Chairman’s Summary
History of the Joint and Combined Operations

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While the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region has been significantly changing today, Japan revised its National Defense Program Guidelines in December 2013. In addition to the existing demand for reinforcing Japan-US alliance, building a “dynamic joint defense force” was approached against the backdrop of increasing needs for joint and combined operations.

Furthermore, this year, 2014, marks the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War; there is increasing interest in that War among the former battlefield countries in Europe as well as other war participant nations such as the United States and Australia. The War marked the beginning of modern joint and combined operations, which, having undergone various challenges in the Second World War through the Gulf War, are now one of the most important factors to decide the outcome of warfare.

In this context, we have introduced a new theme entitled “History of the Joint and Combined Operations” to the International Forum on War History 2014. Our goal is to learn and draw lessons on how to properly cope with modern-day security and defense issues, by examining how individual nations or armed services dealt with this challenge, what problems actually occurred in battlefields, and how they overcame them in a historical perspective.

A summary of this year’s Forum is as follows.

The Forum began with former General Ryoichi Oriki’s keynote address on the subject of “The Evolution and the Future of Joint and Combined Operations.” At the outset, former General Oriki noted that amid the changing security environment and the changing role of military forces, the significance of integrating and combining military forces had changed. He presented an outlook of Japan’s joint and combined operations from a historical perspective. He also discussed and examined the role of military forces as a political and diplomatic tool, the issue of integrating the Japanese army and navy during the Pacific War, and the postwar process leading up to the establishment of the Joint Staff Office.

Next, with regard to future joint and combined operations, former General Oriki presented on the relationship between military alliances and coalitions and emphasized the need for integration that extends beyond the interoperability of information and communication systems and the individual equipment of the army, navy, and air force. He then considered the challenges that stand in the way of having a more robust joint operation system and strengthening Japan-U.S. Alliance arrangements, based on coherent defense strategies and policies, joint operations, and Defense program.

Former General Oriki concluded by underscoring the importance of preparing for joint and combined operations by applying strategies and operations that take modern scientific and technological progress into account and look ahead to the future, while also harnessing the
features and capabilities of each military service.

In the first session, presentations were made regarding two WWI battlefields, focusing on all-arms warfare, the joining of the army, navy, and air force services, and the combined operations of the military forces of different countries. This was followed by comments and questions about the presentations.

First, Dr. Graham Dunlop examined the Gallipoli campaign from the strategic to the tactical levels with a focus on amphibious aspects, and systematically shed light on the causes of the Allied forces’ defeat. Dr. Dunlop identified that the chief cause of failure, above all others, was the British forces’ baseless underestimation of the Turkish forces, which led to overconfidence and intelligence being downplayed. As for other reasons, Dr. Dunlop mentioned that while commanders at each chain of command must be aggressive for a successful amphibious operation, there were commanders that lacked this verve in the Gallipoli campaign. He also stated that although amphibious operations needed to be planned jointly from the outset, in Gallipoli, only the navy was involved in the initial planning, and that inadequate time was given for planning after integrating. In addition, Dr. Dunlop noted that although troops had to have mastery in their respective fields in amphibious warfare, in Gallipoli, the troops were not fully qualified and sufficient training was not conducted.

This was followed by Prof. David Stevenson’s presentation on joint or all-arms warfare on the Western Front in 1918 during WWI. The static trench warfare on the Western Front evolved into mobile operations by both the German and Allied forces in 1918. Prof. Stevenson identified that joint or all-arms warfare was one of the causes of this evolution by analyzing the context of the Western Front campaign during its final months leading up to this military revolution.

Prof. Stevenson explained the factors that contributed to the limited successes of Germany’s offensives in March to July 1918. There were two tactical features. One was an artillery strategy called the Bruchmüller System. He explained that, under this system, Germany kept its artillery under tight secrecy, delivered a great volume of shell in a short timeframe, shifted to neutralizing the enemy or bombardment target, and transitioned to creeping barrage after the infantry moved forward. The other feature was the infantry’s infiltration tactics. Under this tactic, attacks would be conducted not in waves but by Small platoon-sized groups, which would infiltrate the Allied positions, bypassing strongpoints, and advance as much as possible.

