PROGRAM

Opening Session
9:30 – 9:35 Opening Remarks
Nobushige Takamizawa (President, NIDS)
9:35 – 9:40 Welcoming Remarks
Hironori Kanazawa (Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense)
9:40 – 9:50 Chairman’s Remarks
Junichiro Shoji (Director, Center for Military History (CMH), NIDS)

Keynote Address
9:50 – 10:30 “The Influence and Meaning of the Pacific War in Global History”
H.P. Willmott (Honorary Research Associate, Greenwich Maritime Institute, University of Greenwich)

10:30 – 10:45 Break

Session 1: Japan and China
10:45 – 11:10 “Reconsideration of Post-War Understanding of Modern Japanese History: An Examination of War and Colonial Rule of Imperial Japan”
Fumitaka Kurosawa (Professor, Tokyo Woman’s Christian University)
11:10 – 11:35 “The Pacific War in Modern Chinese History: An Examination of Conflicting Modern Historical Images”
Liu Jie (Professor, Waseda University)
11:35 – 12:10 Comment and Discussion
Discussant: Haruo Tohmatsu (Professor, National Defense Academy)

12:10 – 13:30 Lunch
Session 2: Southeast Asia and Australia

13:30 – 13:55 “Significance of the Pacific War for Southeast Asia”
   Kyoichi Tachikawa (Chief, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS)

   Peter Dennis (Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy)

14:20 – 14:55 Comment and Discussion
   Discussant: Hiroshi Noguchi (Associate Professor, Nanzan University)

14:55 – 15:10 Break

Session 3: UK and US

15:10 – 15:35 “Churchill’s War; Attlee’s Peace”
   Philip Towle (Visiting Professor, University of Buckingham)

15:35 – 16:00 “Unexpected Gifts: The Impact and Legacy of the Pacific War in America”
   Roger Dingman (Professor Emeritus, University of Southern California)

16:00 – 16:35 Comment and Discussion
   Discussant: Ken Kotani (Senior Research Fellow, International Conflict Division, CMH, NIDS)

16:35 – 16:50 Break

Panel Discussion

16:50 – 17:50 “The Legacy and Implications of the Pacific War”

Closing Session

17:50 – 17:55 Closing Remarks
   Yorito Yamamoto (Vice President, NIDS)
PARTICIPANTS

Chairman

Junichiro Shoji
Director, Center for Military History (CMH), NIDS
M.A., University of Tsukuba


Keynote Speaker

H.P. Willmott
Honorary Research Associate, Greenwich Maritime Institute, University of Greenwich
Ph.D., King's College, University of London


Speakers

Fumitaka Kurosawa
Professor, Tokyo Woman’s Christian University
Ph.D., Keio University

Liu Jie
Professor, Waseda University
Ph.D., University of Tokyo

Kyoichi Tachikawa
Chief, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS
Ph.D., Sophia University

Peter Dennis
Emeritus Professor, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy
Ph.D., Duke University

Philip Towle
Visiting Professor, University of Buckingham
Ph.D., King’s College, University of London
Roger Dingman
Professor Emeritus, University of Southern California
Ph.D., Harvard University


**Discussants**

Haruo Tohmatsu
Professor, National Defense Academy
Ph.D., University of Oxford


Hiroshi Noguchi
Associate Professor, Nanzan University
M.A., Sophia University


Ken Kotanj
Senior Research Fellow, International Conflict Division, CMH, NIDS
Ph.D., Kyoto University

SUMMARIES

Keynote Address

The Influence and Meaning of the Pacific War in Global History

H. P. Willmott

This paper is formed in three parts: an examination of the Pacific War with reference to international history; an examination of this conflict in terms of the nature of war; and an examination of this conflict in terms of the conduct of operations: in short, the history, the state and the services respectively.

In examining the place of this conflict within the context of international history there is no questioning of the conventional wisdom that dates twentieth century history in terms of 1914 and 1989-1991 but sets out the view that the wars of the Second World War in Europe and the Far East were the most destructive parts in a series of conflicts between 1937 and 1975 that rewrote the international order. As a secondary theme, the relationship between friendship and hostility is examined in terms of changes of relationships in the aftermath of war.

