Program,
Participants,
Summaries
PROGRAM

Opening Session

9:25 – 9:30 Opening Remarks
Toru Mimura (President, NIDS)

9:30 – 9:35 Welcoming Remarks

9:35 – 9:40 Chairman’s Remarks
Junichiro Shoji (Director, Center for Military History (CMH), NIDS)

Keynote Address

9:40 – 10:20 “Island Defense and Seizure Operations, and Naval Strategic Lessons: Learned by Imperial Japan in the Pacific Theater of Operations during World War II”
Yoji Koda (VADM JMSDF (Retired), Former Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet)

10:20 – 10:35 Break

Session 1: The Diplomacy and War over Islands: the European Theater in WW II

10:35 – 11:00 “Occupation and Humanitarian Aid—A Case Study: The Channel Islands 1944-1945”
Phylomena H. Badsey (Lecturer, University of Wolverhampton)

11:00 – 11:25 “Britain and the Campaigns in Greece and Crete in 1941”
David Horner (Professor, Australian National University)

11:25 – 11:35 Comment
Kanji Akagi (Professor, Keio University)

11:35 – 12:05 Discussion

12:05 – 13:30 Lunch

Special Address

13:30 – 14:10 “Containment and Cold War before the Nuclear Age: Liddell Hart and Allied Strategy in 1937-1941”
Azar Gat (Professor, Tel Aviv University)

14:10 – 14:15 Break
Session 2: The Diplomacy and War over Islands: the Asian-Pacific Theater in WWII

14:15 – 14:40 “America Adapting: Submarine Warfare and Pacific Islands”
Frank G. Hoffman (Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.)

14:40 – 15:05 “Battle for Guadalcanal: As Viewed from the Perspective of the Concentration of Forces”
Lieutenant Colonel Tatsushi Saito (Research Fellow, CMH, NIDS)

15:05 – 15:15 Comment
Ryoichi Tobe (Professor, International Research Center for the Japanese Studies, the Graduate University for Advanced Studies)

15:15 – 15:45 Discussion

15:45 – 16:00 Break

Session 3: The Diplomacy and War over the Falklands Islands

16:00 – 16:25 “The Logistics of the British Recovery of the Falkland Islands 1982”
Stephen Badsey (Professor, University of Wolverhampton)

16:25 – 16:50 “Political and Diplomatic Lessons of the Falklands War”
Ken Kotani (Senior Research Fellow, CMH, NIDS)

16:50 – 17:15 “Military Implications of the Falklands War: From Japan’s Point of View”
Lieutenant Colonel Jun Yanagisawa (Professor, Air Staff College)

17:15 – 17:25 Comment
Yuichi Hosoya (Professor, Keio University)

17:25 – 17:55 Discussion

Closing Session

17:55 – 18:00 Closing Remarks
Major General Yorito Yamamoto (Vice President, NIDS)
PARTICIPANTS

Chairman

Junichiro Shoji
Director, Center for Military History (CMH), NIDS
M.A., University of Tsukuba

Keynote Speaker

Yoji Koda
Advisor for Japan Marine United CORP., Vice Admiral, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), Retired
Former Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet

Special Speaker

Azar Gat
Professor, Tel Aviv University
DPhil., University of Oxford
Moderator

Tomoyuki Ishizu
Chief, International Conflict Division, (CMH), NIDS
M.A., King’s College London

Speakers

Phylomena H. Badsey
Lecturer, University of Wolverhampton
Ph.D., University of Kingston
War, Journalism and History: War Correspondents in the Two World Wars (co-authored) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012); World War II and the Media (co-authored) (in preparation, publisher to be determined, 2013); Pearls upon a Thread: the Political Thought of Vera Brittain (being considered by Oxford University Press).

David Horner
Professor, Australian National University
Ph.D., Australian National University

Frank G. Hoffman
Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
M.A., Naval War College
Tatsushi Saito (Lieutenant Colonel, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force)
Research Fellow, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS
M.A., Waseda University

Stephen Badsey
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Ken Kotani
Senior Research Fellow, International Conflict Division, CMH, NIDS
Ph.D., Kyoto University
Japanese Intelligence in World War II (Oxford: Osprey, 2009); The Pacific War Companion (co-authored) (Oxford: Osprey, 2005); Intelligence Elsewhere (co-authored) (Georgetown University Press, 2013).

