

# **Keynote Address**



# Japan-U.S. Alliance and Geopolitics in a New Era

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## Introduction

Thank you for inviting me to this International Forum on War History today.

The Japan-U.S. alliance refers to the mutual cooperation that Japan and the United States engage in “the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East” as set out in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. This mutual cooperation is carried out in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the decisions associated with it, and formal and informal understandings.

This cooperation forms the foundation of Japan’s foreign and security policy, and this Japan-U.S. alliance is now entering a new era.

In April 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Barack Obama held a Japan-U.S. summit meeting in Washington, D.C. This meeting was held a day after the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation was announced. At a joint press conference held after the meeting, Prime Minister Abe stated that Japan and the United States turned a “new page” in the history of their alliance.

I agree with the Prime Minister. I view this “new page” as a new page that begins a new chapter of a book.

This is to say that the history of the Japan-U.S. alliance is the history of the enhancement of mutuality between Japan and the United States. “Mutuality” means “cooperating with and for each other.” The new Guidelines, coupled with Japan’s new security legislation, enhance mutuality in the Japan-U.S. alliance in a groundbreaking manner and elevate it to a new level.

This landmark development is epitomized by the phrase, “*Otagai no tame ni*”—the only phrase President Obama said in Japanese at the press conference. The President went on to say that the United States and Japan are “with and for each other,” and that this is the essence of the alliance between the two countries.

Based on these remarks made by the President and the Prime Minister at the Japan-U.S. joint press conference, in my address today I would like to begin by verifying that Japan and the United States have entered a new stage in the history of their alliance in terms of the enhancement of the mutuality of the alliance. In connection with the mutual cooperation of the alliance, there is also the issue of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense that has been a subject of much discussion. While this issue is settled for now under the Japanese government’s new interpretation of the Constitution and new security legislation, I would like to once again review this issue and share my observations of what the main points were. I will then examine the nature of the Japan-U.S. alliance in a new era by referring to a single map.

I believe you have all received a handout and the map. If you will, I would like to kindly ask for about an hour of your time.

### **(1) Enhancement of mutuality in the Japan-U.S. alliance: With and for**

President Obama mentioned the Japanese phrase, “*Otagai no tame ni*,” and then rephrased it into “with and for each other” in English. I would like to refer to this English phrase for our consideration. In doing so, we cannot forget that in the history of the Japan-U.S. security relationship, an era of “security with and for each other” was preceded by an era of confrontation between each other. That is, there was an era of “security against each other.”

There are various opinions as to when the security confrontation between Japan and the United States began. However, there is no mistake that “security against each other” was very much on the minds of the two countries before World War II, at the very least after World War I. This awareness ultimately led to the Japan-U.S. war.

How was peace maintained in Japan and the United States until the war broke out? The answer is the Washington Naval Conference that was held from 1921 to 1922. Peace was secured by the Japan-U.S. coordination that emerged out of this conference.

In other words, under the Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty and the Four-Power Treaty regarding the Pacific, Japan and the United States pledged to maintain the status quo by de facto splitting the sphere of influence in the Pacific into two. In addition, by concluding the Nine-Power Treaty prescribing the territorial integrity and the open door policy of China, the two countries pledged to coordinate with other countries on their China policy. The Japan-U.S. coordination was premised on these pledges.

Unfortunately, coordination between the two countries fell apart over the response to Chinese nationalism. This was anti-imperialist nationalism that heightened in China under the strong influence of the Soviet Union and communism.

Japan entered into military confrontations with China over the protection of interests in China in the Manchurian Incident, followed by the Sino-Japanese War. With the United States supporting China politically and economically, confrontation emerged between Japan and the United States. This confrontation continued to deepen, intertwined with the War in Europe. Japan, which signed the Tripartite Pact—an agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy—was inspired by Germany’s military advancements and advanced into southern French Indochina. In response to Japan’s revealing ambition to advance into Southeast Asia, the United States retaliated with the severe tactics of Japanese asset freeze and oil embargo. From this time, the sand began to flow through the hourglass marking the hours until the Japan-U.S. war broke out.

The war ended with Japan suffering a devastating defeat. The Pacific was not split between Japan and the United States; rather, it became something like a U.S. lake with the United States gaining sole control of or establishing sole hegemony in the Pacific.

What happened to “security against each other”? Japan recognized that “security against the United States” may have meaning in theory but was meaningless in reality. Maybe I shouldn’t say “meaningless.” Simply said, having experienced major defeat no less, but also because of the emergence of atomic bombs, Japanese people decided to shelve “security against the United States,” at least the security form as it existed before the war.

There are still countries in the world that have not dismissed “security against the United

States.” However, many countries in the world have in fact shelved “security against the United States.” For example, Great Britain put an end to this concept by the end of the 19th century. In principle, like Japan, the United Kingdom appears to have decided to preserve national security while sustaining its friendship with the United States, having some degree of trust in the justice and faith of the peace-loving people of the United States. This is basically believed to have been the reason that Great Britain terminated its alliance with Japan following World War I.

Of course, not considering “security against the United States” does not mean that “policy against the United States” is not allowed or that “opinion against the United States” is not tolerated. These are separate issues. In any case, Japan determined that it had no other choice but to ensure “security against the United States,” if there is even such a thing, through the renunciation of war with the United States, friendship with the United States, or through Japan-U.S. partnership and the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Then what about the United States? After the United States secured victory against Japan and gained hegemony in the Pacific, maintaining this hegemony became a security issue. Fearing a war of revenge by Japan, the United States made sure that Japan was disarmed, revising the Constitution to enshrine that Japan would never maintain war potential. This was instilled in the minds of the Japanese people through the democratization of Japan for dismantling militarism, implementation of a purge and censorship, dissolution of zaibatsu, execution of liberal land reform, and modification of other Japanese systems. Even after the U.S. occupation ended, the United States had measures to ensure “security against Japan” by keeping Okinawa to monitor Japan to prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism.

