The Quest for International Justice and Asianism in a “New Order in East Asia”: Fumimaro Konoe and his Vision of the World

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In the mid-19th century, the Sino-centric order under the Qing Dynasty prevailed in East Asia. Japan, having just opened the country to the world owing to the mounting pressure of the black ships from the great Western Powers, was undergoing changes to establish the national polity as a member of the modern Western international system. Approximately eighty years later in 1938, Japan proclaimed the “New Order in East Asia,” in a challenge to the Western-centric international order. This proclamation marked a significant milestone in history in that it also served as one of the important triggers for the Pacific War.

While the “New Order in East Asia” was the first publicly announced grand strategy of its own for Japan, it also signified the culmination of Asianism. The Asianism had been the sole grand strategic concept, that was coherently underlying Japanese diplomacy since Meiji Restoration. Before 1930 the government pursued traditionally realistic approach, while those outside the government advocated idealism. The “New Order in East Asia” symbolizes reversal in the Japanese political landscape. In the form of the “New Order in East Asia,” Asianism that had long been cherished mainly among civilians became an official policy of the government.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to inquire into why such a conception was formed in the 1930s. It will focus on changes in the ideas of Fumimaro Konoe, who was deeply involved in the birth of the “New Order in East Asia” as prime minister. Conventionally, the logic of overturning the status quo has consistently been applied to explain the “New Order in East Asia”; the “New Order in East Asia” is only a name given to or a government version of Asianism, which is essentially a mere slogan to
justify and glorify the Sino-Japanese War after the fact, and is the embodiment of Konoe’s ideas represented in his paper “Ei-Bei Hon’i no Heiwa Shugi o Haisu” (Opposed to the Anglo-American-Centered Pacifism), which in turn led to the Pacific War. This paper is to fully review such an interpretation.

“The New Order in East Asia” was an ideological attempt to sublate the dilemma of modern Japanese continental policies, namely imperialism and colonialism, by replacing them with new logic: a new order based on international justice with respect for the relationships with Washington System and Asianism for dealing with Chinese nationalism. The Asianism shown here is a new conception that has undergone a transformation from a mere ideological skeleton assumed since the end of the Meiji period to an ideology based on certain internal understanding bitterly learned from uncompromising Chinese resistance expressed during the Sino-Japanese War. In other words, this transformed Asianism embraces not only the Zeitgeist of anti-imperialism after World War I, but also Asian traditions.

However, it is also true that this logic failed to change the course of history and instead served to justify and glorify the Sino-Japanese War. This is simply because it was fettered by Japanese continental policies, such as the fait accompli after the Manchurian Incident and “Manchukuo interests” as the absolute prerequisite for the country to survive. However, it should not be overlooked that it also served to somewhat restrain extreme expansive and aggressive policies from being implemented.

After the end of the Cold War, issues of nationalism that had long been repressed by ideology are surfacing in Asia. Different from Europe, however, regional order enforced by sovereign nations has not yet been established. In this respect, the history of searching for a new order through, and the lessons learned from, the “New Order in East Asia” may hold some suggestions for the current Asian situation.
Sir Michael Howard warned that in long periods of peace, both states and their military forces are like sailors. Between wars they have to navigate by dead reckoning, leaving behind the certitudes of successful strategies and weapons of the last war. The longer the peace, the more both Statesman and Soldier have to extrapolate from the last test of combat. The further they travel to develop new capabilities or technologies, the greater the risk that their readings are wrong. This is especially true for periods of dramatic technological change. Strategic planners in the United States struggled during the interwar era, another long age of peace. However, for the most part, American strategists sailed on blindly in a fog of peace until the last moment. Late in the day, they found out how well they navigated, and how well the aims of their strategies meshed with the various means devised to attain them.