In examining the nature of war four matters are afforded consideration: the change in ownership of the Trident in the course of the Second World War; the fact that the Pacific War was by historical and by naval standards a short war; the fact that for the victorious United States this was a conflict most modest in terms of losses; and the fact that this was a very unusual war in terms of its being prosecuted across an ocean. A final matter presented in this section is consideration of the fact that at some stage or another all powers fight the wrong war at the wrong time because of fundamental error in examining the nature and means of the enemy, and Japan’s dubious record in this matter is given due consideration.

In examining the conduct of operations six matters are afforded consideration. The relationship between supremacy and victory is set alongside the American industrial achievement in the course of the Second World War, which is contrasted with the fact that Japan had limited capacity; the fact that the American drive across the central Pacific was very much a tri-service achievement; the nature and outcome of the guerre de course against Japanese shipping is considered; the Japanese services’ capacity to “situates the appreciation” and the contrast with the findings of the Institute for Total War Studies is examined; and the Allied advantage in Intelligence matters is the last subject examined under this label.

The summary consists of an examination of “Japan the Taliban” in a conflict between democratic liberalism and determinist absolutism which resulted in the victory of Lincoln over Hegel.
Reconsideration of Post-War Understanding of Modern Japanese History:  
An Examination of War and Colonial Rule of Imperial Japan

Fumitaka Kurosawa

The understanding held by Japanese people about the history of Japan’s wars and colonial rule in the prewar Showa era has been debated often both inside and outside of Japan in recent years. The following are some of the factors facilitating such debate. First, a renewed perception of Japan’s past acts came about in Asian countries along with Japan’s rapid economic growth which began in the 1960s and subsequent increasing involvement in the international community, particularly its deepening economic relations with Asian countries, and as Japan increased its “presence” in Asia once again. Also, Japan has been forced to confront its previous history of war as a result of ever closer relations in recent years, not only economic but also diplomatic, with other Asian countries.

Second, a growing sense of confidence and a new nationalism among many Japanese from the 1980s, arising from the pride of having become an economic superpower, made it easier for many Japanese to voice statements that affirmatively viewed Japan’s past actions. This created a situation in which friction with other countries was easily triggered. Also, after the collapse of the economic bubble, the loss of confidence of sorts among the Japanese, arising from a nostalgia for the lost prosperity of the past and a feeling of entrapment and uncertainty about the future, led to the rise of a perception of history which was more compatible with nationalism which conversely sought to recover Japanese “pride.”

Third, since the 1980s, Asian countries have progressed in their economic development and democratization. In particular, South Korea and China have entered a new stage in their growth as nation-states.

Fourth, in addition to such economic development and democratization, the collapse of the East-West Cold War structure, which had a significant influence on the historical consciousness of each country, has made the emergence of more nationalistic (or more self-centered) interpretations of history easier. Along with that, historical issues have become tied to politics, and a phenomenon known as the “playing the diplomatic card (historical card)” in regard to historical issues has emerged.

Fifth, as symbolized by the “comfort women” issue, a point of view has gained traction which seeks to reconstruct the history of the past based on the contemporary perspectives of “humanity and human rights” as well as “gender.” Such perspectives per se are known to be viewpoints which are easily politicized and intimately related also with the issues of “apology” and “compensation” for wartime acts.

What sort of interpretations of history have been put forth regarding the wars and colonial rule in the Showa era prior to World War II by Japan’s historians who inevitably should be fostering, mainly through history education, the foundations of the understanding of history
among the Japanese? This report will review the issue centering on the attitudes of postwar historians specializing in Japan’s modern history.
The outbreak of the Pacific War gave hope to the Nationalist Government of China on which the long war with Japan had taken a substantial toll. Chiang Kai-shek’s judgment that “the Chinese resistance has overcome the most dangerous period and the critical juncture of Japan's invasion of China has passed,” which was based on the understanding that “the war between China and Japan has transformed into a world war” was made immediately after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. In Chiang Kai-shek’s understanding, the Pacific War and the Sino-Japanese War could only be different stages of the same war. Historians in China today also view the Pacific War as an extension and enlargement of the Sino-Japanese War, much the same as Chiang’s understanding. On the other hand, in postwar Japan, the “15-Year War,” “Asia-Pacific War,” and other such terms have emerged. And, in the “Draft Constitution for Japan,” which Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party announced in April of this year, the term “last war” is used, a term which is very familiar to many Japanese. For many people, the “last war” signifies nothing other than the “Pacific War” which started in 1941.

