Chairman’s Summary
Japan’s Alliances: Past and Present

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The subject of this year’s International Forum on War History is “Japan’s Alliances: Past and Present.”

The Japan-U.S. alliance has gained further importance in recent years. Meanwhile, the U.S. presidential election has thrust the spotlight on the nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. With this year marking the milestone year of the 65th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Security Treaty of 1951), this year’s Forum was held with the objective of reviewing Japan’s alliances from a historical perspective.

Alliances have primarily been a subject of theoretical studies in international politics. With regard to the alliances Japan has concluded, many studies on the political and diplomatic history have researched Japan’s individual alliances. Nevertheless, very few studies provide a comprehensive review, nor conduct comparative analyses of the alliances Japan has concluded.

The alliances Japan has concluded have three major characteristics. Firstly, it was extremely rare for a non-Western country like Japan to establish alliance relationships with many Western countries, as it had done following the opening of Japan, including with Britain, Russia (Soviet Union), Germany, Italy, and the United States.

Secondly, Japan concluded alliances with Anglo-Saxon countries, namely the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and contributed to the formation of a stable international order for approximately 70 years, equivalent to more than two-thirds of the 20th century. Thirdly, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Japan-U.S. Alliance did not dissolve after the Cold War and remains in effect to this day. Professor Akihiko Tanaka notes that in this regard, Japan’s alliances are comparable to the “Delian League” which was founded in 478 BC between Greek polis (city states) in Athenai to counter pressure from Persia, and remained in effect for over 70 years.

Based on these observations, this Forum, focusing on Japan’s alliances, compares and examines the alliances before the Second World War (Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy) and after the Second World War (Japan-U.S. Alliance) from a historical perspective, taking into account the security situation surrounding Japan in the respective periods. The purpose was not only to discuss the nature of Japan’s alliances

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3 Tsuchiyama, Anzenhoshō no Kokusai Seijigaku, p. 307.
from a variety of angles from a historical point of view, but also to deepen understanding on the essence of the alliances themselves. In particular, the goal of the Forum was to gain historical insights for appropriately addressing the security and defense issues currently facing Japan, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone of these measures.

An overview of this year’s Forum is as follows.

The Forum commenced with a special address by Professor Mark A. Stoler entitled “Special Relationship? The Anglo-American Alliance During World War II.” Professor Stoler began by mentioning how Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in his memoir on the Second World War, labeled the Anglo-American Alliance after the war as a “special relationship.” He then pointed out that while many people tend to view this relationship as a natural one based on a common language, interests, values and cultures, in fact the two states were not always allies, and the alliance only developed as an outcome of the fighting in the Second World War. On this point, he brought up the history of Anglo-American relations from the 18th century to the late 19th century, mentioning how numerous immigrants from Europe arrived in the United States to escape the alliances and wars of Europe. As President Thomas Jefferson asserted on this bilateral relationship in his 1801 inaugural address, the United States was “kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe.” Of course, we must not forget the American War of Independence (1775-83), a second Anglo-American War (1812-15), conflicts that led to a third war in the 1830s and 1840s, the American Civil War (1861-65) and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895. He also mentioned that the U.S. entered the First World War in 1917, pointing out that America fought not as an ally of Britain, but as an independent “associated” power of the Allied Powers. He then said that when the U.S. Senate then refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, until the end of the 1930s Britain distrusted America and considered it an inconsistent ally. Furthermore, he pointed out that when the Second World War broke out, the United States did not immediately declare war after signing the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, and only embarked upon war against the Axis Powers after the Japanese Navy’s attack on Pearl Harbor that December.

Professor Stoler emphasized that the reason why the wartime alliance between Britain and America grew under the complicated circumstances of their bilateral relationship was not only because of personal trust between Prime Minister Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, but rather due to a fear of their common enemy: the Axis Powers. Moreover, he stated that their common language of English played an important role in communication during the war. These factors facilitated the unification of command through the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, military information-sharing in intelligence activities, and the execution of combined operations such as Operation Overlord (i.e. the landing operation at Normandy). He concluded, however, by saying that although the wartime alliance between Britain and the U.S. enabled a coordinated military strategy against the Axis Powers, it also produced discord over issues concerning the postwar international order—such as a system of free trade, colonialism, and relations with foreign countries—and this is why Prime Minister Churchill referred to a “special relationship.”