This effort summarizes American strategic planning in the interregnum between two great crucibles. Much of this planning lacked policy guidance, supporting intelligence and net assessments, or integrating mechanism to tie together divergent planning efforts by the different armed services. This results in the numerous and separate color-coded plans of the inter-war period, including War Plan Orange. These plans were continuously adjusted during “the long peace.” As conflict loomed, in both Asia and Europe, American strategic plans constantly changed and policy makers reacted to fast changing circumstances.

Ultimately, strategic planning is more than the production of a strategy document or a detailed strategic plan for a specific contingency. “Strategy is a process,” we are forewarned, “a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.” John Lewis Gaddis, in his *Strategies of Containment*, defined strategy as “the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, [and] objectives to resources.” This definition captures the necessity of defining policy aims, adapting the instruments of
national power; including the military, towards defined intentions over a long period of time. This incorporates the need for military innovation, driven by strategic requirements and organizational realignment to exploit new opportunities. This essay attempts to ascertain how well American planners kept ends, ways and means in consonance.

American strategic planning produced predictably messy and pluralistic results. If one understands the equally messy and chaotic nature of its strategic culture, this is not astonishing. The results are rather uneven. One Service focused on only one adversary and in one theater. The American Navy was genetically ready for only Plan Orange and the Pacific. The American Navy tended to define future conflicts in Mahanian notions of maritime supremacy and a second Jutland. Its development of carrier aviation into a great offensive weapon proved invaluable. Yet it also failed to develop the submarine as an offensive weapon. The Navy did help the Marines develop amphibious warfare into an art form. While conventional wisdom held that amphibious landings against prepared defenses were near impossible, the Marines thought otherwise. They offset the defender’s advantages with naval gunfire, close air support, special landing craft for ship to shore movement, and innovative equipment and logistical support. The development of amphibious warfare represents a classic case study in strategically relevant military innovation.

Another service ignored any sort of strategic or political framework, oriented itself around technology and prepared for only one mission. The Army Air Corps did not concern itself with who or where it would fight. It would be prepared to conduct strategic bombing anywhere or against anyone. Regrettably, it would not be ready for anything else. The Air Corps doctrine was founded on the premise that “Aircraft can penetrate any known air defenses and destroy any known targets with bombs.” American air power proponents were not always willing to test their assumptions though. Conviction about the independent and decisive role of aviation became dogma, accepted as a matter of faith. As early operations showed in North Africa and later in Europe, tactical aviation was necessary for successful operations, and fighter escorts were needed to fulfill the promises of strategic bombing. Air proponents had always asserted that bombers could penetrate deeply into enemy territory and conduct their missions without fighter escorts. Such rosy
expectations were much too optimistic.

Finally, the U.S. Army was immune to the influences of strategic planning during the 1920's. It was inoculated from reality by the prevailing isolationism and penurious spending of the American Congress, and it intellectually quarantined itself from both armor concepts in Europe, and the need for extensive air-ground coordination for modern warfare. The Army's early performance underscores the difficulty of "getting it right" as well as what Williamson Murray has called "the extent of the payoff for getting it right and the penalty for stagnation." Only belatedly as the fog of peace burned off did it figure out how it would fight. None of the armed forces were completely prepared for the ultimate accounting to come.

In the end, American prewar strategic thinking was less a strategy of innocence produced by a linear or deliberate process than it was a strategy of improvisation. Since strategy is a process of constant adaptation in the face of imperfect information, it must be "an amalgam molded on the anvil of necessity." For American planners, it could not have been anything else.

Total War, Modernism, and the "Final War with United States": Kanji Ishiwara and his View on War, his View on Grand and Military Strategies

ISHIZU Tomoyuki

Kanji Ishiwara has always been a rather controversial figure, even today; many writings on him have been published. Certainly, he is famous as a military planner and executor of the Manchurian Incident, but he had no subsequent battle experience. In fact, he entered the reserves as a lieutenant general, just before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. In addition, although he successively held prominent positions such as Section and Division Chief in the Army General Staff Office, his tenure in that office was only about a couple of years in total. Why is such a figure a subject of discussion even now?

