurocentric bias and stress on creating overseas bases in England and in the Mediterranean world that would place nuclear armed bombers within range of the Soviet heartland. The Soviet naval and air forces stationed in China’s Liaotung peninsula and in the Vladivostok area menaced American forces already based in Japan, but Soviet Asia did not represent the strategic center-of-gravity in a U.S.-USSR war.

To draft an enduring mutual security treaty between the United States and Japan required patience and understanding from both parties. The issue of cost-sharing, complicated by currency value and exchange problems, required one stream of negotiations. Another negotiating stream was a status-of-forces agreement that would define the legal status of American service personnel stationed in Japan, a matter of great concern with the restoration of Japanese civil and criminal codes in the 1950s. A third negotiating stream focused on the
purchase of American warships, aircraft, and heavy ground war weapons and the development (or rebirth) of the Japanese armaments industry. In the long run, the treaty the State and Defense departments negotiated had to be ratified by the U.S. Senate with a two-thirds majority vote.

The ways in which State and Defense guided the treaty through the ratification process is as important as the diplomatic negotiations that produced the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty of 1960. They provide special insight into how American domestic politics influenced bilateral mutual security agreements with Japan, as well as other Asian nations.
Session 2

Formation of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Shingo Nakajima

It is well known that a Japanese diplomat who had been engaged in the conclusion of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty called that this bilateral relation is the “cooperation regarding material things and people”. That means the Treaty is characterized by the fact that Japan offers military bases (“material things”) to U.S., whereas U.S. offers their forces (“people”) to defend Japan. Over the course of time, such relation has gradually changed into “cooperation regarding people and people” in various aspects. However, the underlying basic structure of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements remained as “cooperation regarding material things and people”. In late years, this underlying basic structure has moved toward a significant transformation. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements have undergone some changes since its formation, but now is likely the most momentous turning point it has ever faced.

This paper is aimed to analyze the formative period of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements from Japan’s point of view. Obviously, the cabinet of Shigeru Yoshida made a significant mark on this formation. While he was in power, Japan’s defense capabilities were reconstructed based on the close relationship with U.S., let alone the conclusion of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1951. His government also drove forward Japan’s postwar rearmament program from the launch of the National Police Reserve in 1950 to the foundation of Defense Agency/Self-defense Forces in 1954. That is why Yoshida’s vision and decision-making have been the primary object of studies for a long time.

His central concern was on the early conclusion of peace treaty and the economic reconstruction of Japan. Japanese government faced, however, some challenges more than ever to ensure the national security of Japan in the post peace treaty period—challenges aroused by the Cold War spreading to East Asia and a “Hot War” that broke out in 1950 in the Korean Peninsula. Prime Minister Yoshida selected a course of action to gradually build up defense capabilities, on one hand, to the extent that it would create little drag on the economic reconstruction; he decided, on the other hand, to conclude a bilateral security treaty with U.S., keep offering military bases even under the peace treaty, and depend on U.S. for the security for some time to come.

In the meanwhile, such bilateral relation, namely “cooperation regarding material things and people” was not taken for granted by all in Japan. There were various arguments and disputes over a future vision of Japan-U.S. security relation in the post peace treaty period among anti-administration parties such as the Socialist Party, and politicians of conservative parties including Ichiro Hatoyama as well as former officers of the Imperial Army and Navy. This paper focuses on the arguments of some actors who criticized Yoshida’s security policies, especially those standing on the conservative side. By so doing, I wish to show the characteristics of Yoshida’s security policies, in particular of the relations with U.S.
Session 3

‘The Shape of Things to Come?’:

Alessio Patalano

In his capacity as President of the United States-Japan Foundation, George Packard has recently observed that the US-Japan Security Treaty stands today as the longest lasting alliance between two great powers since the Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648.¹ This is no trifling achievement. It is a testament to almost sixty years of debates in Washington and Tokyo about the political, economic, and social costs of marinating the alliance against the benefits it provides to American and Japanese national security.² Why does the alliance matter? What difference does it make? What purposes does it serve? These questions underscored debates that continue to the present day and that contribute to the alliance’s ability to remain relevant.³

This paper engages with the above questions by exploring the changing strategic value of the alliance throughout the 1970s. Diplomatic historians have demonstrated how current debates can be considered to draw their origins in the aftermath of the Nixon doctrine and its impact on US-Japan security ties.⁴ In particular, from an American perspective, during the 1970s the answers to the above questions started to require civilian and military elites to regularly engage with two different sets of issues. The first concerned the role and significance of East Asia in the U.S. Cold War security posture. The second set focused on the type and level of military commitment the United States wished Japan to possess to meet American policy goals without undermining regional stability with fears of a resurgence of Japanese militarism.

