

## **Total War and Japan: Reality and Limitation of the Establishment of Japanese Total War System**

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### **Introduction: Impact of the Total War and Response of Japan**

#### (1) The First World War as total war

The First World War (1914-1918) as total war has brought significant changes to the traditional form of war. Traditional war was waged between regular military forces (Cabinet War) and there was a certain border between the battlefield and the home front. However, after World War I, that border has become ambiguous due to the appearance of modern weapons. Such a form of war is called total war.

That is to say, modern weapons such as aircraft, tanks and submarines appeared on the scene on a full scale and battlefields that had been limited to the ground and the surface of the sea extended into the air and the sea. Although the appearance of modern weapons is an achievement of modern technologies, war has caused enormous human and physical damages that are not comparable to those caused by traditional war. The expansion of battlefields and worsened damages were predicted to further accelerate in future war.

Total war is characterized by mass mobilization, mass consumption and mass destruction so that mobilization is inevitable not only in the military field but also various fields such as economy, education, thought, mentality and culture. It is possible, therefore, to call a state that establishes a mobilization system to deal with total war as a "total war state." It was Leon Daudet (1869-1942) of the Action française, French royalist, who proposed such a theory of a total war system for the first time. He argued that World War I was actually fought as total war and released a book entitled *La guerre totale* (The Total War) in 1918 when the war ended.

Daudet argued in the book that World War I was different from traditional wars and that its impact would spread to various fields such as politics, economy, industry, intellect, commerce and finance and would reach all the states and people. It was German General Erich Ludendorff (Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff, 1864-1937) who familiarized the public with the theory of total war the most based on the argument of Daudet. Ludendorff wrote *Der totale Krieg* (Total War) in 1935 and advocated the necessity of mass mobilization of military forces by complete universal conscription.

#### (2) Characteristics of total war theory

The characteristics of total war are summarized in three aspects: changes of characters of military war,

increased importance of economic and industrial mobilization and necessity of mental and ideological mobilization. In military war, there are two strategies: an annihilation strategy whose purpose is to annihilate enemies and the exhaustion strategy whose purpose is to force enemies to exhaust its national strength including the military power. In the former case, the aim would be to achieve results in a short decisive battle and active operations are deployed from the very beginning of the war by intensively mobilizing forces and supplies in large quantity in order to achieve that aim. It is constantly required to possess a load of forces and stockpile strategic goods and resources from peacetime and to extend the limit of military service and to an increase in the military budget. Concerning weapons, an aggressive and frontal equipment system is mainly secured. This is a strategy chosen by countries with limited natural resources such as Japan and Germany.

On the other hand, in the case of the exhaustion strategy, exhaustion of military resources of enemies is the first goal and mobilization of forces is kept to the minimum in the very beginning of war in order to save military capabilities until the time for a decisive battle. Therefore, a long battle is designed as much as possible. Strategic goods are stockpiled moderately and the choice that puts pressure on private demand is avoided. This strategy is adopted by countries that have advantage in terms of capital and technology such as the U.S., the U.K. and France.

Moreover, the increased importance in economic and industrial mobilization imposed a substantial burden on the Japanese industrial structure that was inferior in capital accumulation and technological level to western advanced countries. Limited capital, technology and human resources in Japan were turned into economic and industrial mobilization. This helped the military sector to be reinforced, but the private sector fell behind further. In addition, concerning mental and ideological mobilization, excessive military education and thoughts were introduced to the classroom and this resulted in rigid education. At the same time, free speech and activities were limited to a certain extent. As the war-time system had been put in place, this caused stagnation and blinkered Japanese society.

As I explained, there arise relatively wide gaps in the recognition on the total war theory, a method of establishing the total war system and its content depending on conditions of each state at the stage of total war. Such characteristics of military war were concreted very clearly in the Second World War which was waged as a more complete total war. Japan and Germany had looked for a way for an active all-out system with the aim of establishing a total war state from the late 1920's to the early 1930's, and ultimately set out on the path to a total war state of a short-term decisive battle type with a view to establishing a national general mobilization system by the initiative of the military.

### (3) Impact of total war and preparation of Japan for total war

The interest of the Japanese people in World War I was relatively low. On the other hand, the form of

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World War I had a strong impact on major leaders in the government and quite a few started to have deepened their sense of crisis.

As an example, in order to prepare for war in the future, Aritomo Yamagata, one of the most powerful political leaders at that time, said: “we had no choice other than to mobilize all nationals, fully utilizing the resources of the state, and in other words dissolving the class system and then relying on the power of a united nation.”<sup>1</sup> Tsuyoshi Inukai, a famous proponent of party politics who was respected as god of universal suffrage, expounded at the Nationalist Party Conference in January 1918 that: “All Japanese males are soldiers. All factories are engaged in military industry.”<sup>2</sup> Among the Imperial Japanese Army, early on Kazushige Ugaki started planning measures for total war with Giichi Tanaka. He also understood precisely the essence of total war as he commented: “What will decide the outcome of war in the future is a state’s full-force impact and deployment logistics, in addition to combat and operational tactics.”<sup>3</sup>

Among figures of national authority, it was a group of reformist Imperial Army officers, later collectively called the “Tosei-ha” (Control Faction), who systematically executed the measures for total war. In particular, on 27 December, 1915, after the outbreak of World War I, they established a special military investigation committee, and put financial and human resources into ascertaining and examining the war situation and the war-time systems of the states involved.