To answer in a sentence, it is because he was a very attractive person,
notwithstanding his complicated personality. His profile is complex, especially his ideas. As a matter of fact, throughout his life there were several observable events which cannot be expressed without using the term “conversion.” This is one of the factors that make it difficult to understand him. Ishiwara was an attractive person. In fact, let alone in his hometown, the Shonai district of Yamagata prefecture (Tsuruoka City and Sakata City), he still has a most devoted following all over Japan, though the reasons are not the same.

It would be dangerous to sum up such a complex profile as Ishiwara’s in a short article. Therefore I dare to limit the considerations covered in this article to the following three aspects. First, Ishiwara as student of military history and strategy: I will take up this aspect in order to know his view of the world and of war before we can approach his specific policymaking. Accordingly, the centerpiece of the discussion here should include the “Transcript of Lectures” from his lecturing days at the Army Staff College, along with such chronological materials as the “Sensoushi Taikan” (General Outline of the History of War) and “Saishu Senso Ron” (The Theory of the Final World War) which are regarded as his primary work.

Secondly, we will focus on Ishiwara as a policy planner. Here we will mainly follow his footsteps as he served as a military bureaucrat e.g. Chief of the Operations Section, Chief of the War Directing Section, and Chief of the Operations Division at the Army General Staff Office. This is intended to discover how Ishiwara was focused on changing Japan based on his own view of the world and war.

Needless to say, the term "ideas" signifies totality. Indeed, it is impossible to examine one aspect of Ishiwara alone, apart from his total picture. However, having limited considerations covered in this article owing to space, while keeping to the main point, I have to eliminate the following aspects of Ishiwara, which have been under the spotlight up until now. These include Ishiwara as a staff officer (planner and executor of the Manchuria Incident), military commander (regiment and division), Pan-Asianist (leading the “East Asian League” or Toa Renmei movement), religionist (believer of the Nichiren sect), so-called agricultural fundamentalist (life in Nishiyama, Yusa-cho, Yamagata prefecture), and student of the theory of civilization (ideas on the “Pre and Post History of Mankind”). Of
course this has much to do with my personal view of Ishiwara. That is to say, my proposition in this article is to assert that Ishiwara should be appraised not for his personality but for his impressive ability as a cool-headed military bureaucrat. And this is the very reason why we need to ponder Ishiwara’s present-day significance.

Hence, the third objective for consideration is Ishiwara’s present-day significance. Why would it be important today to reflect on a past soldier’s strategic ideas and his specific policy planning? It is Ishiwara’s ideas and practice, especially his approach as "strategist" that are important today. In other words, it is his stance that should be highly praised: he construed his own view of war, and determined his vision of war in the future, then strived for the creation of a national grand design covering the national and military strategies supporting this view and vision. It can be said with certainty that many drawbacks exist in Ishiwara’s view of war, and his perspective on the nature of future war can hardly be regarded as correct. Moreover, from the very beginning he, as no more than a division chief of the General Staff, could not be granted the authority to decide on a grand design for a nation. Of course he might be permitted to make plans for diversified policies to the maximum extent of the authority granted to a division chief, but it is the role of politics to determine the national grand design itself. While in his speech Ishiwara appraised in Karl von Clausewitz as an honorable figure, he often demonstrated an anti-Clausewitz stance in his deeds. This is with respect to the relationship of politics and military affairs that constitute the centerpiece of Clausewitz's theory, or more specifically, with regard to the right and wrong of soldiers’ commitments to politics. Obviously, such a stance as his was abnormal in that it deviated from the politico-military standards in those days.

