The Influence and Meaning of the Pacific War in Global History

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In examining the Japanese war and its place in History one would begin by acknowledging orthodox wisdom: as the Hungarian historian John Lukacs indicated more than twenty years ago, the two world wars are the mountain ranges of twentieth century history,¹ and the Japanese war is one part of the second of these conflicts. One would suggest, moreover, that the conventional western interpretation of the twentieth century is one that sees the First World War as the start of the twentieth century, which ended with the conclusion of the Cold War and the unravelling of the Soviet system and state between 1989 and 1991.

The assured way of changing History is to become an historian, and I would note that the war in the Pacific, between the United States and Japan, had its immediate origins in the Japanese occupation of Saigon and southern Indo-China in July 1941. But when did the resultant war end? I would suggest 30 April 1975 with the North Vietnamese capture of Saigon. And I would note one other matter, and that is the major wars of independence that were fought in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War were fought in European imperial possessions that had been lost to the Japanese in 1941-1942 — the East Indies, Indo-China and Malaya. And, of course, there was the small matter of the renewal of the Chinese civil war which was and remains the largest single war to have been fought since 1945.

I would remind you that today we almost as far from the Pearl Harbor attack as person in 1941 was from the end of the Shogunate, and I would suggest that with the passing of time a new view of history may well emerge, one that sees what we term the Second World War as two wars, the two most destructive wars, in a series of conflicts that lasted between July 1937 and November 1975, after which time virtually all the planet was governed by indigenous sovereign states, the Soviet system excepted. “The 38-years’ war” does not sound right, but what we are talking about is “The Wars of Empires and Nations, 1937-1975.” And, of course, the Japanese will date these proceedings from September 1931, so in fact we are talking about a 44-year war.

In terms of the legacy of the Japanese war I would suggest another development, namely the transposition of Hostility and Friendship. In July 1937 the relationship between Japan and the United States was decidedly difficult and over the next four years worsened. At the same time the relationship between China and the United States was one of friendship though this did not extend to much in the way of American help in facing Japanese aggression after this time. The relationship between Japan and the United States was one of hostility, between China and the United States one of friendship. Between 1941 and 1945 these respectively became relationships of enmity and the closeness of allies. But with the end of first the Pacific war and then the resumption of the Chinese civil war the relationships began to change. At this time a

defeated Japan was little more than a client state of the United States but in the aftermath of the San Francisco treaty and the emergence of Japan from the shadow of defeat the relationships reversed themselves: the relationship between China and the United States was one of hostility and the relationship between Japan and the United States was one of friendship. The hostility of Sino-American relations lessened with the passing of the years and the emergence of China as a major trading partner but relations between the two countries remain difficult while the relationship between Japan and the United States has deepened over the years. Friendship and Hostility changed sides in the aftermath of the Pacific war, and it is perhaps worth noting a parallel interpretation of events, and that is that America’s ability to shape matters lessened with victory as those differences checked by a common enemy re-asserted themselves with that enemy’s defeat. Allies are not necessarily friends, but I would suggest that Japan and the United States, over the passage of time, have become both allies and friends in a way and to an extent that would have seemed impossible before and during the Second World War.

Three other matters relating to the legacy of the Japanese war commend themselves as worthy of consideration at this point, and the first can be defined very simply and is not a subject of dispute. In the course of the Pacific war ownership of the Trident changed hands, and, unusually, ownership changed hands without the two parties involved fighting one another for its possession. Until Pearl Harbor, the greatest navy in the world was that of Britain. The inter-war limitation treaties had seen Britain and the United States placed on an equal footing but for reasons of history and prestige the British Navy still ruled the waves: the fact that Britain was at war after 1939 only reinforced her navy’s position, irrespective of the American Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act of June-July 1940. With Pearl Harbor, and notwithstanding American losses, the United States moved to a position of naval supremacy: her building programmes, and specifically her carrier building programmes, ensured that the British Navy would be reduced to secondary status: in a very obvious sense the Pacific war marked out the end of Britain as a global power. These points may be countered in terms of timing and detail but are basically beyond dispute and are reasonably well known if not always recognised in these terms, but less obvious is the answer to the question of which country was third in the naval pecking order by August 1945. The French and Italians both had battleships but very little else and of course there was the Soviet Navy, but one would suggest that Canada was the third-ranked naval power at this time.