However, this concept of “security against Japan,” dating back to before the war, gradually weakened with the steady advancement of demilitarization and the U.S. notion of democratization in Japan, combined with the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union that began to divide the allied powers. Then, in 1950, five years after the end of World War II, the outbreak of the Korean War brought about a decisive change in the concept. It was decided that “security for Japan” was important, not “security against Japan.”

George F. Kennan, the father of the U.S. Cold War policy, explained that to win the Cold War, it was important to draw Japan, one of the five regions with world-level military production capabilities, to the U.S. camp, i.e., not letting Japan be taken by the Soviet camp. Therefore, Kennan himself went to Japan and sought to realize a shift towards an occupation policy to this end.

The U.S. military attached importance to the geographical location of Japan, along with its industrial power and manpower. In other words, in terms of postwar security in the Pacific, the United States began to draw the U.S. line of defense not at the U.S. west coast but stretching from the Aleutian Islands to Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and the Southeast Asian islands. The United States began to perceive that it needed to establish U.S. military bases in Japan to serve as the core component of this line of defense and to protect Japan from adversary camps.

In the wake of World War II, Japan intended to become a neutral nation by relying on the security of the United Nations (UN) to maintain the security of Japan. However, when the Cold War began and it became clear that the UN would not act as expected, the idea gained

currency that the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan was the only way to ensure the security of Japan for the time being. Understanding that renting out military bases would provide not only security for Japan but also security for the United States, Japan offered to rent out military bases to the United States.

The former security treaty, i.e., the security treaty that the governments of Japan and the United States signed separately on the same day as the signing of their peace treaty, was precisely intended to ensure “security for each other” based on these views of the two countries.

Having said that, the old security treaty was no more than a provisional treaty signed after the peace treaty. The treaty was designed in effect to ensure “security for each other” but was formatted to ensure “security for Japan.” This is clearly stated in the preamble. The preamble states the United States’ unilateral notion to the effect that the United States would station its forces to protect Japan, as it would not have military forces to exercise self-defense in signing a peace treaty and gaining independence.

There is an important point to make here. Japan wanted the security treaty to state that Japan would rent out military bases and the United States would station its military forces there, that while the military forces in Japan would certainly contribute to its security, it would simultaneously contribute to the security of the United States, that it was an anomalous treaty but nevertheless a mutual treaty for and with each other, and that there was mutuality in the sense of “cooperation regarding material things and people” (military bases and U.S. forces). However, the United States did not allow for this.

Moreover, while the text of the treaty clarified that Japan had an obligation to rent out military bases to the United States, the text could not be construed to mean that the United States was obligated to protect Japan. As a result, dissatisfaction in Japan grew over the security treaty, which was viewed as a one-sided treaty in which only Japan bore obligations and as an agreement simply for the stationing of the U.S. Forces.

Although the treaty was actually intended “for each other,” the treaty did not make this explicit. While the two countries were supposed to stand “with each other,” it was uncertain whether the U.S. Forces would defend Japan.

Naturally, people in Japan began to voice the opinion that such a treaty was unsuited for security cooperation between sovereign states, and that the treaty must be revised immediately. By then, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) had been established, its economy was recovering, it restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and it acceded to the UN. The U.S. government, too, recognized that if it neglected these opinions, Japan would soon begin to seek the course of military neutrality. The United States wanted to avoid this during a time when the socialist camp in the Soviet Union was already about to gain momentum due to the successful launch of the Sputnik satellite. Harboring such fears, the United States agreed to revise the treaty.

With the revisions made to the security treaty in 1960, the security relationship between Japan and the United States was given the form of “security with and for each other,” establishing the basic structure of “security with and for each other.”

Since then, this structure has evolved substantially with the various policies and decisions implemented in response to the changes in the international security environment

and Japan-U.S. relations, forming the Japan-U.S. alliance of today 56 years later.

I would like to bring your attention to the revisions of the security treaty. The preamble of the new treaty enshrines that Japan and the United States are signing this treaty because they have a common concern in the “maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” In addition, Article 5 recognizes that an armed attack against Japan, a country in the Far East, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of not only Japan but also the United States. In other words, the new security treaty clarifies that it is a security treaty “for each other.”

What about the “with each other” aspect? Article 6 provides that Japan would rent out military bases to the United States that it could utilize for the peace and safety of the Far East and of Japan. These military bases were indispensable to the United States’ Far East strategy as well as world strategy. Japan would cooperate with the United States by renting out such military bases to the country. On the contrary, Article 5 prescribes that the United States would cooperate with the defense of Japan should it become a target of an armed attack. The security treaty specifies these as obligations of the two parties.

What is interesting about Article 5 is that it states that Japan and the United States would jointly respond if either party were attacked in “the territories under the administration of Japan.” In other words, it prescribes that if Japan were attacked, then the United States would cooperate to defend Japan, while if the United States in Japan, i.e., the U.S. Forces Japan, were attacked, then Japan would cooperate to defend and help the U.S. Forces Japan.

Mutual cooperation meaning “with each other” in the context of the security treaty is fundamentally about “cooperation regarding material things and people.” This cooperation takes the form of Japan renting out military bases and the United States providing troops. There is no mistake that this cooperation is reciprocal and provides benefits to both parties. However, this type of cooperation can easily produce dissatisfaction for both parties as the military bases and troops they are providing, i.e., material things and people, are asymmetric.

The party providing material things, i.e., renting out military bases, is dissatisfied that the other party does not understand the associated inconvenience and dangers. Vice versa, the party supplying people, i.e., providing troops, has a tendency not to respect the other party as it seems that the party is not bearing the risks and is delegating defense operations in exchange for renting out military bases.