Admitting this, however, the study of Ishiwara still has significance. Now that the framework of the cold-war era, where all we had to do was respond to the strategic environment the United States and the Soviet Union provided, has passed, Japan today is driven by necessity to establish, of its own accord, its own grand and military strategies. This is why the study of Ishiwara becomes all the more important and worth pursuing.
His way of thinking, first clearly determining the future strategic environment and view of war, second defining the national interest of Japan based on it, and then drawing on the grand and military strategies needed for ensuring the national interest, is just what is required of present-day Japan. This involved the issue of strong leadership that can be paraphrased by Ishiwara’s words, “war leadership,” a capability that the current Japan is said to be lacking.

Ishiwara’s ideas changed dramatically with the times, but as mentioned above, the coverage of this article is mainly limited to the period up to his days as the Chief of the Operations Division of the General Staff Office. Accordingly, his ideas after the outbreak of the Pacific War until his death in 1949 are not discussed herein.

American Strategy and Leadership in World War II:
The Problem of a Two Front Strategy

Williamson Murray

In this period of global dominance by the United States, in which not only its military power, but its culture reach into every corner of the world, it is hard to remember the strategic perspective and attitudes of the American polity across the great divide represented by the Second World War. The America of 1939 seems a strange place indeed to those who have lived through the past sixty years. On one hand, the United States was a world power – already in economic terms a super power. On the other hand, most Americans perceived themselves as entirely separate from the rest of the world. The myth of the “new Jerusalem” – protected from the evils of the “old” world by the vast distances of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans – remained firmly ensconced in the American Weltanschauung (world view).

Even more to the point, American culture remained thoroughly parochial. However impressive America’s great cities might have appeared, most Americans still lived on small farms and towns – at least in terms of their thought patterns. If anything, the terrible impact of the Great Depression had exacerbated the isolationism that Americans had embraced in 1920 – a deeply held belief throughout the polity that
the United States should play no active role in world affairs outside of the Western Hemisphere. Such attitudes retained a firm hand on the perceptions of many Americans right through to 7 December 1941.

Thus, in 1939 there are three aspects to America’s strategic situation that are remarkable, when compared to today. First, Americans steadfastly believed that not only was it in the best interests of their nation to remain neutral in the terrible conflicts that had broken out in Asia and Europe in the late 1930s, but that such a stance represented a moral imperative. Second, the military forces of the United States were palpably unprepared to contribute in any significant fashion to the terrible struggles that were spreading across the globe. In terms of its combat power, the United States Army ranked with those world powers Bolivia and Paraguay – at the bottom of deployable military power. Admittedly the United States Navy had begun a considerable program of rearmament, but that effort represented America’s isolationist urge to maintain a wall between itself and the world. Third, the American economy, while sluggishly emerging from the Great Depression, hardly appeared to possess the capabilities that would within four years allow the United States to build the world’s largest navy and air force and a huge army, while at the same time supporting the British and Soviet war efforts with massive deliveries of armaments and raw materials that kept them in the war.

In the end, strategy is more than a matter of individuals. It is a complex, iterative processes that involves geography, the external context, culture, historical influences, chance, as well as the interplay among individuals, their foibles, and their strengths. Because of the limited amount of time available, this essay will examine American strategic leadership and the processes involved in the making of U.S. strategy through the interactions among three individuals: Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his two chief military advisers, General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King. The purpose of doing so is to trace in chronological form the interplay and decision making that resulted in the United States being the only real winner, left among the shambles of the catastrophe that was World War II.
As we define "strategy" as a rational choice of available means to achieve a certain objective, Japan after the World War II was one of the furthest countries from talking of strategy. In the wake of the surrender in August 1945, Japan lost much of power to achieve whatever objective it set. It lost its military power completely and economic might in the form of colonies as well as industrial base. In addition, Japan was deprived of its prewar diplomatic status as one of the ex-enemy countries. In short, Japan appeared to be a passive object of the international environment rather than a willing actor who influenced it.

However, given the fact that Japan became an economic giant just within thirty years after the devastating defeat, it is next to impossible not to assume there was indeed a "strategy" in the postwar Japan. In fact, for all the conflicts and tensions about the Japanese diplomacy in the early postwar era, there appears a rather consistent objective for the Japanese diplomacy in the macroscopic sense. The objective was to get out of the status of a defeated nation and regain the position of a legitimate member of international society.