In recent years, Chinese historians have shown a strong interest in the status of “major power,” a position which China secured during the Pacific War. The historical significance of the following facts is actually considerable. The battlefields of the Sino-Japanese War were named the “China Theater” and Chiang Kai-shek was appointed its Supreme Commander. In January 1943, during the war, China annulled the unequal treaties which had been forced on China by the United States and European nations after the Opium Wars. In November of the same year, along with U.S. President Roosevelt and Britain’s Prime Minister Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the National Government of China, attended the Cairo Conference, thrusting China into the status of a global power. At the inauguration of the United Nations, a representative of the Republic of China signed the United Nations Charter at the San Francisco Conference, and contributed to the establishment of the United Nations as a permanent member of the Security Council. In other words, interest in the issue of the improvement of China’s international standing during the Pacific War led to a reassessment of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government, and has prompted a multipolarization of China’s historical view.

Also, U.S.-Soviet relations during the Pacific War led to the formation of two political parties in China: the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party. It goes without saying that the Soviet Union had an impact on the Communist Party behind the scenes, but, from 1944 to 1947, the United States also dispatched observers to Yan’an and attempted to make official contact with the Communist Party. Diplomacy with the United States during the Pacific War was the beginning of real diplomacy by the Communist Party of
China. The relationship between the United States and the Communist Party, which developed during this period, became an important asset in the rapprochement between China and the United States which started in the 1970s.

During the Pacific War, the Communist Party of China grew considerably, and, in 1946, the year following the end of World War II, a full-fledged constitution emerged in the Republic of China under the leadership of the Chinese Nationalist Party. China was on the verge of the final stage of “military administration, political tutelage and constitutional government,” a concept conceived by Sun Yat-sen and which China had pursued since the Xinhai Revolution. However, the Communist Party did not recognize the legitimacy of the Chinese Nationalist Government and branded its constitution as a “sham constitution” and attacked it. In the continuing civil war, the Communist Party completely negated the legal system which the Chinese Nationalist Party had established, and created a neo-democratic and socialist legal system. However, the “Constitution of the Republic of China” which was brought to Taiwan still maintains its legitimacy today, and has created a democratic society on Taiwan. How should the mainland Chinese, who aim for unification with Taiwan, come to terms with the Constitution of the Republic of China, a legacy of modern history which came into being after the Pacific War? Straddling the Taiwan Strait, two views of history are clashing vehemently.

The Pacific War and its legacy have brought about diverse modern historical images in today’s Asia-Pacific region. The purpose of this presentation is to sort out these historical images and reconsider the issue of what the Pacific War was for China.
Session 2

Significance of the Pacific War for Southeast Asia

Kyoichi Tachikawa

The significance of the Pacific War for Southeast Asia has been discussed from the perspective of “change” or “continuity” or the two combined. This presentation is based on the results of and discussions conducted in existing research, and, while acknowledging the “continuity” from before the Pacific War through its aftermath, a contemporary perspective will be included in discussing the “change” brought about in Southeast Asia as a result of the same war acting as a “catalyst.”

In the presentation, first, from a macro-level perspective looking at Southeast Asia as one unified region, I will talk about the “emergence” of Southeast Asia, including the name of “Southeast Asia” and a recognition which views the region as one grouping.

Next, interspersing a micro-level perspective focusing on each area of Southeast Asia, I will describe the impact which the Pacific War had on the politics, military affairs, economy, society, culture and other aspects of Southeast Asia. Naturally, I recognize that the changes which occurred in Southeast Asia during the Pacific War differ by area. Japan’s policies and measures during the war and their effect were not uniform, either. In this presentation, I will uncover as many common points as possible, and, in focusing on that exposition, I will also point out differences by area.