Jun Yanagisawa (Lieutenant Colonel, Japan Air Self-Defense Force)
Professor, JASDF Staff College
M.A., Sophia University
Discussants

Kanji Akagi
Professor, Keio University
Ph.D., Keio University

Ryoichi Tobe
Professor, International Research Center for the Japanese Studies and Graduate University for Advanced Studies
Ph.D., Kyoto University

Yuichi Hosoya
Professor, Keio University
Ph.D., Keio University
SUMMARIES

Keynote Address

Island Defense and Seizure Operations, and Naval Strategic Lessons: Learned by Imperial Japan in the Pacific Theater of Operations during World War II

Yoji Koda

Introduction

✽ Why would island defense become an issue now?
In Japan, island defense is a question of growing concern that has fired up debate. The speaker discusses its backdrop in relation to the current international security environment.

✽ What is island defense?
The definition of island defense is established on which the reasoning of this talk shall be based.

Analysis of island defense (Battle for islands)

✽ Amphibious operation and island battle
Difference between these two confusable military operations is made clear and the respective characteristics are summarized from the viewpoints of both offensive and defensive sides.

✽ Overview and classification of island battles during and after WWII
Battles in the Pacific Ocean
• Japan’s offensive operations at the outset of the war: Guam/Wake Island, Philippines
• Midway Islands
• Solomon Islands Campaign: Guadalcanal to Bougainville
• Operations around the Central Pacific Islands: Marshall Islands and Gilbert Islands
• After February 1944: Truk Islands, New Guinea (Biak Island), Mariana Islands, Caroline Islands, and Philippine Islands
• 1945: Iwo Jima and Okinawa
• Singular operation: Makin Island (Raid operation in August 1942)

Falklands War

Grenada Operation

Lessons from the addressed cases and today’s significance

✽ For Japan
The strategic implications are weighed with respect to future Japan in the light of the “lessons” and “significance” learned from above.
For other nations

Universal and today’s significance of the island defense operations and applicable lessons are drawn.

Conclusion
Session 1

Occupation and Humanitarian Aid—A Case Study: The Channel Islands 1944-1945

Phylomena H. Badsey

This paper discusses the ethical, moral, and associated international issues surrounding the provision of humanitarian aid to an enemy force that has invaded isolated islands that are part of one’s own sovereign territory, that has publically stated that it will defend its illegal occupation by military force, but has become stranded by the changing circumstances of the campaign, and is now in need of humanitarian assistance, chiefly food.

The historical case study for this discussion is the German occupation during the Second World War of the Channel Islands, which began on 30th June 1940 with an unopposed invasion, and continued until the surrender of the German garrison to arriving British forces on 9th May 1945. The Channel Islands are a group of small islands which lie immediately off the west coast of Normandy in France, but for historical reasons they are British sovereign territory, and have a British population. They were the only British sovereign territory in Europe occupied by the Germans in the Second World War, something to which the Germans attached great political and symbolic importance, as a consequence of which the German garrison was very large in relation to the number of inhabitants, approximately 40,000 troops at its height. Following the Allied landings in Normandy on D-Day, 6th June 1944, and the defeat of German forces in France over the next three months, the German garrison of the Channel Islands found itself isolated, without any hope of receiving reinforcements or supplies, but was under the direct order of Hitler not to surrender or abandon the islands. In July 1944, the German garrison confiscated the islands’ harvest, and by November the islands’ civilian authorities under the occupation recognized that the islanders who had already have experienced great deprivation were suffering from malnutrition and related diseases.

The British and German governments agreed that unarmed merchant ships carrying humanitarian aid for the civilian population, chiefly food, under the flag of the Red Cross would be allowed into the islands. The first shipments arrived in December 1944, and continued into 1945. This humanitarian aid was not intended for the occupying German garrison, who were now starving. The military discipline of the garrison held, but there were individual cases of food parcels intended for the civilian population being purloined, and also cases of the civilian population sharing food with them out of sympathy.
One of the intriguing questions about Britain’s strategy in the Second World War concerns its decision in February 1941 to commit forces to the defence of Greece. At that time, the British Commonwealth was standing alone against Hitler’s Germany. The Axis powers—Germany, Italy, Hungary and Romania—dominated Europe. Germany had a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, and Spain seemed to be tilting towards Germany. The Battle of Britain might have been over, but German bombers were still striking each night at British towns and cities. At sea, German submarines were gaining the upper hand. The only glimmer of success was in northern Africa, where Commonwealth forces had advanced into Italian Libya. It hardly seemed that Britain was in a position to open a new front against the Axis, which would need to be supported across the seas, at the other side of Europe.