Its reports were featured in booklets such as *Kaigai Sakenja Hokoku (Reports of the Overseas Envoy)* and *Rinji Gunji Chosa I'inkai Geppo (Monthly Bulletin of the Special Military Investigation Committee)*. Subsequently, as the outcomes of research conducted by the Imperial Japanese Army, “The Need for a Whole Nation Mobilization Plan” (the General Staff Office, September 1917), “Empire Defense Resources” (the General Office Staff, August 1917), and “Ideas on a Whole Nation Mobilization” (the Special Military Investigation Committee, May 1920) were also issued successively. The preparation for the construction of a total-war system steadily proceeded with that.<sup>4</sup>

After the end of World War I, democracy and a self-determination movement became a worldwide trend. In those days, party politics also became active in Japan. Under such conditions it became inevitable to balance the idea of democracy and the democratic system with Japan’s measures for total war. In other words, in what fashion to adjust and balance the repletion of democracy and the construction of the total-war system, which appeared to conflict with one other on the surface, strongly

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<sup>1</sup> Soho Tokutomi, ed., *Koshaku Yamagata Aritomo Den (The Life of Duke Aritomo Yamagata)*, Vol. 3 (Hara Shobo, 1969), p. 1188.

<sup>2</sup> Yoshinao Washio, *Inukai Bokudo Den (The Life of Bokudo Inukai)*, Vol. 2 (Hara Shobo, 1968), p. 406.

<sup>3</sup> Revised by Jun Tsunota, *Kazushige Ugaki*, Vol.1 (Misuzu Shobo, 1970), p. 327.

<sup>4</sup> The above-mentioned principal reports are contained at the end of the author’s book *Soryokausen Taisei Kenkyu: Nihon Rikugun no Kokkasodoin Koso (Study on Total War System: National Mobilization Scheme of the Japanese Army)* (first edition: San’ichi Shobo, 1981, new edition: Shakaihyoronsha, 2010).

influenced the form of Japanese measures for total war.

During the time between the enactment of the “Military Industry Mobilization Law” (1918), the starting point for legal adjustments, and that of the “Whole Nation Mobilization Law” (1938), they sometimes needed to fundamentally reconsider the relationship between the military and industry. In the process of adjustment and balance, the military and industry parties confronted one another and then compromised, in repeated cycles. During the period of the Hara Cabinet, they actually established the Kokusei-in (National Census Bureau) in 1920. This was the actual start for full-scale national mobilization, and it ultimately developed into the Kikaku-in (National Policy Planning Bureau). However, it would be better to say that the adjustment among the three parties of party politicians, military officers

In the process of creating measures for total war, the complicated civil-military relation unfolded, and they couldn’t resolve conflicts until the end of the Pacific War. In the end, they were never able to construct a Japanese model of the total-war system. The primary reason was that attribute of the Japanese state-structure of having multiple authority figures: they could not fully adjust their own interests among themselves, although the total war system was a need of the state as well as for the people. In other words, the state-structure of Japan, with multiple powerful stakeholders, turned into an element that was a critical obstacle to the construction of a total-war system.

To articulate the process of creating measures for total war, the author points out the conflicts that occurred in the process; thus it is then possible to examine the essence of Japan as a state. Additionally, the author makes the conclusion that the Japanese model of a total-war system was highly deficient, even in comparison with those of Europe and the United States.

## **1. Reality of the Japanese Total War System: Process of Development of Laws and Scheme of Total War State Establishment**

### **(1) Preparation of Japan for total war**

After World War I ended, the Japanese government came to think that a form of future war was no doubt going to be more thorough total war based on the investigation results of the Army and the Navy. Therefore, it started to develop laws on a full scale toward the establishment of the total war system. The Munitions Industries Mobilization Act (Act No. 38) enacted in March 1918, the year in which World War I ended, was a starting point.

The act was to provide different munitions industries with protection and promotion for scarce resources by clarifying various resources required in wartime from peacetime and to establish a system that was capable of responding to wartime immediately by enhancing those industries. This was different

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from a requisition order whose purpose was to force industries to donate various resources owned by them, because its purpose was to encourage industries to donate various resources expected to be necessary in wartime. It was the development of laws in another dimension compared to traditional mobilization and impressment.