It was Shigeru Yoshida, prime minister who led the country in the first decade after the surrender, who formed the basic elements of the postwar Japanese diplomatic strategy. He objectively analyzed the power left to Japan and its limitations. Also he recognized the reality of the postwar international environment. Although importance of Yoshida's strategy has been well appreciated in Japan since 1960s and later came to be called as the "Yoshida doctrine" in 1980s, the tone of praise to Yoshida was biased towards emphasizing the economic aspect of his diplomacy. Recent studies based on newly uncovered sources suggest that Yoshida's view was far more tilted towards politics and security than the conventional notion on the "Yoshida doctrine," and that was the reason why Yoshida succeeded in setting the postwar Japan diplomatic strategy.
But it was Yoshida's successors who actually enriched and implemented the basic framework of the diplomatic strategy of Yoshida's. There were roughly two strands in Yoshida's successors. The first strand was pursued by such figures as Tanzan Ishibashi and Hayato Ikeda, who were more economy-oriented, emphasized non-military aspects of international relations, and put emphasis on domestic harmony in the liberalist line. The second strand was represented by such figure as Ichiro Hatoyama, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and Nobusuke Kishi, who were more anti-Communist, took national pride and independence more seriously, and ideologically were democratic nationalists. Eisaku Sato in some sense combined the two strands and set the return of the Okinawa from the United States as the final goal of the postwar diplomacy. He retired in 1972 after achieving this goal, signaling the end of the era of the post-surrender diplomacy.

A Strategy By Accident: U.S. Pacific Policy 1945-1975

Richard H. Sinnreich

My assignment from Professor Murray was to describe and reflect on the evolution of America's Pacific strategy from the end of World War II in 1945 through U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam thirty years later. The premises, of course, are that America during this period had a discernible and coherent Pacific strategy, that the latter however imperfectly informed U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military activities in the Pacific region, and that one therefore can draw reasonable conclusions about both the appropriateness of the strategy to the prevailing security environment and the effectiveness with which it was executed.

All three premises are questionable. In fact, the historical record of America's post-war Pacific involvement reveals a largely extemporized policy process compounded of pre-war prejudices and wartime experience, domestic politics and military hubris, and efforts to apply to the Pacific region without material modification strategic categories and objectives developed in a European context, all underwritten by profound ignorance of the internal social dynamics of the regional nations involved and the political influences governing their external relations. That
the results were not more disastrous than they turned out to be in part reflected secular forces extrinsic to U.S. policy, and in part a national robustness that allowed the U.S. to absorb and, in the end, repair political and military errors that might well have permanently injured the strategic position of a less powerful nation.

The ironies of America’s Pacific involvement after World War II tumble over one another in extraordinary profusion. An America that in 1945 proclaimed itself an enemy of colonialism found itself by 1975 condemned as the principal obstacle to regional self-determination. A China to which Americans in 1945 had a profound emotional and political commitment had become by 1975 one of America’s chief adversaries, while a Japan that in 1945 was a prostrate and detested enemy had become by 1975 one of our closest political partners and strongest economic competitors. A Sino–Soviet relationship perceived in 1952 as the principal engine of threats to America’s Pacific security instead found itself exploited in 1972 as their most promising deterrent. And defeat in Vietnam, far from producing the much–feared collapse of the dominoes, instead presaged Communist retrenchment in nearly every nation in the region. These and other ironies were no accident, but instead reflect as little else could the strategic uncertainty and ad hoc policy–making with which the U.S. engaged in the Pacific during the 30 years after World War II.

All this, of course, is clear enough in hindsight. It was far less clear in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when a triumphant America saw its hopes for peace shattered by the emergence of a new totalitarian threat the more traumatic for originating in two of the very allies on whom the U.S. had counted, however ingenuously, to help secure that peace. Indeed, the very rapidity of that transformation virtually guaranteed that America’s strategic response would be reactive rather than deliberate. That it could have been foreseen—indeed, was foreseen by a few clear–headed observers—only makes the story more poignant.