Lastly, I will touch upon the perception of the times and the relationship between Southeast Asia and Japan as well as former colonial powers in presenting my conclusion.

Status of each area of Southeast Asia and Japan’s policies toward the region during the Pacific War
1. Countries independent since before the war: Thailand
2. Administered by Japan’s military
   (1) Independent midway through the war: Burma, Philippines
   (2) Preparing for independence at the final stage of the war: Indonesia (East Indies)
   (3) No plans for independence: Malaya, North Borneo
3. Sovereignty maintained by colonial powers
   (1) Independent at the final stage of the war: French Indochina
       →Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos
   (2) No plans for independence: Portuguese East Timor
Old Enemies, New Friends: Australia and the Impact of the Pacific War

Peter Dennis

The Second World War, and more particularly, the Pacific War, was a profoundly disturbing experience for Australia. A vast country with a very small population (just over 7 million at the end of 1941), on the periphery of the most populous region in the world, found itself in late 1941 isolated and apparently in grave danger of imminent invasion. Pre-war Australian defence policy had rested on the so-called ‘Singapore strategy’, in which the United Kingdom guaranteed the security of southeast Asia and Australia and New Zealand by means of the naval base in Singapore. The fall of Singapore and the subsequent imprisonment of the 8th Division of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force, together with the entry of the United States into the war, brought about sweeping changes in Australia’s outlook and defence relations, and had lasting effect on Australia’s immigration policy.

My paper will look at what one historian has called Australia’s ‘search for security’ in the post-First World War period; its historic fear of Asia, and its reaction to the events of 1942-45. The Australian response to those years can be summed up in a deep hostility (even hatred) towards Japan, and a determination to find ‘great and powerful friends’ to provide Australia with a measure of security. I will look at the Australian contribution to the occupation of Japan and Australia’s involvement in the Korean War, the latter in particular leading to what has become the cornerstone of Australian defence and security policy, the ANZUS Treaty between the United States, Australia and New Zealand. As the fear of a resurgent Japan receded it was replaced by concerns about the spread of communism, which led to the creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

The Second World War demonstrated that the military model upon which Australia had relied since Federation in 1901, namely a tiny professional army supported by a large citizen, part-time force, with volunteer bodies raised for specific overseas deployments, was no longer suitable, thus leading to the creation of the Australian Regular Army in 1947, but that development was hampered by financial stringency in defence matters as other priorities in government spending took precedence.

The war had also demonstrated the importance of population, both for immediate defence needs and for the overall robustness of the economy. ‘Populate or perish’ became the slogan underpinning the government’s intention to increase Australia’s population by 1% through immigration. Initially bound by the ‘White Australia’ policy, restrictions on immigration were nevertheless gradually relaxed in 1947, and completely abolished in 1973-75. Since then Australia has had a policy of large-scale migration (currently about 190,000 a year), with special emphasis on skills migration. While there is some resistance to (and misunderstanding of) the concept of multiculturalism, it is widely accepted that the Australia of the 21st century is more prosperous, secure and interesting than it was in the 1940s. The legacy of the Pacific
War for Australia has, perhaps unexpectedly, been a positive one.
The attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 catapulted the United States into the Second World War giving it the opportunity to show that it was the predominant world power. The ensuing Pacific War ensured that Britain would emerge amongst the victors; it precipitated the end of colonialism in Asia and divided Britain from Australia and New Zealand thus eventually encouraging Britain to make one of its most important decisions since 1945, to join the European Community; it helped shape the British view of their role in the Second World War as heroic victims and encouraged British people to be more introspective about their international role and more sensitive towards other peoples; it destroyed many of the British investments in Asia built up over the previous century and increased the debts burdening an economy already weakened by two European wars and the Great Depression. Importantly, Britain’s indebtedness encouraged governments to maintain an over-valued currency to the disadvantage of British industry and trade.