A course toward the establishment of the total war system pioneered by the Munitions Industries Mobilization Act was concretized by the establishment of the Munitions Bureau in May 1918 that supervised matters related to the enforcement of the Act under the control of the cabinet. The president of the Munitions Bureau was the Prime Minister and vice ministers of the Army and the Navy also served as vice ministers of munitions. In addition, human resources were assembled from all ministries and agencies. Although the Munitions Bureau was a comprehensive organization of parties concerned from all ministries and agencies, 10 military personnel were its member in the beginning and the preparation for full-scale mobilization of munitions industries led in reality by the military started on a full scale.

The total war system is a political system for dealing with total war and is intended to be established even in peacetime. The change of form of war to total war leaves no choice but to align a state system with a total war approach particularly in the case of states with relatively low national endurance against a long-drawn-out war such as Japan and Germany.

The preparation for mobilization was sketched out from the 1920's based on such a point of view and organizations for mobilization were established one after another. The interest in securing and mobilizing human resources was the most important target in the process of establishing the total war system and various approaches were suggested. The Resources Bureau established under the Cabinet in May 1927 was a starting point. The bureau viewed humans as resources in terms of concept and the slogan of "mobilization of human resources" and policies for it were developed.

Such a movement became more active in the 1930's and the 1940's. The appendix of my book *Soryokusen Taisei Kenkyu: Nippon Rikugun no Kokkasodoin Koso* (Study on Total War System: The National Mobilization Scheme of the Japanese Army)<sup>5</sup> contains the point related to this movement. For example, "Opinions on the National General Mobilization" drawn up by the Special Military Investigation Board in May 1920 is a document of extreme importance. It cites public mobilization first as what constitutes national general mobilization followed by the industrial mobilization, transportation mobilization, financial mobilization and other mobilization. In this document which was positioned as a basic document of the subsequent total war system, public mobilization was later understood as human resources. The public is clarified as a target concept of mobilization.

In other words, a society where goods and humans are homogenized under the concept of resources

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<sup>5</sup> See pp. 213-244 of the first edition (San'ichi Shobo, 1981) and pp. 224-255 of the new edition (Shakai Hyoronsha, 2010).

is a total war system and works for systematizing that society at a national level is a process of establishing the national general mobilization system.

Actually, for the total war system as a political and economic system whose biggest goal is national general mobilization as a national policy, the theory of public mobilization and the theory of human resources mobilization per se are its goal. The recognition of viewing human beings as one of resources is the fundamental thought that supports the total war system. Total war theories based on a variety of approaches were presented in the 1920's and the 1930's. The controversy over methodology of how humans are turned into a resource was a common issue in those theories.

## (2) Toward the enactment of the National General Mobilization Act

As a central organization in charge of duties for mobilization led by the military was established, the Army has decided to establish the Engineering Division, Ordnance Bureau in the Ministry of the Army in charge of works for formulating an annual Army plan for munitions industry mobilization. The National Statistics Bureau was established as a central control organization for munitions industry mobilization by the Friends of Constitutional Government cabinet led by the President Takashi Hara in May 1920 in an extension of those movements. The Munitions Bureau and the Statistics Bureau were integrated into the National Statistics Bureau for the purpose of developing and reinforcing governmental organizations related to industrial mobilization.

However, the government decided to dismantle the National Statistics Bureau in October 1922 under pressure from international opinion of disarmament symbolized by the Washington Naval Treaty based on the momentum of antiwar and peace that came into fashion as an international trend after World War I and from public opinion requiring administrative and financial streamlining as part of the tight fiscal policy due to the recession after the economic boom that lasted for a while after World War I.

Under such circumstance, the government had to postpone policies premised on the establishment of the total war system. In addition, as the influence of the Great Depression in the late 1920's started to reach Japan, it became more difficult to pursue the movement of establishing the total war system. Nevertheless, the Army had enhanced the Engineering Division under the Munitions Bureau as its industrial mobilization organization and steadily implemented the industrial mobilization plan since FY1920. As a result, in May 1927, the Resources Bureau was established as an organization for handling central managing duties and consultations in order to prepare for the control and operation of resources supplied according to the general mobilization system under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister. Duties related to national general mobilization was brought back on track. Nearly half of the Resources Bureau, same as the National Statistics Bureau consisting of active military officers of the Army and the Navy and it was basically an organization in charge of duties related to general mobilization led by the military.

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In a series of repeated establishment and dismantlement of organizations for national general mobilization, a notification on general mobilization (March 1930) was issued to departments concerned in the name of the commissioner of the Resources Bureau under the initiative of the Japanese Army at the time before and after the Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931. Then the General Mobilization Planning Meeting was convened to initiate specific works for designing a general mobilization plan. Twenty personnel including Hajime Sugiyama, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, participated in this planning from the Army.

Such movements became more active through the Manchurian Incident and resulted in the establishments of the Planning Agency (May 1937) and the Planning Bureau (October 1937). The general mobilization plan was drawn up steadily. Then, the National General Mobilization Act was enacted in April 1938 and a legal basis for military mobilization and national general mobilization was prepared.

The repeated establishment of organizations in charge of general mobilization and the development of laws had advanced and the establishment of Japanese total war system was pushed forward. Of course, it is not possible to make an assertion that such movements directly meant the formation of a total war state. However, there was no doubt that with keen awareness of total war, the creation of Japanese state was planned and executed in the process of preparing for total war.