The second matter, likewise, cannot be disputed but is seldom considered in such terms, and it was the simple fact that the Pacific war was a short war. I once read a 1943 British navy planning document which stated that the last war — that is the First World War — was by naval standards a short war. The First World War lasted four years and three months. The Pacific war lasted four years less three months. What is striking about this fact is historically great powers have not been defeated by sea power, which was the case in this conflict, and this involved the defeat of what was the fifth-ranked great power in so short a period and across an ocean. Historically, great powers have had to have been defeated on land, by armies, for a decision to be reached, but the American victory in this war was remarkable in terms of the relative shortness of the war and the fact that the war was prosecuted across thousands of miles of ocean. In terms of the latter only the Spanish destruction of the Aztec and Inca empires stand
comparison with the events and outcome of the Pacific conflict: the Seven Years’ War and British conquest of India 1757, Canada 1759, and the capture and occupation of Havana and Manila in 1761 really being the only other conflict that stands in comparison.

The third matter is more contentious because it comes complete with lasting bitterness. The Pacific war may have been a short war, and it may have been very unusual in terms of its being prosecuted across an ocean, but it was also, for a victorious United States, a cheap war. The Americans lost 106,000 dead in the course of the Pacific war and that, in terms of the cost of defeating the fifth-ranked power in the world, was remarkably cheap. This argument, however, is over-laid by two obvious considerations, namely the cost of defeat for Japan and the cost of the wars in east Asia and southeast Asia. The relatively low cost to the United States was the direct result of victorious sea power and the avoidance of continental warfare. The cost of war for China remains a subject of fierce debate—I have seen estimates that range between 9,400,000 and 20,000,000 Chinese service and civilian dead from all causes between July 1937 and August 1945, but whatever the figure it is overshadowed by the total of 27,000,000 dead—9,000,000 military dead, 6,000,000 prisoners killed in captivity and 12,000,000 civilian dead—suffered by the Soviet Union between 22 June 1941 and 12 May 1945, a total that represents 19,014 dead a day, every day, for 1,420 days. Put another way, in every week between June 1941 and May 1945 the Soviet Union lost more dead than the United States lost in the entire Pacific war. That was the cost of continental warfare fought on one’s own soil, which the United States was fortunate enough to avoid in this conflict though one would add one contemporary note. Industrialisation has made major wars shorter: great powers can make greater efforts than hitherto but the ability to sustain that effort over long periods has diminished. Major wars are getting shorter while casualties, as a result of the changes wrought by the Information Revolution, are now numbered in scores and hundreds, no longer hundreds of thousands.

Any examination of the Japanese war must address one matter, perhaps best summarised by Clausewitz:

The grandest and most decisive act of judgement which the statesman and general is called upon to make…is to correctly understand the nature of the war in which he is engaged and not to make it, or attempt to make it, something it is not or cannot be.

In a sense this comment explains every defeat, and every country has fought the wrong war at some time or another, but in the case of the Japanese war the Clausewitzian statement correctly summarises Japanese failure in two respects: first, the Japanese never understood

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4 These totals are taken from the Russian general staff estimate that formed part of President William Clinton’s speech in Normandy in June 1994. Also *Europe Asia Studies*, July 1994, Michael Ellman and S. Maksudov, *Soviet Dead in the Great Patriotic War*, give a total of 26,600,000 dead.
the force of nationalism other than their own, most obviously with respect to China and the United States, and, second, in seeking to make the war against the United States something it was not and could not be, the Japanese high command sought to dictate the terms of reference by which the war would be fought. Very seldom are the terms of reference of a war determined by one nation: there is, by the very nature of things, an inter-play between two sides, witness Afghanistan since 2001. In this war the United States made the fundamental mistake of thinking that she could fight as she wished and succeed where the Soviets, with considerable manpower, had failed.