Britain’s efforts to assist Greece to resist the German invasion in April 1941 quickly led to defeat, with the loss of some 15,000 British Commonwealth troops, killed, wounded, and captured. On the face of it, the decision to help Greece seemed unwise. Equally contentious was the decision to try to hold the island of Crete which the Germans attacked in May 1941. This too led to a British defeat. Beyond the question as to whether it was in Britain’s interest to become involved in these two forlorn campaigns, lurk further questions. What does the conduct of the campaigns say about the military capabilities of the British Commonwealth’s armed forces and their commanders at this time?

With the advantage of hindsight we should ask whether Britain reaped any benefit from these campaigns. Were there higher strategic and political gains? Some have argued that Germany’s campaign in Greece delayed its attack against Russia and thereby contributed to its subsequent defeat there. Other research has suggested that the Greek campaign had no influence over the timing of Barbarossa.

Britain, like Japan in 1942, was a small island country with a scattered maritime empire. But there the similarity ends. Britain was still concerned about public opinion around the world, but in particular in the United States. How much did this contribute to Britain’s strategic decisions in the early months of 1941?
The paper outlines the most general premises and perceptions that underlay the Western democracies’ defense policy and grand strategy before and during the crisis period 1938-1941. It argues that, unique to democracies, these centered on isolation, appeasement, containment, and cold war. Although they were not explicitly defined as a doctrine at the time, they were very much in the air, decisively shaping policy. They have continued to underlie strategic policy in the democracies throughout the Cold War and into the present.

The paper suggests that the man who most systematically formulated all this in the language of strategic doctrine as early as the 1930s was the famous British military theorist and commentator, B. H. Liddell Hart. The focus of his interest was developments in Europe, but similar policies and strategies were practiced in the Pacific by the United States in an attempt to contain Japan.
America Adapting: Submarine Warfare and Pacific Islands

Frank G. Hoffman

For more than three decades at the beginning of the last century, America’s best strategic and military minds labored over the tyranny of time and distance of a conflict against Orange, the empire of Japan. Although their efforts lacked guidance from the nation’s political leaders, the planners in both the Army and the Navy debated and wargamed the difficulties of a trans-Pacific test of arms. Planners accurately anticipated Japan’s opening moves in a sudden war, as well as the general outline of advances into Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Much of this effort still derived its energy from the U.S. Navy’s infatuation with the modern Dreadnought and the belief that eventually the war against Japan would be decided, as Mahan taught, in a titanic clash of capital ships concentrated in line. At the same time, though, planners recognized that setting the stage for such a clash required the development of a major fleet with a capable naval aviation component. The need for advanced bases to support the Fleet and to provide necessary logistics via underway replenishment was also well understood, which gave play to the development of amphibious capabilities that many thought were obsolete given the debacle at Gallipoli in World War I.

The Navy’s preferred plan for the Pacific contest of arms was ultimately shelved by the Joint Board. The head of the U.S. Navy, Admiral Stark, directed that it be deleted from the Navy’s preparation for war in late 1940, as it was drawn up for a war under circumstances that no longer existed. A two-front war, with Europe as a priority, was now belatedly the official American policy. Plan Orange was officially eliminated from the national plans set in July 1941, some three decades after its original inception. However, it still animated the Navy’s thinking and it still drove the way the Navy leadership and its operational commands approached war in general, and the Pacific in particular. The Plan may not have had official sanction but it remained the U.S. Navy’s mental model or way of war.

In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the United States reacted by initiating a defensive war of attrition against the empire of Japan. Initially, the Navy was not able to implement its much rehearsed War Plan Orange with carrier group thrusts across the Central Pacific and ponderous battlewagons searching for an American Trafalgar. Instead, the Navy started by ordering unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan’s sea lines of communications, a mission for which it was operationally and tactically unprepared. For a few years, U.S. Navy strategists began to think more about what the submarine force might contribute. Strategic requirements and legal precedents were debated, and the Navy’s high command understood that the preponderance of military power in the Pacific would favor the Japanese initially. The employment of the fleet submarine to blunt Japan’s expected thrusts towards Southeast Asia offered a potential solution.