In Session 1 there were two presentations on the Anglo-American Alliance and the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, as well as comments and questions
concerning these topics.

Dr. Steven Bullard gave a presentation entitled “Race, nation and Empire: Australian attitudes to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-23.” Dr. Bullard divides the history of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance into three periods: from the formation of the alliance in 1902 through its renewal in 1905 and 1911; the First World War; and the peace settlement after the First World War. He analyzed the Australian attitudes to the alliance in terms of race, nation and empire. He refers to how Australia, after the federation in 1901, was initially uncertain about handling its own security as a new state. He also pointed out that although Australia supported the Anglo-Japanese Alliance out of fear of Japan’s international rising, Australia also included Japan in the restrictive immigration practices originating from the White Australia Policy. He went on to state that while the Japanese Navy escorted vessels bound for Europe and played a security role in the seas around Australia during the First World War, there were serious concerns in Australia over Japan’s military action to secure former German territories in the Pacific. He went on to argue that the reason Australia gave for supporting a continued Anglo-Japanese Alliance after the war was that it was the only means of restraining the military action of Japan—which had become a threat to Australian peace and freedom—and bringing stability to Australia’s security. Lastly, he concluded that the Four-Power Treaty signed at the Washington Naval Conference played a crucial role in Australia’s security after the First World War as a replacement for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was not renewed.

Next was Professor Nobuo Tajima’s presentation entitled “Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.” Presuming that the United States was the hypothetical enemy against the Tripartite Pact, Professor Tajima mentioned the feasibility of forming a Quadripartite Pact that would have included the Soviet Union, and of Germany’s idea of adding the Republic of China to this Quadripartite Pact. He thus addressed the Tripartite Pact from three perspectives: the state of affairs in Germany and in Europe; relations between the Tripartite Pact and the Soviet Union and the Republic of China; and the Tripartite Pact as a deterrent against the U.S. He then discussed the historical significance of these three topics. He explained that after the Second World War broke out, although Germany defeated France, the German strategy was deadlocked by the failure to overthrow Britain, and this is why Germany concluded the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy as a diplomatic means of deterring America’s entry into the war and surrendering Britain. Germany expected nothing more of Japan than an attack on Singapore, and he pointed out that while Germany’s goal was for Japan’s entry into the war to force Britain to surrender and to deter America from participating in the war. And there were also debates within Germany about creating a continental block by partnering with the Soviet Union to form a Quadripartite Pact, or of even adding the Republic of China to such an alliance. However, when hostilities broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union in June 1941, the idea of a Quadripartite Pact to deter America fell apart, and there was a relative drop in the deterrent ability of the existing Tripartite Pact to keep the U.S. out of the war. He then posited that the Tripartite Pact was thus rendered worthless as a deterrent strategy against the United States. He finished his presentation by making three points in conclusion: that the military alliance between far-flung Japan and Germany was always impractical; that it would have been impossible for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China,
a combatant in the Second Sino-Japanese War, to accept a Quadripartite Pact with the Soviet Union, much less such an alliance involving the Republic of China; and that regardless of the fact that the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union robbed the Tripartite Pact of its deterrence against the United States, but Japan’s support for this alliance was an important reason why negotiations between Japan and the U.S. broke down.

As a commentator for this session, Dr. Kiyoshi Aizawa, Chief of the National Security Policy Division, commented on and posed questions relating to these two presentations. He began by stating that when comparing these two prewar alliances Japan concluded, the general historical evaluation is that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a “successful alliance” for Japan, while the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy was a “failed alliance.” He continued to state that both of these alliances are viewed in terms of Japan’s relations with the U.S. and Britain, and that while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance strengthened ties with both America and Britain, the Tripartite Pact severely exacerbated these relationships and led to Japan fighting a war against these two countries. He then pointed out that the Japan-U.S. Alliance brought peace and security to postwar Japan and this became the source of today’s strong ties between the two countries. He went on to examine only the two prewar alliances and posit that they differed considerably in nature, as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a “simple” bilateral agreement, while the Tripartite Pact was a “complex” multilateral one. However, as Dr. Bullard stated in his presentation, even the “simple” Anglo-Japanese Alliance was for the Britain Empire encompassing the Commonwealth a complex affair involving “diplomacy within the Empire,” and for most of the time the Anglo-Japanese Alliance lasted over the roughly 20 years following the Russo-Japanese War, it was a “passive” alliance with a military purpose emanating from complicated circumstances.