For that is the obverse of excuse by hindsight. Throughout the long struggle that began with civil war in China and ended in the tragedy of Vietnam, dissenting voices repeatedly challenged the premises of America’s Pacific policy and as routinely were suppressed, in some cases viciously. Few Americans today remember names like
John Carter Vincent, John Stewart Service, and Owen Lattimore. They and others were among the first casualties of the Cold War in Asia, careers and reputations destroyed in a domestic political battle that often cynically exploited Americans’ offended astonishment at the unraveling of the peace in which so many lives and so much treasure had been invested. They would not be the last. In the end, no aspect of America’s Pacific engagement from 1945 to 1975 is more tragic than the extent to which its failures as well as its successes were self-inflicted.

As Thucydides warned long ago, it is the recurring weakness of great powers to believe that they can deal with the world as they wish it to be rather than as it is. For Americans, culturally and historically disinclined to acknowledge limits on man’s capacity to order the future to his liking, that self-confidence has been at one and the same time our greatest national asset and most dangerous liability.

So it remains today. The history of America’s Pacific engagement thus is not of merely academic interest. On the contrary, no examination could be more relevant to the strategic challenges confronting the U.S. at the dawn of the 21st century.

“Basic Defense Force Concept” as Strategy

MICHISHITA Narushige

The “Basic Defense Force Concept” (BDFC) has been the only comprehensive and sophisticated defense strategic concept developed in the postwar Japan. However, most of existing studies treated this subject not from strategic studies perspectives but from policy, political science, and political history perspectives. Also, Japanese defense policy remains to be a hard subject to understand for foreign observers partly because few studies are available on Japan’s basic defense concepts such as BDFC in English. This study aims to find out major characteristics of BDFC and discuss their implications from strategic studies perspectives.

There are eight major findings in this study.
First, BDFC is a sophisticated strategic concept in the sense that it took into account global and regional strategic environment as well as military balance in assessing military threats and determining the size of Japan’s armed forces. In other words, BDFC paid attention to not only military balance on the theater level but also political and military circumstances on the strategic level. Despite some oversimplification, i.e. assessing enemy intentions based on its capability to attack without major mobilizations, its contention that enemy intentions would not change as easily as had widely been assumed was convincing enough to be adopted in the Japanese defense planning.

Second, BDFC paid a lot of attention to quantitative aspects of potential threat but not necessarily to qualitative aspects. In a way, BDFC could remain valid for a long period of time partly because it remained vague about what kind of threats that it intended to deal with. However, lack of attention to the qualitative aspects of threat seems to have produced tendency of Japanese defense analysts to focus on quantity over quality and prevented realistic scenario building from being conducted. Moreover, lack of qualitative analysis seems to have resulted in defense forces that lacked sense of focus. Japanese propensity to remain vague about the nature of threat might be further exacerbated by the changing strategic environment in which threat is becoming more and more elusive.

Third, BDFC cared primarily about providing deterrence and defense for Japan, and did not pay enough attention to ways in which to deal with coercive use of force. Such a tendency was understandable during the Cold War, but now that coercive use of force has come into fashion in Asia, exemplified by North Korea’s missile launches in 1993 and 1998, and Chinese missile launches in 1996, it is untenable that we remain indifferent to coercive use of force. However, it is not clear how Japanese defense forces might be able to undercut effectiveness of coercion. If Japan is to introduce missile defense systems to deal with ballistic missile threats, their utility as a counter-coercive measure should be carefully assessed in addition to their utility as deterrent and defensive measures.