Prof. Stevenson then discussed the Allied offensives. He stated that in spring 1918, Gen. Ferdinand Foch was appointed as Allied General-in-Chief on the Western and Italian Fronts. As the General-in-Chief, Foch devised the Allied strategy, and this led to coordinated sequence of assaults. Prof. Stevenson further noted that the Allied forces conducted more enhanced all-arms co-operation than Germany and the accurate intelligence was the key to the success. In conclusion, Prof. Stevenson stated that the superiority of Allied forces in different theatres depended on the allies’ command of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean sea-lanes (which, too, of course were the product of the combined operations of Allied navies), and that the ability to make full use of the world’s manpower and economic resources underpinned the Allied victory.
Regarding these presentations, discussant Prof. Haruo Tohmatsu noted that some people refer to the Russo-Japanese War prior to WWI as “World War Zero” and that the two wars were closely linked in terms of alliances and total war. He also pointed out that General Ian Hamilton, the commander of the Gallipoli expeditionary force, had been dispatched to observe the Russo-Japanese War and witnessed the Siege of Port Arthur. Prof. Tohmatsu asked Dr. Dunlop whether Hamilton recalled observing the Siege of Port Arthur and whether it had any impact on the implementation of operations. Also, Prof. Tohmatsu asked whether any problems were rooted in the fact that the French army, larger than the British army, and quite proud, put under the command of the British army.

With respect to the first question, Dr. Dunlop responded that observing the Siege of Port Arthur likely had a personal impact on Hamilton, but that the operational scheme had already been decided before Hamilton assumed his position. Dr. Dunlop therefore believed that Hamilton had minimal impact on the advancement of the Gallipoli campaign, if any. Concerning the second question, he responded that the French forces had numerous problems on the Western Front and did not wish to bear any further responsibility. Therefore, it is likely they were pleased to take second seat.

Prof. Tohmatsu, noting that the Russia-France alliance predating WWI had set up a permanent military commission, asked Prof. Stevenson whether during WWI the British and French drew references to the experience of the Russia-France alliance. Additionally, he asked whether the experience of the combined operations during WWI was reflected in the Siberian Intervention, the first combined operation after WWI.

On the first question, Prof. Stevenson responded that Britain and France often worked together even without an alliance. On the second question, he responded that WWI and the Siberian Intervention were different in both force size and the nature of the campaign, and for this reason, the did not reflect the experience of WWI.

Prof. Lawrence Freedman delivered a special address entitled, “Strategy and Decisive Battle.” Prof. Freedman presented a strategic framework called the “classic model,” and considered the origins and issues of this strategic doctrine, based on the strategic theories found in the classical works of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, von Moltke, and Liddell Hart. In his address, Prof. Freedman raised issues and made analyses related to the relationship between politics and military in military history, focusing on the “decisive battle” concept, while accounting for discussions on the “operational” level of war. He concluded that leaders have to think more carefully about the interaction between the political and military strands of strategy and have to show adaptability and flexibility in all stages of conflict.

In the second session, three presentations were given on joint and combined operations in the WWII era, which were followed by comments and questions in response to the presentations.

The first presentation was made by Senior Research Fellow Katsuya Tsukamoto regarding the introduction of aircraft carriers, whose full-fledged operations began during WWI, and enabled the operations of aircraft in vast oceans. Senior Research Fellow Tsukamoto analyzed joint operations by comparing the three countries of Japan, the United States, and Britain in view of the strategic environment, operational thought, and organization of their
navies. He then went on to say that during the WWII era, the U.S. Navy used aircraft carriers not only for fleet battles, but also for a wide range of tasks, including to support landings and for the bombing of onshore targets, and thereby, succeeded in demonstrating air power. He mentioned that enabling the development of aeronautical technology as well as other technological advancements of each country’s military forces had a lot to do with making appropriate personnel assignments (appointment of Isoroku Yamamoto, who was enthusiastic about strengthening the navy’s air power) and organizational arrangements.

Prof. Williamson Murray delivered the second presentation concerning combined operations during the WWII era by the British and U.S. forces. He revealed that as Britain confronted a difficult battle to thwart the Axis forces’ offensive following the French surrender in June 1940, the United States pushed for a large-scale landing and established and clarified a military strategy of the Allied forces. While both the British and U.S. forces were not fully prepared to execute joint operations, due to the demands of the geographical features of the area, i.e., the great expanses of the Pacific theater and ocean, the United States adapted to cooperation among military services more quickly than Europe. Prof. Murray highlighted the active roles played by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt as the political and military leaders of Britain and the United States, as well as by Dwight Eisenhower, who exercised leadership as the Supreme Allied Commander, and concluded that they contributed to the success of the combined and joint operations of the British and U.S. forces, including the invasion of Normandy in June 1944.