### **2. Preparation for Total Wars under *Taisho* Democracy: Background of its Limitation**

#### (1) Preparation for total war in the age of *Taisho* democracy (1910's - 1920's)

Submarines, aircraft, tanks and toxic gas weapons appeared in battlefields of World War I due to the fast development of modern military technology. In addition, while battlefields used to be limited to the ground and the surface of the sea, new ones appeared undersea and in the air during World War I. The border between the battlefield and the home front gradually started to disappear because of rapid expansion of war areas and spaces. War was not far from the reality anymore for the people and was exposed to a risk that their living space might turn into a battlefield anytime.

The characteristics of World War I are the appearance of modern weapons with killing power that did not exist in the past and the expansion of battlefields, which caused enormous damage. At the same time, there appeared a social structure in which a great number of people were forced to participate in wars in some way with their full strength, because a form of war changed to a form of total war. Such structure was the biggest factor of causing unprecedented disastrous damages. In order not to experience the disaster of war again, the trend of democracy came into fashion worldwide. The total war of World War I moved democracy to a major trend in the world.

The origin of democracy may be traced back to the age of the French Revolution, but World War I was a moment when democracy was recognized as a very important system or thought at a worldwide level. The idea that it is impossible, unless *demos* (people) and *kratia* (power) which are the root of democracy are activated worldwide, to prevent a battle for supremacy by a group of nations that seek supremacy spread.

On the other hand, however, this democracy was reaffirmed as an essential factor for establishing the total war system in the age of total war. That is to say, in the world after World War I, it became inevitable to introduce a new system or thought that was capable of responding to total war no matter what type of political system might be adopted.

Taking a concept of modernization for example, as it became necessary to establish and expand a system related to the development, production and deployment of the new weapon system that appeared during World War I, the weight of the concept that regarded modernization as technology and capabilities of producing a large quantity of weapons and ammunition had increased. Therefore, a technology prioritized system (technocracy) emerged and it became a thought taking precedence over everything. Furthermore, as the total war resulted in enormous human cost, this urged an increased size of human mobilization in the battlefields and the home front.

The two issues of scientificism and human mobilization became the key of response to total war. The role of states expanded to ensure technocracy. In addition, not coercive power but the bottom-up public initiative became important to smoothly promote human mobilization. To that end, raising of interests in technological innovation and development and the democratization of human mobilization were to become a premise. In total war, Japan was originally inferior to Western countries in terms of both capital and technology so that the mobilization of human resources was expected to be strongly required for reinforcing the national strength. For that reason, the framework of the total war system was established as one human mobilization system.

The motivation for driving particularly the mobilization of human resources for total war should be considered. That has to be awareness that can be shared by the public from both internal and external factors, and it is easy if the public are interested in the response to total war and support it. However, the thing is not that simple so that it is necessary to strongly appeal to equality in the appearance of total war society in the process of establishing of the total war system. In any case, the change of state regime to a total war system as an internal issue became an urgent issue after World War I.

Another external factor is that it was necessary for Japan to gain supremacy in mainland China and the Southern Ocean areas such as Indonesia as supply centers of resources to satisfy own needs (Autarkie), because a large quantity of physical resources was to be consumed in total war. The orientation toward self-sufficiency to secure a physical base of the total war system had strengthened a

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point of view of regarding mainland China and the southern area as resources and markets. Its final destination was the wars of Japan against Asia in the 1920's and the 1930's.

(2) Total war system and democracy

Did the power of democracy that became a global trend after World War I exercise in a large way in the establishment of a total war state or a total war society? This issue has attracted a particular attention of people including the author in the study on total war in Japan and is now a subject of discussions. As mentioned earlier, democracy is premised on the expression of desires of the public to actively play an own role in order to realize national, social or individual growth and happiness as energy and motivation.

The public collectively collaborates by forming organizations such as political parties and labor unions, and strive to realize such a goal. In fact, such energy and motivation expanded to the world after World War I. In Japan, the party cabinet under Takashi Hara appeared in 1918. The Universal Manhood Suffrage Act realized in 1925 was based on the same type of desire. On the other hand, in Korea that was under the control of colonial administration by Japan, the March 1 Incident that occurred in March 1919. In such a circumstance, democracy actually played a role in establishing the total war system.

The total war system cannot be realized only by a handful of military personnel, bureaucrats and politicians. Rather, it depends on how much the public shows interest in and understanding on the total war system and strives to actively participate in mobilization. The development and enhancement of organizations such as political parties and labor unions that realize so to speak *demokra* (democracy) were extremely important in nurturing such public. In brief, the time of democracy and the time of total war commenced almost at the same moment.

At a glance, it may sound strange that democracy and a total war thought had actually built up a collaborative relation, although they had contradictory aspects. One needs to understand here that a domestic political system that is capable of responding to war at any time can avoid national crisis in the age of total war. At the same time, the total war system is prepared and established in various forms as a national strategy for stabilizing the domestic political order under the excuse of national crisis prevention and crisis management.