Dr. Aizawa asked Dr. Bullard about Australia’s final position on continuing the alliance and its response to the Four-Power Treaty at the Washington Naval Conference, as well as relations with Japan during the Second World War. He also asked Professor Tajima what Germany expected from Japan in the Tripartite Pact and about the feasibility of a Quadripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. In response to these questions, Dr. Bullard answered that then Prime Minister William Hughes worried that if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance expired then Japan would become a major threat, so he was in favor of the agreement. He then stated it would go too far to assert that the failure to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance expired then Japan would become a major threat, so he was in favor of the agreement. He then stated it would go too far to assert that the failure to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance led to the hostility between Japan and Australia during the Second World War. And Professor Tajima answered that what Germany wanted from Japan through the Tripartite Pact was an attack on Singapore that would speed the collapse of Britain and make Germany’s war with the Soviet Union come to a swift close, which Germany believed would sustain Japan’s deterrence against the United States. With regard to the feasibility of a Quadripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union, he answered that it would have been possible considering that Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union were all totalitarian states, and that the diplomatic policy of dictators is unpredictable.

Lastly, as Chairman of this Forum, I asked Professor Tajima about the differing perspectives about alliances and treaties between the Japanese, who value faithfulness, and the Germans, who broke the peace and international pledges. Professor Tajima then answered
that one could say Adolf Hitler was cynical about treaties, and he prioritized his own country’s interests without considering such matters as compliance with international law, but Japan also acted in line with its own interests. In addition, he pointed out that it was not only out of faithfulness that Japan supported the Tripartite Pact, but also because the pact was a guarantee for Japan’s plans for a “Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

In the keynote address, Professor Kazuya Sakamoto presented on “Japan-U.S. Alliance and Geopolitics in a New Era.” Professor Sakamoto began by explaining that the introduction of the new Guidelines (Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation) and Japan’s new security legislation (Legislation for Peace and Security) in 2015, 70 years after the end of the Second World War, enhanced the mutuality of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the sense of “with and for each other.” He recalled the history of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in regard to the history of the enhancement of the mutuality, and provided an overview of how “cooperation regarding material things and people” and “cooperation regarding people and people” have been understood in the context of the security environment of Japan. He underscored that the purpose and the mission of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in a new era need to be discussed from a geopolitical perspective, and described the security outlook of Professor Nicholas Spykman who taught international politics and geopolitics at Yale University before and during the Second World War. Professor Spykman’s basic view was that Britain and Japan, separated from the continent by sea, have an important role to prevent U.S. security from being overwhelmed by the potential power of the entire Eurasian continent (entire Old World). Professor Sakamoto stressed that Professor Spykman’s geopolitical thinking has offered significant historical insight into the “free and open Indo-Pacific strategy” connecting Asia and Africa presented by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Professor Sakamoto ended his address by stating that the history of the Japan-U.S. Alliance has started a new chapter, and concluded that Japan and the United States as global partners must cooperate as allies for the security and prosperity of the whole liberal world.

In Session 2, two presentations were made focusing on the old and new Japan-U.S. security treaties between the 1950s and the end of the 1960s, which were followed by comments and questions.

First, Dr. Allan R. Millett gave a presentation entitled “The United States-Japan Mutual Security Agreements, 1951 and 1960.” Dr. Millett discussed the characteristics of the two security treaties concluded by Japan shortly after the Second World War, focusing on the ways in which the U.S. Departments of State and Defense approached Congress until the treaties were concluded, taking into account the different historical contexts of Europe and East Asia during the Cold War. He highlighted that in 1950, the United States had two options—become Japan’s friend and ally; or demilitarize Japan. Under these circumstances, requests were made by the U.S. military (Joint Chiefs of Staff) that attached importance to the continued use of the U.S. bases in Japan, as well as by Congress that feared the “drifting” of Japan. He explained that in this context, the State and Defense Departments played a leading role in undertaking various measures to persuade the swift signing of a peace treaty and a security treaty with Japan, taking into consideration the international political situation, including the outbreak of the Korean War and the communizing of China. He stated that in particular, the importance
of the former was emphasized loudly at the State Department, with connections being drawn between the swift signing of a peace treaty with Japan and the spread of the Cold War into East Asia. Meanwhile, Europe was the area of interest of the general war plan of the U.S. forces at the time, and East Asia was not a strategic focus of the plan. Even if Japan’s importance increased for logistic support purposes during the Korean War, there was a strong desire not to place restrictions on the independent and autonomous uses of the U.S. bases. He noted that the swift signing of the peace treaty with Japan was largely helped by the fact that then Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett advocated for the swift signing of a peace treaty with Japan as well as defense agreements, which in turn enabled collaboration with the State Department that promoted the signing of the treaties. However, the situation surrounding the signing of the treaties was extremely complex. Dr. Millett stated that following the signing of the treaties, Japan was left with a variety of issues, including the issue of the U.S. bases in Japan and the legal treatment of U.S. military personnel, the United States’ use of bases and restrictions on nuclear weapons, as well as concerns over reinforcing the defense capabilities of a sluggish Japan. He concluded that these issues led to the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960.