The U.S. Navy spent 30 years preparing for its preferred campaign against Japan. As war
approached, its leadership recognized the increased reliance that America would place upon
the submarine to offset Japanese military advantages. Mahanian thinking and nearly 20 years
of international law were quietly shelved. Should war break out suddenly in 1941, the Navy’s
leaders were prepared to respond with whatever means they had against Japan’s extended lines
of communication and merchant shipping.

Thus, senior naval planners prepared conceptually to employ their meager submarine fleet in
an aggressive way to attrite Japanese forays and conduct economic warfare. However, they
had not really used the time to operationalize that adjustment beyond the planning stage into
the Fleet. The Navy had not thought out the necessary components for such a campaign. It
was one thing to debate the strategic merits of a Pacific guerre du course. It was another thing
entirely to put it into execution. The poor results in the first years of the campaign bear out this
assessment. They did not have the doctrine, the personnel, the training, or weapons to execute
the new plans for economic warfare.

Campaign pressures and operational realities would force the Navy to adapt. A major
element of the effort to adapt required a rethinking of what submarines could and should do
in a major conflict. New concepts of operations, new tactics, new doctrine, new techniques
for conducting attacks at night, and new personnel all had to be adapted. The American Navy
struggled to find the right tactics and to correct many problems with their weapons to implement
their strategy. They wasted years learning what worked and what did not, at great costs.

This adaptation included building up new bases and creating maintenance centers for
submarines. First this began in the Philippines, which the Americans had to abandon when
they fled to Australia. Bases in Australia were not too far from critical chokepoints and
vulnerable energy supplies, but the U.S. Navy failed to focus on them initially. Later, bases
in Guam, Midway, and Saipan became refueling and submarine bases to facilitate more and
more submarines being ruthlessly applied to all the merchant shipping that supplied Japan’s
economy. Many today focus on islands as air bases, but their role as sub bases cannot be
overlooked.

American subs sunk over 1,300 ships including 20 major naval combatants (8 carriers,
1 battleship and 11 cruisers). Japanese merchant shipping losses included 5.5 million tons of
shipping or about 85 percent of its total prewar and wartime production total. This exceeds
the total sunk by the Navy’s surface ships, its many carriers, and the Army Air Corps bombers
combined. The idea that submarines would account for 55 percent of Japan’s losses at sea
was never anticipated during those hundreds of wargames at the U.S. Navy War College. No
was the importance of oil imports, which were severely reduced by 1945. “Had submarines
concentrated more effectively in the areas were tankers were” the historian Clay Blair claims,
“oil imports probably could have been reduced sooner and the collapse of the fleet, the air arm,
merchant shipping and all other activities dependent upon fuel oil hastened.”

When I spoke here a decade ago, I called the American strategy, a strategy of improvisation.
In the end, American strategic thinking was not deliberate planning but constant learning
and adaptation. Strategy is often the product of solutions that Maurice Matloff described as
“molded on the anvil of necessity.” Belatedly, the American Navy’s subs had to be molded
under the heat of combat on that anvil into an effective solution by adaptation.

The lessons about the geography of the Pacific, the role of naval forces in seizing and holding islands, of denying one’s opponent access to the ocean highway, and the role of submarines against economic targets remain relevant today as they in the last Pacific war.
Session 2

Battle for Guadalcanal: As Viewed from the Perspective of the Concentration of Forces

Tatsushi Saito

The battle for Guadalcanal was fought between the two forces, whose power were approximately equal, to seize an island, roughly the size of Chiba Prefecture, located some 560 miles from both Japan’s base at Rabaul and the U.S. base at Espiritu Santo.

The basic plot of the battle was set between the 1st U.S. Marine Division and the 17th Army of Japan; the former strove to expand its perimeter which was to protect an occupied airfield to a line where they would be able to keep away Japan’s effective gunfire against the airfield, whereas the latter attempted to break through the line, then neutralize the airfield by gunfire and recapture it.

In order to wage such a land battle, the both forces required the maritime transport of massive heavy military equipment, including artillery pieces and tanks, which are the core of fighting power, which resulted in the aspect of the race to concentrate forces. That race, in turn, led to another maritime warfare pursuing naval and air supremacy.

Transports had to be used for carrying such heavy equipment. Japan organized and dispatched three convoys in succession. The first convoy (August 24-25, 1942) was intended to land the 2nd Echelon of Ichiki-Shitai (Ichiki Detachment), and the second (October 14) and third (November 13-14) convoy aimed to support the offensive operations by the 2nd Division and the 38th Division, respectively, each with heavy equipment.