Except, perhaps, in the very final stages of a war may one side hold the power of decision, but in the Japanese war two matters indicate the problem and dangers associated with that power. The first is the Japanese decision to begin the mobilisation of the Kaigun in June 1940, a process that would take eighteen months. Just what the Kaigun in June 1940 calculated would happen at the end of 1941 is something I have never been able to ascertain, but the fact was that the decision of June 1940 meant in effect that Japan could not stay mobilised into 1942. One assumes that the United States passing of the Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act in June-July 1940 was the major factor in Japanese calculations, presenting her with a go-now-or-never dilemma in July 1941, but herein is the second matter: the American embargo of July 1941 in effect presented Japan with this dilemma at the very time when the United States did not have the means of meeting a Japanese threat.

Thus far I have dealt with the legacy of war at the level of the state, and at this point I would turn to services. States wage wars, services fight and individuals see combat, and here one looks at the second of these and I would suggests that western societies, and specifically Britain and the United States, have one self-inflicted problem of defining the relationship between supremacy and victory. In naval terms I would suggest that much of the problem is Mahanian and stems from the Carlyle interpretation of history: history is the product of individuals—the Great Men account. But any consideration of British naval power suggests not individuals such as Howe, Rodney, Jervis and Nelson as the basis of victory but a systemic basis of supremacy that provided victory. Victory at sea was the product of supremacy and not a case of supremacy being the result of victories. British supremacy was based upon national superiority to enemies in terms of financial resources and economic strength plus advantages of geographical position, superiority of numbers and trained manpower.

In the case of the Pacific war American superiority resulted in twin manifestations: first, the Americans were able to fight the Japanese to a point of exhaustion that made itself obvious in the Guadalcanal campaign and then the moves into the central Solomons; second, the Americans built the equivalent of two fleets in the meantime. Less the latter point be doubted, in February 1945 the Americans had five carrier task groups committed to the raids on the Japanese home islands. These totalled 116 warships of which just two fleet carriers and two heavy cruisers had been in service on 7 December 1941. The basis of American victory was supremacy and specifically superiority of numbers, and to give one example of this

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supremacy: at Leyte Gulf in October 1944 the Americans had more destroyers and destroyer escorts – 178 — than the Japanese had carrier aircraft – 116. The battle still had to be fought and won, but the Americans waged war on the basis of numerical superiority which enabled them to bring potentially overwhelming and irresistible force to the point of contact.

From the time of Lincoln and Grant the United States waged war on the basis of mass, firepower and shock action made possible by superiority of manpower, position and industrial resources to her enemies. Herein the Second World War is possessed by many examples of what this means sufficient to note that what happened in this war was literally the industrialisation of war. The Americans built weaponry and trained manpower en masse and on a scale that before 1941 was all but unthinkable. The United States in this war raised but a hundred divisions but she supplied her allies with aid the cash value of which was sufficient to allow her to raise 2,000 infantry or 555 armoured divisions: at peak production American factories built an aircraft every 295 seconds, and in terms of her navy the United States between December 1941 and August 1945 commissioned seventeen fleet, nine light and 74 escort carriers, eight battleships, twelve heavy and 32 light cruisers, 338 destroyers, 416 escorts and 202 submarines, and these figures exclude units built for her allies. At the same time American building of auxiliary and merchant shipping reached some 13,500,000 tons in both 1943 and 1944, a remarkable achievement in light of the fact that between 1922 and 1937 the United States completed just two dry-cargo merchantmen. The point herein is that American yards were able to build fleet units, escort and minesweeping units and merchantmen and at the same time repair and refit, maintain and overhaul, fleet and escort units and merchantmen, i.e. U.S. yards were able to simultaneously undertake six separate efforts and to do so on a scale that was without precedence: the total of 2,751 liberty ships built between December 1941 and August 1945 represented roughly the size of the British merchant fleet in September 1939, and this was by some margin the greatest merchant fleet in the world.