Therefore, even if the security treaty is intended “for each other,” it has shortcomings in cultivating a sense of “with each other,” the sense that the parties are working together. Consequently, the spirit of the alliance is not fostered and the ties between the parties are not deepened. This is to say that it is “cooperation regarding people and people” that forms the foundation of alliance cooperation, which is to say that there must be cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces in the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

Article 5 of the security treaty incorporates this cooperative relationship. However, due to the Japanese government’s interpretation of the Constitution that Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defense, the geographical area in which Japan can cooperate to defend the United States was extremely limited and restricted to inside Japan. Moreover, this limited scope of cooperation was reduced to formality when the security treaty was initially revised. As a matter of fact, “cooperation regarding people and people” was introduced in the revised

security treaty mostly because the United States needed to format the new treaty similar to other mutual treaties such as the NATO treaty. In this regard, “cooperation regarding people and people” lacked real substance. It was not until years later that Japan and the United States began to formally discuss the specifics of their cooperation.

Now let me briefly outline the main developments in the enhancement of “with and for each other” in the Japan-U.S. alliance in the years after the security treaty was revised and last year, i.e., before the new Guidelines and Japan’s new security legislation were introduced.

The first noteworthy development was the return of administrative rights over Okinawa in 1972. Until then, although Japan-U.S. security cooperation was “cooperation regarding material things and people,” the military bases in Okinawa comprising a larger area than that of the U.S. military bases provided by Japan on its mainland were under U.S. administrative rights and were not covered by the security treaty. Thus, cooperation “with each other” regarding material things and people was not cooperation between sovereign state equals.

Besides, the military bases in Okinawa were initially established to maintain security against Japan. The United States placed Okinawa under its administrative rights so that it could at least secure the military bases in Okinawa should Japan become neutral and should the United States not be able to utilize the military bases on mainland Japan. Mutual cooperation in the form of “with and for each other” was impossible without the return of the administrative rights.

Conversely, the security treaty took the form of an alliance treaty between sovereign states equals for the first time after the treaty was revised and Okinawa was returned. In the history of the Japan-U.S. alliance, the return of Okinawa was a landmark event comparable to the second revision of the security treaty.

As the Vietnam War dragged on, the return of Okinawa was underpinned by the questions of how to strengthen the alliance, in particular, how Japan and the United States would deal with the forthcoming deadline of the new security treaty in 1970.

Going back to “cooperation regarding material things and people,” Japan and the United States have striven to streamline, realign, and reduce the U.S. military bases in Okinawa based on the changes in the international environment, especially after the Cold War. While it is true that difficult issues exist, including the issue of the relocation of Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, there are ongoing efforts to realign the military bases in Okinawa.

Another point related to “cooperation regarding material things and people” is that in the 1970s, the Japanese government began to pay for part of the costs of the stationing of the U.S. Forces separate from rent, and has been increasing its host nation support. Of the total cost of stationing U.S. Forces in Japan, Japan pays around 70% excluding the salaries of U.S. military personnel, or around half of the costs including the salaries of U.S. military personnel.

What about the enhancement of “cooperation regarding people and people”? First and foremost, this cannot be discussed without reference to the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation of 1978. These Guidelines formally set forth the basic arrangements for role sharing between the U.S. Forces and the SDF in the event of a contingency in Japan. Whereas much of the Japan-U.S. cooperation until then relied on informal channels, the U.S. Forces and the SDF thereafter engaged in full-fledged cooperation for the defense of Japan, which

included the enhancement of trainings.

Against the backdrop of the first guidelines were the detente and its failure as well as the development of Japan into an economic power. The Guidelines produced considerable outcomes for the Japan-U.S. alliance cooperation when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and during the second Cold War in the 1980s. For example, Japan played no small role in securing the West's victory in the Cold War by containing the Soviet Far East fleet.

During the Cold War, the Japan-U.S. alliance was premised on a total war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the importance of defending Japan and the military bases in Japan was clear to both Japan and the United States. When the Cold War ended, however, the two countries had to stand ready for not a total war but regional conflicts and terrorism.

So in 1997, the Guidelines of 1978 was revised in response to China's rise and to North Korea's nuclear and missile developments. The post-Cold War Guidelines widened the scope of "cooperation regarding people and people" to outside of Japan. Now Japan was able to provide rear area supports to the U.S. Forces in areas surrounding Japan, even on the high seas surrounding Japan if a situation occurs that could have a grave influence on the security of Japan if left unchecked. The revised Guidelines provided for "cooperation regarding people and people" in the event of not a contingency in Japan but a contingency in the Far East. However, the use of force was not included in SDF cooperation in such cases.

The attacks of 9/11 occurred five years after the revision of the Guidelines. Half a century after the former security treaty was concluded, the Japan-U.S. alliance was put to the test by an entirely unforeseen situation. Nevertheless, Japan acted quickly, in part due to its bitter experience with the Gulf War that broke out in 1991 ten years earlier. It was decided that SDF vessels would be sent to refuel U.S. naval vessels in the Indian Ocean far beyond the Far East to help the U.S. Forces' war on terror.

A quarter-century has already passed since the Cold War ended. Japan and the United States have made clear that the post-Cold War Japan-U.S. alliance is mutual cooperation "for each other." For example, in the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton referred to "the Asia-Pacific region"—a geographically wider area than the Far East—in view of the rise of China. In addition, Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush whose solidarity were strengthened in response to the 9/11 attacks called the Japan-U.S. alliance "the U.S.-Japan global alliance."

A decade after the 9/11 attacks, amid the increasing concerns over the military rise of China, including the issue of the Senkaku Islands, "Operation Tomodachi" of the U.S. Forces Japan in the Great East Japan Earthquake contributed to clarifying that the Japan-U.S. alliance was "for each other," albeit indirectly.

**(2) New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Japan's new security legislation, and the right of collective self-defense: Non-use of force in foreign territory (land, waters, and airspace of other countries)**

So the structure for “security with and for each other” was pretty much already in place before the new Guidelines and Japan’s new security legislation were introduced. Then why can we say that these two developments further solidified and signaled a new era in the Japan-U.S. alliance?