In other words, troops should be kept ready at all times even if there is no war. Even if war did not initiate, it is planned to diffuse the consciousness of national defense and the thought of nationalism by creating the condition where a state is always ready for waging a war. The distinction between wartime and peacetime disappears by converting peacetime into wartime and vice versa.

## **Conclusion: Total War System and Pluralistic Federation Japan**

### (1) A fascism system and a total war system

Before concluding this article, let us touch on the correlation between the fascism system and the total war system, which has always been the author's challenge, although it partially overlaps with the points mentioned above.

According to textbooks, the reasons for the emergency of fascism in Europe after World War I are the stalemated capitalist system that had rapidly developed and the appearance of questions and contradictions with regard to the capitalist system revealed by the emergence of a socialist state, the Soviet Union. Those problems coupled with internal contradictions each state had caused internal conflicts. This is why so-called fascism movements and fascism parties that advocated the necessity of overcoming various contradictions and being united under a nation across the difference of races and social classes appeared one after another.

In 1922, the emergence of the fascist regime by the march into Roma by Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) became a turning point and then Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (1892-1975) of Spain, Antonio Salazar (1889-1970) of Portugal and Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) succeeded in establishing a fascist system. In addition, fascist parties and fascists such as the Action Française (French royalist) in France and Oswald Mosley (1896-1980) in the United Kingdom were dominant also in western countries, although they could not take the reins.

The thought of fascism is summarized by the expression, for example, in a famous speech given by Mussolini on October 28, 1925. He said, "Everything shall be under the control of the state. No one shall be outside the state nor oppose the state" (*Tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato, nulla contro lo Stato*). "Everything shall be under the control of the state" meant that a state came ahead of social classes and races and a state in which all the people were homogenized under the state power was intended.

Such a state ideology of fascism had gradually started to appear in Asian, particularly in Japan. In the case of Japan, Japanese fascism was formed through the function of the absolute being called the emperor system as a vehicle to integrate all the people at a mental level and a constitutional level. It was a time when the theory of describing the emperor system by the term fascism was dominant.<sup>6</sup>

However, fascism in Germany and Italy was defined as "bottom-up fascism" (in terms of Masao Maruyama). It was because, particularly in the case of Germany, the fascism party which was a fruit of voluntary and subjective movements of the public was born through legal procedures of election. A

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<sup>6</sup> In order to understand those discussions on Japanese fascism, see Rekishi Kagaku Kyogikai (The Association of Historical Sciences), ed. (edited and commented by Keiichi Eguchi), *Rekishi Kagaku Taikei, Dai 12 kan: Nihon Fasizumu Ron (Historical Sciences, Vol.12: On the Japanese Fascism)* (Azekura Shobo, 1977).

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number of questions have been asked to such definition. That is to say, there is a theory that denies the establishment of fascism in Japan, because Japanese fascism was not established through legal procedures by the public as in the case of Germany. The controversy over Japanese fascism has been discussed in various ways based on contradictory opinions of Marxists and anti-Marxists.

In a sense, an angle of analysis based on the theory of total war system has been required as a system from a different point of view to those contradictory points in question. The above-mentioned speech by Mussolini may be understood as a suggestion of total war system not just fascism system in that he appealed the establishment of a stable and robust political community across the differences of social classes and races. In that context, the socialism/communist system can be understood as a kind of a total war system, because it is a dictatorial system in which there is only one class.<sup>7</sup>

After all, if a system intends to mobilize and unite the people by a state regardless of whether it was with a top-down iron hand or by a bottom-up conciliatory approach, such a system may be categorized by the term “total war system.” It would be important to point out risk and problems of such a system by actively questioning its significance.

It is a widely-known fact that Mussolini was an activist from the Italian Socialist Party and strongly influenced by Marxism and Syndicalism and that he was committed to Georges Sorel (1874-1922), a philosopher of revolutionary Syndicalism. In addition, a political style of Nazism owed much to the propaganda of the Soviet socialism and the communist party, as Hanna Arendt (1906-1975) pointed out a similarity between Nazism and Stalinism and maintained that Italian Fascism, German Nazism and Soviet Stalinism were “twin totalitarianism.”<sup>8</sup> That means that the three systems are the same political system in nature.