In this presentation, I would like to overview the Japanese battle for Guadalcanal compared with that of the U.S. and consider the cause of Japan’s defeat, focusing on such vital transport of heavy equipment, especially the Japanese convoys to this island.
### Outline of primary cases of Japanese and American concentration of forces and battle for Guadalcanal (August-November, 1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Japanese Army concentration</th>
<th>American Army concentration</th>
<th>Land and Sea Battle for Guadalcanal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>1, 5th MarR, 11th AR, etc. [transport]</td>
<td>Battle of Savo Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Min Bridgehead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>Ichiki-Shitai (1st Echelon) [Rat transport]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Equally matched each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Marines airplanes landed</td>
<td>Offense by Ichiki-Shitai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Battle of Eastern Solomons</td>
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<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24th-25th</td>
<td>Ichiki-Shitai (2nd Echelon) [#1 Convoy]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29th-Sep 7th</td>
<td>Kawaguchi-Shitai [Rat/boat transport]</td>
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<td>13th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td></td>
<td>7th MarR (Appr. 4300) etc. [transport]</td>
<td>US offense against the Matanikau west bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>1st-3rd</td>
<td>2D (29thiR, 15Hx4) [Rat transport]</td>
<td>Extension of Bridgehead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st-3rd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US offense against the Matanikau west bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Battle of offshore Savo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>17AHQ [Rat transport]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th-12th</td>
<td>Weapon, etc. (15Hx4, etc.) [Seaplane carrier]</td>
<td>164th R (Appr. 6000) etc. [transport], Air transport</td>
<td>2D offense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>2D (2 iRs, A, TK, etc.) [#2 Convoy]</td>
<td>Fuel, ammunition, etc [Rat transport, Air transport]</td>
<td>US offense against the Matanikau west bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th-26th</td>
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<tr>
<td>30th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early Nov</td>
<td>38D (228thiR, etc. Appr.4200) [Rat transport]</td>
<td>2 Rs, A unit, etc. [transport]</td>
<td>US retreat to the Matanikau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td></td>
<td>182th R(-) [transport]</td>
<td>Naval Battle of Guadalcanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd-14th</td>
<td>38D (Appr. 10000, Ammunition, etc.) [#3 Convoy]</td>
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</table>
Logistics played an essential role in the British recovery of the Falkland Islands in 1982, but not a dominant one.

The chief British military strategic issue was how to project and sustain sufficient military force at a distance of more than 12,000 kilometres without access to a major port facility, which was essentially a problem in logistics. But throughout the campaign, these logistical considerations were subordinated to greater international political imperatives, since the political support or benign neutrality of several other countries was critical to the British success. Chiefly, the political need for speed and continuity of action overrode what would have been the best logistical practices for the British, with the result that they encountered a number of logistical and tactical problems in their campaign.

The political acquiescence of the United States in the British use of Ascension Island and Widewake air base should be singled out as among the most important logistical factors in the British campaign. In an improvised campaign, the British coped with most of the logistical issues facing them by initiative and adaptability, with some consequent problems due to a lack of formal procedures, although these problems never became great enough to place the success of their campaign at risk. The major logistical lessons identified by the British government after the war were that rates of usage of munitions (especially missiles) were higher than expected; that there was a need for higher levels of logistical support for operations outside the NATO area; that there was a need to improve their air-to-air refuelling capability; and the importance of civil resources as part of the war effort, including the Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT).

The single greatest supply issue for the British was fuel (petrol, oil and lubricants or POL) of all kinds and for all uses, rather than ammunition or other supplies. Their single greatest transport problem was overland transport once the ground campaign had begun, in particular the shortage of helicopters and the danger of risking ships and other naval units close inshore without air superiority. In summary, the British logistic effort in the war was a remarkable success.
Session 3

Political and Diplomatic Lessons of the Falklands War

Ken Kotani

This paper focuses on the foreign diplomacy and leadership of the Thatcher administration during the Falklands War. Full-fledged studies of this war were made possible after the release of its detailed official history by Professor Lawrence Freedman, as well as the disclosure of its archive materials by the UK National Archives in December 2012. The paper mainly discusses about (1) to what extent the Thatcher regime grasped the situation before the War, and (2) its foreign diplomacy and leadership in directing the war.