Above all, this is by and large because the Japanese government revised the way it understood the relationship between the Constitution and the right of collective self-defense that forms the basis of the Japan-U.S. alliance in international law. The government enabled the exercise of the right of collective self-defense albeit in a limited manner. Now that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is allowed, security cooperation “with each other” can be enhanced considerably.

Until two years ago, the Japanese government’s interpretation of the Constitution was that it does not permit Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense under any circumstances. To be honest, I think it is regrettable that the government long continued to maintain this constitutional interpretation.

The government insisted that the Constitution does not prohibit the use of force to the minimum extent necessary for self-defense, and therefore, the SDF is constitutional. The government also affirmed that Japan naturally has the right of collective self-defense because it is a sovereign state. Despite saying so explicitly, the government made the unclear assertion that although Japan could exercise the right of individual self-defense, it could not at all exercise the right of collective self-defense. How could this be?

There is nothing to support this assertion anywhere in the Constitution. The government continued to make unfounded arguments about the Constitution permitting the use of force for self-defense, and not enabling Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense as its purpose would be to defend other nations, i.e., force would be used to protect other nations. Or the government stated that the use of force to the minimum extent necessary for self-defense is limited to counterattacks in the case that Japan is attacked. The government advocated that even if another country is attacked and Japan is therefore in danger, the use of force to protect the other country is never permitted, even if this country is an ally. Surely these are unfounded arguments that misunderstand international law and ignore common security sense.

This is what I suspect happened. Because the government said at the beginning that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense in all of its forms was not permitted, the government could not easily go back on its word later. However, the issue is why did the government initially have this interpretation? Was it because the government was foolish? No, I do not think so. In considering this question, we need to think back to 1954 when the government first stated that Japan could not exercise the right of collective self-defense. This of course also has to do with the establishment of the SDF.

Let’s say that this was the government’s logic. Under the Constitution, Japan cannot maintain war potential, but it has the right of self-defense. Therefore, the government decided

to establish a SDF that can use force for self-defense. If so, the government must of course make it clear to the people that this organization that can use force has no resemblance to the prewar Japanese military.

The government certainly has to clarify that another Manchurian Incident will never occur. In the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese army, under the pretense of self-defense, advocated for war and the use of force for maintaining its interests in Manchuria in northeast China. And it was the Japanese army stationed in Manchuria that willfully advocated this.

However, in connection with this, I infer that the government had to go a step further and make it clear that Japan would build upon the basic concept of security and not repeat its prewar failures.

What is this concept? It is the idea that maintaining the security of a nation requires not only the defense of its territory, but also the defense of places closely linked to the defense of national territory. This is the idea held by Yamagata Aritomo, an elder statesman of the Meiji government. By the way, I am bringing him up not because this venue, Hotel Chinzanso, used to be the residence of Yamagata. In any case, in a famous memorandum written before the First Sino-Japanese War, Yamagata stated that it is not self-defense unless a nation itself protects both its “sovereignty line” and “interest line.”

In the case of Japan, Yamagata’s interest line refers to the Korean Peninsula that looks similar to a dagger protruding from the Eurasian continent toward the Japanese archipelago. Yamagata argued that the security of Japan could not be maintained without the security of not only the sovereignty line that makes up the territory of Japan but also the security of the Korean Peninsula. He contended that the security of Japan would be in danger if Japan’s major adversarial power gains a hold of the Korean Peninsula. Yamagata claimed that Japan’s self-defense depended on the security of the Korean Peninsula. Needless to say, this does not mean that Japan has to always protect or annex the Korean Peninsula. It can become a permanently neutral country. In any case, Yamagata conceived that the self-defense of Japan would become difficult if a major adversarial force gained a hold of the Korean Peninsula.

If this concept is followed strictly, then it is possible that Japan would need to dispatch troops overseas for self-defense to protect its interest line. Similar to the First Sino-Japanese War or the Russo-Japanese War, Japan may need to use force overseas over the control of the Korean Peninsula.

But if this is presented as the assumption, i.e., that such scenarios are possible, then the government had no chance of gaining public understanding for the establishment of the SDF. Whether it is the Korean Peninsula or anywhere else, the people of Japan did not want to dispatch any more troops overseas. They had had enough. In this sense, the government had no hope of establishing the SDF unless it explained clearly to the people that the SDF would not and cannot be dispatched overseas for the resolution of international conflicts, not even for self-defense.

1954 was the year after the Korean War ended in an armistice. It was a time when there were real concerns about what would happen if the Korean War occurs again, or whether the new Japanese forces or rather the SDF would be dragged into the war as a member of the UN force led by the United States.

In light of these concerns, Japan's upper house, the House of Councillors unanimously approved a resolution specifying that an SDF would be created but that it would not be mobilized overseas. The government also made its view clear that the SDF could not be mobilized overseas.

That said, will the Korean Peninsula, thought to be intricately linked to the security of Japan before the war as it lied on the interest line, conveniently have nothing to do with Japan after the war since it became a peace-loving nation? Of course not. In reality, the outbreak of the Korean War posed a threat to the security of Japan. In response to this situation, the National Police Reserve was established under the orders of the GHQ. This National Police Reserve was helpful to some extent in ensuring the security of the sovereignty line, such as in responding to internal disputes and guerilla activities. Nevertheless, the National Police Reserve was not helpful for ensuring the security of the interest line. What happens then?

Fortunately, the U.S. Forces continued to be stationed in the Korean Peninsula following the outbreak of the Korean War. In 1954, after the Korean War ended in an armistice, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea was signed. As a result, friendly forces began to protect the security of the Korean Peninsula, at least the security of its southern half which was more important for the security of Japan.

While this gave Japan much to be thankful for, the government needed to make it clear to both the Japanese people and to the United States that Japan cannot use force on the Korean Peninsula, even if the United States asks Japan to help protect the security of the Peninsula. While it is OK for the U.S. Forces to utilize Japan's military bases to defend the Korean Peninsula, Japan's SDF could not go to the Korean Peninsula and utilize force.