Although one can point out a number of issues in comparative discussions on commonality and similarity, the issue here is a comparative discussion of fascism and the total war system. To deliberate on

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<sup>7</sup> Concerning the connection between the total war system and the fascism system, in a recent study by Ken'ichi Arakawa entitled *Senji Keizaitaisei no Koso to Tenkai: Nihon Rikukaigun no Keizaishiteki Bunseki (The Concept and Development of Wartime Economic System: Economic Historical Analysis of the Japanese Army and Navy)* (Iwanami Shoten, 2011), *Soryokusen Taisei Kenkyu (Study on Total War System)* by Koketsu is put on the table for discussion and he points out that “the purport of Atsushi Koketsu is that the establishment of the total war system is a factor of changing the prewar social system into fascism and that the entire process of establishing the total war system is thus called as Japanese fascism (a nationalism movement with an irrational system of thought) (p.16, note 4). He criticizes that “Koketsu moves his discussion forward on the premise that fascism is irrational” (p.16, note 8). It is true that the author discussed on the premise that the Japanese total war system was basically Japanese fascism in his book published thirty years ago. Although the author emphasized the unity of relation between the two systems in his book, he did not mention their interrelation sufficiently. The author would like to venture to say that he now argues the course toward the establishment of the total war system as a background that promoted the formation of Japanese fascism from a point of view of coordination and integration of democracy and fascism.

<sup>8</sup> *Zentaishugi no Kigen (Origin of Totalitarianism)*, 1951, publication of translated version into Japanese by Misuzu Shobo in 1972.

that issue, one needs to ask what the support base of the total war system is. There are two reasons for asking that question.

The first is that political systems that can be regarded as a total war system have actually been born even after the Second World War. For example, a number of military and authoritarian regimes emerged such as military and authoritarian regimes represented by the Park Chung-hee (1917-1979) regime of South Korea and the Jiang Jieshi (1887-1975) regime of Taiwan in the 1950's and military regimes appeared in various countries in South America such as the Juan Domingo Peron (1895-1974) regime and the Augusto Pinochet (1915-2006) regime. While these regimes contained the request for domestic democratization by physical violence, they aggressively pushed forward policies for modernization at the national initiative. This is a political system called developmental dictatorship.

These regimes may be called as modern fascism. More than that, they pushed forward policies that gave national development the first priority at high costs by hiding the request for domestic democracy and contradictions based on the excessive supremacy of nationalism and succeeded in achieving certain economic development and forming a large middle class (white color class). The middle class formed in that process became the support base of the total war system.

Although there is no need to take examples of those countries, the total war system in prewar Japan and the postwar total war system in the postwar reform period and the economic reconstruction period no doubt promoted economic development. As a result the large middle class not comparable to prewar times was formed and it is said that "all Japanese belong to the middle class." This has inevitably created a structure in which the people have middle-class mentality and are indifferent to their own social class or position. This is actually what the total war system intends.

The second issue to be challenged is directly and indirectly related to the above-mentioned point. A kind of propaganda in which a total war system is a function to promote equalization and homogenization by neutralizing a variety of differences and disparities each individual who constitutes the society naturally has sharply spurred the people's consciousness. A national crisis such as war is tactfully replaced with a public crisis and the political system in which the people are driven into war for the purpose of and reason for risk management is established. When the people are mobilized for a common national issue such as war in an integrated manner whether it is waged abroad or domestically, the differences of social classes and positions are dissolved.

For example, the differences of origins and backgrounds are dissolved when persons are inducted into the army and sent to battlefields. It was certainly evident in the army life but the Japanese people who were put into the wartime regime were converted into fictitious soldiers while the state was turned into a fictitious battlefield. In summary, the total war system can be understood as a nationalism-oriented society that disables differences of individuals and converts them into objects that constitute the state in

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the name of victory in war and economic development.

(2) Today's issue of study on a total war system

What are issues of today's study on the total war system? I believe that there are at least the following two issues.

The first issue is that if there is any possibility that the modern total war system becomes further dominant, it is necessary to doubt the reality of modern democracy in order to prevent it. Although democracy is an important thought and system that relativize the existing power, at the same time it often results in a tool for mobilizing the public. The United States has employed a method of resorting to wars one after another in the name of saving democracy. This American way gives us an impression that democracy has been brought down to nothing but a thought for mobilizing the public.

The second issue is to overcome the false egalitarianism that is said to be created by the total war system, although it has been discussed including its merits and demerits in the modern study on the total war system. In false egalitarianism, the people's consciousness is unified. The reality is spreading in our society where a variety of social contradictions are hidden under this false egalitarianism and incorporated into the total war system on which modern look is put.

On the other hand, the reality of a society under a total war system, that is a total war society, is that the young generation in Japan that publicly states that our hope is war due to an underlying sense of stagnation in the society and the existence of many people who are effectively ousted from the society are mixed. In that sense, one has to accept subjectively that a total war society plays a role as a tool for hiding a variety of contradictions and problems.

One should not secure his position first by taking free ride on goals presented by the state. Rather, each of us has to answer the question that how much space one can secure in the future for being independent from the state and power, maintaining autonomy and acting freely. Unless one keeps asking this question, he has no choice but to be incorporated into the total war system or total war society characterized by mobilization, control and management.

A total war system may be differentiated by the name of European total war system or Japanese/German total war system for the sake of convenience. However, what is important here is to take measures for effectively utilizing democracy when it is intended to establish a total war system even in the case of a democratic state. Including the case of Japan, the slogan of all nations and partial revision of power structure were enforced for establishing the total war system.