Next, Dr. Shingo Nakajima, Senior Fellow of the National Security Policy Division, made a presentation on “Formation of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.” The presentation primarily focused on the timeframe during which the old Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was concluded. Dr. Nakajima examined the formation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, as known as “cooperation regarding material things and people.” In doing so, he outlined the arguments made by the conservative groups involved in Japan’s rearmament program and by former officers of the Imperial Army and Navy, comparing them with postwar Japan’s path of rebuilding itself under the leadership of Shigeru Yoshida. First, he explained that politician Ichiro Hatoyama criticized the “gradual rearmament” approach taken by his political rival Yoshida, and that Hatoyama advocated the establishment of a self-defense force and adoption of a conscription system based on the revision of the Constitution of Japan. He noted that this was because Hatoyama viewed the stationing of the U.S. forces as an extension of the occupation, and that the establishment of a self-defense force linked to the withdrawal of the U.S. forces Japan was along the same lines as the foreign policy approach of placing some distance with the United States in comparison to Yoshida. Dr. Nakajima also stated that former officers of the Imperial Army and Navy and Yoshida were in agreement mainly about the establishment of national forces. He said that unlike former officers of the Imperial Army, however, former officers of the Imperial Navy recognized the need for continued defense cooperation following the withdrawal of the U.S. forces, and held similar views as Yoshida regarding the maintenance of Japan-U.S. relations. Lastly, he referred to Mamoru Shigemitsu’s concept and discussed the Foreign Ministry’s plan that took into consideration the complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces Japan, based on switching the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty into the kind of mutual defense treaty the United States signed with other countries. He concluded that the plan suggests that Japan, as a truly independent nation, wished to secure autonomy to develop a relationship with the United States as equal partners, without unilaterally depending on the United States for defense.
Following these two presentations, commentator for this session, Associate Professor Ayako Kusunoki, made the following comments and questions regarding the Japan-U.S. relationship and Japan’s options in the postwar years against the historical background of the 1950s. First, Associate Professor Kusunoki acknowledged that the United States’ security treaty with Japan and mutual defense treaties with other countries had a provisional nature, and stated that it was important to examine the United States’ overall perception regarding its alliances with other countries. She also noted that with regard to the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the U.S. bases in Japan, the primary interests of Japan and the United States had different political intentions. In addition, she asked both presenters whether the United States had no concerns in connection with Japan’s options for concluding the old Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Regarding Japan’s rearmament, economic growth, and the stationing of the U.S. forces in the 1950s, she asked Dr. Millett about Japan’s security and economy and Dr. Nakajima about Japan’s options, including the “ifs” of history, and their feasibility. Dr. Millett responded that security and economy are closely interrelated, noting that there was considerable domestic dissatisfaction over the fact that Japan’s rearmament did not progress as much as the United States had expected, and that the economic demand created by the U.S. bases in Japan in no small way had an impact on the economic recovery of Japan. Dr. Nakajima responded that the signing of the peace treaty would have been clearly delayed had Japan refused to provide the land for the U.S. bases, and went onto to state that as postwar Japan had a variety of options for rearmament, approaches other than the path followed by Yoshida were also possible, including revising the Constitution.