Fourth, BDFC is a threat-based concept in one respect but a non-threat-based concept in another. On the one hand, BDFC prepared for a limited and small-scale
aggression, which typically meant a surprise attack that the enemy could bring to bear without significant mobilization. On the other hand, BDFC called for planning defense forces based primarily on geographical, organizational, and functional requirements. How these aspects fit together was never convincingly explained. As a result, BDFC incited never-ending debate as to how defense force level is and/or should be determined.

This problem was solved in 1995 when the requirement to be able to “effectively deal with limited and small-scale aggression” was dropped from the National Defense Program Outline. It was a major departure from the traditional defense policy which based the required force level on the level of perceived threat. It is true that we have to pay more attention to “risk” than “threat” in the world of uncertainty. However, given the strategic environment in this region, threat, instead of risk, must still be on the central stage when we think about Japanese defense policy.

Fifth, while BDFC prepared for rapid defense build-up in case the assumed international environment changed negatively, it did not prepare for defense build-down in case a comparable positive change occurred. Partly for this reason, Japan’s response to the end of the Cold War was relatively slow. In other words, BDFC provided Japanese defense policy with upward elasticity and downward rigidity.

Sixth, BDFC clearly explained the level of military risk that political leaders (and Japanese citizens by extension) would have to take in adopting the concept as an official policy. It was good in the sense that such an attitude was consistent with civilian control over defense matters. However, it was not good enough in the sense that Japan adopted BDFC without taking measures to enable political leaders to make necessary but difficult decisions in case of crisis.

Seventh, BDFC provided deterrence and defense not by means of punishment but by means of denial. Fortunately, the emphasis on denial over punishment is consistent with the emerging strategic environment. However, it is not yet clear whether credible deterrence and defense can be attained without ability to punish. Even the predominant superpower like the United States uses denial, punishment,
and preemption as tools for its deterrence and defense in this “new” international security environment.

Finally, BDFC is based on the realist assumption that balance of power stabilizes international relations. However, Japan seems to welcome the emergence of U.S.-centric unipolar system as providing stability. Or BDFC applies balance of power only to East Asia.

So far, BDFC has failed to incorporate liberal means of bringing about peace such as interdependence, democratic peace, and liberal institutionalism into the framework. While the realist assumptions in BDFC remain valid, BDFC will certainly benefit from some adjustments and incorporation of liberal means of keeping peace.

US Policy and Strategy, 1970 to the Present

Mackubin T. Owens

This time-frame subsumes three distinct periods: 1970-1981, US retrenchment following the Vietnam War; 1981-1990, intense competition with the Soviet Union leading to the latter’s collapse; and 1991-2003, the emergence of US hegemony. Although there is a degree of continuity in US policy and strategy throughout the entire time-frame, there are also important discontinuities.

In 1970, the United States was trying to extricate itself from Vietnam. In order to effect this extrication, the United States pursued a policy of détente with the Soviet Union. However, the abandonment of South Vietnam by the United States encouraged a Soviet adventurism that manifest itself in the invasion of Afghanistan.

The presidency of Jimmy Carter represents the nadir of US influence during the Cold War. It was not until the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 that the United States began to reassert itself as a great power. In the 1980s, the US pursued a policy that went beyond containment. Employing a combination of military and economic tools, Reagan administration policy makers sought to force the Soviet
Union to bear the full economic cost of its policies. The military component of this policy was based on the simultaneous modernization of conventional and nuclear forces and pursuit of a defense against ballistic missiles. During this time, the US military services developed and implemented new strategic and operational concepts that not only helped to put pressure on the Soviet Union but also positioned the United States for the post-Cold War environment.

Since 1990, the United States has been a hegemonic power. Its policy and strategy have been designed to shape the international security environment by discouraging the rise of a competing power, maintaining access to Eurasia, and reassuring friends and allies. The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 represented a setback to US goals, but the policy changes after 9/11 are likely to enhance the US position of hegemony.

This paper will examine both the continuities and discontinuities of US policy and strategy over the period. It will then discuss how these policies and strategies at the national level affected the strategic concepts and doctrines of the US military services.