One insists on this point, because the author would like to pay attention to the fact that the post war total war system in Japan has mobilized the people by the slogan of production first with the aim of economic development based on democracy and achieved the high economic growth, which is a

characteristic of the recent total war system.

### **Supplementary Argument: Recent Study on Total War System in Japan**

The author supposes that the first book which includes the term a total war system in its title is his book entitled *Soryokusen Taisei Kenkyu (Study on Total War System)* (1981). Recently, a number of books which have a total war or total war system in their title have been published mainly in the fields of history and politics.

Yasushi Yamanouchi, Ryuichi Narita and J. Victor Koschmann, eds., *Soryokusen to Gendaika (Total War and Modernization)* (Kashiwa Shobo, 1995) triggered the biggest controversy among them. In the part entitled “Shohoteki Joron: Soryokusen to Shisutemu Togo (Methodological Introduction: Total War and System Integration),” Yamanouchi suggests a method of drawing World War II as “the battle between the irrational and dictatorial fascism system (including Germany, Italy and Japan) and the rational and democratic New Deal system (including the U.S., the U.K. and France).”

In addition, he argues, “it is necessary to examine World War II from a point of view of social reorganization by the total war system” not based on the battle between fascism and New Deal. More precisely, the two systems had a similarity in that it became essential to convert the domestic political and economic system into the total war system, because World War I and World War II were actually waged as total wars. His argument eliminates the simplification of the existing way of regarding World War II as the battle between fascism and democracy and points out the limit of categorizing it as a battle for resources and markets between imperialist powers.

In summary, Yamanouchi maintains that both democratic states and fascism states adopted the total war system that was based on national general mobilization at the arrival of the age of total war and drove the people into wars in national crisis as a resource by dissolving various differences and discrimination in the country. He also maintains that each individual was forcefully homogenized in order to incorporate the people into the framework of the total war system in the name of general mobilization and the social hierarchical system was abolished to achieve equalization. This is “social reorganization” Yamanouchi advocates and he argues that as a result the total war society shifts “from a hierarchical society to a system society.”

Such suggestion of issue by Yamanouchi has called attention from various fields and been discussed. As one has also thought about the significance of the issue of “fascism in the name of democracy” emphasized in the fascism theory of Maruyama for a long time, he became keenly aware of the necessity of being freed from a simple textbook recognition of fascism v.s. democracy. As a stepping stone of such

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necessity, the author published *Soryokusen Taisei Kenkyu (Study on Total War System)* because he recognized that a form of war called total war forced a form of a state to be changed fundamentally in establishing the total war system. Thus, the author is strongly interested in this argument of Yamanouchi.

It is certain, however, that the suggestion of Yamanouchi has come under a lot of criticism. Among them, Chizuko Ueno explained the necessity of a new term and a new concept by insisting that “calling a social system as a systematized society is almost an undefined concept” and the “systematized society” has “an implication of an irresponsible system without subject” as a “mutual dependence system without core” in “Criticism on the thesis of “from a hierarchical system to a systematized society.”<sup>9</sup>

There is a problem here of convenience and ambiguity of the term “system” which is used by relatively easy idea in recent years. At the same time, if a “hierarchical society” is defined as a society of difference/discrimination or a society where a kind of hierarchy is the base of social order and various conflicting relations are mixed such as production and consumption, control and controlled and prosperity and poverty, while a system society is defined as a society where those conflicting relations are dissolved and disappear superficially apart from the reality and individuals are released from specific classes and establish new relations in the false egalitarian relation.

If the naming such as a total war system as a political system and a total war society as a social form is permitted, there naturally arise discussions whether the formation of this false egalitarian society is a purpose or means for the transition to the next ideal system or society.

The remark of Nagao Nishikawa is very interesting in that sense. He argues that the nation-state system did not change drastically by the total war system, but the original characteristics of nation state were more clarified by the total war system” in relation to the total war system and the nation-state theory.<sup>10</sup>

That is to say, he points out that a nation state that abolishes diversity and originality but imposes forced homogeneity is a state system in accordance with the total war system that facilitates expeditious mobilization by imposing forced homogeneity in a similar way. At this point, it becomes possible to assume that a state of total war system is formed as a result of thorough enforcement of a nation state. The point argued by Nishikawa seems to demonstrate an essential issue to question modern significance of the total war system.

A “nation state” that ensures the national supremacy by incorporating groups of various races, cultures and identities into the concept of nation and homogenizing them coercively has already reached

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<sup>9</sup> Chizuko Ueno, *Kokumin Kokka to Jendah (Nation State and Gender)* (Seidosha, 1998).

<sup>10</sup> Nagao Nishikawa and Kozo Watanabe, eds., *Seikimatsu Tenkanki no Kokusai Chitsujo to Kokumin Bunka no Keisei (International Order and Formation of National Culture at the Turning Point at the End of the Century)* (Kashiwa Shobo, 1999).

the limit in the 21st century. Therefore, a variety of groups for arousing and injecting nationalistic ideology has appeared and they are trying desperately to prevent ground collapse of a “nation state.” In such case, the idea that a “total war system state” is what replaces a “nation state” is much leap, while the idea and planning of converting the makeup from “nation state” are plausible as a group to prevent the collapse of a “nation state” for the time being.