Lastly, as Chairman of this Forum, I went back to Associate Professor Kusunoki’s comment and asked Dr. Millett about the differences between the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the mutual defense treaties at the time and between the Treaty and NATO, as well as about the U.S. alliance strategy. Dr. Millett explained the difficulties of managing alliances among the parties to an alliance, referring to the example of NATO. He stated that there are various issues associated with allocating funds for defense cooperation under each alliance and issues related to the preparation of operational plans, and noted the need for a comprehensive alliance strategy. He further stated that alliances should be regarded as outcomes tailored to the situation at the time.

In Session 3 there were two presentations focusing on the Japan-U.S. Alliance and Japanese defense policy in the 1970s and ‘80s, followed by comments and questions. Dr. Alessio Patalano started the session with a presentation entitled “The Shape of Things to Come?: The decade the US-Japan Security Treaty became a ‘Maritime Alliance’ (1971-1981).” Dr. Patalano began by expressing his desire to contribute to the discussion.

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5 The question of when exactly Japan’s relationship with the United States became an “alliance” is an important point to remember when considering U.S.-Japan relations after World War II. The first time the term of “alliance,” was used in an official capacity was in a speech by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda when he made a trip to the United States in March 1977, and it first appeared in an official document in a joint statement released at a May 1981 summit between Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and President Ronald Reagan. It should also be noted that Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper) first made use of the term in the 1991 edition, stating that “the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship, centering around the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, constitutes the basis of Japan’s diplomacy.”
among scholars researching alliances about the effectiveness of such agreements by exploring the changing strategic values of the Japan-U.S. Alliance during the 1970s. In contrast to the détente between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in the 1970s, he stated that massive increases in Soviet naval and air strength in the Asia-Pacific and the U.S. Navy’s growing obsolescence and contraction caused a qualitative transformation to U.S.-Japan security cooperation. He then pointed out that a U.S. Navy document from the time, “Project Sixty,” called for greater Japanese maritime control in the Far East. He went on to explain that in response, in 1976, the National Defense Program Outline, the basic plan for Japan’s defense capabilities, incorporated greater deterrence capabilities against the Soviet Navy in the seas near Japan (particularly in the three major straits) and along sea-lanes. In 1978, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation created a legal framework for security cooperation between the two countries. He discussed how Japan began to play a role in maritime control in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea and, according to the Guidelines, conducted combined maritime operations with the United States to defend the waters around Japan, thus providing the impetus for the construction of a mechanism for the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. Navy to engage in combined operations, planning and exercises. After that, he explained that Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki announced a plan in 1981 to defend 1,000 nautical miles of sea-lanes, and that in 1983 Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone stated that Japan would prevent Soviet submarines and other vessels from passing through the Japanese archipelago by controlling the three straits. Dr. Patalano then said this is how the “maritime alliance” between Japan and America came to be formed. Lastly, he concluded by stating that during the 1970s, the United States’ view of Japan changed dramatically from one of a country that provides bases in East Asia for U.S. forces stationed in Japan, to one of a security partner sharing central strategic responsibilities.

Next, Dr. Yasuaki Chijiwa, Senior Fellow of the National Security Policy Division, gave a presentation entitled “Japan-U.S. Alliance and Japan’s Defense Concept.” He began by characterizing his research “alliance management,” a category within more general research on alliances. He continued with a detailed examination of the Basic Defense Force Concept that was introduced with the National Defense Program Outline formulated on October 29, 1976. In this presentation, he first discussed the concept of repelling limited and small-scale aggression, which states that in “Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance.” This was one key component of the Basic Defense Force Concept. He stated that rather being a self-reliant defense doctrine within the Japan-U.S. security framework, as it has been traditionally described, it is no more than a concept of building up defense capabilities, and was a different approach to operations, and in that sense provided coherence with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. He then addressed the concept of maintaining various functions/functional and geographical balance, which states that “[T]he possession of the assorted functions required for national defense, while retaining balanced organization and deployment, including logistical support.” Discussing America’s response as an ally to the Basic Defense Force Concept, he explained that although the United States was concerned about unregulated growth in Japan’s defense capabilities under the concept of “complementarity,” the U.S. did not actively try to interfere in the process of formulating the National Defense Program Outline, and instead held more interest in the true scale of Japan’s
defense force and the nature of Japan-U.S. cooperation. Lastly, he said that the Basic Defense Force Concept symbolized the role Japan’s defense force played a quarter-century after the Second World War to make the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty a deterrent, and later paved the way for the time when Japan alone, or in partnership with the United States, would construct a deterrent force.