Japan, by comparison, was able to commission into service no fewer than seven fleet and four light carriers, a very respectable effort, but the fact was that her production of other types of warship was decidedly modest — four escort carriers, two battleships and five light cruisers — and did not extended to destroyer, escort and merchant shipping production. Japan was able to produce 1,699,000 tons of shipping in 1944, which was more than half her total wartime production, but the basic point can be made very simply and without mindless recourse to statistics: Japan was a one-shot power that could not match American strength in depth. Japan could not handle more than two of the six shipbuilding tasks at any one time, and herein lies a point of obvious significance not in terms of Japan but the situation at the present time. In 1941 the Americans had the means and the time to meet not just American

but Allied needs, but in 1990, a mere fifteen years after the end of the Vietnamese war, the U.S. Navy had to go to no fewer than seven countries to meet its immediate needs, to make itself ready to meet the demands of a campaign in the Middle East. In terms of the constituent parts of sea power as defined historically - fighting fleets, escort forces, merchant and fishing fleets, shipbuilding industry and trained manpower — have in very large measure disappeared, perhaps most obviously with regard to Britain and the United States.

Looking back to the Pacific war one would note an obvious point — that this conflict saw the first large-scale genuinely tri-service undertakings though ironically the United States and Japan did not have independent air forces. Looking at the American undertakings in and after November 1943 the pattern is clear — the use of land-based air power to neutralise an objective, the use of naval power to isolate that objective and to put military forces ashore, the use of ground forces to secure the objective and bring air fields into service, and the repeat of the process in terms of the next advance to contact. By way of contrast, in the 1991 campaign against Iraq, army and naval forces operated in support of air power even though battleships were possessed of unprecedented range of fire and were able to engage targets as far inland as Baghdad.

A second point is no less obvious — the Pacific war saw a successful guerre de course, arguably the only successful guerre de course in history. It is very difficult to know where to start an examination of what is a somewhat neglected aspect of the Pacific war, but perhaps the most relevant is the Kaigun estimate made in mid-1941 that Japan could expect to lose 75,000 tons of shipping a month to all forms of enemy action.\(^\text{10}\) That proved to be the case in just seven months of the Pacific war — in December 1941 naturally enough and in January, February, April, June, July and September 1942, i.e. those months in which the Japanese held the initiative or when their enemies did not have the means to take the war to Japanese shipping on any significant scale.

But what seems to be overlooked in most accounts of the guerre de course is that before June 1944 the greater part of Japanese shipping losses were sustained not by the merchant fleet but by naval auxiliary shipping and army transports that between November 1942 and June 1944 were obliged to operate in sea areas increasingly controlled by the American enemy. But while most of these losses were inflicted by submarines and land-based aircraft, and the real destructive edge was provided in Operation HAILSTONE on 17 February 1944, which was the most destructive single day in naval history. On this day, at and off the base at Truk in the Carolines, three American carrier groups, with warships and submarines operating in support, accounted for nine warships of 32,257 tons and 26 naval auxiliaries, four army transports and two merchantmen of 196,641 tons. The crucial point herein is that in February 1944 total Japanese shipping losses numbered 112 auxiliaries, transports and merchantmen of 512,230 tons and this was the only calendar month during the Pacific war when overall losses exceeded half a million tons. Japanese losses eased somewhat after February 1944 but with the tide of war reaching the Philippines in September 1944 losses reached 122 auxiliaries, transports and

merchantmen, a total exceeded only in July 1945, by which time the average size of lost ships was 2,145 tons, less than half the size of lost ships in February 1944 (4,573 tons), such was the loss of quality shipping by 1945. Of the 123 merchantmen of 244,549 tons lost in July 1945 all but three were lost in Japanese home waters and the East China Sea, evidence that Japan had lost all semblance of strategic mobility by war’s end.11