When it comes to the discussion of the Falklands War and its history, the most controversial things among all are whether Thatcher adequately grasped the circumstances around the Falklands before the war, and why she did not respond accordingly if she had properly grasped it. Stereotyped observations often point out that Thatcher failed in responding properly because she had no interest in diplomacy or security issues, which were considered as matters to be handled by Carrington, the Foreign Secretary. According to the Franks Report, however, which was developed in the following year of the war, no political defect is attributed to the Administration. Among other historiographical materials recently made public, there are some Franks Committee’s records of testimony taken from the government officials including Thatcher. Based on all these materials, it can be understood that it was very difficult back then to predict an invasion by Argentina.

It would be also premature to make an assertion that Thatcher knew little of diplomacy or security issues, since she is regarded as the first Prime Minister that attended the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) regularly. In addition, Foreign Secretary Carrington was also an experienced politician, who had served as the Defense Secretary. Therefore, a simple schematic opinion that the Administration’s indifference brought about the Argentine invasion cannot be justified.

Subsequently, when she anticipated a clash of arms with Argentina, Thatcher formed the war cabinet to establish the structure needed for the government-led conduct of war. In a war cabinet, the Prime Minister is supposed to have direct control in leading diplomacy and war, but the problem was how a politician, an amateur in military affairs, should be involved in directing the war. In other words, it was also the problem of senior military officers as to how they should support a politician’s war direction. During the war, it was Admiral Lewin, Chief of the Defence Staff, who played a role of node between political and military affairs. By attending the war cabinet, he grasped the political requirements of the Administration, and then via the Chiefs of Staff committee, he passed them along to the Northwood Headquarters in charge of military operations. That is to say, by remaining thoroughly committed to the role of military adviser for the Administration, Admiral Lewin allowed Northwood to be devoted to the military operations.
While civil-military relations have raised sensitive issues in many countries, the British have a long tradition of forming a war cabinet since the First World War. Thus, they could take advantage of the experience during the Falkland War.
Session 3

Military Implications of the Falklands War: From Japan’s Point of View

Jun Yanagisawa

The Falklands War in 1982 is characterized by the landing operations carried out by both the Argentine and the British away from their home lands, and by naval vessels which were for the first time ever, subjected to threats from aircraft for a prolonged period since WWII. With these characteristics, this war shall be of great help when considering Japan’s island defense. This paper, taking into account the change of the times and the difference in actors, etc., considers the implication of the Falkland War for Japan.

First, from the strategic point of view, until immediately before the outbreak of the War the British could not predict the invasion launched by Argentina, which, in turn, was not able to estimate that the opponent would dare to recover the territory. This was why both the two forces fought with a partial lack of the weapon systems fitting to the theater and contributing to the victory, or short of their amount, even if available. Such defects were particularly significant on the Argentine side. With regard to allies, the British received practical assistance from the US and European countries. Argentine obtained support from many countries of South America, but no tangible assistance. When applying these to Japan, Japan has well recognized the significance of defense of islands, and has set about reorganizing troops and equipment. With respect to the alliance, it seems successful for now that Japan could get political and military support from the U.S.

Second, from the tactical point of view, it is said that a lot of principles of war were reaffirmed in this campaign. First, air superiority had to be ensured for victory. The British could almost gain it, but not in a complete manner. Second, sea control was vital. The British nuclear submarines completely kept the enemy’s fleet in port. Third, although inadequate, the British enjoyed predominance in concentrating firepower and securing mobility. Fourth, the superiority in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), which was also enjoyed by the British. Fifth, carrying out joint operations: the British were slightly in advance of the opponent thanks to their long experience in fighting wars in different parts of the world, although it was not a complete form of joint operation.

When considering these in the context of Japan, especially the first through the fourth points, Japan is developing capabilities to cope with these. But some lacking functions are problems to be solved (e.g. SEAD or Suppression of Enemy Air Defense). As with regard to jointness, for making quick response to infringement of Japanese sovereignty feasible, either the establishment of a standing joint force, or designating certain forces with the specific task, along with constant joint exercises should also be taken into consideration.

It seemed unlikely that Argentina, whose Air Force was still flying Mirage IIIs, would recapture the Falkland Islands, from Britain. However, the economy of the countries in East Asia is strong, and increasing military spending has resulted in the expansion of their military
capability accordingly. Japan would have to build defense capabilities in accordance with the situation on a long-term basis, while coping with massive budget deficits. And Japan should prepare for warfare in a new dimension such as in cyberspace, so as not to make the same mistake as that of France which fell in face of “Blitzkrieg” in 1940.