This is probably why the government stated that Japan could not exercise the right of collective self-defense under the Constitution. I do not know whether, based on the Constitution-formulation process, the government thought that the United States would be unable to say anything if the Constitution is given as the reason. In any case, the government stated that Japan could not exercise the right of collective self-defense under the Constitution.

In relation to the issue of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, the defense of Guam or the defense of Hawaii tends to be given as examples, but this is a theoretical discussion. In reality, I believe the foremost issue, both in the past and today, is the question of whether in the case of a contingency in the Korean Peninsula, Japan can dispatch the SDF to the Korean Peninsula for self-defense purposes to defend the interest line and whether the SDF can go so far as to use force to help the U.S. Forces in the ROK.

That is why it was so crucial that last year, Prime Minister Abe responded at the House of Councillors that even if the SDF were allowed limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense, the SDF would never utilize force on the Korean Peninsula in the case of a contingency on the Peninsula. The Prime Minister stated straightforwardly that the government's conventional interpretation of the Constitution would not change, i.e., the use of force to the minimum extent necessary for self-defense generally does not include dispatching the SDF overseas to use force, for example, the use of force on the Korean Peninsula.

Both the former and new security treaties are based on the right of individual self-defense and the right of collective self-defense. Therefore, so long as Japan has a security

treaty with the United States, it will be perceived that Japan may dispatch the SDF overseas for self-defense to protect the “interest line” as referred to long ago. To avoid this situation, the government may have said that the SDF to be newly established can exercise the right of individual self-defense but not the right of collective self-defense. If that is the case, I can see why the government stated this.

In terms of deepening the Japan-U.S. alliance, personally I think it would have been much better if the government had not stated this; if it had not made any unnecessary statements like the SDF cannot at all exercise the right of collective self-defense. The government should have put forward that the SDF to be newly established will comply with the House of Councillors resolution and is not intended to be dispatched overseas to use force even for self-defense purposes, that this was outside the scope of the use of force to the minimum extent necessary for self-defense, that with regard to the self-defense of Japan, the United States would be entrusted with much of the ensuring of the security of the interest line that was formerly at issue, that Japan would of course cooperate with the United States, and that in doing so it would not use force but instead pursue other forms of cooperation such as renting out military bases.

Even with this explanation, that SDF would not be going to the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam, Afghanistan, or anywhere overseas and exercising the right of collective self-defense. Moreover, this kind of explanation would have made it easier to pave the way for permitting the exercise of the right of collective self-defense overseas, i.e., in the territory, waters, airspace, or other places of other countries. By this I mean the exercise of the right of collective self-defense on Japanese territory as well as in the high seas and their airspace. Being able to do this would have great significance for the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is an alliance between maritime nations connected by the sea.

Japan’s new security legislation and the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation are designed to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance cooperation or “cooperation regarding people and people” precisely in these high seas and their airspace.

First, above all, they enable the SDF to exercise the right of collective self-defense albeit in a limited way. Secondly, they introduce the concept of asset protection (protection of equipment, etc.). Furthermore, they expanded Japan’s logistics supports and established permanent mechanisms for alliance coordination. These measures strengthen the “with each other” aspect of the Japan-U.S. alliance between maritime allies in a groundbreaking manner.

Let me explain briefly how permitting the limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense allows for far more substantive “with each other” scenarios than before. For example, the Constitution had always enabled the SDF to help protect a U.S. Forces’ vessel if there is an armed attack against this vessel in Japan’s territorial waters. Or rather, the SDF has an obligation to do so under Article 5 of the security treaty.

What if the armed attack took place in the high seas 100 m away from Japan’s territorial waters? In that case, even if the U.S. vessel had been conducting operations to defend Japan, even if Japan was in danger, the SDF could not help protect this vessel. “Sorry, according to the government’s interpretation of the Constitution...” This is what Japan had to say but not any longer.

“But it’s 100 m! It’s only 100 m so we’ll just assume it’s inside territorial waters. After all, it is inside Japan’s contiguous zone. Let the SDF go help the vessel. Oh, what? 1,000 m? Well, why don’t we let that pass as well?” Maybe this is how the government conceived it.

But this is not OK. This is not permitted under the law. It assumes that the law will be broken. Furthermore, trainings cannot be conducted in advance. Above all, if Japan continued to say for the record that the SDF cannot help a U.S. vessel in such distances, there was fear that adversaries would perceive that Japan has its guard down, appalling Japan’s allies and shattering the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. alliance. There was always this fear that the alliance would weaken and possibly break apart.

It would have to be an exceptional situation for an armed attack to be lodged against a U.S. vessel. At least right now this scenario is hardly realistic. Therefore, I used to joke that instead of saying on the record that the SDF cannot help when in fact it ends up helping the U.S. vessel, it is far better for deterrence purposes to say that the SDF will help when in fact it will not end up helping the U.S. vessel.

The important point here is that rather than an incident occurring and actually exercising the right of collective self-defense, it is more important to enable the exercise of the right of collective self-defense so that an incident is less prone to occurring.

Of course, a strengthened deterrence of the Japan-U.S. alliance must be underpinned by strengthened effectiveness of the alliance should an incident actually occur. In this regard, the limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense is a last resort. In practice, other aspects will become important for the alliance cooperation, such as asset protection or the expansion of logistics supports. For example, the SDF will be able to supply ammunition in “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”

Especially important will be asset protection. Before, the SDF was permitted to use weapons to protect its own weapons. Now, when the SDF is conducting combined operations with the U.S. Forces or other forces for training or other activities, the SDF can protect the weapons of the U.S. Forces or other forces. The SDF can use force to protect the equipment, vessels, and aircraft of the U.S. Forces or other forces.