By this time the American submarine had been displaced at the cutting edge of the American effort by mines and by shore-based aircraft while by tonnage carrier aircraft accounted for three quarters of the warship tonnage sunk in the war’s final phase between 1 April and 15 August 1945 (52 warships of 227,827 tons of totals of 140 warships of 299,208 tons).12 In this final phase for all practical purposes the Imperial Navy ceased to exist as the Americans overwhelmed Japanese defences with Operation STARVATION, which was the mining of home waters. In this final phase mines accounted for at least 162 auxiliaries, transports and merchantmen (of 287,461 tons), which represented 39.41% by numbers and 35.80% by tonnage of all Japanese losses in home waters.13 Japan, very literally, was on her beam ends by July 1945 and as was subsequently admitted could not have continued the war into 1946. As it was what happened to Japanese shipping very closely accorded with the predictions made by the Institute for Total War Studies on 27 August 1941. It had predicted that by the end of 1943 Japan’s shipping situation would have become very difficult and by the end of 1944 Japan would have reached the point at which she would no longer be able to wage war effectively. What the Institute could not predict, of course, was the American development and use of the atomic bomb, but it did foresee the Soviet entry into the war as the latter reached its final stage.14 As it was the United States could have defeated Japan in a naval campaign that left her merchant fleet untouched or she could have defeated Japan by a guerre de course that left the Kaigun untouched. In the event she destroyed both the Kaigun and the merchant fleet, such was the reality of total war, which Japan as a state and the Kaigun as a service had never anticipated.

But if Japan and the Kaigun were guilty of never anticipating the situation in which they found themselves then they were in good company because there were changes in the conduct of operations between 1941 and 1945 that no one in 1941 could have anticipated. At sea the U.S. Navy in 1941-1942 learnt a basic lesson that “the-more-you-use-the-less-you-lose,” and between November 1943 and October 1944 in which time American forces secured Eniwetok, raided Truk and Koror, secured Saipan, won the battle of the Philippine Sea and conducted operations off and over the Philippines, the U.S. Navy lost just two fleet units, a destroyer and a destroyer escort, to all forms of Japanese action,15 such was the new-found invulnerability of mass and Japanese ineffectiveness. In 1945 American carriers in operations against the

11 The Japanese losses are the author’s own calculations based upon figures taken from The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II. A Graphic Presentation of the Japanese Naval Organization and List of Combatant and Non-Combatant Vessels Lost or Damaged in the War.
13 Ibid., pp. 514-515.
14 Tohmatsu and Willmott, A Gathering Darkness, pp. 98-100.
Japanese home islands in effect mounted combat air patrols over Japanese airfields\textsuperscript{16} while in the last stages of the war the Americans mounted raids by fighter aircraft that were escorted by B-29 heavy bombers.\textsuperscript{17} And finally, in the very last days of the war, the Soviets put together an offensive that saw a tank army conduct a 900-km. advance—the equivalent of an advance from Caen in Normandy to Milan in Italy via Lyons,\textsuperscript{18} and over comparable ground—and from a start-line some 480-km. from the nearest railhead, in just eleven days. These latter developments were all but unimaginable even in 1943.