Lastly, Prof. Daniel Marston stated that British and Indian forces (mostly volunteers) were largely responsible for the occupation of French Indo-China in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender, when the area came under the jurisdiction of the South East Asia Command (SEAC). He explained that the 20th Indian Division was tasked with emancipating prisoners of war and civilians, and at the same time, was engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns against nationalist guerrillas (the Vietminh). Furthermore, he introduced a historical fact not well known in Japan, namely that British/Indian forces and Japanese forces which were enemies until the end of the war conducted a partial combined operation out of necessity, and formed a united front in a counterinsurgency campaign against the Vietminh. Prof. Marston discussed the difficulties of commanding a diverse coalition of military forces as a combined operation, and noted that the Japanese forces were unable to easily cast aside their antagonistic sentiments towards the British and Indian forces.

Regarding these three presentations, discussant Chief Kyoichi Tachikawa asked the following questions. His first question to Senior Research Fellow Tsukamoto concerned the relationship between the Japanese navy’s pursuit of both aircraft carriers and base aviation, and investment and distribution of defense resources. Senior Research Fellow Tsukamoto responded that this was essentially an issue of resource allocation, and was the result of Japan’s distribution of resources to various platforms while giving priority to cruisers. The second question concerned the reasons the former Japanese military was not adept at joint operations. Senior Research Fellow Tsukamoto identified the differences in the Japanese army’s and Japanese navy’s imaginary enemies, a lack of organization to coordinate the two services, and the absence of leadership by civilian personnel as contributing factors.
Chief Tachikawa’s first question to Prof. Murray was about establishing lessons regarding the joint and combined operations of WWII. Prof. Murray stated that the lessons of joint and combined operations were established as each military force made adjustments during the war, and were obtained as a result of the “feedback loop” (a learning and promotion mechanism). The second question was in connection with the political and military leaders who contributed to successful joint and combined operations. Prof. Murray responded that one of the reasons Roosevelt had success in joint and combined operations were his opportunities to interact with many Navy personnel while he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He said this experience played a major influence on Roosevelt’s subsequent appointments, such as Marshall and King.

Chief Tachikawa’s first question to Prof. Marston was in relation to the differences between combined operations against guerillas and combined operations against modern military forces. Prof. Marston responded that the two were not very different in terms of their level of difficulty, and that either way, the national interests of the parties and the modality of the operation needed to be holistically considered. The second question concerned factors for conducting successful combined operations with a previous enemy force. Chief Tachikawa said this issue was one of the focal points in present-day Iraq and Afghanistan. Prof. Marston responded that while it is difficult to stand shoulder to shoulder with a previous enemy force, it has often happened historically. He also revealed that in some cases, Japanese soldiers who formed a united front with the British and Indian forces cooperated voluntarily.

In the third session, three presentations were made on the theory and practice of joint and combined operations after 1945. This was followed by comments and questions regarding the presentations.

Prof. Carter Malkasian said that AirLand battle is receiving attention once again in the United States for the following reasons: the rise of competitors for the United States means a conventional war is again a major question; reconsideration of army doctrines; and the introduction of AirSea Battle. He went on to point out two constraints. First, AirLand Battle, which was adopted to retaliate against the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, is similar to maneuver warfare. Because of its endorsement of deep strikes against an enemy in fighting, strikes against a nuclear power have the risk of escalation into nuclear war. Secondly, AirLand Battle is not suited for unconventional war, such as guerrilla warfare by lesser powers. Also, Prof. Malkasian stated that amphibious warfare deemed necessary in AirLand battle has the risk of escalating war and can only be used, for example, to reinforce an ally. He underscored that accordingly, in East Asia, AirLand Battle can only be used in limited scenarios, such as counteroffensive operations within an ally. He concluded that AirLand Battle is a throwback to WWII, and can only be applied to modern warfare in a limited manner, and that AirSea Battle, which is similar in the sense that it calls for a high level of cooperation between services, is better suited for modern warfare.

Prof. Toshi Yoshihara explained that anti-access strategy had been adopted three times, by Japan during the Pacific War, by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and by China in recent years. He said that China’s anti-access follows the Soviet strategy: It implements missile attacks from cruisers, missile ships, submarines, bombers, and onshore sites; It conducts a
decisive war when the enemy fleet has weakened; It also considers delivering a blow in a short war against enemies entering from exterior lines. On this basis, Prof. Yoshihara noted that time was key to destroying the anti-access strategy. Lastly, he stated that China today did not have the naval power that Japan and the Soviet Union had in the past, but that the threat from the north was declining and that China’s economic power was gradually approaching that of the United States. Prof. Yoshihara concluded that it was difficult to destroy China’s anti-access and that high cost expenditures were necessary for victory.