As significant as what the Pacific War did, and in many ways more difficult to explain, is what the war did not do. While it brought a series of ignominious British defeats up to 1943, what it did not do was to undermine the British political elite’s determination to play a major world role. Thus the war meant that, for good or ill, the British made a greater military contribution to the Western alliance during the Cold War years than any Western state except the United States. Secondly, and despite the burdens which elite ambitions imposed, these did not stop Britain establishing the ‘welfare state’ after 1945 to improve living conditions amongst the poorer part of the population. Thirdly, despite the plethora of autobiographical accounts of the Pacific War and other fronts in the conflict against the Axis powers, the Second World War did not produce literature, and particularly, poetry on a level with that spawned by its predecessor. British schoolchildren study the poetry of the trenches and often visit the battlefields and the graveyards, emphasis on Second World War literature is much less. Finally, neither the belated victories in the Pacific War, nor in Europe, gave rise to the triumphalism so prevalent after the Napoleonic Wars a century before. There are no city squares, nor railway stations named after British victories from 1943 to 1945.

In 1945, despite all their defeats in the Pacific and elsewhere, British leaders still accepted Winston Churchill’s rhetoric and considered their country one of the ‘Big Three’, by the end of the country’s economic decline in the mid-1970s, when it had to appeal to the IMF for assistance, it was generally considered one of the weaker members of the European community with a smaller GDP than France and Italy. Even though Britain subsequently recovered from its economic decline it was left with the residue of this period in its fateful decision to join the European Community in January 1973, a decision made much easier by the impact of the Pacific War but which has profoundly divided British parties and people ever...
On the other hand, the dominance of the United States in the international system demonstrated by the Pacific War and, much later, by the collapse of the Soviet Union has produced an ‘Indian summer’ for the British elite because it has increased British confidence and influence. English is the world language and this spreads the influence of the BBC, Reuters and Britain’s leading universities. Britain has a very weak industrial base compared with Germany or Japan but it remains influential because of its soft power, and this might have surprised many in the dark years of the Pacific War or indeed during the 1960s. It is also a more egalitarian, more open and more introspective country than it was in the years of its dominance and for that its people should be grateful.
Session 3

Unexpected Gifts: The Impact and Legacy of the Pacific War in America

Roger Dingman

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was arguably the most decisive event of the Twentieth Century for Americans. It triggered a war that, when properly understood, lasted from December 7, 1941 to April 28, 1952 when the Treaty of Peace with Japan came into effect. This essay examines the immediate social and economic impact of the war, explores its consequences for postwar American policy and strategy, and probes its lingering effects upon Americans’ thinking about the Asia/Pacific region today.

For Americans, the war that began at Pearl Harbor was a global one. To discern the impact of what would later be called the Pacific War this essay’s focus narrows to California, the state most affected by the fighting in the far Pacific. It first shows how war changed life for the author’s extended family and then compares and contrasts its experience to that of other Californians and Americans more generally. The resulting geospatial, socio-economic, and attitudinal changes formed the first unexpected gift of the Pacific War: a “people of plenty” determined to create a “new America” in the future.

The Pearl Harbor attack forced Americans to “look west” across the Pacific as never before. Strategists, policy-makers, and citizens drew two far-reaching conclusions about the imperatives of national security from it. Their nation must never again be the victim of surprise attack, and it must become the dominant Pacific/Asian power. Translating those ideas into a grand strategy, comprehensive policy, and specific force designs and deployments proved slow and difficult. Peacemaking became the arena in which contending diplomats, admirals, and generals struck bargains that resulted in a second unexpected gift: the United States Japan Security Treaty and ancillary agreements with other nations that had fought Japan. The resulting security system as modified over time remains the cornerstone of peace in the Pacific to this day.

The image of the Pacific War in the minds of Americans today is complex. It has been shaped by American-Japanese frictions, by films, television miniseries and books that commanded public attention, and by more recent events. In it, the war’s combatants appear very differently. Americans are seen as heroic members of “the greatest generation” whose deeds make them models for the nation’s defenders today. Japanese, once viewed as fierce and treacherous, have become “the good enemy,” more human, and open to change than America’s post-9/11/2001 foes. That perception of the men and women who fought the Pacific War has delivered its ultimate unexpected gift: Americans’ determination to preserve, now and in the future, friendship with Japan and peace in the Pacific.