The penultimate service matter I would place before you relates to the deliberate misreading of situations in which services—and nations—find themselves. The basis of service analysis is the appreciation of the situation in which services and nations find themselves: the process, in English, is called their “appreciating the situation.” But services come equipped with a “can-do” attitude and states similarly assume capability in dealing with the situation in which they find themselves. This often results not in their “appreciating the situation” but their “situating the appreciation” whereby the evidence is arranged to support pre-determined conclusions. All great powers have fought the wrong war at the wrong time and have been worsted in conflicts that they either should have won with ease or avoided, but the Japanese record in this respect in the inter-war period and specifically in 1939-1941 really is in a class of its own. The assumption that a \textit{guerre de course} would result in Britain’s defeat whereas Japan would not be so defeated; the calculations involving anticipated shipping losses and building capacity; the assumption that Japan could determine the terms of reference of a Pacific war; the various assumptions about American weaknesses: all these point to the services and with them the Japanese state made calculations flawed in every way. The different outcomes of the campaigns against shipping need no elaboration; as noted earlier, the calculation of maximum losses of 75,000 tons of shipping a month was realised in just seven months of the war\textsuperscript{19} while the calculation that Japan could build 900,000 tons of new shipping per year was reached in 1943 and 1944 but only at a cost of growing numbers of ships out of service; the terms of reference of the Pacific war were not Japan’s to determine: all these matters represent fundamental error in understanding the situation in which Japan, state and services, found themselves in 1940-1941. In terms of the latter perhaps one point may be mentioned. The Japanese planned to fight a defensive war in the islands of the central and southwest Pacific, the \textit{Kaigun}’s calculation being that a series of mutually-supporting bases could be backed by the fleet with the result that the enemy could be fought to the point of exhaustion. This, indeed, is what happened, most obviously at Guadalcanal, but it was the Americans that put it into effect.

The last service matter I would raise is perhaps the greatest single advantage that the Allies commanded at Japanese expense after April 1942, and that was Intelligence. The ability


\textsuperscript{17} General Curtis E. LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor, \textit{Mission with LeMay. My Story}, p. 374.

\textsuperscript{18} In Japanese terms from Shimonoseki to Tokyo. Willmott, \textit{The Great Crusade}, pp. 466-470.

\textsuperscript{19} Willmott, \textit{The Last Century of Sea Power}, Volume 2, pp. 459-460.
to read Japanese signals provided incalculable advantage reference the battles in the Coral Sea and off Midway in 1942, and continued to the end of the war, as the sinking of the heavy cruiser *Haguro* in the Indian Ocean in May 1945 proved, and the basic point is simple enough: the Japanese lost their intelligence sources with the outbreak of war while their enemies fought on land and at sea on the basis of massive advantage, in large measure because Japanese security was wholly inadequate. In this matter the Japanese were in the good company of their German associates.

To summarise, and to borrow a saying: tactics and weapons change but within relatively small limits strategy, men and geography do not. The seas that remain to this day so vital to Japan are those same seas where defeat manifested itself in 1944-1945 while ashore Japan is still faced by those same peoples that she faced at that time albeit in different guises: China, the Koreas and Russia have all undergone fundamental change yet they remain tied to difficult relationships with Japan. For Japan, too, there has been fundamental change. The Japan that fought the Second World War was Japan the Taliban.20 This definition is given with no pejorative intimation but is provided in terms of the phenomenon that may be defined as a turning of a collective back on western values, a return to a very selective view of Japan’s historic values and history, and a recourse to armed struggle alongside a belief in force as the means of forging a distinctive national identity and ensuring national liberation. Thus war was the means whereby discipline could be imposed upon society, and, in a self-fulfilling manner, this discipline was the basis of the moral advantage — *yamato damashii* — that would ensure victory. But what happened to both Germany and Japan after 1945 produced something that was very different.

When enemies meet in the heart of one’s country then there is something very wrong with one’s system. The atomic bombs, the surrender in the *Missouri* and the occupation to which Japan was subjected necessarily meant that what may be termed an aggressive ultra-nationalist and military determinism had been found wanting and Japan as a nation and as a people had to go back to basics in order to deal with released energies and forces without fear of prosecution and discrimination. The positive elements in Japanese ethos came to the fore as they ultimately did in Russia and even in China where it would seem that the worst oppressive brands of communist absolutism have been excommunicated. Since 1945, in the on-going continuous conflict between freedom and determinist creeds, one implication of the Pacific war would seem to be that in this war Lincoln won a significant victory over Hegel: freedom, the product of democratic liberalism, prevailed over determinist absolutism.

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20 This title was first employed in Tohmatsu and Willmott, *A Gathering Darkness*, pp. 1-24.