Drawing upon primary and secondary sources, including a wealth of declassified documents from the Nixon and Ford administrations and recently published US Navy documentation, this paper argues that the engagement with the above set of issues contributed to set the foundations for the development of an ‘operational’ dimension of the relationship based on a shared strategic vision. The paper’s argument is that 1970s were, in this respect,

² Ibid.,
the decade that witnessed for the first time the emergence of a grand strategy that underpinned the relationship. This transformed the ‘security treaty’ from a political commitment to defend Japan conventionally and by means of a nuclear umbrella, into a ‘maritime alliance’.

In setting forth this argument, the paper aims to link existing work on the evolution of the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Forces to the broader diplomatic history literature, expanding the understanding of this period as one of ‘soul-searching’ and transition in the US-Japan bilateral relations. Diplomatic historians have explored in detail the impact of the Nixon doctrine and the changing dynamics of great power relations on Japanese defence policy-making. However, such a focus fails to sufficiently account for the equally significant strategic transformation that came to shape the need of an alliance between Washington and Tokyo by the end of the decade.

The paper postulates that two factors have to be considered to fully understand the nature of the qualitative changes in the US-Japan security ties that takes place in the 1970s. First, in clear contrast with the general atmosphere of détente in Soviet-US relations, Soviet naval and air power in East Asia grew considerably throughout this decade. Second, issues of obsolescence and of contractions in capabilities within the US Navy raised concerns about the navy’s ability to meet its global requirements. The combination of these two factors shaped US perceptions about Japan’s potential contribution to the alliance. Indeed, a consensus emerged in the United States that a Japan with a maritime-centric defence posture would be able to pursue its national security goals, offers invaluable contributions to the alliance, and contribute to the stability of East Asia.

This vision underwrote four crucial policy initiatives in the second half of the decade: the maritime emphasis of the qualitative build-up proposed in the National Defence Programme Outline of 1976, the sea-lanes defence centric character of the Guidelines for Defence Cooperation of 1978, the Japanese decision to participate to the RIMPAC exercise, and the 1,000 nautical miles sea-lanes defence pledge by Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko in 1981.

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The aim of this presentation is to explore the relationship between Japan-U.S. alliance and Japan’s defense concept in the 1970’s. When we divide studies on alliance into three categories, namely the alliance formation, the alliance management and the alliance effectiveness, this presentation focuses on aspects of the alliance management in that it inquires coherence between a nation’s defense concept and the alliance system that nation joins in.

The “National Defense Program Outline” (NDPO) developed on October 29, 1976 introduced the “Basic Defense Force Concept.” Identifying what is supposed to be regarding Japan’s defense posture, the Outline state that “[T]he possession of the assorted functions required for national defense, while retaining balanced organization and deployment, including logistical support,” “Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance,” “At this time, the present scale of defense capability seems to closely approach target goals of the above-mentioned concept,” and Japan’s defense concept “will be standardized so that, when serious changes in situation demand, the defense structure can be smoothly adapted to meet such changes.” These constitute what is known as the Basic Defense Force Concept.

Among these components of the Basic Defense Force Concept, the statement “Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance” is a notion, so-called “repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance” How should we then view the relationship between this notion and the Japan-U.S. Security Agreements? One view focusing on “without external assistance” is that the notion is originally based on the idea of “self-reliant defense;” although it admits the very role of Japan-U.S. alliance. Another view of some others focusing on “limited and small-scale aggression” is regarded as an idea weighing heavily the Japan-U.S. alliance. Another view of some others focusing on “limited and small-scale aggression” is regarded as an idea weighing heavily the Japan-U.S. alliance, for it assumes that Japan relies on U.S. to cope with an aggression that goes beyond “limited and small-scale.” In this presentation, however, apart from this binary of “self-reliant defense vs Japan-U.S. alliance,” we examine first the coherence between the notion of repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance and the Japan-U.S. alliance in terms of the “buildup and operation of defense capabilities.”

We examine next a notion such as, “[T]he possession of the assorted functions required for national defense, while retaining balanced organization and deployment, including logistical support,” that is in short, the concept of “maintaining various functions/functional and geographical balance.” In fact when the NDPO was developed, U.S. initiated the concept of “complementarity” in the context of Japan-U.S. security relationship. Did it not produce
a logical conflict with the idea of Japan’s maintaining various functions/functional and geographical balance based on the Basic Defense Force Concept? How should we understand the relationship between these two seemingly conflicting concepts? We discuss the background that U.S. accepted Japan’s Basic Defense Force Concept including the idea of maintaining various functions/functional and geographical balance, while embracing the concept of complementarity.