This concept itself was not a new one, but this alone seemed like some kind of camouflage. However, when it is combined with the permission to exercise the right of collective self-defense albeit in a limited manner, as well as expanded logistics supports and permanent cooperation and coordination mechanisms between the U.S. Forces and the SDF under the new Guidelines, the scope of cooperation of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the high seas and their airspace can be expanded considerably and its quality can increase dramatically.

### **(3) Geopolitics of the Japan-U.S. alliance: For the security of a liberal world**

This raises the following question. In turning a “new page” in the history of the alliance, if the “with each other” relationship of the Japan-U.S. alliance is strengthened significantly, will the “for each other” relationship also be strengthened? Of course, they have to go in tandem. Only if the two are together can we sense that the alliance has started a new chapter or entered a new era.

The new Guidelines states that “In an increasingly interconnected world,” the Japan-U.S. alliance “will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.” As this demonstrates, the Guidelines emphasizes the role of “the U.S.-Japan global alliance” not limited to the Asia-Pacific region.

Of course, even in a “global” alliance, the alliance cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is the most important. In recent years, regional threats have increased to a level of serious concern, such as North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and China’s military rise and adventurism. The alliance is expected to deal with these threats first and foremost.

North Korea’s nuclear threat is increasing in severity, given that a regime collapse would likely lead to major turmoil. In addition, there is China’s adventurism in the East and South China Seas. As they are interlinked with China’s top core interest of the Taiwan issue, they are difficult issues that have no simple solutions. Japan and the United States have already vowed that the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan Strait issue constitutes an important purpose of the alliance. Therefore, the two countries must consider measures to ensure security to realize the peaceful settlement of this issue. Accordingly, China issues are expected to further increase in difficulty. Considerable readiness is needed to deal with both the threats posed by North Korea and China.

Assuming this as a given, the Japan-U.S. alliance going forward must go beyond dealing with such immediate threats and carefully look ahead to how to create an international environment so that such threats do not emerge. The alliance needs to broaden its horizon and carry out cooperation taking into consideration the significance and priority of the threats facing Japan and the United States in the context of overall world politics.

In other words, the liberal world order in which Japan and the United States exist—the order based on liberty, democracy, and rule of law—is being shaken by terrorism, the refugee issue, Russian and Chinese actions, and more. It will be important to consider the purpose of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the context of the larger picture of how it can contribute to protecting and developing this order.

This is not to imply that this was not the case in the years past. This has been the case from long ago. What I am saying is that now that the “with and for each other” aspect is clearer, this is something that needs to be re-instilled.

In this regard, I believe the Japan-U.S. alliance going forward needs to carry out cooperation that is more mindful of not only advancing the cooperation in Articles 5 and 6 of the security treaty, but also the advancement of the political and economic cooperation stated in Article 2.

As shown in the handout, Article 2 of the security treaty concerns political and economic cooperation between Japan and the United States. The article enshrines that the two countries will contribute toward “the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their liberal institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded.”

In the preamble of the same treaty, it states that the two countries desire to uphold “the principles of democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law.” Coupled with this sentence,

it can be said that Article 2 declares that Japan and the United States will conduct security cooperation amid the development of a liberal world.

In fact, in the joint press conference I referred to at the beginning of my address, President Obama emphasized that Japan and the United States are not merely allies but true global partners. This description illustrates U.S. expectations for advancing U.S.-Japan cooperation in the world not only in the area of security but also in a range of other areas such as politics, economy, and culture. This has direct implications for Article 2.

It must also not be forgotten that Article 2 of the security treaty is pretty much the same provision as Article 2 of the NATO Treaty. In other words, the European industrialized countries and Canada also pledged to cooperate with the United States for the development of a liberal world. All members of the G7 Summit have pledged this. In this sense as well, Article 2 is an important provision for the Japan-U.S. global partnership.

Japan is the only non-Western country among the major countries of the liberal world. This is good evidence that the liberal world is universal, extending beyond differences in race and culture. Therefore, Japan can contribute to the development of a liberal world even only as a member of the G7. Furthermore, Japan can contribute as the third largest economic power in the world in terms of GDP. For example, during the global financial crisis, Japan lent US\$100 billion to the IMF, and the IMF Managing Director thanked Japan for “the biggest loan ever in the history of mankind.” On top of that, Japan has considerable soft power. The Prime Minister can even transform into Super Mario.

However, in the coming years, Japan’s contribution to the liberal world should increase not only in the political, economic, and cultural realms, but also in the area of security. Needless to say, a liberal world must be developed by peaceful means. Forcing certain values on other countries through military means goes against the values of the liberal world. That said, it is also true that a country must sometimes resort to military means to ensure the survival of the liberal world.

Now please take a look at the map in the handout. This map is on the title page of *America’s Strategy in World Politics*, a book written in 1942 by Prof. Nicholas J. Spykman (1893-1943) who taught international politics and geopolitics at Yale University before and during the war. In this map, the earth is drawn with St. Louis, a city in central United States, in the center. (This map is printed at the end of this chapter.)

I have always insisted that this is an important map that we should keep in mind for thinking about the future Japan-U.S. alliance or Japan and the United States as global partners, especially for thinking about the “for each other” aspect. This is because I believe this map is necessary for thinking about the security of not only Japan and the United States but of the entire liberal world.

Due to time constraints, I am unable to speak at length today about either Prof. Spykman or geopolitics. So let me simply go through the main points.

Prof. Spykman died of an illness in 1943, a year after writing this book. Since the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack, the professor stressed that the United States would have to protect the security of Japan when the war ended, arousing great controversy. Of course, he was stressing that the security of Japan was needed for the security of the United

States. In other words, he emphasized “security for each other.”

Prof. Spykman’s basic view was that the security of the United States rested on preventing the entire Eurasian continent, with 2.5 times the land area and 10 times the population of the United States and the potential strength of the entire Old World, from developing into a New World that overwhelms the United States.

In this map in which the north is at the top, it looks as though the Old World is trying to crush the New World from above. Prof. Spykman’s security paradigm envisions the United States, a member of the New World, working hard to support Eurasia of the Old World so that it does not fall on its head.