After these two presentations, the commentator for this session, Associate Professor Takuma Nakashima made some comments and asked questions as below. He stated that the discussion in the West mostly focuses on the relationship between the U.S. and NATO, then asked Dr. Patalano how the impact of the Japan-U.S. relationship is understood within the context of the history of the Cold War, and how the relationship is characterized as a subject of research into alliances. Associate Professor Nakashima also mentioned that other Western countries have faced the “dilemma of self-reliance” vis-à-vis the United States, and asked how we should think of Japan’s “self-reliance” in comparison to other countries. He then stated to Dr. Chijiwa that the topic of self-reliant defense re-emerged among politicians within the cabinet of Eisaku Sato in the 1960s, and asked whether this needs to be considered separately from the self-reliant defense discussed among bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defense. He then asked whether defense officials wanted to introduce ideals stemming from the Basic Defense Force Concept to defense policy, as was done with the Fukuda Doctrine in diplomatic policy after the diplomatic and defense objectives at the time were achieved through the 1972 reversion of Okinawa and the normalization of diplomatic relations with China, rather than through détente. In response to these questions, Dr. Patalano said that in the 1970s a crisis in Eastern Europe was more likely, and thus the United States undoubtedly focused most of its attention on NATO. He went on to explain that since NATO ground forces in Europe were outnumbered by the Soviet military, the U.S. had to deploy naval forces to Europe and was pressed with the problem of needing to somehow respond to growing Soviet naval strength in the Asia-Pacific. Concerning a self-reliant defense force, he then answered that when comparing Japan to Britain, Britain has a deterrent in its conventional forces, which differs from Japan’s situation. Next, Dr. Chijiwa stated that the phrase “self-reliant defense” has various implications, such as solitary defense, a greater role within an alliance, or producing armaments domestically, and has thus always been an ambiguous concept. He answered that politicians and academics engaged in discourse and policymaking should consider how to categorize the terminology. He then said that defense officials may have wanted to incorporate their ideals into defense policy, but expressed his personal opinion that after the setbacks of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan, what defense officials actually intend is to proceed with building up defense capabilities to meet large goals for which there is no time limit.

Based on the discussions throughout the Forum, the following overall observations may be made regarding “Japan’s Alliances: Past and Present.” First, there is no doubt that alliances with maritime nations are best for Japan. Throughout history, island and maritime nations around the world have dealt with pressure and threats from continents by forming alliances with other maritime nations. In the case of the Anglo-Japanese and Japan-U.S. Alliances, while both were alliances with global superpowers, in the case of the former, Britain requested to share roles with Japan from a global perspective, whereas Japan wished to focus on the issues
of East Asia, which in turn factored into the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This experience offers many historical insights for maintaining and administering the Japan-U.S. Alliance.6

Second, the discussion on why Japan concluded many alliances has concerned the question of whether it was security factors, such as balance of power, or bandwagon, with both discussions focusing on physical national power and interests. In the case of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, however, the sharing of values (spiritual foundation) was also an important element, and this has been an underlying factor behind the long-lasting alliance relationship.

In the new security treaty, the Preamble states, “Desiring...to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,” and Article II states, “by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded.” Additionally, in the May 1981 Joint Communique between the leaders of Japan and the United States (Prime Minister Suzuki and President Reagan), it was noted that, “The President and the Prime Minister, recognizing that the alliance between the United States and Japan is built upon their shared values of democracy and liberty, reaffirmed their solidarity, friendship and mutual trust.” These spiritual factors along with geopolitical factors are expected to become ever more important for Japan’s alliances in the 21st century.

Third, Japan was the direct cause in very few of the alliances that have ended, such as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Opinions are likely divided as to whether this is because of Japan’s “faithfulness” to alliances, or simply “force of habit” that originates from lack of power political thinking.7 The significance and purpose of alliances are constantly evolving due to changes in the international environment and power relations among the countries concerned, and alliances are not ever lasting. Maintaining alliances requires the ceaseless efforts of the parties to the alliances, and politicians must be sensitive to the subtle changes.

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6 Regarding what the two alliances have in common and the difficulties of administering the alliances, see: Terumasa Nakanishi, Kuni masani Horobintosu [Perishing of a State] (Tokyo: Shueisha, 1998), Chapter 7.