Chief Tomoyuki Ishizu pointed out that the definition of amphibious operations was ambiguous. He then examined the history of amphibious operations and stated that the “aerial” element is becoming increasingly critical in present-day amphibious operations. He listed and explained the functions of amphibious operations; namely, assault, raid, withdrawal, demonstration, and support to other operations, as well as the phases of amphibious operations, namely, “planning and preparation,” “passage to the battle zone,” “pre-landing operations,” “securing the beach,” and “consolidation and exploitation.” Chief Ishizu underlined the critical importance of logistics in amphibious operations, and discussed amphibious operations from the perspective of defenders, i.e., defense at the water’s edge, mobile ground defense, and defense in depth. He concluded that for successful amphibious operations, the following were important: a marine corps that is independent and autonomous from ground, naval, and air forces; mobility; a “package” of units, e.g., the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF); and “mission tactics,” namely, respecting discretion and decentralizing decision-making accordingly.

Discussant Prof. Narushige Michishita made the following comments regarding the three presentations. Regarding Prof. Malkasian’s presentation, he agreed that amphibious operations entailed difficulties, and stated that in modern times, the possibility of remote islands being captured in peacetime needs to be taken into account. Preparations must be made with this concern in mind.

With regard to Prof. Yoshihara’s presentation, Prof. Michishita expressed agreement that the strategy of modern China was similar to the strategies of the Soviet Union and Japan in the past. However, he said Prof. Yoshihara did not mention that while there were rules to avoid clashes between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, no such rules exist in the environment surrounding present-day China, making the situation more dangerous. Another difference is that unlike during the Cold War, in the present-day, allies such as Japan, Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea, have an increased presence for the United States.

Prof. Michishita then asked Prof. Yoshihara what the differences were between the maritime strategies of years past and the current AirSea Battle in terms of strategies for dealing with anti-access. To Chief Ishizu, Prof. Michishita asked whether it was dangerous that the term “amphibious operations” conjures up the image of operations carried out at sea. As a follow-up, he asked which was advantageous in amphibious operations – offense or defense.

In response to these questions, Prof. Yoshihara noted that contrary to the past concepts between the United States and the Soviet Union, China, which could accept even high risks, might utilize escalation, in part due to its lack of Rules of Engagement (ROE). With respect to differences with the 1980s, Prof. Yoshihara said China could not vow to implement an
offensive strategy, partially due to political issues, and the United States also faces the issue of fiscal austerity. Chief Ishizu responded that it was desirable not to use the term “amphibious operations” as the “aerial” component was missing, and that a new term needed to be created based on a clear definition. As for which was advantageous – offense or defense, he responded that looking back in history since the era of Sir Francis Drake in the late 16th century when British way in warfare was established, a sweeping answer could not be made as to which was advantageous.

Lastly, regarding session three as a whole, former General Oriki, the keynote speaker, commented that Japan had a short history with joint and combined operations, and that it was important to consider how past lessons could be applied for the future to adapt to the changes in the times. Former General Oriki said that in examining joint and combined operations, policy and strategy, must be distinguished from military tactical aspects. He underscored that the way forward was to consider the relationship between joint and combined operations and technology. Prof. Freedman, who delivered the special address, commented that with British way in warfare and its associated amphibious operations, the point was to use naval forces rather than ground forces. He also noted the importance of the issues of allies and logistics as they relate to joint and combined operations.

Based on the discussions over the course of the Forum, this topic of the history of joint and combined operations may be summarized as follows.

First, advance planning and the sharing of the concept are vital for joint and combined operations. It is desirable that outreach and training are conducted as much as possible to maintain communication from peacetime, and that a permanent liaison organization or command is established. This needs to be done by taking the different cultural aspects among the countries and military services into account.

Secondly, it must be kept in mind that the implementation of joint and combined operations is largely affected by the qualifications of the leaders and the political environment. The operations need to flexibly adapt to the war situation. In particular, combined operations must be able to improvise, so that prior agreements can be modified based on changes in the war situation. Communication and trust-building are needed to make it possible.

Thirdly, a feedback loop is critical to extract lessons regarding joint and combined operations and to learn from them and promote them. This cycle needs to be in constant operation. Doctrines are being developed and lessons are being taught with regard to joint operations. In the case of combined operations, however, they have not yet reached that level, and lessons are being learned sequentially.

Fourthly, going forward, it is expected that there will be more coalition operations based on coalitions of the willing. Challenges were identified, including counter-insurgency (COIN) and other non-conventional warfare as well as capacity building, including of civilians. Technological innovations, as they pertain to joint and combined operations, were raised as a theme requiring further consideration.