Where in the Old World of the Eurasian continent lies the center of the power to crush the United States? Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861–1947), a British geographer and politician commonly considered the founder of geopolitics, contended that the center lies in the central area of the Eurasian continent and called it “heartland.” On the other hand, Prof. Spykman believed that the center of the power lies in the periphery of the continent in an area he named “rimland.”

Prof. Spykman notes the importance of Europe in the West, the importance of East Asia, especially China’s coastal area, in the East, and the importance of India in the future. The professor explained that the United States needs to pay caution to ensure that a formidable power from Europe or East Asia does not emerge, such as a nation or an alliance that would threaten the security of the United States, and that doing this was essential for the U.S. security strategy.

The important areas that the United States needs to pay caution were two island nations that are small but powerful, separated from the rimland by sea—in this map, the island nations separated by two oceans to the right and left of the United States. They are Great Britain and Japan. As is written in the handout, the professor writes as follows:

Twice in one generation we have come to the aid of Great Britain in order that the small off-shore island might not have to face a single gigantic military state in control of the opposite coast of the mainland. If the balance of power in the Far East is to be preserved in the future as well as in the present, the United States will have to adopt a similar protective policy toward Japan.

(Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics*, 1942)

Once again, on the map, the palms of the right and left hands needed for the New World to support the Old World (extending across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans though not visible) may be Great Britain and Japan.

The professor forecast that in postwar Asia, i.e., the left hand side, China would rise in place of Japan. The professor believed that China would control the rimland, and that the United States needed to protect Japan to suppress the power of China. The professor makes an alarming comment that while China is weak at the moment, it will develop power in the postwar years and acquire air force power; therefore, Tokyo’s fire insurance stakes are bound to increase.

Let us consider Japan as seen on this map. Japan faces two gigantic nations: China with which it is separated by the Sea of Japan; and the United States with which it is separated by the Pacific Ocean. However, the distance of the sea separating Japan and these two nations is totally different. Solely from a geopolitical perspective, for Japan to remain independent between these two nations, it is a sensible security strategy if Japan and the distant United States get together to keep the nearer China in check. Of course, Japan may have no need to team up with the United States if Japan is capable of holding down China on its own. In that case, however, Japan and the United States would have to become opposing forces. In World War II, Japan went against this geopolitical common sense.

Based on what I have stated, I would also like to bring your attention to another important point about Japan-U.S. security cooperation as signified in this map.

As with Sir Mackinder's geopolitics, Prof. Spykman's geopolitics is geopolitics of maritime nations and is premised on the concept that maritime security must be safeguarded for the survival and prosperity of one's nation. This is true both militarily as well as politically and economically. It is the concept that freedom of navigation in waters and free trade are needed to protect a nation's security, prosperity, liberal institutions, and democracy.

70% of the world is made up of oceans, and 90% of the trade is conducted via oceans. If you look closely at the world's topography, the world is comprised of a single body of water connected together and many scattered islands—a single ocean and many islands including the large islands called continents. It is precisely this fact that gives geographical grounds to the command of the sea theory ("He who commands the sea has command of the world") and forms the core element of the geopolitics of maritime nations.

In this regard, in Prof. Spykman's geopolitics, the term "three Mediterraneans" is important along with the term "rimland." "Three Mediterraneans" refer to the nodes of the five continents and the three seas that constitute the strategic positions for controlling the world. One of them, needless to say, is the "European Mediterranean" separating the Eurasian and African continents. The other is the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico that the professor calls the "Mediterranean Sea in America." This sea separates the Southern and Northern American continents. The third is the "Asiatic Mediterranean" surrounded by the line connecting Taiwan, Singapore, and Cape York in Australia. This sea separates the Eurasian and Australian continents. The South China Sea accounts for a majority of the Asiatic Mediterranean.

If you look at this map, you can clearly see how important the "three Mediterraneans" making up a part of the maritime traffic line for freely navigating in the world's oceans are for U.S. vessels and merchant ships. Ships depart the West Coast, pass the Pacific Ocean, and sail to the Indian Ocean via the Asiatic Mediterranean. They pass the Indian Ocean, transit the European Mediterranean from the Red Sea and cross the Atlantic Ocean. They then transit the American Mediterranean and return to the West Coast. The three Mediterraneans secure maritime access not only for this voyage around the world but also to various regions of the globe. Freedom of activities and freedom of navigation in these waters form the foundation supporting the global strategy of the maritime nation of the United States.

Let us again take a look at this map. I see the maritime traffic line around the Eurasian

continent as being something like a rope that the United States has tied to support the weight of Eurasia. What do you think?

Today, China claims that the South China Sea—one of the “three Mediterraneans”—is its own and is building military outposts on rocks and shallows, undaunted by the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. China continues to uphold that the South China Sea would be turned into China’s “internal waters,” using the term “core interests.” This poses a serious challenge to the entire U.S. global strategy.

Incidentally, Prof. Spykman made another uncanny remark, stating that if anybody is to control the South China Sea in the future, it would not be the Japanese Navy, nor the British Navy, nor the U.S. Navy; it would be the Chinese Air Force that can build multiple air bases on the coast. At the same time, however, the professor makes a somewhat reassuring comment that China’s control of the Far East can be prevented if the United States and the major European countries have military bases on islands opposite China’s coast and stand up to China.

According to the United States, it currently cooperates on maritime security with around 30 navies including those of allies and friends. In recent years, the United States has sought to strengthen cooperation over the South China Sea issue with countries neighboring this sea, such as the Philippines and Vietnam. This cooperation is indeed indispensable to the security and prosperity of the U.S.-led liberal world order. Therefore, the global partners of Japan and the United States must also enhance their cooperation over the South China Sea issue.

As globalization advances and the Earth becomes smaller, Japan and the United States should be more conscious that the various seas of the world are an interest line for the two countries, that the entire liberal world will protect these interest lines, and that Japan—a key country in the liberal world—will also play a considerable share of this role.