In order to consider the above-mentioned points, one can also refer to “nationalism for national defense” and “social nationalism” that supported the total war system mentioned in Shoichi Amemiya, *Sirizu Nihon Kingendaisi (7): Senryo to Kaikaku (Modern and Contemporary Japanese History Series, Vol. 7: Occupation and Reform)* (Iwanamishoten, 2011). The basic slogan of a total war state is the advanced national defense state and what supports it is not dictatorial nationalism but the “nation” who constitutes the society. However, in prewar Japan, the result of national mobilization was secured for the first time when the advanced national defense state and the nation are positioned in a parallel relation. In this idea, a state and its nation are not contradicting, but they have a unifying relation. In a total war system, those conflicting existences were indeed interpreted as and converted into cooperative existences. Amemiya emphasizes in his book that their relation has been consistent before and after the war in a sense.

There still exist a number of arguments whether the establishment of the prewar total war system succeeded in Japan. However, in “Manchukuo (Manchurian Empire)”, an emperor system that in reality imposed separateness had been put in place. Therefore, it was impossible for Japanese state that had maintained a form of the state as “pluralistic federation” to be completely converted into a total war state structurally and functionally. It was not a complete total war state even with legal binding power by the National General Mobilization Act (enacted in April 1938) and political binding power by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (established on October 12, 1940). On the other hand, the completeness level of a total war state was higher in Manchukuo than in Japan where binding force of the emperor system was relatively weak.

The last point to be added is that there have been quite a few argumentations in today’s study on a total war system that the total war system shifted to the postwar Japanese society, not just seeing it as the prewar Japanese political system. Those arguments were rarely seen at the time when the author published my book. Although the author had already advocated the continuity between prewar and postwar periods, grounds were not sufficient in those days. One can say that sufficiently convincing arguments have been developed today.

If the process in which a modern state is formed as an artificial state where coercive internal integration is literally promoted by a state as a so-called “nation state” is a trend of the international society in the 20th century, total war system states specifically exemplify such a trend. It seemed that

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modern states as a nation state would be further reinforced by putting the total war system in place and their durability would be secured. However, a question has been asked about how modern nations based on internal integration should be in a new trend of so-called globalization in recent years.

There would be an argument that the total war system as a form of unilateralism state might be shaken from its foundation in globalization due to a lowered relative position of states.<sup>11</sup> The total war system and globalization seem to be recognized as conflicting concepts.

If one pays attention to a detail related to this point, a state that adopts a total war system is substantially a self-sufficient state (autarky state). It avoids collaboration or cooperation with other states as much as possible based on the principle of unilateralism and aspires for a completely independent state in the economic, political and military fields. An extremely important character of the total war state scheme of prewar Japan was that wars of invasion took root as the principal national policy in the process of heading toward an autonomous state without depending on western capital and technology by virtually bringing Taiwan, Korea and “Manchukuo” under the colonial control and securing supply centers of resources from those bases.

In that context, the establishment of the total war system and wars came to the surface like a relation of the two sides of a coin. It is not meaningful much to ask whether the process of establishing the total war system was the principal cause of waging wars or its establishment was promoted as a result of waging wars. It is certain that those factors are recognized as one. The Western total war system (if one dares to call it) which was realized in the U.S., the U.K. and France did not simply choose to wage wars. It was because they had superiority in terms of capital and technology.

What one needs to emphasize here is that the decision to initiate war could be made at any time as a national will under certain conditions and circumstances regardless of whether the Japanese/German total war system or the Western total war system. Based the historical fact, it is true that Japan decided to focus not on war but on economic development as a state after the war and this resulted in the postwar economic revival. This is also the case in another lost country Germany.

The above-mentioned book entitled *Senryo to Kaikaku (Occupation and Reform)* by Amemiya confirms that “the equalization and modernization of social relations have progressed” due to the total war in relation to those points in question and presents a point of view that total war led to postwar reforms executed after the war. The idea that total war system connects the prewar and postwar periods was raised again by Amemiya and has attracted attention. However, it is essential to develop discussions based on the point that the prewar and postwar total war systems were put under different political

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<sup>11</sup> For example, see Yasushi Yamanouchi et al, eds., *Soryokusen Taisei kara Gurobarizeishon e (From Total War System to Globalization)* (Heibonsha, 2003).

situations of war and peace.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Concerning the above-mentioned trend of study on total war, for more detail, see “Soryokusen Taisei Kenkyu de Naniga Ronjirarete Kitaka (What Has Been Argued in Study on Total War System)” in Atsushi Koketsu, *Shinpan: Soryokusen Taisei Kenkyu (New Edition: Study on Total War System)* (Shakai Hyoronsha, 2010).