Shigeru Yoshida who built the foundation of postwar Japan conceived that Japan is a maritime nation and must support the lives of the people by trading with other countries, and that accordingly, it is essential that Japan cooperates with the United States and Great Britain—maritime nations that have the power to control oceans, that are most prosperous economically, and that have a tradition of liberalism. He stated that in the postwar era, it is essential that Japan cooperates especially with the United States. This was not because of doctrines or ideology. He conceived this was a shortcut for enhancing the interests of the people.

As Yoshida envisioned, Japan in the postwar era developed within the U.S.-led liberal world and enjoyed far more security and prosperity than before the war. Once it achieved some capacity to defend itself, Japan not only contributed economically but also contributed to military operations other than war. Going forward, it will become important to expand the latter contribution.

Japan’s cooperation operations in the high seas to this end will increase. Of course, I do not expect Japan to suddenly take the lead in realizing freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

Nonetheless, there should be more operations that Japan can perform for maritime security based on the changes in the international situation. If there are countries whose surrounding sea is being disputed, then Japan can support the maritime policing capabilities

of these countries. Or Japan can provide assistance for the political and economic stability of these countries. Japan can also extend military cooperation to the extent that it can. Japan can conduct various trainings with relevant countries involving the United States. Of course, security in the East China Sea, which will also need to take the Taiwan issue into consideration, will require more wisdom and efforts than ever before.

Let me just clarify that when I say wisdom and efforts for maritime security, I do not mean that only the Maritime Self-Defense Force should work hard since, in the case of Japan, this includes the defense of islands. Naval power is not just about ships; it is also about military bases and aircraft flying above the sea. As this concerns the work of many of you here today, I wanted to make sure that there was no misunderstanding.

I would like to add that in the new era of the Japan-U.S. alliance, the work of the SDF will increase. At the very least, it will not decrease. I am certain of this. However, it goes against logic that the work is increasing but the budget is not.

Until now, whenever I discussed security, I always made a point of saying that the SDF must be able to exercise the right of collective self-defense. From now on, I will make a point to always say that the defense budget needs to increase.

I will not say by how much. I do not expect to see a dramatic increase immediately. And in thinking about the defense budget, we cannot forget about history. Right around the time that the SDF was established, the defense budget was about 2% of GDP. When the United States pressed Japan to double the budget to 4%, it was Shigeru Yoshida that refused the increase based on his light armament and economic reconstruction doctrine.

## **Conclusion**

For the past more than 60 years, Japan-U.S. security cooperation has enhanced its mutuality in the sense of “cooperating with and for each other.” Last year marked a turning point in the history of the alliance in that a new chapter was started. In the new chapter, Japan and the United States as global partners must carry out alliance cooperation for the security and prosperity of the entire liberal world, including, of course, addressing the clear immediate threats that are increasing in severity. In this process, it will be essential for Japan and the United States, as maritime nations, to cooperate for maritime security. This is what I wanted to say today. Although time is running out, I would like to just briefly make two more points.

The first is about the meaning of “protecting one’s country on one’s own.” If it means Japan must basically protect the Senkaku Islands on its own, then this is quite understandable, leaving aside the issue of nuclear deterrence. If Japan does not have sufficient abilities to do this, then it needs to make efforts to increase its capacity.

However, as I stated today, if self-defense refers not only to protecting the direct security of one’s country and one’s people, or the security of the sovereignty line to use an old term, but also to protecting the security of the closely-related regions and the interest line, then it is difficult for a country to protect itself on one’s own. I am not only talking about Japan. This also applies to the United States, which uses 36% of the world’s military expenditures. If the United States were able to protect itself on its own including the interest line, then it would not

need allies. Whether it is Japan or the United States, “security by and for oneself” is becoming difficult as globalization advances and the Earth becomes smaller.

This is why “self-defense” in a broad sense requires cooperation with other countries, i.e. international cooperation, and therefore, requires cooperating with partner countries’ self-defense. In other words, collective self-defense becomes necessary. I propose that this is the modern-day definition of “security by and for oneself.”

Selecting such partner countries or allies is a serious matter that determines the fate and destiny of the nation. Prior to the Japan-U.S. alliance, Japan had remarkably successful as well as terribly unsuccessful experiences with selecting partner countries.

In the successful cases, allies sent an armada against adversaries crossing the ocean towards Japan. In unsuccessful cases, coordination of supplies between allies and Japan relied on submarines, and most of it ended in failure. Japan sent five ships and only made one successful round-trip. I believe this suggests what is important for the self-defense of Japan.

The other point I would like to add is Japan’s development as a maritime nation. It will be 20 years this year since the death of professor of international politics Masataka Kosaka. The first book he published half a century ago is entitled, *The Vision of Japan as a Maritime Nation*. In this book, Kosaka explains that Japan must exist not as a country within Asia but as a country within the world, and that to do this it must not withdraw itself into a corner of Asia protected by seas but extend its reach across the vast ocean and to the rest of the world. That is, Kosaka explains that Japan must not be an island country but a maritime nation.

I believe it is as Kosaka explains and that this is still the unchanging basis of the national strategy of Japan.

The difference between today and half a century ago when Kosaka wrote his first book is that there is now a far more conducive environment for Japan to evolve as a maritime nation within the alliance with the United States. Furthermore, its impact on world politics is far greater compared to half a century ago.

At the recent Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), Prime Minister Abe put forward the concept of “free and open Indo-Pacific” connecting Asia and Africa. This concept should be considered together with the “arc of freedom and prosperity” concept that was put forward during the first Abe administration. If we project this concept onto the map of Prof. Spykman, it is clear that this concept has enormous significance for the security and the development of the Japan-U.S. alliance and of the liberal world.

In this regard as well, I believe we are now in an era in which Japan must create a new “Vision of Japan as a Maritime Nation” against the backdrop of the Japan-U.S. alliance that has started a new chapter.

Thank you very much.

